Graduate

This course introduces students to contemporary debates among political philosophers about the value of equality. We begin with arguments for and against distributive equality, the view that justice demands that everyone possess equal amounts of some good or bundle of goods. We then examine arguments for and against relational egalitarianism, the view that our relationships to one another ought ideally to be free of hierarchy. (A) (I)

An advanced study of the theoretical philosophy of the 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume. The focus of this course will be a careful reading of Book 1 of the Treatise on Human Nature and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Some topics of the course include: Hume’s empiricism(s), Hume on abstract objects, existence and negation, Hume’s theory of causation, Hume’s theory of belief, and Hume’s relation to skepticism. (IV)

This course critically examines contemporary theories of justice from an ecological perspective. We will begin by examining work in ecological economics that situates the economy in nature and challenges contemporary approaches to capitalist development. We will then consider the extent to which theories of justice can address problems related to resource depletion, sustainability, and economic growth. Readings include texts by Rawls, Armstrong, Kolers, and Stilz. In the final section of the course, we will consider approaches that seek to chart a new way forward for thinking about economic justice, including theories of degrowth and movements to revive the commons. (A) (I)

An investigation of the applied ethics of technology in the 21st century. Fundamental debates in applied ethics are paired with recent technological case studies. Topics covered include moral dilemmas, privacy, consent, human enhancement, distributed responsibility, and technological risks. Case studies include self-driving cars, geo-engineering, Internet privacy, genetic enhancement, Twitter, autonomous warfare, nuclear war, and the Matrix. (A) (I)

Whereas philosophers of Antiquity and the Middle Ages generally hold that good conduct is required for happiness, modern moral philosophy conceives of it as required by law-like obligation. Anscombe has famously argued that such a conception makes no sense independently of belief in a divine law-giver. Is she right? Or should philosophy rather take seriously the experience of “feeling duty-bound” to keep promises, help people in need, work conscientiously etc. and conclude that there is such a thing as moral obligation independently of a legislating authority? What does the Natural Law tradition say about this? What is actually involved in the idea of a moral Ought? Can there be absolute practical necessities? or unconditional obligations without sanction? Would we have reason to comply? How can the content of a “moral law” be known? Are happiness-oriented ethics definitely incompatible with ideas of such a law? (A) (I)

In the course of discussing how it is that a philosophical problem arises in the first place, Wittgenstein says, “The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.” This isn’t the only place where Wittgenstein speaks as if being gripped by philosophical problems is a matter of succumbing to illusions--as if a philosophers are magicians who are taken in by their own tricks. In this course, we’ll discuss philosophy and magical performance, with the aim of coming to a deeper understanding of what both are about. We’ll be particularly concerned with Wittgenstein’s picture of what philosophy is and does. Another focus of the course will be the passion of wonder. In the Theaetetus, Plato has Socrates say, “The sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin.” And when magicians write about their aesthetic aims, they almost always describe themselves as trying to instill wonder in others. Does magic end where philosophy begins? And what becomes of wonder after philosophy is done with it? (B) (IV)

In the first part of the course, we’ll be discussing an argument to the effect that: in order for radical skepticism about empirical knowledge not to be intellectually obligatory, we must understand ourselves as enjoying a very particular kind of self-consciousness. In the remainder of the course, we’ll be trying to get into view what an adequate account of that sort of self-consciousness might look like. (B) (II)

What are the qualities of character that enable us to be valuable members of our political communities, the institutions that employ us, and any other groups of which we are a part?  Do the right answers to these questions depend on where you are situated in the community or on the form of political constitution in question?  Do they harmonize with each other? And are these the same as the qualities that make us morally good human beings?  These are questions that the Ancient Greek philosophers thought hard about and we will take the works of those thinkers as our starting point and constant companions.  But we will consider some moderns as well, and our goal will be to enrich our reflection about the kinds of people we ourselves would like to be.  Virtues we may discuss include: civic friendship, justice, forthrightness in public speech (parrhesia), courage, and (for lack of a better term) effectiveness. (A)

A close reading of this literary and philosophical masterpiece.  This dialogue addresses the nature of the soul, love, lust, political persuasion, philosophical dialectic, poetic myth, the forms, and the difference between written and spoken discourse.  What emerges in its dramatic action and explicit argumentation is a picture of human beings as speaking animals and of what a good life for animals like us might be. (III)

Key contemporary debates in the philosophical literature often rely on formal tools and techniques that go beyond the material taught in an introductory logic class. A robust understanding of these debates---and, accordingly, the ability to meaningfully engage with a good deal of contemporary philosophy---requires a basic grasp of extensions of standard logic such as modal logic, multi-valued logic, and supervaluations, as well as an appreciation of the key philosophical virtues and vices of these extensions. The goal of this course is to provide students with the required logic literacy. While some basic metalogical results will come into view as the quarter proceeds, the course will primarily focus on the scope (and, perhaps, the limits) of logic as an important tool for philosophical theorizing. (B)