Graduate

An introduction to the techniques of modern logic. These include the representation of arguments in symbolic notation, and the systematic manipulation of these representations in order to show the validity of arguments. Regular homework assignments, in class test, and final examination.

Course begins in late Spring quarter and continues in the Autumn quarter.

Aristotle's investigation into the nature of primary being (or substance, ousia) in the middle books of his Metaphysics proceeds against the backdrop of two structural commitments: (i) categorialism; and (ii) the modalities of being, namely actuality and potentiality. Metaphysics È is given over in large measure to (ii), though it proceeds alert to the role of (i) as well. We will proceed in two phases. In the first phase, we will work minutely through every chapter save the last of Metaphysics È, attending closely to the text-elucidating, interpreting, and assessing. In the second phase, we will work through the same text again, now thematically, primarily with a view to understanding four interconnected issues: the natures of potentiality and actuality; the priority of actuality; the role of the modalities in the science of being qua being; and the broader relation between the modalities and categorialism. Naturally these sorts of questions will be in view in our first pass through the text, but we will largely hold them in abeyance until the second pass, we will also make freer use of the entire Aristotelian corpus in our discussions.

Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) was one of the leading figures of mid-20th century Oxford Philosophy. This course will focus on a close reading of his 1949 masterpiece, The Concept of Mind, with its attack on the "category-mistake" of the Cartesian "Myth of the Ghost in the Machine." Attention will be paid to Ryle's metaphilosophical writings and his views on language, his views on knowledge (and the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that), his relation to behaviorism, and his impact on subsequent developments in the philosophy of mind including the token-token identity theory and functionalism. (III)

The Workshop will expose students to cutting-edge work in "general jurisprudence," that part of philosophy of law concerned with the central questions about the nature of law, the relationship between law and morality, and the nature of legal reasoning. We will be particularly interested in the way in which work in philosophy of language, metaethics, metaphysics, and other cognate fields of philosophy has influenced recent scholarly debates that have arisen in the wake of H.L.A. Hart's seminal The Concept of Law (1961). Students who have taken Leiter's "Jurisprudence I" course at the law school are welcome to enroll. Students who have not taken Jurisprudence I need to understand that the several two-hour sessions of the Workshop in the early fall will be required; they will involve reading through and discussing Chapters 1-6 of Hart's The Concept of Law and some criticisms by Ronald Dworkin. This will give all students an adequate background for the remainder of the year. Students who have taken jurisprudence courses elsewhere may contact Prof. Leiter to see if they can be exempted from these sessions based on their prior study. After the prepatory sessions, we will generally meet for one hour the week prior to our outside speakers to go over their essay and to refine questions for the speaker. Confirmed speakers so far include Leslie Green, Stephen Perry, Frederick Schauer, Natalie Stojlar, Mark Murphy, and Kevin Toh.

This course will begin by examining the central writings of the early American Pragmatists, C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. We will compare the early formulations of pragmatism that appear in these works, both against one another other, as well against more recent formulations of pragmatism, as put forward by such philosophers as Putnam, Davidson, and Rorty. (II) (III)

The workshop involves discussion of general issues in writing the essay and student presentations of their work. Although students do not register for the Summer quarter, they are expected to make significant progress on their preliminary essay over the summer.

Key contemporary debates in the philosophical literature often rely on formal tools and techniques that go beyond the material taught in an introductory logic class. A robust understanding of these debates---and, accordingly, the ability to meaningfully engage with a good deal of contemporary philosophy---requires a basic grasp of extensions of standard logic such as modal logic, multi-valued logic, and supervaluations, as well as an appreciation of the key philosophical virtues and vices of these extensions. The goal of this course is to provide students with the required logic literacy. While some basic metalogical results will come into view as the quarter proceeds, the course will primarily focus on the scope (and, perhaps, the limits) of logic as an important tool for philosophical theorizing. (B)

In this course we shall seek to understand Hegel's 1821 book, Elements of the Philosophy of Right. This book is traditionally understood to contain Hegel's "political philosophy," but the book also proposes a metaphysics of human agency, claims about the relation of philosophy to its own historical time, a rejection of utopian political thinking, a theory of crime and punishment, and a theory of the relationship between individual and communal life that he says is based on his "speculative philosophy," and so is "dialectical." In Hegel's terms, the book should be understood as his theory of "objective spirit," and we shall attempt to understand what that subject matter might be. (V)