2012-2013

This workshop is open only to PhD Philosophy graduate students planning to go on the job market in the fall of 2012. Course begins in late Spring quarter and continues in the Autumn quarter. Pass/Fail.

Autonomy is the centre of Kant’s conception of morality. Hence we must try to understand the idea of self-legislation if we want to understand his moral theory, and examine its consistency and implications if we want to know whether an account of morality can be based on it. The course is to include discussion of the Categorical Imperative and of wider ethical questions regarding topics such as moral motivation, law and virtue. Students will participate by reading relevant texts, presenting brief comments on them, and joining in the discussion.

In this course, we will examine the most well-known attempts to develop a theory of inductive logic, i.e., a logic which defines the (probabilistic) relations of inductive support that obtain between sentences in a formal language. In the first half of the course, we will examine, in detail, Carnap’s program in inductive logic. We will consider both the early “a prioristic” stage of Carnap’s work, in which it was held that the principles of inductive logic suffice to determine a unique methodology for inductive reasoning, as well as the subsequent weakening of these principles to allow for a continuum of inductive methods. In the second half of the course, we will examine the various philosophical objections leveled at Carnap’s program, as well as examine more recent attempts to assign probabilities to sentences in a first-order language. Readings for the course will include works by Carnap, Goodman, Putnam, Gaifman and Paris among others. (II)

In this course we will read the first volume of Karl Marx’s Capital. (I) (V)

Vast areas of Anglophone practical philosophy have focused on Aristotle's ethics of late, and some new neo-Aristotelians have turned to work by Thomas Aquinas for help. Our tasks in this seminar will be three: (1) to consider recent work in neo-Aristotelian ethics; (2) to see what contemporary neo-Aristotelians seek in turning to Aquinas; and three, to consider how far Thomistic thought about virtue, happiness, practical reason and practical wisdom are compatible with contemporary neo-Aristotelian practical philosophy more generally. (I) (IV)

This seminar will take up the idea -- developed after Freud, but influenced by him -- that freedom and love are fundamental values in psychoanalysis. And they are fundamental values of psychoanalysis because they are constitutive of flourishing human life. We shall read carefully articles by Hans Loewald, Paul Gray and Heinz Kohut (as well as articles by Lear and Levenson) that try to show how freedom and love show up in the details of human life, often hidden as such, and how psychoanalytic treatment facilitates their development. We shall concentrate on theory and technique: giving clinical vignettes that give concrete realization to these ideals. Students should have previous acquaintance with the writings of Freud as well as Plato's Symposium. The seminar is open to graduate students in Philosophy and Social Thought as well as to undergraduate majors in Philosophy and Fundamentals. All others require permission of the instructors. Taught jointly with Clinical Prof. L. Levenson (Yale), Visiting Kohut Professor in the Committee on Social Thought.

An action, according to Aristotle, can be a logical conclusion of thinking. We shall try to understand this claim by reading book 7 of Nicomachean Ethics (we shall discuss Aristotle on practical syllogism, the weakness of the will, the difference between practical and theoretical). We shall proceed to consider the place of these ideas in Kant's First and Second Critique.We shall look at commentaries on the relevant texts by E. Anscombe, J. Dancy, S. Engstrom, J. McDowell, A.W. Price, S. Rodl, and others.

The Workshop will explore a broad range of topics that arise in ethics, philosophy of action, and philosophy of criminal law related to questions of freedom and responsibility: what is it to act freely? Is responsibility compatible with the causal determination of action? Does the assignment of responsibility in the criminal law make philosophical sense? How does addiction or mental illness affect ascriptions of responsibility in the law, and how should it? Readings will be drawn from philosophy, psychology, and criminal law theory.
Coates and Leiter will meet with enrolled students for two two-hour sessions in October to go over some classic readings on the subject of freedom and responsibility. We will then host six or seven outside speakers addressing these issues. Coates or Leiter will meet with the students a week in advance for one hour to go over the readings. Confirmed speakers so far include Pamela Hieryonmi (Philosophy, UCLA), Stephen Morse (Law & Psychiatry, Penn), Hanna Pickard (Philosophy, Oxford), Derk Pereboom (Philosophy, Cornell), and Gary Watson (Law & Philosophy, Southern California).

Attendance at all sessions of the Workshop is a requirement. JD students should contact bleiter@uchicago.edu with a resume and a brief statement of background and/or interest in the topic in order to secure permission to enroll. Philosophy PhD students may enroll without submitting these materials.