Spring

The seminar will consist in a close reading of two of Henry James’s great last novels, The Ambassadors and The Golden Bowl. The novels are widely regarded as the finest examples of English literary prose, composed in James’s distinctive (and “difficult”) late style. But the novels also require intense attention to a wide range of philosophical issues. These issues arise in James’s attempt to portray human experiences of one’s own mindedness and judgements as well as experiences of others in a social context James understands as historically distinctive: the decline of authoritative European moral conventions and the adequacy of the new conventions arising in American capitalism and consumerism. (What does “decline” mean in such a context and what could count as adequacy or inadequacy?) Many of the emerging issues involve both psychological and moral dimensions: how should we understand why someone would “change his mind’ about fundamental matters of principles? What is self-deceit and why is it so prominent in the novels? How is self-deceit different from willful self-blindness and self-opacity? What counts as genuine self-knowledge? What is the relation between intelligence and virtue? What could require self-renunciation in the service of some ideal? Throughout, we shall be concerned with how the treatment of such issues in the novels could be considered a “philosophic” treatment if in literary form rather than traditional philosophical analysis.

An introduction to the concepts and principles of symbolic logic. We learn the syntax and semantics of truth-functional and first-order quantificational logic, and apply the resultant conceptual framework to the analysis of valid and invalid arguments, the structure of formal languages, and logical relations among sentences of ordinary discourse. Occasionally we will venture into topics in philosophy of language and philosophical logic, but our primary focus is on acquiring a facility with symbolic logic as such.

What is philosophy? Is it the inquiry into the fundamental nature of reality? Or is it an inquiry into how we ought to live our lives? Is there progress in philosophy? And is this progress undermined by widespread persistent disagreement? Is there a philosophical method, and should there be one? What is the goal of philosophy? Is it knowledge, understanding, or something else?

A philosopher ought to know what they are up to. Yet, there are about as many metaphilosophical theories as there are philosophical ones. Moreover, metaphilosophy is a branch of philosophy and, as such, philosophical methodology can be informed by philosophical convictions.

The goal of this course is not to find the One True Answer to these questions. It is for you to develop your own answers, so that next time you are at a party and say you study philosophy, you can finally explain what that actually means. (B)

Aristotle’s Metaphysics is one of the most difficult and rewarding texts in the philosophical tradition. It attempts to lay out the goals, methods, and primary results of a science Aristotle calls “first philosophy.” First philosophy is the study of beings just insofar as they are beings (as opposed to physics, which studies beings insofar as they come to be, pass away, or change), and if completed it would stand as the most fundamental and general science. Our aim will be to understand: if and how such a science is possible, what the principles of such a science are, what being is, which beings are primary, and what are the causes of being qua being. We will discuss the Metaphysics as a whole, but focus on A-B, Γ, Z, Η, Θ, and Λ. Our approach will be “forest,” rather than “tree” oriented, preferring in most cases a coherent overview to close reading. (B)

This course is about the aims of human life. We address the question through two contrasting conceptions of life: 1) life in the sense of an ongoing activity—and its associated values of pleasure, enlightenment, and happiness, and 2) life in the sense of a biographical story—and its associated values of achievement, glory, meaning, and purpose. We will attempt to understand how these two conceptions of life are compatible, and if one or the other is prior. Readings include: Aristotle, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, William James, Bernard Williams, Iris Murdoch, and Jonathan Lear. (A)

This course will explore the problem of other minds, beginning with a comparison of this problem with others to which it is sometimes thought to be closely related. Our first object of comparison in this regard will be with the problem of our knowledge of the external world.  We will explore supposed similarities and differences between other minds and external world skepticism and between various philosophical responses to each. The main asymmetry between these two problems is often held to lie in the idea the that knowing another mind is a matter of knowing a special kind of content. (Human beings are not mere objects. When one knows another mind, one knows a formally distinct kind of object than a mere material thing.) We will also explore the idea that the most fundamental difference between the two problems lies not merely in the content but in the form of the knowledge. This requires treating the problem of other minds as one whose solution requires attention to the second person form—one in which, in the paradigmatic case, two subjects are known to each other. In this connection, we will explore a variety of forms of nexus—linguistic, epistemological, and ethical—in which a pair of subjects can stand in a reciprocal recognitive relation to one another. The primary readings for the course will be from Elizabeth Anscombe, Anita Avramides, Stanley Cavell, John Cook, Vincent Descombes, Martin Gustafsson, Jennifer Hornsby, John McDowell, Richard Moran, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (II)

In this seminar, we will examine the logical and metaphysical writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. We will begin by exploring the metaphysical underpinnings of Leibniz’s calculus of analytic containment, as developed in such essays as General Inquiries into the Analysis of Concepts and Truths (1686) and A Mathematics of Reason (1690). We then consider how Leibniz’s logic informs some of the metaphysical ideas developed in some of Leibniz’s less technical philosophical writings, including Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and On the Ultimate Origination of Things (1697). These distinctive logico-metaphysical conceptions, which give a singular shape to Leibniz’s philosophy, reach their full maturity in his best known essay on metaphysics, the Monadology (1714), with which the seminar will conclude. (IV)

An in-depth study of Benedict Spinoza’s major work, the Ethics, supplemented by an investigation of some of his early writings and letters. Focus is on Spinoza’s geometric method, the meaning of and arguments for his substance monism, his doctrine of parallelism, and his account of the good life.

Ever since the establishment of modern science, a central topic of discussion is whether and how scientific reasoning differs from political, moral, or philosophical reasoning. One of the traditionally identified unique features of science is its ‘ideal’ of being ‘value-free’. The value-free ideal of science states that scientific reasoning from evidence to theory should not be influenced by social, political, or moral values. In recent decades numerous philosophers of science have concerted that the value-free ideal of science is neither attainable nor desirable. Some of the motivations for this criticism are to promote traditionally underrepresented perspectives such as feminism in science and to rethink the social and moral responsibilities of scientists beyond those understood under scientific integrity. The main upshot of this critique is that scientific objectivity must be redefined in a way that does not imply value-freedom. This course will give an outlook on the central ideas and concepts in the science and values debate and beyond it. The core philosophical discussion will focus on the main arguments for the untenability or undesirability of the value-free ideal and their criticisms. The broader context of discussion will include topics such as the science-society relationship, how scientific expertise and scientifically informed policy relates to democratic governance, public trust in science, and misinformation. Some of the questions that this course aims to answer are:

What features of scientific reasoning makes it open/closed to the influence of social, political, or moral values?

Can science be objective without being value-free?

Is the value-free ideal of science attainable?

In which ways is the value-free ideal of science desirable/undesirable?

Is there a clear-cut distinction between scientific and social values?

Should scientific reasoning take the societal implications of research into account?

Should socially-relevant research be governed by special norms?

What is the significance of the objective image of scientific inquiry for public trust in science? (B)

Neo-Aristotelian analytic philosophical work in ethics and in the philosophy of mind treats developing a proper understanding of human nature as central to understanding the character and place of rationality in our lives, what it is for human beings to be in right relations with themselves and one another, and those qualities of character crucial to human happiness.  In this course, we will consider new work in analytic neo-Aristotelian philosophy alongside Aquinas’s understanding of the human being. For Aquinas, the human being is the intellectual animal—the highest sort of animal and the lowest of intellectual creatures.  Human beings have distinctive strengths and challenges on this view, and turning to Aquinas sheds a new light on contemporary philosophical work.