Winter

A fundamental category through which we understand the world is the category of action. This course offers an intensive overview of the metaphysics of action. We will first cover some basics including the relationship between actions, agency, and agents, the range of action kinds, what kind of thing action is, the distinction between basic and nonbasic action, agent nihilism, and the possibility of mental action. Next, in hopes of coming to better understand the nature of action, we will look at how action relates to other phenomena such as reasons, causation, knowledge, control, and normative life. (B) (II)

Wittgenstein wrote a letter to G. E. Moore after hearing Moore give the paper which first set forth a version of (what has come to be known as) Moore’s paradox. The version of the paradox that Moore first set forward involved imagining someone uttering the following sentence: “There is a fire in this room and I don’t believe there is.” Wittgenstein’s understanding of the importance of Moore’s paradox may be summarized as follows: Something on the order of a logical contradiction arises when we attempt to combine the affirmation of p and a denial of a consciousness of p within the scope of a single judgment. In his letter to Moore, Wittgenstein writes:

To call this … “an absurdity for psychological reasons” seems to me to be wrong, or highly misleading. It … is in fact something similar to a contradiction, though it isn’t one…. This means roughly: it plays a similar role in logic. You have said something about the logic of assertion. Viz: It makes sense to say “Let’s suppose: p is the case and I don’t believe that p is the case,” whereas it makes no sense to assert “p is the case and I don’t believe that p is the case.” This assertion has to be ruled out and is ruled out by “common sense,” just as a contradiction is. And this just shows that logic isn’t as simple as logicians think it is. In particular: that contradiction isn’t the unique thing people think it is. It isn’t the only logically inadmissible form.

The aim of the seminar is to understand why Wittgenstein thinks Moore’s paradox provides an example of something that is akin to a contradiction and how it brings out why logic isn’t as simple as logicians think it is. In Section x of Part II of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, devoted to an exploration of Moore’s paradox, we find Wittgenstein making these three remarks:

1. My own relation to my words is wholly different to other people’s.
2. If there were a verb meaning ‘to believe falsely,’ it would not have a meaningful first-person present indicative.
3. “I believe….” throws light on my state. Conclusions about my conduct can be drawn from this expression. So there is a similarity here to expressions of emotion, of mood, etc,.

The workshop will seek to understand: how my relation to my own words is wholly different from my relation to those of other people; wherein the asymmetry lies between the use of a range of verbs (such as “believe,” “know,” and “perceive”) in the first-person present indicative form and other uses of the same verbs (e.g., in the second-person or past tense form); and how the logical grammar of these verbs is related to that of expressions of emotion, of mood, and of sensation, including expressions that takes the form of avowals. Finally, we will explore why Wittgenstein thinks a philosophical investigation of these three points ought to lead to an expansion and transformation of our entire conception of logic

In addition to readings by Moore, Wittgenstein, and related secondary literature, we will study thematically related writings by Matthew Boyle, Cora Diamond, Arata Hamawaki, Jonas Held, Michael Kremer, J. M. E. Mactaggart, Margaret MacDonald, Norman Malcolm, Marie McGinn, Eric Marcus, Richard Moran, Bertrand Russell, and Crispin Wright on first-person avowals, self-knowledge, self-alienation, and transparency. (II)

Students writing senior essays register once for PHIL 29901, in the Autumn Quarter, and once for PHIL 29902, in the Winter Quarter. The Senior Seminar meets for two quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout.

Aristotle said that “first philosophy” is the branch of knowledge that is both most general—having to do with everything—and the most foundational. In this course we will explore various attempts in the history of philosophy to describe and produce such a science, beginning with Plato and Aristotle’s attempts to describe being and ending with Wittgenstein’s skepticism about such a project. We will try to produce a generalization about what first philosophy is and about its possibility and limitations. (B)

In this course we will explore some of the central questions in epistemology and metaphysics. In epistemology, these questions will include: What is knowledge? What facts or states justify a belief? How can the threat of skepticism be adequately answered? How do we know what we (seem to) know about mathematics and morality? In metaphysics, these questions will include: What is time? What is the best account of personal identity across time? Do we have free will? We will also discuss how the construction of a theory of knowledge ought to relate to the construction of a metaphysical theory-roughly speaking, what comes first, epistemology or metaphysics? (B)

This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters.

This course introduces students to issues and questions that have defined scholarship in the philosophy of mind as well as to prominent theories in the field. Starting from Descartes and the articulation of a general “mind-body problem,” we will go on to investigate particular mental phenomena (such as beliefs, emotions, sensations, and intentions) by considering what philosophers have said about them, drawing primarily from the 20th century and the analytic tradition. We will read works in Dualism, Identity-Theory, Functionalism, and Eliminativism. Besides offering a brief survey of the field, this course equips students with the resources for evaluating whether some particular view provides an adequate account of human mindedness. (B)

This will be a discussion-centered seminar that facilitates close readings two texts: Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript.  Each of these texts is officially by the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus.  But the author of that author is Soren Kierkegaard.  Topics to be considered will include: What is subjectivity?  What is objectivity?  What is irony?  What is humor?  What is the difference between the ethical and the religious?  What is it to become and be a human being?  We shall also consider Kierkegaard’s form of writing and manner of persuasion. In particular, why does he think he needs a pseudonymous author? (IV)                                 

What is the relationship between physical processes in the brain and body and the processes of thought and consciousness that constitute our mental life? Philosophers and others have puzzled over this question for millennia. Many have concluded it to be intractable. In recent decades, the field of cognitive science--encompassing philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, linguistics, and other disciplines--has proposed a new form of answer. The driving idea is that the interaction of the mental and the physical may be understood via a third level of analysis: that of the computational. This course offers a critical introduction to the elements of this approach, and surveys some of the alternative models and theories that fall within it. Readings are drawn from a range of historical and contemporary sources in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. (B) (II)

In this class we explore the debate about moral evil in German Idealism. Kant teaches that the moral law is the law of freedom while also holding that immoral activity is entirely imputable to the subject and therefore free. How are the two claims compatible? We will reconstruct Kant’s own answer to this question as well as its discussion in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. And we will trace connections between the debate among the German Idealists and certain developments in contemporary moral constitutivism. Special attention will be given to Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, according to which actual immorality is a condition of human freedom, our capacity for moral goodness. We will examine Kant’s case for this doctrine and its role in the moral philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. (A) (IV)