Philosophy of Science

One can distinguish four ways in which science and aesthetics are related during the last two centuries. First, science has been the subject of artistic effort, in painting and photography and in poetry and novels (e.g., in Goethe’s poetry or in H. G. Wells’s Island of Doctor Moreau). Second, science has been used to explain aesthetic effects (e.g., Helmholtz’s work on the way painters achieve visual effects or musicians achieve tonal effects). Third, aesthetic means have been used to convey scientific conceptions (e.g., through illustrations in scientific volumes or through aesthetically affective and effective writing). Finally philosophers have stepped back to consider the relationship between scientific knowing and aesthetic comprehension (e.g., Kant and Bas van Fraassen). In this course, we will consider these four modes of relationship. The first part of the quarter will be devoted to Kant, reading carefully his third critique; then we will turn to Goethe and Helmholtz, both feeling the impact of Kant, and to Wells, a student of T. H. Huxley. We then consider more contemporary modes expressive of the relationship, especially the role of illustrations in science and the work of contemporary philosophers like Fraassen. (B) (I) (II)

We will begin by trying to explicate the manner in which science is a rational response to observational facts. This will involve a discussion of inductivism, Popper’s deductivism, Lakatos and Kuhn.  After this, we will briefly survey some other important topics in the philosophy of science, including underdetermination, theories of evidence, Bayesianism, the problem of induction, explanation, and laws of nature. (B) (II)

An introductory exploration of some of the central questions in the philosophy of science. These will include: what is (the definition of) a science--such that the natural, formal, and social sciences all count as sciences, but (for example) philosophy and literary criticism do not? How, in the natural sciences, do theory-building and observation relate to each other? Can some of the sciences be reduced to other sciences? (What is reduction of this kind supposed to involve?) What is evidence? What are the old and new problems of induction? What is a scientific (or indeed any other form of) explanation? What is a law of nature? Do the sciences make real progress? (B)

In this seminar will examine the views of the American pragmatist philosopher C.S. Peirce as they pertain to the nature and methodology of science. The course will be organized around a careful reading of the six essays comprising the series “Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” published by Peirce in Popular Science Monthly in the years 1877-78.  Among the many topics addressed in these essays are: (1). What is the aim of scientific inquiry? (2). What are the conditions for the meaningfulness of a scientific hypothesis? (3). What is the role of probability in science (inverse inference vs. hypothesis testing)? (4). Are there natural laws? (5). What are the grounds for inductive inference? (6) How are we to classify the various sciences? In addition to the six essays mentioned above, we will also consider some of Peirce’s later writings on the subject as well as contemporary interpretations of the Peircean view. (II)

This lecture-discussion course will trace different theories of explanation in history from the nineteenth century to the present.  We will examine the ideas of Humboldt, Ranke, Dilthey, Collingwood, Braudel, Hempel, Danto, and White.  The considerations will encompass such topics as the nature of the past such that one can explain its features, the role of laws in historical explanation, the use of Verstehen history as a science, the character of narrative explanation,the structure of historical versus other kinds of explanation, and the function of the footnote. (II)

Core background in evolution and genetics strongly recommended. This course draws on readings and examples form linguistics, evolutionary genetics, and the history and philosophy of science. We elaborate theory to understand and model cultural evolution, as well as explore analogies, differences, and relations to biological evolution. We also consider basic biological, cultural, and linguistic topics and case studies from an evolutionary perspective. Time is spent both on what we do know, and on determining what we don't. (B)

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field in which theories and methods from psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and philosophy are used to study cognition. Computational models play an increasingly significant role in the understanding of cognitive phenomena such as perception, categorization, concept formation, and problem solving. In this course, students will become familiar with some of the methods and models used in cognitive science, and discuss philosophical issues pertaining to the methodology and basic premises of cognitive science. (B)

Topic: Language, Time, and Nature (instructor: M. Teichman)

