Spring

The concept of alienation is central to the practical philosophy of Hegel and Marx. Following the work of the latter, the notion became a basic critical concept of social theory: under certain social conditions human agents are said to be alienated from their own agency. When the notion of alienation is discussed in contemporary analytic action theory and ethics, it tends to appear primarily as a tension or contradiction within the mind: as an estrangement from one’s own desires or from demands, norms, or ideals one is aware of. This internalization stands in stark contrast to the considerations that appear under that heading in the work Hegel and Marx. Here, the whole discussion is framed through the idea that one can only know one’s own agency through its realization in the world. Consequently, the problem of alienation appears as the impossibility of seeing oneself in one’s work.

Given the conceptual frameworks on offer in contemporary analytic action theory, it is not clear whether one can make sense of a critique of social conditions along these lines. The current debate on knowledge of one’s own actions divides into two main camps. The one side defines the human condition as one where one necessarily encounters one’s deeds just like other events in world: as alien and given from without. The other side defines intentional action as necessarily known by its subject from within or self-consciously. In consequence, there seems to be no space for a critique of alienation: either because it seems inevitable or because it seems impossible. One of the central questions of the seminar will be how one has to understand human agency such that alienation is conceivable.

On closer inspection, what Marx’ calls “alienation” seems to be ultimately a privation of the kind of practical knowledge that Aristotle calls “practical wisdom” (phronesis) and the correlated form of agency that he calls praxis. We will discuss Marx’ account in relation to Aristotle’s and Hegel’s developments of these concepts as well as in relation the discussion of practical reasoning, practical knowledge, and practical truth in the work of contemporary philosophers such as G.E.M. Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Christine Korsegaard, Gilbert Ryle, and Michael Thompson. Marx famously distinguishes four dimensions of alienation: the workers is said to be alienated (1) from their products, (2) from the act of production, (3) from the human form of life, and (4) from their fellow human beings. We will consider the respective practical categories and the correlated forms of practical cognition. (I) (III)

In one of his most widely read pieces of writing—the chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding called “Of Identity and Diversity”—John Locke writes: “[S]ince consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person…”  Locke’s account of personal identity has puzzled, annoyed, and inspired readers since it was published in the second edition of his Essay, in 1694. One aim of this course will be to find a coherent reading of it, one that considers objections that later writers—most famously Butler and Reid—made to it as well as some recent readings of it. Part of the point of this endeavor will be to see what, if anything, we still can learn from Locke concerning what a person is. A second aim of the course will be to arrive at an understanding of consciousness that makes sense in light of what we’ve learned about persons and personal identity from Locke. (III)

A close reading of Alfred North Whitehead's seminal work.

Thinking about the nature of wisdom goes back to the Greek philosophers and the classical religious sages, but the concept of wisdom has changed in many ways over the history of thought. While wisdom has received less scholarly attention in modern times, it has recently re-emerged in popular discourse with a growing recognition of its potential importance for addressing complex issues in many domains. But what is wisdom? It's often used with a meaning more akin to "smart" or "clever." Is it just vast knowledge? This course will examine the nature of wisdom-how it has been defined in philosophy and psychological science, how its meaning has changed, and what its essential components might be. We will discuss how current philosophical and psychological theories conceptualize wisdom and consider whether, and how, wisdom can be studied scientifically; that is, can wisdom be measured and experimentally manipulated to illuminate its underlying mechanisms and understand its functions? Finally, we will explore how concepts of wisdom can be applied in business, education, medicine, the law, and in the course of our everyday lives. Readings will be drawn from a wide array of disciplines including philosophy, classics, history, psychology, behavioral economics, medicine, and public policy. The course will include lectures by philosophers and psychologists. This course is offered in association with the Chicago Moral Philosophy Project and the Good Life program (the Hyde Park Institute).

