2012-2013

Students writing senior essays register once for PHIL 29901, in either the Autumn or Winter Quarter, and once for PHIL 29902, in either the Winter or Spring Quarter. (Students may not register for both PHIL 29901 and 29902 in the same quarter.) The senior seminar meets all three quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout.

Students are required to submit the college reading & research course form.

Topic: Rules, Autonomy, and Metaphysics of Normativity (instructor: T. Tiisala)
It is a philosophical commonplace to use the expression ‘space of reasons’ to highlight the normative character of rationality in contrast to a notion of nature as a system of causal (or probabilistic) laws. Yet one may wonder whether this distinction entails a dualistic metaphysics, where two spheres of reality are so separated that a connection between them becomes unintelligible. In this course, we will examine a strategy to avoid such a dualism by explaining the normative standards of reasoning in terms of what is sometimes called ‘attitude-dependence’. In other words, we will focus on the idea that subjects who reason also constitute the norms of reasoning by holding each other responsible to some standards of correctness in thought and action. In particular, we will examine and elaborate the explanatory resources of this strategy, whose emergence we will trace to Kant’s notion of autonomy, in connection with the following three challenges. (1) The normativity of reasoning cannot be generally understood in terms of a self-conscious activity of rule-following, because in that case any rule for the application of a rule would require another rule for its own application, and infinitely so. (2) It cannot be completely up to one to decide which normative standards one is bound to, because that would preclude the possibility of error and thus also obliterate normativity. (3) Proposals that seek to overcome these two challenges by modeling reasoning as a discursive practice, accounting for its normative structure on the basis of social statuses of commitment and entitlement, are incompatible with the traditional way of understanding freedom as rational constraint and power as constraint due to an external force. Finally, we will investigate the limits of the explanatory strategy that relies on attitude-dependence by asking to what extent the attitudes on which it makes norms depend can be plausibly understood as elements in the natural history of the human species. We will read texts by Rousseau, Kant, Sellars, Ryle, Brandom, McDowell, Foucault, Canguilhem, Dennett, and others.

Topic: Reasons, Motivation, and Morality (instructor: N. Ben Moshe)

We often say things like “he ought to do so-and-so” or “she has a reason to do such-and-such”. But what do we mean when we talk about what people ought to do or about their reasons for action? What is the relation between people’s reasons and their motivations? Are there reasons which exist independently of our motivations? Or are all reasons somehow dependent on the motivations which we happen to have or which we would have if we were fully rational? Related questions extend into the realm of morality: Are there reasons which are specifically moral in nature? If so, how are they related to our motivations? Finally, is one irrational or in error if one does not act on moral reasons, or can there be a perfectly coherent, non-mistaken villain? In this course we will discuss some of the central meta-normative and meta-ethical positions regarding the nature of normative and moral reasons: Thomas Nagel’s realism, Christine Korsgaard’s Kantian anti-realism, Sharon Street’s Humean anti-realism, and Michael Smith’s hybrid of Humean-Kantian realism. We will introduce these positions by discussing Hume’s and Kant’s views on motivation and moral motivation, as well as the distinction between internal and external reasons and between motivating and normative reasons. We will also consider the nature of specifically moral reasons - in particular, reasons stemming from the motive of duty - and their alleged categorical force. Additional authors include Donald Davidson, Philippa Foot, Barbara Herman, John McDowell, Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams.

Topic: Rules, Autonomy, and Metaphysics of Normativity (instructor: T. Tiisala)
It is a philosophical commonplace to use the expression ‘space of reasons’ to highlight the normative character of rationality in contrast to a notion of nature as a system of causal (or probabilistic) laws. Yet one may wonder whether this distinction entails a dualistic metaphysics, where two spheres of reality are so separated that a connection between them becomes unintelligible. In this course, we will examine a strategy to avoid such a dualism by explaining the normative standards of reasoning in terms of what is sometimes called ‘attitude-dependence’. In other words, we will focus on the idea that subjects who reason also constitute the norms of reasoning by holding each other responsible to some standards of correctness in thought and action. In particular, we will examine and elaborate the explanatory resources of this strategy, whose emergence we will trace to Kant’s notion of autonomy, in connection with the following three challenges. (1) The normativity of reasoning cannot be generally understood in terms of a self-conscious activity of rule-following, because in that case any rule for the application of a rule would require another rule for its own application, and infinitely so. (2) It cannot be completely up to one to decide which normative standards one is bound to, because that would preclude the possibility of error and thus also obliterate normativity. (3) Proposals that seek to overcome these two challenges by modeling reasoning as a discursive practice, accounting for its normative structure on the basis of social statuses of commitment and entitlement, are incompatible with the traditional way of understanding freedom as rational constraint and power as constraint due to an external force. Finally, we will investigate the limits of the explanatory strategy that relies on attitude-dependence by asking to what extent the attitudes on which it makes norms depend can be plausibly understood as elements in the natural history of the human species. We will read texts by Rousseau, Kant, Sellars, Ryle, Brandom, McDowell, Foucault, Canguilhem, Dennett, and others.

