PHIL

Decisions about medical treatment and medical policy often have profound moral implications. Taught by three philosophers, a physician, and a medical lawyer, this course will examine such issues as paternalism, autonomy, informed consent, assisted suicide, abortion, organ markets, distributive justice in health care, and pandemic ethics. (A)

What is the relationship between physical processes in the brain and body and the processes of thought and consciousness that constitute our mental life? Philosophers and others have puzzled over this question for millennia. Many have concluded it to be intractable. In recent decades, the field of cognitive science--encompassing philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, linguistics, and other disciplines--has proposed a new form of answer. The driving idea is that the interaction of the mental and the physical may be understood via a third level of analysis: that of the computational. This course offers a critical introduction to the elements of this approach, and surveys some of the alternative models and theories that fall within it. Readings are drawn from a range of historical and contemporary sources in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. (B) (II)

An introduction to the most important elements of Heidegger's philosophy, including: his account of the distinctness of human existence, his basic ontological theory, his account of Western modernity, his philosophy of art, and his relation to other philosophers, especially to Nietzsche.

What is philosophy? Is it the inquiry into the fundamental nature of reality? Or is it an inquiry into how we ought to live our lives? Is there progress in philosophy? And is this progress undermined by widespread persistent disagreement? Is there a philosophical method, and should there be one? What is the goal of philosophy? Is it knowledge, understanding, or something else?

A philosopher ought to know what they are up to. Yet, there are about as many metaphilosophical theories as there are philosophical ones. Moreover, metaphilosophy is a branch of philosophy and, as such, philosophical methodology can be informed by philosophical convictions.

The goal of this course is not to find the One True Answer to these questions. It is for you to develop your own answers, so that next time you are at a party and say you study philosophy, you can finally explain what that actually means. (B)

Is the labor movement a proper subject for political philosophy? What would it be to develop a political philosophy of labor unions? In this course, we will explore the relationship of unions to class interests, to ideas of justice and solidarity, and to the critique capitalism. We will consider the contradictions that arise from the fact that unions are institutions embedded in capitalist relations of production, while simultaneously being part of a movement that contests and challenges the terms of those very relations. We will explore the idea that under certain conditions, unions can be conceived of as agents of change involved in political projects oriented to overcoming injustices related to class. Time permitting, we will also explore the complex relationship of class-based political projects to injustices of race and gender.

Aristotle’s Metaphysics is one of the most difficult and rewarding texts in the philosophical tradition. It attempts to lay out the goals, methods, and primary results of a science Aristotle calls “first philosophy.” First philosophy is the study of beings just insofar as they are beings (as opposed to physics, which studies beings insofar as they come to be, pass away, or change), and if completed it would stand as the most fundamental and general science. Our aim will be to understand: if and how such a science is possible, what the principles of such a science are, what being is, which beings are primary, and what are the causes of being qua being. We will discuss the Metaphysics as a whole, but focus on A-B, Γ, Z, Η, Θ, and Λ. Our approach will be “forest,” rather than “tree” oriented, preferring in most cases a coherent overview to close reading. (B)

This course is about the aims of human life. We address the question through two contrasting conceptions of life: 1) life in the sense of an ongoing activity—and its associated values of pleasure, enlightenment, and happiness, and 2) life in the sense of a biographical story—and its associated values of achievement, glory, meaning, and purpose. We will attempt to understand how these two conceptions of life are compatible, and if one or the other is prior. Readings include: Aristotle, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, William James, Bernard Williams, Iris Murdoch, and Jonathan Lear. (A)

This course will explore the problem of other minds, beginning with a comparison of this problem with others to which it is sometimes thought to be closely related. Our first object of comparison in this regard will be with the problem of our knowledge of the external world.  We will explore supposed similarities and differences between other minds and external world skepticism and between various philosophical responses to each. The main asymmetry between these two problems is often held to lie in the idea the that knowing another mind is a matter of knowing a special kind of content. (Human beings are not mere objects. When one knows another mind, one knows a formally distinct kind of object than a mere material thing.) We will also explore the idea that the most fundamental difference between the two problems lies not merely in the content but in the form of the knowledge. This requires treating the problem of other minds as one whose solution requires attention to the second person form—one in which, in the paradigmatic case, two subjects are known to each other. In this connection, we will explore a variety of forms of nexus—linguistic, epistemological, and ethical—in which a pair of subjects can stand in a reciprocal recognitive relation to one another. The primary readings for the course will be from Elizabeth Anscombe, Anita Avramides, Stanley Cavell, John Cook, Vincent Descombes, Martin Gustafsson, Jennifer Hornsby, John McDowell, Richard Moran, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (II)

In this seminar, we will examine the logical and metaphysical writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. We will begin by exploring the metaphysical underpinnings of Leibniz’s calculus of analytic containment, as developed in such essays as General Inquiries into the Analysis of Concepts and Truths (1686) and A Mathematics of Reason (1690). We then consider how Leibniz’s logic informs some of the metaphysical ideas developed in some of Leibniz’s less technical philosophical writings, including Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and On the Ultimate Origination of Things (1697). These distinctive logico-metaphysical conceptions, which give a singular shape to Leibniz’s philosophy, reach their full maturity in his best known essay on metaphysics, the Monadology (1714), with which the seminar will conclude. (IV)

Recent developments in artificial intelligence have brought about a radical reconceptualization of our idea of knowledge work. The model of the laboratory scientist, whose task is to conduct elaborate experiments that probe, in minute detail, the correctness of a theoretical hypothesis, is gradually giving way to that of the data scientist, whose concern is to wrangle massive datasets in an effort to extract from them reliable predictions with only a minimal theoretical guidance. In this course, we will explore some of the epistemological implications of this AI-driven shift in our conception of knowledge and the work that goes into acquiring it. Focusing on applications of artificial intelligence that utilize feed-forward deep neural networks for statistical inference, we will investigate what the shift to "big data" means for our philosophical theories of induction. Are the learning algorithms employed in the training of deep neural networks really "theory free"? If so, why should we trust that their predictions are reliable? How do neural networks purport to solve the curve-fitting problem and Goodman's new riddle of induction, without giving weight to theoretical virtues such as simplicity? Without a background of causal knowledge to structure their inferences, how do neural networks distinguish between causation and mere correlation, and if they cannot, why should we allow their predictions to serve as inputs to a theory of rational decision making? (B) (II)