Graduate

Issues attending the concepts of negation, limit, and intentionality (construed as thought’s capacity to be answerable to reality) are typically approached in isolation one from another. The course will pursue the contrary hypothesis: namely, that the puzzles arising in connection with these three concepts form a nexus, so that none of them can be comprehended apart from the relations that it entertains with the two others. In order to motivate and substantiate this hypothesis, we will exhume and revive a philosophical tradition that runs from Plato to Wittgenstein through Kant and Sartre and whose defining feature lies in the upholding of this approach. We will examine how the three notions come into play in what Wittgenstein calls “the mystery of negation”: “This is not how things are, and yet we can say how things are not.” Bringing out their nexus requires accounting for the unity and univocity of the concept of negation across two ways of using negation that seem to pull in opposite directions: in the one case, “not-p” makes use of “not” in order to reject p as false (as in “The shirt is not red”), which requires that p lies within the limits of the realm of the intelligible; in the other case, “not-p” makes use of “not” to reject p as nonsensical (as in “The sweet is not a colour”), as if excluding p from the realm of the intelligible. (B)

Readings will include texts by Plato, Maïmonides, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Frege, and Wittgenstein.

The thoughts of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are intertwined throughout their philosophical developments. Both take their departure in phenomenology’s central insight that the mind transcends itself toward the world and the attending dissolution of the false problem of how the mind can hook up onto the world. As Sartre once put it: “Each of us was trying to understand the world insofar as he could, and with the means at his disposal. And we had the same means – then called Husserl and Heidegger – as we were similarly disposed.” (“Merleau-Ponty vivant”) At the same time, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were both dissatisfied with the accounts that Husserl and Heidegger provided of the relations between perception, language and action. German phenomenology, they argue, stumbles over the problems of other minds and history. However, their respective diagnoses are fundamentally divergent, and so are the alternative accounts that they seek to articulate. The aim of the course is to introduce students to the thoughts of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty by attending to the life-long philosophical debate between them. It is driven by the hypothesis that each of the two authors is at once the most penetrating reader and the deepest critic of the other. Although the course will recurrently present their philosophies against the background of concepts and problems bequeathed by the analytic tradition and in the light of recent debates in analytic philosophy (we will revisit the Dreyfus-McDowell debate regarding the place of conceptual capacities in perception, the McDowell-Pippin debate about agency, and contemporary debates about self-knowledge revolving around the so-called “Transparency principle”), it departs from the current analytic reception of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in that it does not confine itself to their early works but delves into their mature works as well.

According to our ordinary thought and talk, many sorts of things can be, and often are, biased: people, groups (the biased committee), inanimate objects (the biased coin), sources of evidence (biased samples, biased testimony, biased surveys), mental states (biased perceptions, biased beliefs), the outcomes of deliberation (biased decisions, biased evaluations), and algorithms. The course will be divided into two parts. In the first part of the course, we will ask what it means to say that someone or something is biased. Among other things, we will ask whether people are biased in the same way as surveys are biased, and whether surveys are biased in the same way as algorithms are biased. In the second part of the course, we will examine some specific forms of bias in reasoning: hindsight bias, confirmation bias, status quo bias, among others. What, exactly, are the cognitive mechanisms underlying these biases? And are they always irrational? 

How did philosophy come to be understood as a special concern with our language? We shall deal with this question by studying some essential chapters in twenty-first-century philosophy (Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Davidson).

Trans experience raises interesting philosophical questions about how people understand and misunderstand each other as gendered beings, how our internal senses of ourselves relate to the way society perceives us, and how to re-imagine our ideas of a good or normal body.  This graduate seminar explores some of these questions through readings in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy that center trans and feminist perspectives. (I)

Epistemology is the study of belief, and addresses questions like “what are we justified in believing?” and “when does a belief count as knowledge?”  This course will provide an overview of Bayesian epistemology, which treats belief as coming in degrees, and addresses questions like “when does rationality require us to be more confident of one proposition than another?", “how should we measure the amount of confirmation that a piece of evidence provides for a theory?”, and “which actions should we choose, based on our judgments about how probable various consequences are?” (B) (II)

This course introduces non-classical extensions and alternatives to classical logic, and the philosophical debates surrounding them. Topics include modal logic (the logic of possibility and necessity), intuitionistic and many-valued logics (in which sentences may be neither true nor false, or both true and false), and relevant logic (which tries to refine the classical concept of entailment to capture the idea that the premises of arguments should be relevant to their conclusions). 

Students will learn tableau-style proof theories and Kripke frame semantics for a variety of non-classical logics, and will discuss adjacent philosophical issues, including the nature of necessity and possibility, the metaphysics of ordinary objects and fictional characters, the nature of truth, and the relationship between the world and the logical theories we use to describe it. (B) (II)

We will read selections of Lucretius' magisterial account of a universe composed of atoms. The focus of our inquiry is: how did Lucretius convert a seemingly dry philosophical doctrine about the physical composition of the universe into a gripping message of personal salvation? The selections include Lucretius' vision of an infinite universe, of heaven, and of the hell that humans have created for themselves on earth.

This course will consist of a focused reading of Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics. Our aim will be to understand Aristotle’s theory of knowledge, the significance of experience, and the nature of reasoning. Readings will include some of the Platonic antecedents of Aristotle’s work, including the Theaetetus and Sophist. (B)

We discuss the nature and philosophical implications of the practice of interpretation, focusing especially on the interpretation of philosophy. We will address questions such as: what is interpretation, and at what does it aim? What counts as success or failure? Is the interpretation of philosophy itself a form of philosophy? What is the ethical significance of interpretation? This course will involve a practical element. In addition to reading texts on the theory of interpretation, we will spend time in and out of class developing interpretations of selected philosophical texts. (B)