Winter

This course introduces non-classical extensions and alternatives to classical logic, and the philosophical debates surrounding them. Topics include modal logic (the logic of possibility and necessity), intuitionistic and many-valued logics (in which sentences may be neither true nor false, or both true and false), and relevant logic (which tries to refine the classical concept of entailment to capture the idea that the premises of arguments should be relevant to their conclusions). 

Students will learn tableau-style proof theories and Kripke frame semantics for a variety of non-classical logics, and will discuss adjacent philosophical issues, including the nature of necessity and possibility, the metaphysics of ordinary objects and fictional characters, the nature of truth, and the relationship between the world and the logical theories we use to describe it. (B) (II)

We will read selections of Lucretius' magisterial account of a universe composed of atoms. The focus of our inquiry is: how did Lucretius convert a seemingly dry philosophical doctrine about the physical composition of the universe into a gripping message of personal salvation? The selections include Lucretius' vision of an infinite universe, of heaven, and of the hell that humans have created for themselves on earth.

An introduction to the concepts and principles of symbolic logic. We learn the syntax and semantics of truth-functional and first-order quantificational logic, and apply the resultant conceptual framework to the analysis of valid and invalid arguments, the structure of formal languages, and logical relations among sentences of ordinary discourse. Occasionally we will venture into topics in philosophy of language and philosophical logic, but our primary focus is on acquiring a facility with symbolic logic as such.

Topic: Hegel and Marx: Philosophies of History

This course will survey and compare Hegel’s and Marx’s writings about human history. Questions that will be discussed include: What can philosophical reflection on historical changes reveal? Is there anything necessary (noncontingent) about changes in history? What relation can philosophy have toward the future? Is the philosophy of history a part of practical philosophy? In what ways does Marx’s view differ from Hegel’s philosophy of history? How did Marx’s views on history change over his lifetime? Why are early socialists often thought to have had a technologically deterministic view of human history? What alternative views are available? Can claims of progress in the realization of freedom be defended?

The notion of substance has long been at the center of metaphysical theorizing. Substances are said to be fundamental and independent things, capable of existing on their own, which are the bearers of properties. An account of substance has also been thought central to metaphysics in that the primary sense of ‘being’ is the sense in which substances are beings. But there has been a great deal of controversy over how to give an account of the nature or being of substance, what sorts of things we should count as substances, what we can know of substance, and even whether the notion of substance is intelligible. In this course we will examine a number of influential accounts of substance in medieval, early modern, and contemporary metaphysics. Historical figures we will likely read include Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, Suárez, Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke. Contemporary readings may include texts by Justin Broackes, Kit Fine, Robert Pasnau, Kathrin Koslicki, Michael Della Rocca, and Shamik Dasgupta. (B)

Ontology is, in Quine’s phrase, the study of “what there is.” Ontologists debate the existence and nature of numbers, properties, propositions, ordinary objects, possibilia, and so on. Metaontology asks about the status of this discourse and tries to characterize its goals and prospects. What does it mean to say that something exists? Are there criteria of ‘ontological commitment’? How do the things ontologists debate relate to what ordinary people say? After an historical introduction, the first part of the course will survey a few first-order ontological debates. The remainder of the course will consider varieties of realism and of anti-realism in metaontology. We will read authors such as Rudolf Carnap, W. V. O. Quine, Peter van Inwagen, Ted Sider, Hilary Putnam, and Amie Thomasson. (A)

Perhaps it is better to give than to receive, but exactly how much giving ought one to engage in and to whom or what?  Recent ethical and philosophical developments such as the effective altruism movement suggest that relatively affluent individuals are ethically bound to donate a very large percentage of their resources to worthy causes—for example, saving as many lives as they possibly can, wherever in the world those lives may be.  And charitable giving or philanthropy is not only a matter of individual giving, but also of giving by foundations, corporations, non-profits, non-governmental and various governmental agencies, and other organizational entities that play a very significant role in the modern world.  How, for example, does an institution like the University of Chicago engage in and justify its philanthropic activities?  Can one generalize about the various rationales for philanthropy, whether individual or institutional?  Why do individuals or organizations engage in philanthropy, and do they do so well or badly, for good reasons, bad reasons, or no coherent reasons?

This course will afford a broad, critical philosophical and historical overview of philanthropy, examining its various contexts and justifications, and contrasting charitable giving with other ethical demands, particularly the demands of justice. How do charity and justice relate to each other?  Would charity even be needed in a fully just world?  And does philanthropy in its current forms aid or hinder the pursuit of social justice, in both local and global contexts?  This course will feature a number of guest speakers and be developed in active conversation with the work of the UChicago Civic Knowledge Project and Office of Civic Engagement.  Students will also be presented with some practical opportunities to engage reflectively in deciding whether, why and how to donate a certain limited amount of (course provided) funding. (A)

A survey of the thought of some of the most important figures of the period from the fall of Rome to the Scottish Enlightenment. The course will begin with an examination of the medieval hylomorphism of Aquinas and Ockham and then consider its rejection and transformation in the early modern period. Three distinct early modern approaches to philosophy will be discussed in relation to their medieval antecedents: the method of doubt, the principle of sufficient reason, and empiricism. Figures covered may include Ockham, Aquinas, Descartes, Avicenna, Princess Elizabeth, Émilie du Châtelet, Spinoza, Leibniz, Abelard, Berkeley, Hume, and al-Ghazali.

This is a workshop for 3rd year philosophy graduate students, in which students prepare and workshop materials for their Topical Exam.