Undergraduate

Recent developments in artificial intelligence have brought about a radical reconceptualization of our idea of knowledge work. The model of the laboratory scientist, whose task is to conduct elaborate experiments that probe, in minute detail, the correctness of a theoretical hypothesis, is gradually giving way to that of the data scientist, whose concern is to wrangle massive datasets in an effort to extract from them reliable predictions with only a minimal theoretical guidance. In this course, we will explore some of the epistemological implications of this AI-driven shift in our conception of knowledge and the work that goes into acquiring it. Focusing on applications of artificial intelligence that utilize feed-forward deep neural networks for statistical inference, we will investigate what the shift to "big data" means for our philosophical theories of induction. Are the learning algorithms employed in the training of deep neural networks really "theory free"? If so, why should we trust that their predictions are reliable? How do neural networks purport to solve the curve-fitting problem and Goodman's new riddle of induction, without giving weight to theoretical virtues such as simplicity? Without a background of causal knowledge to structure their inferences, how do neural networks distinguish between causation and mere correlation, and if they cannot, why should we allow their predictions to serve as inputs to a theory of rational decision making? (B) (II)

An in-depth study of Benedict Spinoza’s major work, the Ethics, supplemented by an investigation of some of his early writings and letters. Focus is on Spinoza’s geometric method, the meaning of and arguments for his substance monism, his doctrine of parallelism, and his account of the good life.

This seminar will introduce some of the central concepts of psychoanalysis: Mourning and Melancholia, Repetition and Remembering, Transference, Neurosis, the Unconscious, Identification, Psychodynamic, Eros, Envy, Gratitude, Splitting, Death. The central theme will be how these concepts shed light on human flourishing and the characteristic ways we fail to flourish. Readings from Plato, Aristotle, Freud, Loewald, Lacan, Melanie Klein, Betty Joseph, Hanna Segal and others.

Modern theories of the subject – theories that answer the questions of what we are, how we are, and how we relate to others – have their roots in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Philosophers of the era, finding themselves free to diverge from classical accounts of the human and its world, pursued anew such questions as: What is the mind and how does it come by its ideas? How do we attain a sense of self? Are we fundamentally social creatures, or does the social (at best) represent a restriction on our animal drives and passions? Literature, meanwhile, examined these questions in its own distinct manner, and in doing so witnessed what many scholars recognize as the birth of the novel – a genre for which accounts of the subject are of central importance. This interdisciplinary course will read widely in Early Modern and “Enlightenment” literature and philosophy to better understand the roots of contemporary accounts of the subject and the social. Philosophical readings will include texts by John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, Mary Astell, Thomas Reid, Marya Schechtman, and Stephen Darwall. Literary readings will include Richard Steele, Alexander Pope, Horace Walpole, Eliza Haywood, John Cleland, Ignatius Sancho, Laurence Sterne, and Jane Austen. (A)

(A) or (B) and (I) or (II)

Ever since the establishment of modern science, a central topic of discussion is whether and how scientific reasoning differs from political, moral, or philosophical reasoning. One of the traditionally identified unique features of science is its ‘ideal’ of being ‘value-free’. The value-free ideal of science states that scientific reasoning from evidence to theory should not be influenced by social, political, or moral values. In recent decades numerous philosophers of science have concerted that the value-free ideal of science is neither attainable nor desirable. Some of the motivations for this criticism are to promote traditionally underrepresented perspectives such as feminism in science and to rethink the social and moral responsibilities of scientists beyond those understood under scientific integrity. The main upshot of this critique is that scientific objectivity must be redefined in a way that does not imply value-freedom. This course will give an outlook on the central ideas and concepts in the science and values debate and beyond it. The core philosophical discussion will focus on the main arguments for the untenability or undesirability of the value-free ideal and their criticisms. The broader context of discussion will include topics such as the science-society relationship, how scientific expertise and scientifically informed policy relates to democratic governance, public trust in science, and misinformation. Some of the questions that this course aims to answer are:

What features of scientific reasoning makes it open/closed to the influence of social, political, or moral values?

Can science be objective without being value-free?

Is the value-free ideal of science attainable?

In which ways is the value-free ideal of science desirable/undesirable?

Is there a clear-cut distinction between scientific and social values?

Should scientific reasoning take the societal implications of research into account?

Should socially-relevant research be governed by special norms?

What is the significance of the objective image of scientific inquiry for public trust in science? (B)