PHIL

This course is designed to provide MAPH students – especially those interested in pursuing a PhD in Philosophy – with an introduction to some recent debates between philosophers working in the analytic tradition. The course is, however, neither a history of analytic philosophy nor an overview of the discipline as it currently stands. The point of the course is primarily to introduce the distinctive style and method – or styles and methods – of philosophizing in the analytic tradition, through brief explorations of some currently hotly debated topics in the field. The course will be divided into six units; with the exception of the first unit, all of the topics discussed in this course can be seen as primarily located in epistemology, the theory of knowledge. Yet in the course we will also be thinking about topics in such areas as metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of language.

The first unit of the course will focus on the nature of analytic philosophy and the idea of analysis. This will be followed by units on the analysis of knowledge, the propagation of knowledge through testimony, practical versus theoretical knowledge, the propagation of practical knowledge, and justice and injustice in epistemology.

The course will be run as a mixture of lecture and discussion. All students should come to class having done the assigned reading and prepared to engage in a productive discussion. Students will write three short papers (6-8 pages) and provide discussion prompts on the Canvas site for the course.

We will study the first volume of Karl Marx’s Capital, attempting to understand the book on its own terms and with minimal reference to secondary literature. (A) (I)

This course explores the Western philosophical tradition of reasoned reflection on religious belief. Our questions will include: what are the most important arguments for, and against, belief in God? How does religious belief relate to the deliverances of the sciences, in particular to evolutionary theory? How can we reconcile religious belief with the existence of evil? What is the relationship between religion and morality? In attempting to answer these questions we will read work by Plato, Augustine, Anselm, Nietszche, and Freud, as well as some recent texts. (B)

Title: Internalism and Externalism about Meaning

This seminar will explore an advanced topic in philosophy. It is required as part of the intensive track of the Philosophy Major.

An exploration of some of the central questions in metaethics, moral theory, and applied ethics. These questions include the following: are there objective moral truths, as there are (as it seems) objective scientific truths? If so, how can we come to know these truths? Should we make the world as good as we can, or are there moral constraints on what we can do that are not a function of the consequences of our actions? Is the best life a maximally moral life? What distribution of goods in a society satisfies the demands of justice? Can beliefs and desires be immoral, or only actions? What is “moral luck”? What is courage? (A)

We will begin by trying to explicate the manner in which science is a rational response to observational facts. This will involve a discussion of inductivism, Popper's deductivism, Lakatos and Kuhn. After this, we will briefly survey some other important topics in the philosophy of science, including underdetermination, theories of evidence, Bayesianism, the problem of induction, explanation, and laws of nature. (B) (II)

One of the most curious ideas in the foundations of logic to emerge over the last several decades is the idea that logic is in some sense reducible to the theory of types and computer programs. This course will introduce students to the technical material needed to understand such claims and tackle the question of whether this new way of thinking of the foundations of logic is plausible. The course will cover such topics as the lambda calculus, intuitionistic logic, the Curry Howard correspondence, and Martin-Lof type theory. Students will be assumed to have a grasp of the basic theory of first order logic. Some exposure to undergraduate level mathematics will also be helpful. (B) (II)

The ‘problem of free will’ is to reconcile our perception of ourselves as free agents with ideas about the structure of reality, and our place within it, that appear to belie that perception. The problem is old, of perennial interest, and, it would seem, wholly intransigent. We shall try to get as close as we can to understanding the root of the problem’s seeming intransigence. Our readings will be both historical and recent. Authors include Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Strawson, and Frankfurt. Topics include logical necessity, time’s arrow, causation, natural law, motivation, compulsion, and moral responsibility. (A) (I)

This will be a seminar on the instructor’s book manuscript, the topic of which is our capacity to know our own minds (especially via what I call “reflection”) and its relation our capacity to know the non-mental world (a posture of mind in which our own mental states are not in view, but rather “transparent”).  Themes will include: the scope and basis of privileged self-knowledge, the nature of rationality, the structure of self-awareness and its connection with the capacity for first person thought, the nature of bodily awareness, the extent to which it is possible to do psychology “from an armchair”, the question of how to interpret failures of self-knowledge and self-understanding, the value of self-knowledge in a human life.  In the background will be still grander concerns about the sense in which a human being might be a being whose being is an issue for it in its being (!). 

We will read chapters from the instructor’s manuscript, but also contemporary sources representing a variety of views on these topics.  The seminar could serve as an opinionated, graduate-level introduction to contemporary debates about self-consciousness and self-knowledge. (III)

For each second of John’s life, consider the claim that he is young at that second. Many of these claims will be clearly true: he is young at all of the seconds that make up the first year of his life. Many of these claims will be clearly false: he is not young at all of the seconds that make up his 89th year. If all of these statements are either true or false, it follows that there was a last second at which it is true to say that he is young, and a first second at which it is true to say that he is not young. But that seems wild! One second can’t make the difference between a young person and an old person.

This is one of the central problems raised by the phenomenon of vagueness. This course will examine a variety of philosophical issues raised by the phenomenon of vagueness in the philosophy of language, philosophical logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. Among other things, we will discuss: the philosophical significance of vagueness, the relationship between vagueness and ignorance, decision-making under indeterminacy, and the question of whether vagueness is an essentially linguistic phenomenon. (B)