Many philosophers have thought that studying the way we speak can lead to philosophical insight--that investigating language can itself be a way of doing philosophy.  This tutorial will investigate whether that is a viable endeavor.  We will look at Quine's influential argument to the effect that one can draw philosophical conclusions from linguistic investigations, followed by one its most serious criticisms.  Then, to answer that criticism, we will examine two topics in some depth.  First, through texts by such authors as Leibniz, Russell, Kenny, and Emmon Bach, we will consider whether tense and grammatical aspect have anything to tell us about the nature of time.  Second, through texts by such authors as Aristotle, Kripke, and Carlson, we will consider whether loose commonsense generalizations have anything to tell us about the status of natural or artificial kinds.  We will conclude the course by revisiting the major line of criticism against linguistic philosophy and considering whether, based on these two case studies, there is anything to say in response.

Topic: Rationality and Animal Minds (instructor: A. Browne)

The topic of animal minds has often proved divisive among philosophers.  Rene Descartes claimed that believing brutes think is ``the greatest of all prejudices we have retained from infancy'', while David Hume found no truth more evident than that ``beasts are endow'd with thought and reason as well as men''.  In this course we will be looking at a recent version of this controversy, one that stems from the idea that the concept of rationality should be central to our understanding of the mind and its place in nature. Our main concern will be where the minds of non-rational animals fit in this picture.  Along the way we will consider such questions as what it is to have a mind and how we recognize another, how our intellectual capacities differ from those of other creatures, and why philosophers have been led to say seemingly implausible things about the minds of non-human animals.  Authors we will read include Frege, Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, John McDowell, David Finkelstein, Jason Bridges, Susan Hurley, Elizabeth Camp, Alasdair MacIntrye, and Matthew Boyle.

Topic: Language, Time, and Nature (instructor: M. Teichman)
Many philosophers have thought that studying the way we speak can lead to philosophical insight--that investigating language can itself be a way of doing philosophy.  This tutorial will investigate whether that is a viable endeavor.  We will look at Quine's influential argument to the effect that one can draw philosophical conclusions from linguistic investigations, followed by one its most serious criticisms.  Then, to answer that criticism, we will examine two topics in some depth.  First, through texts by such authors as Leibniz, Russell, Kenny, and Emmon Bach, we will consider whether tense and grammatical aspect have anything to tell us about the nature of time.  Second, through texts by such authors as Aristotle, Kripke, and Carlson, we will consider whether loose commonsense generalizations have anything to tell us about the status of natural or artificial kinds.  We will conclude the course by revisiting the major line of criticism against linguistic philosophy and considering whether, based on these two case studies, there is anything to say in response.

Topic: Rationality and Animal Minds (instructor: A. Browne)

The topic of animal minds has often proved divisive among philosophers.  Rene Descartes claimed that believing brutes think is ``the greatest of all prejudices we have retained from infancy'', while David Hume found no truth more evident than that ``beasts are endow'd with thought and reason as well as men''.  In this course we will be looking at a recent version of this controversy, one that stems from the idea that the concept of rationality should be central to our understanding of the mind and its place in nature. Our main concern will be where the minds of non-rational animals fit in this picture.  Along the way we will consider such questions as what it is to have a mind and how we recognize another, how our intellectual capacities differ from those of other creatures, and why philosophers have been led to say seemingly implausible things about the minds of non-human animals.  Authors we will read include Frege, Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, John McDowell, David Finkelstein, Jason Bridges, Susan Hurley, Elizabeth Camp, Alasdair MacIntrye, and Matthew Boyle.

This lecture-discussion class will focus on a close reading of Darwin's two classic texts. An initial class or two will explore the state of biology prior to Darwin's Beagle Voyage, and then consider the development of his theories before 1859. Then we will turn to his two books. Among the topics of central concern will be: the logical, epistemological, and rhetorical status of Darwin's several theories, especially his evolutionary ethics; the religious foundations of his ideas and the religious reaction to them; and the social-political consequences of his accomplishment. (II) (V)