David Finkelstein is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the College. He received his AB in philosophy and psychology from Harvard and his PhD from the University of Pittsburgh. Finkelstein works and teaches principally in epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. His book, Expression and the Inner, offers an account of the authority with which we speak about our own thoughts and feelings and of the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states.
Selected Publications
Expression and the Inner, Harvard University Press, 2003 (PDF chapter 1, PDF chapter 6)
“From Transparency to Expressivism,” in Günter Abel and James Conant (eds.) Rethinking Epistemology (De Gruyter, 2012): 101-118. PDF
Teorema Précis Volume XXX/3 (2011) PDF
Finkelstein's Teorema Replies Volume XXX/3 (2011) PDF
“Rule-Following,” forthcoming in The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences, ed. Patrick Colm Hogan, Cambridge University Press. PDF
“Expression and Avowal,” in Wittgenstein: Key Concepts, ed. Kelly Jolley (Durham, UK: Acumen Press, 2010): 185-198. PDF
"Holism and Animal Minds," Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond, ed. Alice Crary (MIT, 2007) PDF.
"Wittgenstein's 'Plan for the treatment of psychological concepts'," in Wittgenstein in America, ed. Timothy McCarthy and Sean Stidd (Oxford, 2001): 215-236. PDF
"Wittgenstein on Rules and Platonism," in The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Reed (London: Routledge, 2000): 53-73. PDF
"On the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious States of Mind," American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2) (April 1999): 79-100. PDF
"On Self Blindness and the Inner Sense,"Philosophical Topics, Volume 26, Nos. 1 & 2, Spring & Fall 1999 PDF
Media
David Finkelstein interviewed on WBEZ's "Odyssey"
Recent Courses
PHIL 50100 First Year Seminar
This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters.
Enrollment limited to first-year graduate students.
PHIL 24100 Consciousness
In the first third of the course, we'll be discussing an argument to the effect that, in order for empirical knowledge to be so much as possible (so: in order for radical skepticism not be intellectually obligatory), we must enjoy a particular kind of self-consciousness. In the remainder of the course, we'll be trying to get into view what an adequate account of that sort of self-consciousness might look like. (B)
Either two courses in the Department of Philosophy, or Philosophical Perspectives plus one course in the Department of Philosophy.
PHIL 50100 First Year Seminar
This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters.
Enrollment limited to first-year graduate students.
PHIL 54101 Consciousness and Memory
Two questions that we’ll be addressing in this course are: (1) How should we understand the difference between conscious states of mind and conscious behaviors, on the one hand, and unconscious states of mind and unconscious behaviors, on the other? And (2) How, if it all, might a satisfactory answer to question 1 help us to think about the kinds of relations we bear to our own past states of mind and behaviors? Texts will include: the famous chapter of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding called “Of Identity and Diversity” (where Locke speaks of consciousness’s being “extended backwards” to past actions and thoughts), selections from late Wittgenstein’s writings, and various articulations of more contemporary theories of consciousness and self-knowledge. (III)
PHIL 21506 Memory and Unity of a Person
In one of his most widely read pieces of writing—the chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding called “Of Identity and Diversity”—John Locke writes: “[S]ince consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person…” Locke’s theory of personal identity has puzzled, annoyed, and inspired readers since it was published in the second edition of his Essay, in 1694. The main aim of this course will be to arrive at a reading of it that (1) situates it in the context of earlier philosophers’ writings about selves and souls, (2) is informed by an understanding of Locke’s own views concerning consciousness and memory, among other things, and (3) carefully considers objections that later writers—most famously Butler and Reid—made to Locke’s theory. In this endeavor, we’ll be aided by two excellent recent books: Udo Theil’s The Early Modern Subject (2011) and Galen Strawson’s Locke on Personal Identity (2011). Along the way, we’ll devote some time to considering one or two recent neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity. (B)
PHIL 50100 First Year Seminar
This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters.
Enrollment limited to first-year graduate students.
PHIL 50100 First Year Seminar
This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters.
Enrollment limited to first-year graduate students.
PHIL 50213 Late Wittgenstein
This course is meant as an introduction to Wittgenstein's later work, with a focus on his *Philosophical Investigations.* Our central concerns will be: (1) Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy; (2) meaning, rule-following, and intentionality; and (3) sensations and privacy. (III)
Enrollment will be limited to philosophy Ph.D. students.
For full list of David Finkelstein's courses back to the 2012-13 academic year, see our searchable course database.