Philosophy of Mind

What is a mind? How are minds related to bodies, to brains, and to the world? In this course, we take up these central questions of the philosophy of mind. We will consider a range of views about the mind-body problem, such as dualism, behaviorism, physicalism, functionalism, and eliminativism. We will also examine accounts that have been given of particular aspects of our mentality, such as consciousness, perception, personal identity, and the so-called propositional attitudes. Finally, we will conclude by considering artificial intelligence. (B)

(B)

What is the relationship between physical processes in the brain and body and the processes of thought and consciousness that constitute our mental life? Philosophers and others have puzzled over this question for millennia. Many have concluded it to be intractable. In recent decades, the field of cognitive science--encompassing philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, linguistics, and other disciplines--has proposed a new form of answer. The driving idea is that the interaction of the mental and the physical may be understood via a third level of analysis: that of the computational. This course offers a critical introduction to the elements of this approach, and surveys some of the alternative models and theories that fall within it. Readings are drawn from a range of historical and contemporary sources in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. (B) (II)

This course introduces students to issues and questions that have defined scholarship in the philosophy of mind as well as to prominent theories in the field. Starting from Descartes and the articulation of a general “mind-body problem,” we will go on to investigate particular mental phenomena (such as beliefs, emotions, sensations, and intentions) by considering what philosophers have said about them, drawing primarily from the 20th century and the analytic tradition. We will read works in Dualism, Identity-Theory, Functionalism, and Eliminativism. Besides offering a brief survey of the field, this course equips students with the resources for evaluating whether some particular view provides an adequate account of human mindedness. (B)

What is the relationship between physical processes in the brain and body and the processes of thought and consciousness that constitute our mental life? Philosophers and others have puzzled over this question for millennia. Many have concluded it to be intractable. In recent decades, the field of cognitive science--encompassing philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, linguistics, and other disciplines--has proposed a new form of answer. The driving idea is that the interaction of the mental and the physical may be understood via a third level of analysis: that of the computational. This course offers a critical introduction to the elements of this approach, and surveys some of the alternative models and theories that fall within it. Readings are drawn from a range of historical and contemporary sources in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. (B) (II)

What is the relationship between physical processes in the brain and body and the processes of thought and consciousness that constitute our mental life? Philosophers and others have puzzled over this question for millennia. Many have concluded it to be intractable. In recent decades, the field of cognitive science--encompassing philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, linguistics, and other disciplines--has proposed a new form of answer. The driving idea is that the interaction of the mental and the physical may be understood via a third level of analysis: that of the computational. This course offers a critical introduction to the elements of this approach, and surveys some of the alternative models and theories that fall within it. Readings are drawn from a range of historical and contemporary sources in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. (B) (II)

What is the relationship between physical processes in the brain and body and the processes of thought and consciousness that constitute our mental life? Philosophers and others have puzzled over this question for millennia. Many have concluded it to be intractable. In recent decades, the field of cognitive science--encompassing philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, linguistics, and other disciplines--has proposed a new form of answer. The driving idea is that the interaction of the mental and the physical may be understood via a third level of analysis: that of the computational. This course offers a critical introduction to the elements of this approach, and surveys some of the alternative models and theories that fall within it. Readings are drawn from a range of historical and contemporary sources in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. (B) (II)

This will be a course on the problem of other minds. We will try to understand what the problem is supposed to be by considering two formulations of it. One formulation is epistemological and has to do with how we can know (1) that there exist others like oneself, and (2) about those particular others. Another formulation is conceptual and concerns the question of where one gets the idea of another subject. Readings will be from philosophy addressing these topics.

Topic: Conceptions of Self

Who am I? How should we understand ‘the self’ and how do we understand ourselves? Is the self just an illusion? In this course, we will survey a variety of contemporary philosophical treatments of the concept of the self, including no-self theories, the self as a bodily manifestation, narrative accounts of the self, and alienated senses of self which occur in psychopathological cases. In exploring aspects of the self, we will ask: What grounds do we have to construct a notion of the self? How might facets of the self be constituted in experience, by our bodies, or through narratives? How might they be challenged by cases like the rubber hand illusion, schizophrenia, dissociative identity disorder, and autism? Are there wrong ways of being a self or relating to oneself? What belongs within the boundaries of the self? In answering these questions, we will consider how the philosophical arguments we read fit with findings from psychology and psychiatry.

In one of his most widely read pieces of writing—the chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding called “Of Identity and Diversity”—John Locke writes: “[S]ince consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person…” Locke’s account of personal identity has puzzled, annoyed, and inspired readers since it was published in the second edition of his Essay, in 1694. One of our aims in this course will be to find a coherent and attractive reading of it, a reading that takes account of influential objections to it offered by later writers. A related goal—one that will take us beyond the discussion of Locke and his commentators—will be to see what sense and what philosophical use we can make of Locke’s prima facie odd-sounding suggestion that an essential and distinctive feature of persons is a capacity to extend consciousness backwards in time. In pursuing the latter goal, we’ll read and discuss Sigmund Freud’s justly famous “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” as well as regions of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in which the author remarks on the distinctive authority that is exhibited by (some) statements that take a first-person past tense form (e.g., “Last Thursday, I was furious with you”; “For a few months during my senior year of college, I intended to go to law school”; “I meant what I just said as a compliment”). Our aim throughout will be to understand the logical (or grammatical) features of, and relationships between, memory, consciousness, first-person authority, and personhood. (B)