PHIL

An introduction to the concepts and principles of symbolic logic. We learn the syntax and semantics of truth-functional and first-order quantificational logic, and apply the resultant conceptual framework to the analysis of valid and invalid arguments, the structure of formal languages, and logical relations among sentences of ordinary discourse. Occasionally we will venture into topics in philosophy of language and philosophical logic, but our primary focus is on acquiring a facility with symbolic logic as such.

Students writing senior essays register once for PHIL 29901, in the Autumn Quarter, and once for PHIL 29902, in the Winter Quarter. The Senior Seminar meets for two quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout.

Students writing senior essays register once for PHIL 29901, in the Autumn Quarter, and once for PHIL 29902, in the Winter Quarter. The Senior Seminar meets for two quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout.

In the early part of the 20th Century, novelists from all over Europe converged on the thought that humanity was in some kind of crisis: culture had broken.  In this class, we will read classics of modernist literature by James Joyce, Robert Musil, Fernando Pessoa, Virginia Woolf, Hermann Broch, Wallace Stevens, alongside philosophical and critical texts by William James, Martin Heidegger, Walter Benjamin, Georg Lukacs, Robert Pippin and others.  Our goal will be to try to understand what has changed for us: what is the new problem of the meaning of life?

People differ from one another, and some of those differences really matter—for working together, for understanding each other, and for shaping who we are. Which differences have philosophical significance, and why? This course explores both the obvious social categories—race, gender, class, culture—and the more elusive, fine-grained differences that challenge the conceit of a universal human nature. Drawing on philosophical, sociological, and literary texts, we’ll investigate how conversation can bridge (or deepen) these gaps, ultimately asking what it means to truly understand someone whose experience may be radically unlike our own.

This course is designed to provide MAPH students – especially those interested in pursuing a Ph.D. in Philosophy – with an introduction to some recent debates between philosophers working in the analytic tradition. The course is, however, neither a history of analytic philosophy nor an overview of the discipline as it currently stands. The point of the course is primarily to introduce the distinctive style and method – or styles and methods – of philosophizing in the analytic tradition, through brief explorations of some currently hotly debated topics in the field.

What can reflection upon artificial intelligence teach us about human thought? This question may be asked and understood in many ways. Our concern will be philosophical: the insight we seek is into the nature and structure of thought as it is for the one thinking, as it informs, shapes, or constitutes the life of a thinking being. This course will lay the groundwork for pursuit of our question by (1) introducing and examining the idea of a model of a human intellectual capacity (2) outlining the basic concepts needed for understanding the architecture of the currently most noteworthy form of artificial intelligence—the class of language models known as GPTs, (3) introducing some of the philosophical ideas needed for analyzing the forms of thought that go into human linguistic communication, and finally (4) endeavoring to bring all of these elements together. (B)

As “theoretical reasoning” is the philosopher’s term of art for reasoning about what is true, “practical reasoning” means to name reasoning about what to do. But on the standard conception of the contemporary philosophical literature, there is no real distinction to be drawn here. “Practical reasoning” is just a species of theoretical reasoning, directed to truths about what we are to do. In this seminar, we will explore an older tradition, beginning with Aristotle and running through Hegel and Anscombe, which seeks to make out a much more interesting thought: that practical reasoning takes us not merely to a judgment of the truth of what we are to do, but all the way to the doing itself. Since reasoning is thinking, this conception implies that there is a form of thinking that is also, and equally, acting. We will read a range of texts from both the historical and contemporary literature, with a view toward seeing how we may make good on this difficult idea. And we will consider in a preliminary way the potential bearing of artificial intelligence upon our question. (I)

Aquinas regards justice as the preeminent moral virtue, and in the Summa theologiae he devotes more Questions to it than to any other virtue (II-II, qq. 57-79). With occasional help from other passages of his, and with an eye to his sources (especially Aristotle) and to later thinkers, we will first work through his general accounts of the object of justice (ius—the just or the right), justice as a virtue, the nature of injustice, and the distinction between distributive and commutative justice. Then, as time permits, we will discuss selected texts on more specific topics such as judicature, restitution, partiality, murder, theft, verbal injuries, fraud, and usury. (A)

The third course will cover Marx’s “Paris Manuscripts” (aka “The 1844 Manuscripts,” aka “The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts”) and Marx’s historical writings about France, especially The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and his writings on the Paris Commune.