I started my appointment at Chicago in Autumn 2019. I received my BA in philosophy from Reed College and my PhD in philosophy from MIT. Before coming to Chicago, I was a Bersoff Fellow at the Department of Philosophy at New York University during the 2018-19 academic year.
Most of my research is in epistemology. I am particularly interested in belief. I have worked on the relationship between belief and credence, on whether epistemic rationality is permissive, whether we can believe at will, and whether it can be rational to have imprecise credences. I also have research interests in formal semantics, especially the semantics of modals and counterfactuals.
PHIL 52961 Topics in Epistemology
This course will cover a variety of topics at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of language. Some possible topics: the relationship partial belief and full belief; self-locating belief; what it is to believe (or know) that something might be the case or that something must be the case; probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities. (III)
PHIL 22961/32961 Social Epistemology
Traditionally, epistemologists have concerned themselves with the individual: What should I believe? What am I in a position to know? How should my beliefs guide my decision-making? But we can also ask each of these questions about groups. What should we -- the jury, the committee, the scientific community--believe? What can we know? How should our beliefs guide our decision-making? These are some of the questions of social epistemology Social epistemology also deals with the social dimensions of individual opinion: How should I respond to disagreement with my peers? When should I defer to majority opinion? Are there distinctively epistemic forms of oppression and injustice? If so, what are they like and how might we try to combat them? This class is a broad introduction to social epistemology. (B)
PHIL 20100/30000 Elementary Logic
An introduction to the concepts and principles of symbolic logic. We learn the syntax and semantics of truth-functional and first-order quantificational logic, and apply the resultant conceptual framework to the analysis of valid and invalid arguments, the structure of formal languages, and logical relations among sentences of ordinary discourse. Occasionally we will venture into topics in philosophy of language and philosophical logic, but our primary focus is on acquiring a facility with symbolic logic as such.