Undergraduate

(A) or (B) and (I) or (II)

Ever since the establishment of modern science, a central topic of discussion is whether and how scientific reasoning differs from political, moral, or philosophical reasoning. One of the traditionally identified unique features of science is its ‘ideal’ of being ‘value-free’. The value-free ideal of science states that scientific reasoning from evidence to theory should not be influenced by social, political, or moral values. In recent decades numerous philosophers of science have concerted that the value-free ideal of science is neither attainable nor desirable. Some of the motivations for this criticism are to promote traditionally underrepresented perspectives such as feminism in science and to rethink the social and moral responsibilities of scientists beyond those understood under scientific integrity. The main upshot of this critique is that scientific objectivity must be redefined in a way that does not imply value-freedom. This course will give an outlook on the central ideas and concepts in the science and values debate and beyond it. The core philosophical discussion will focus on the main arguments for the untenability or undesirability of the value-free ideal and their criticisms. The broader context of discussion will include topics such as the science-society relationship, how scientific expertise and scientifically informed policy relates to democratic governance, public trust in science, and misinformation. Some of the questions that this course aims to answer are:

What features of scientific reasoning makes it open/closed to the influence of social, political, or moral values?

Can science be objective without being value-free?

Is the value-free ideal of science attainable?

In which ways is the value-free ideal of science desirable/undesirable?

Is there a clear-cut distinction between scientific and social values?

Should scientific reasoning take the societal implications of research into account?

Should socially-relevant research be governed by special norms?

What is the significance of the objective image of scientific inquiry for public trust in science? (B)

Abortion is a complex and fraught topic. Morally, a very wide range of individual, familial, and social concerns converge upon it. Politically, longstanding controversies have been given new salience and urgency by the Dobbs decision and the ongoing moves by state legislatures to restrict access to abortion. In terms of moral philosophy, deep issues in ethics merge with equally deep questions about the nature of life, action, and the body. In terms of political philosophy, basic questions are raised about the relationship of religious and moral beliefs to the criminal law of a liberal state. We will seek to understand the topic in all of this complexity. Our approach will be thoroughly intra- and inter-disciplinary, drawing not only on our separate areas of philosophical expertise but on the contributions of a series of guest instructors in law, history, and medicine. (A) (I)

Topic: Heidegger’s Critique of German Idealism

Martin Heidegger claimed that the entire western philosophical tradition reached its ‘culmination’ in the philosophy of German Idealism. In this course we will take this diagnosis seriously, work to understand its presuppositions and implications, and attempt to assess its cogency. We will read closely Heidegger’s major works on Kant, as well as his central writings on Kant’s immediate successors. In addition to supplementary readings from Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, we may also read excerpts from Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Christian Wolff, and Alexander Baumgarten.

(B) (IV)