Anubav Vasudevan

Anubav Vasudevan
Associate Professor
Rosenwald Hall, Room 218-C
Office Hours: On leave 2018-19
773.702.4234
Columbia University PhD (2012); Virginia Polytechinic Institute and State University, BS Physics and Philosophy (2002)
Teaching at UChicago since 2011; on leave 2018-19
Research Interests: Metaphysics & Epistemology

Anubav Vasudevan is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy. His current research interests are in the areas of formal epistemology and the history of logic. His work in the former area relates primarily to issues in the foundations of probability, in particular, the question of how it might be possible to reconcile an objective interpretation of probability with a metaphysical conception of the world as subject to strictly deterministic laws. His research in the history of logic focuses on the logical writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. His work on this topic aims both to illuminate the fundamental relationship that exists between Leibniz’s system of logic and his more well-known metaphysical and epistemological doctrines, and to situate Leibniz’s logic within the broader history of the subject, dating back to Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism and continuing through to the systems of algebraic logic developed in the work of such nineteenth-century logicians as Boole, Peirce, and Schröder. He received his PhD from Columbia University in 2012.

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Selected Publications

Vasudevan, A. Biased Information and the Exchange Paradox. Synthese (forthcoming)

Vasudevan, A. Entropy and Insufficient Reason: A Note on the Judy Benjamin Problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)

Kim, B. and Vasudevan, A. (2017). How to expect a surprising exam. Synthese (August 2017)

Malink, M. and Vasudevan, A. (2016). The logic of Leibniz’s Generales Inquisitiones de Analysi Notionum et Veritatum. Review of Symbolic Logic, 9:686–751

Vasudevan, A. (2013). On the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities. Journal of Applied Logic, 11(4):440–451

Gaifman, H. and Vasudevan, A. (2012). Deceptive updating and minimal information methods. Synthese, 187(1):147–178

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Media

Anubav Vasudevan on Elucidations

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Recent Courses

PHIL 50218 The Problem of Induction

(II)

2017-2018 Spring
Category
Epistemology
Philosophy of Science

PHIL 29400/39600 Intermediate Logic

(CHSS 33600, HIPS 20500)

In this course, we will prove the soundness and completeness of deductive systems for both sentential and first-order predicate logic. We will also establish related results in elementary model theory, such as the compactness theorem for first-order logic, the Lӧwenheim-Skolem theorem and Lindstrӧm's theorem. (B) (II)

Elementary Logic or the equivalent.

2017-2018 Winter
Category
Logic

PHIL 20116/30116 American Pragmatism

This course will survey some of the seminal writings of the early American Pragmatist tradition. We will focus primarily on works by the three most prominent figures in this tradition: C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. Our aim in the course will be to extract from these writings the central ideas and principles which give shape to pragmatism as a coherent philosophical perspective, distinct from both empiricism and rationalism. (B) (II)

2017-2018 Autumn
Category
American Pragmatism

PHIL 50116 Pragmatism

This course will begin by examining the central writings of the early American Pragmatists, C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. We will compare the early formulations of pragmatism that appear in these works, both against one another other, as well against more recent formulations of pragmatism, as put forward by such philosophers as Putnam, Davidson, and Rorty. (II) (III)

2016-2017 Spring
Category
American Pragmatism

PHIL 29400/39600 Intermediate Logic

(CHSS 33600, HIPS 20500)

In this course, we will prove the soundness and completeness of deductive systems for both sentential and first-order logic. We will also establish related results in elementary model theory, such as the compactness theorem for first-order logic, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem and Lindstrom’s theorem. (B) (II)

2016-2017 Winter
Category
Logic

PHIL 22960/32960 Bayesian Epistemology

This course will provide an introduction to Bayesian Epistemology. We will begin by discussing the principal arguments offered in support of the two main precepts of the Bayesian view: (1) Probabilism: A rational agent's degrees of belief ought to conform to the axioms of probability; and (2) Conditionalization: Bayes's Rule describes how a rational agent's degrees of belief ought to be updated in response to new information. We will then examine the capacity of Bayesianism to satisfactorily address the most well-known paradoxes of induction and confirmation theory. The course will conclude with a discussion of the most common objections to the Bayesian view. (II) (B)

2016-2017 Autumn
Category
Epistemology
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For full list of Anubav Vasudevan's courses back to the 2012-13 academic year, see our searchable course database.