2012-2013

This class is a close reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, devoting two class sessions to each book. We will be reading with the following line of questioning in mind: is Aristotle’s ethical theory consistent with our basic moral intuitions? If not, are we willing to take seriously the possibility that our moral outlook could be fundamentally mistaken? If not, can we take Aristotle seriously as an ethicist? The aim of the class is not primarily exegetical; our goal is to figure out whether Aristotle is right, and to think about how and whether it is possible to engage philosophically with an ethically alien point of view. (I) (IV)

An examination of the development of Russell’s interrelated logical, epistemological and metaphysical views, focusing on the period from the Principles of Mathematics (1903) to The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918). (III)

Expressivism---the contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist reaearch program of philosophers such as Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare---and its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought have recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy, including logic, probability, knowledge, belief, and modality. After reviewing the key motivations behind expressivism and its scope beyond the realm of the metaethical, the class will focus on the semantic commitments of expressivism. Of special interests will be the prospects of expressivism to resolve the Frege-Geach problem and, more generally, to arrive at a satisfying model of everyday discourse and reasoning. In addressing these questions, we will consider a number of non-classical semantic frameworks that have recently been proposed in philosophy of language, compare their vices and virtues, and see to what extent they are compatible with the key intuitions behind the expressivist agenda. (II)

This seminar concerns what it is for perceptual experience to possess intentionality. The course will be split into roughly three sections. The first section of the course will cover the nature of intentionality itself. I will discuss the two most prominent contemporary accounts of intentionality: representationalism and relationalism. I will also cover a third (broadly Aristotelian) view according to which intentionality consists in being or becoming what one is directed upon. The second section of the course will canvass attempts to give naturalistic accounts of intentionality (causal/informational accounts, teleo-functional accounts, etc.). The third section will cover the relationship between perceptual experience's intentional features and its phenomenal features including the thesis that there is a distinctive kind of phenomenal intentionality. (III)

Global income and wealth are highly concentrated. The richest 2% of the population own about half of the global assets. Per capita income in the United States is around $47,000 and in Europe it is around $30,500, while in India it is $3,400 and in Congo, it is $329. There are equally unsettling inequalities in longevity, health, and education.
In this class, we ask what duties nations and individuals have to address these inequalities and what are the best strategies for doing so. What role must each country play in helping itself? What is the role of international agreements and agencies, of NGOs, and of corporations in addressing global poverty? How do we weigh policies that emphasize growth against policies that emphasize within-country equality, health, or education?

In seeking answers to these questions, the class will combine readings on the law and economics of global development with readings on the philosophy of global justice. A particular focus will be on the role that legal institutions, both domestic and international, play in discharging these duties. For, example, we might focus on how a nation with natural resources can design legal institutions to ensure they are exploited for the benefit of the citizens of the country. Students will be expected to write a paper, which may qualify for substantial writing credit. (I)

The Workshop will explore a broad range of topics that arise in ethics, philosophy of action, and philosophy of criminal law related to questions of freedom and responsibility: what is it to act freely? Is responsibility compatible with the causal determination of action? Does the assignment of responsibility in the criminal law make philosophical sense? How does addiction or mental illness affect ascriptions of responsibility in the law, and how should it? Readings will be drawn from philosophy, psychology, and criminal law theory.
Coates and Leiter will meet with enrolled students for two two-hour sessions in October to go over some classic readings on the subject of freedom and responsibility. We will then host six or seven outside speakers addressing these issues. Coates or Leiter will meet with the students a week in advance for one hour to go over the readings. Confirmed speakers so far include Pamela Hieryonmi (Philosophy, UCLA), Stephen Morse (Law & Psychiatry, Penn), Hanna Pickard (Philosophy, Oxford), Derk Pereboom (Philosophy, Cornell), and Gary Watson (Law & Philosophy, Southern California).

Attendance at all sessions of the Workshop is a requirement. JD students should contact bleiter@uchicago.edu with a resume and a brief statement of background and/or interest in the topic in order to secure permission to enroll. Philosophy PhD students may enroll without submitting these materials.

This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters.

In this course we will study Kant’s Doctrine of Right, the first part of his Metaphysics of Morals. Where necessary and possible, we also consider some of his other moral and political writings. (I) (V)

In this course, we will prove the soundness and completeness of standard deductive systems for both sentential and first-order logic. We will also establish related results in elementary model theory, such as the compactness theorem for first-order logic, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem and Lindstrom’s theorem. (B) (II)