Topic: Reasons, Motivation, and Morality (instructor: N. Ben Moshe)

We often say things like “he ought to do so-and-so” or “she has a reason to do such-and-such”. But what do we mean when we talk about what people ought to do or about their reasons for action? What is the relation between people’s reasons and their motivations? Are there reasons which exist independently of our motivations? Or are all reasons somehow dependent on the motivations which we happen to have or which we would have if we were fully rational? Related questions extend into the realm of morality: Are there reasons which are specifically moral in nature? If so, how are they related to our motivations? Finally, is one irrational or in error if one does not act on moral reasons, or can there be a perfectly coherent, non-mistaken villain? In this course we will discuss some of the central meta-normative and meta-ethical positions regarding the nature of normative and moral reasons: Thomas Nagel’s realism, Christine Korsgaard’s Kantian anti-realism, Sharon Street’s Humean anti-realism, and Michael Smith’s hybrid of Humean-Kantian realism. We will introduce these positions by discussing Hume’s and Kant’s views on motivation and moral motivation, as well as the distinction between internal and external reasons and between motivating and normative reasons. We will also consider the nature of specifically moral reasons - in particular, reasons stemming from the motive of duty - and their alleged categorical force. Additional authors include Donald Davidson, Philippa Foot, Barbara Herman, John McDowell, Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams.

This course is going to focus on an understanding of the most important conceptions and doctrines defended by Kant in his “Critique of Pure Reason”. It will include a study of relevant ideas found in his German predecessors, notably Leibniz and Wolff, as well as a presentation of important developments in the wake of Kant’s work. In this latter part of the course, Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" is to receive special attention. Apart from lectures, the course will include discussion.

Among the principal tasks of philosophy is to understand the position of our minds and our mental activities within the increasingly detailed account of the world that the physical and biological sciences provide. We will survey and critically examine the developments of this philosophical program in the twentieth century. Special emphasis will be given to the nature of consciousness and of mental content. (B)

This course will examine three central areas of philosophy—epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy—through the lens of issues raised by persistent disagreement. We will consider questions such as the following. What is the connection between the possibility of disagreement and objective truth? When should disagreement with our peers lead us to doubt what we think we know? What is the line between intellectual arrogance and having the courage of our convictions? Does the persistence of moral disagreement show that morality is subjective? Should the political community be neutral between parties that disagree on basic questions of morality, religion and justice? When is and isn’t it acceptable to just agree to disagree? No prior knowledge of philosophy is necessary for this course. (A)

In the course of discussing how it is that a philosophical problem arises in the first place, Wittgenstein says, “The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.” This isn’t the only place where Wittgenstein speaks as if being gripped by philosophical problems is a matter of succumbing to illusions--as if a philosophers are magicians who are taken in by their own tricks. In this course, we’ll discuss philosophy and magical performance, with the aim of coming to a deeper understanding of what both are about. We’ll be particularly concerned with Wittgenstein’s picture of what philosophy is and does. Another focus of the course will be the passion of wonder. In the Theatetus, Plato has Socrates say, “The sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin.” And when magicians write about their aesthetic aims, they almost always describe themselves as trying to instill wonder in others. Does magic end where philosophy begins? And what becomes of wonder after philosophy is done with it? (B)

"Nothing is funnier than unhappiness" says Nelly in Beckett's Endgame. We shall seek to distinguish between unhappiness, as the subject of poetic works, from unhappiness as it is understood by philosophy, which, I would argue, is precisely as funny as nothing. We shall discuss some famous unhappy families. A Greek tragedy (Sophocles: Oedipus Tyrannus), a Renaissance tragedy (Shakespeare, Hamlet), a modern theater of the absurd (Beckett: Endgame).

Global poverty is a human tragedy on a massive scale, and it poses one of the most daunting challenges to achieving a just global order. In recent decades, a significant number of philosophers have addressed this issue in new and profoundly important ways, overcoming the disciplinary limitations of narrowly economic or public policy oriented approaches. Recent theories of justice have provided both crucial conceptual clarifications of the very notion of ‘poverty’—including new measures that are more informed by the voices of the global poor and better able to cover the full impact of poverty on human capabilities and welfare—and vital new theoretical frameworks for considering freedom from poverty as a basic human right and/or a demand of justice, both nationally and internationally. Moreover, these philosophers have pointed to concrete, practical steps, at both the level of institutional design and the level of individual ethical/political action, for effectively combating poverty and moving the world closer to justice. The readings covered in this course, from such philosophers as Peter Singer, Thomas Pogge, David Graeber, and Martha Nussbaum, will reveal, not only the injustice of global poverty, but also what is to be done about it.