For many decades John Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” has been criticized from the left. One recurrent criticism is that justice as fairness cannot respond to the social pathologies that afflict modern societies. The criticism says (i) Rawls’s ideal society (his “well-ordered society”) cannot forestall the presence of significant social pathologies, and (ii) no alteration of justice as fairness that successfully responds to such pathologies could remain within a broadly liberal tradition. In the first half of the course we will read parts of A Theory of Justice as well as other Rawls writings to set the conceptual stage. In the second half we will read several recent writers from the tradition of the Frankfurt School (Axel Honneth, Rahel Jaeggi, Fabien Freyenhagen) as well as others (e.g., Miranda Fricker) who focus on social pathologies. We will ask whether (i) is true and, if it is, whether (ii) is true. (A)

The year-long Workshop will expose students to work in "general jurisprudence" from roughly the last five years, including some new and forthcoming work. General jurisprudence is that part of philosophy of law concerned with the central questions about the nature of law, the relationship between law and morality, and the nature of legal reasoning. ; Confirmed speakers include Emid Ataq (Cornell), Julie Dickson (Oxford), David Plunkett (Dartmouth), Stephen Sachs (Duke), and Kevin Toh (University College London). Students who have taken Leiter's "Jurisprudence I" course at the law school are welcome to enroll. Students who have not taken Jurisprudence I must contact the instructor with information about their prior study of legal philosophy. Detailed familiarity with Hart's The Concept of Law and Dworkin's criticisms of Hart is essential. A final paper of 20-25 pages is required.

What is the object of mathematics? Where does mathematics derive its certainty from? Does it originate from the pure intellect or from empirical experience? Why is mathematics miraculously efficacious” in its application to nature? What is lost and gained in the development of mathematics and how does it shape our worldview? These have been central issues that philosophers since the Antiquity have occupied themselves with, and in many ways, they have shaped the trajectory of the history of philosophy. Philosophers’ answers to these questions have constantly evolved in light of the development of the mathematical sciences as well as the intellectual context of each generation. This course introduces classical texts and debates on the above-mentioned epistemological issues, including the writings of Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Helmholtz, Frege, Husserl, and beyond.

An examination of ancient Greek philosophical texts that are foundational for Western philosophy, especially the work of Plato and Aristotle. Topics will include: the nature and possibility of knowledge and its role in human life; the nature of the soul; virtue; happiness and the human good.

Topic: Autonomy and Liberation

This course explores and compares two determinations of the concept of freedom in the history of philosophy. In the first half of the course, we examine Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the German Idealists’ idea that to be free is to be autonomous, obeying only those laws that one has legislated for oneself. In the second half, we turn to the radical philosophies of anticapitalist Karl Marx and feminist Catharine MacKinnon. For Marx and MacKinnon, the central question of freedom is not autonomy but rather liberation: How can we transition from an unfree world to a free one? Philosophers from both halves of the course conceive of freedom as in some sense self-grounding. We will think deeply about what this means and thereby discover two potential challenges. (1) If all freedom and authority derives from autonomy, how can we make sense of autonomy itself? It seems it would need to create itself. (2) If liberation must come from ourselves, then it cannot depend on anything outside of the social world that already exists. But this means that the tools of liberation must come from the very systems that make us unfree. How is this possible? We will evaluate and compare these two challenges and see whether the philosophers can offer satisfying answers. 

Topic: A Life of One’s Own: Autonomy, Meaning and Selfhood

What does it mean to say that my life is my own, or that I am living my own life? The concept of autonomy bears directly on this issue: put very generally, if I am autonomous, I am the source of my reasons and actions. I am “my own person,” I live my life in a way that is up to me and is not distorted or manipulated by others. In this course, we will investigate what it means to be autonomous, as it bears on my ability to be “my own person” and to live “my own life.” Does the idea that my life, or my actions are my own, depend on my having a self? What does it mean for reasons and motives to be “my own”? How do I decide for myself how I should live? How should I understand the influence of others on who I am and what I decide to do? Do the demands of morality place inappropriate restrictions on my ability to decide how I should live? What, if anything, do I aim at in determining how I should live a life which is genuinely my own? We will begin by reading two accounts of agency and selfhood which explain human selves and human action interdependently, in terms of autonomy: a Humean account, by Harry Frankfurt, and a Kantian account, by Christine Korsgaard.  For both, the self is characterized structurally: what it is to be a self is for one’s beliefs, desires and intentions to be organized in a certain way. We will then explore issues that arise when we consider what it is to live one’s own life, including the nature and value of authenticity, the demandingness of morality, “selfishness” and self-effacement, and the pursuit of meaning in life. Finally, we will consider the psychoanalytic critique of morality, which will offer another perspective on these issues. Psychoanalysis emphasizes the ways in which who we are is not up to us, and that we must live with parts of ourselves we did not choose. What can psychoanalytic theory teach us about what it is to live one’s own life? Readings will be drawn from contemporary ethical theory, as well as psychoanalysis.