Anubav Vasudevan is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy. His current research interests are in the areas of formal epistemology and the history of logic. His work in the former area relates primarily to issues in the foundations of probability, in particular, the question of how it might be possible to reconcile an objective interpretation of probability with a metaphysical conception of the world as subject to strictly deterministic laws. His research in the history of logic focuses on the logical writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. His work on this topic aims both to illuminate the fundamental relationship that exists between Leibniz’s system of logic and his more well-known metaphysical and epistemological doctrines, and to situate Leibniz’s logic within the broader history of the subject, dating back to Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism and continuing through to the systems of algebraic logic developed in the work of such nineteenth-century logicians as Boole, Peirce, and Schröder. He received his PhD from Columbia University in 2012.
Selected Publications
Vasudevan, A. Biased Information and the Exchange Paradox. Synthese (forthcoming)
Vasudevan, A. Entropy and Insufficient Reason: A Note on the Judy Benjamin Problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
Kim, B. and Vasudevan, A. (2017). How to expect a surprising exam. Synthese (August 2017)
Malink, M. and Vasudevan, A. (2016). The logic of Leibniz’s Generales Inquisitiones de Analysi Notionum et Veritatum. Review of Symbolic Logic, 9:686–751
Vasudevan, A. (2013). On the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities. Journal of Applied Logic, 11(4):440–451
Gaifman, H. and Vasudevan, A. (2012). Deceptive updating and minimal information methods. Synthese, 187(1):147–178
Media
Anubav Vasudevan on Elucidations
Recent Courses
PHIL 50218 The Problem of Induction
(II)
PHIL 29400/39600 Intermediate Logic
In this course, we will prove the soundness and completeness of deductive systems for both sentential and first-order predicate logic. We will also establish related results in elementary model theory, such as the compactness theorem for first-order logic, the Lӧwenheim-Skolem theorem and Lindstrӧm's theorem. (B) (II)
Elementary Logic or the equivalent.
PHIL 20116/30116 American Pragmatism
This course will survey some of the seminal writings of the early American Pragmatist tradition. We will focus primarily on works by the three most prominent figures in this tradition: C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. Our aim in the course will be to extract from these writings the central ideas and principles which give shape to pragmatism as a coherent philosophical perspective, distinct from both empiricism and rationalism. (B) (II)
PHIL 50116 Pragmatism
This course will begin by examining the central writings of the early American Pragmatists, C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. We will compare the early formulations of pragmatism that appear in these works, both against one another other, as well against more recent formulations of pragmatism, as put forward by such philosophers as Putnam, Davidson, and Rorty. (II) (III)
PHIL 29400/39600 Intermediate Logic
In this course, we will prove the soundness and completeness of deductive systems for both sentential and first-order logic. We will also establish related results in elementary model theory, such as the compactness theorem for first-order logic, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem and Lindstrom’s theorem. (B) (II)
PHIL 22960/32960 Bayesian Epistemology
This course will provide an introduction to Bayesian Epistemology. We will begin by discussing the principal arguments offered in support of the two main precepts of the Bayesian view: (1) Probabilism: A rational agent's degrees of belief ought to conform to the axioms of probability; and (2) Conditionalization: Bayes's Rule describes how a rational agent's degrees of belief ought to be updated in response to new information. We will then examine the capacity of Bayesianism to satisfactorily address the most well-known paradoxes of induction and confirmation theory. The course will conclude with a discussion of the most common objections to the Bayesian view. (II) (B)
For full list of Anubav Vasudevan's courses back to the 2012-13 academic year, see our searchable course database.