2016-2017

In this class, we will read selections from Aristotle's major works in metaphysics, logic, psychology and ethics. We will attempt to understand the import of his distinct contributions in all of these central areas of philosophy, and we will also work towards a synoptic view of his system as a whole. There are three questions we will keep in mind and seek to answer as readers of his treatises: (1) What questions is this passage/chapter trying to answer? (2) What is Aristotle's answer? (3) What is his argument that his answer is the correct one?

Play is a pervasive, and often underappreciated, feature of the lives of humans and many other animal species. It's also a lot of fun. In this course, we will consider the nature and significance of play, with a particular focus on the distinctively human form of play called games. The course will focus on three interrelated themes. (1) What are play and games? Drawing on thinkers like Johan Huizinga, Roger Caillois, and Bernard Suits, we will develop a vocabulary that allows us to tackle this question analytically, and to draw salient distinctions between kinds of play and games. We will also ask why humans and other animals play, and what form the answer to that question should take. (2) What is the value of playing? Sen and Nussbaum classify play as one of the basic human capabilities. Suits argues that playing games is central to the ideal human life. In investigating the significance of play to human life, we will also consider the ethics and aesthetics of playing. (3) How can thinking about play cast light on other human activities? Wittgenstein famously talks about linguistic activity in terms of games. Rawls uses games to think more generally about rule-governed institutions. And Huizinga argues that both artistic and religious activities are structurally indistinguishable from play. Could play be even more central to human experience than we suppose?

This is a class addressing the possibility of self-directed ethical change. Can you make yourself into a different person from the person that you are? Some readings from hist. of phil (Kant/ Nietzsche) but mostly contemporary readings from autonomy/moral psychology literature.

This course is an exploration of the analytic tradition in philosophy. We will have three goals. First and foremost, we will philosophize in the analytic style. Second, we will try to get a sense of the history of the tradition, beginning with Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, continuing through the logical positivist and ordinary language movements and the subsequent repudiation of these movements (by Strawson, Rawls, Searle, Nagel, Kripke, Lewis, and many others), and ending with a review of the current state of play. Third (and drawing on the history), we will try to answer these meta-questions: what is distinctive about analytic philosophy? How does it relate to the history of the subject? (Was Descartes an analytic philosopher? If not, why not?) What in the philosophy of Hegel, Bradley and others were Moore and Russell reacting to? What is the difference between analytic and continental philosophy? (Why was Husserl a continental philosopher while Frege--his interlocutor--was not?)

In this class we will investigate what it is for a society to be just. In what sense are the members of a just society equal? What freedoms does a just society protect? Must a just society be a democracy? What economic arrangements are compatible with justice? In the second portion of the class we will consider one pressing injustice in our society in light of our previous philosophical conclusions. Possible candidates include, but are not limited to, racial inequality, economic inequality, and gender hierarchy. Here our goal will be to combine our philosophical theories with empirical evidence in order to identify, diagnose, and effectively respond to actual injustice. (A)

In one of his most widely read pieces of writing—the chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding called “Of Identity and Diversity”—John Locke writes: “[S]ince consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person…” Locke’s theory of personal identity has puzzled, annoyed, and inspired readers since it was published in the second edition of his Essay, in 1694. The main aim of this course will be to arrive at a reading of it that (1) situates it in the context of earlier philosophers’ writings about selves and souls, (2) is informed by an understanding of Locke’s own views concerning consciousness and memory, among other things, and (3) carefully considers objections that later writers—most famously Butler and Reid—made to Locke’s theory. In this endeavor, we’ll be aided by two excellent recent books: Udo Theil’s The Early Modern Subject (2011) and Galen Strawson’s Locke on Personal Identity (2011). Along the way, we’ll devote some time to considering one or two recent neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity. (B)

A major theme in modern philosophy is to try and understand the relationship between our view of ourselves as thinking, feeling creatures experiencing the world with our more scientific view of ourselves as mere biological creatures responding to environmental stimuli in accordance with the laws of physiology, physics and chemistry. Are these two views of human life at odds with each other? If not, why not? We will explore the views of the 20th century French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty on these and related questions, focusing on his seminal work, 'The Structure of Behavior.'

In this dialogue, Plato depicts an attempt to describe the nature of expert political knowledge and to distinguish it from demagoguery and charlatanism. Most of the dialogue proceeds by the method of dialectic and so, in addition to fascinating discussions of the role of law, forms of government, and the relation of political ideals to the imperfection of human life, this dialogue is also an important source for understanding Plato's epistemology and conception of the philosophical life. We will work our way through the text week by week. (IV)

This course will broadly be about the concept of mathematical proof, focusing on the case of geometry, and more specifically, focusing on the works of Euclid. While many mathematicians think of Euclid as the pioneer of the modern axiomatic method, this way of thinking seems somewhat anachronistic. How then should we think of Euclidean proofs? What does a Euclidean proof accomplish, how does it accomplish it, and what does this tell us about the nature of mathematical proof more generally? This course will look both at ancient sources and modern sources as a way of tackling these questions. (II)

This seminar is part of a joint research project (The Idealist Project: Self-Determining Form and the Foundation of the Humanities) sponsored by the Neubauer Collegium. The focus of the year's activities is the topic of aesthetic form. There will be two conferences on this topic with the participation of leading international scholars in Autumn 2016 and Spring 2017, with the conference participants returning for seminar sessions devoted to readings of their work. Particular (but not exclusive) attention will be paid to the theory of tragedy. Important points of reference are works by Goethe, Schelling, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Benjamin, and Cavell. (I)