PHIL

Topic: The Principle of Sufficient Reason: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (instructor: A. Pitel)
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is the principle according to which nothing is without a ground or reason why it is, or alternately that every truth or fact is explicable. While the PSR was of central importance to figures in the history of philosophy (most notably Spinoza and Leibniz), it has fallen into philosophical disrepute, as it is alleged that the PSR has (at least) the following unhappy consequences: necessitarianism, modal plenitude, the existence of a self-caused being, and monism. Still, appeals to explicability are pervasive in contemporary philosophy. For example, the view that consciousness is grounded in physical or functional features of the world, or that modality can be understood in terms of existence or linguistic convention, are motivated by the idea that otherwise such phenomena would be inexplicable. However, philosophers today are often happy to make use of appeals to explicability without either accepting the PSR (and its associated baggage) or providing a principled account of what facts must be explicable and what can be inexplicable or merely brute. In this course we will read historical and contemporary work on the PSR, and hopefully say something about whether contemporary philosophy can have its cake and eat it too. We will begin with readings from Spinoza and Leibniz, and then continue into more systematic discussion concerning the relation between the PSR and necessitarianism, monism, and recent literature on grounding and metaphysical explanation. Finally, we will close with a brief discussion of Kant, focusing on the relation between Kant's restriction of legitimate uses of the PSR to objects in space and time and his famous claim that the objects we can know are mere appearances and not things in themselves. In addition to the historical figures mentioned above, we will read work by Robert Adams, Shamik Dasgupta, Michael Della Rocca, Samuel Levey, Martin Lin, Beatrice Longuenesse, Gideon Rosen, Jonathan Schaffer, Anat Schechtman, and Peter Van Inwagen.

Topic: Knowledge in Plato's dialogues (instructor: J. Mendelsohn)

In this course, we will examine the discussions of knowledge (epistēmē in Greek) in Plato's dialogues. The course will center around a close reading of the Theaetetus, Plato's most sustained dialogue on the topic of knowledge, but we will also draw readings from the Meno, Charmides, Sophist, Republic, Phaedo and Protagoras. While knowledge will be our focus, we will find that Plato explores the topic of knowledge by examining a number of related cognitive states and processes, including insight, perception, understanding, inquiry, teaching and learning, justification and expertise. Following Plato, we will consider each of these concepts in turn by reflecting on their treatment in the dialogues. Some of the questions we will ask are: Does Plato defend a theory of knowledge as justified true belief? How is perception related to knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus? Why does Plato think there is a special problem about knowing negative statements? Why does Socrates in the Charmides identify self-knowledge with the virtue of temperance? How does Plato view the relationship between knowledge and understanding? What consequences does this view have for the nature of teaching and learning, and is this view of pedagogy attractive? If we have time, we will go on to look at the reception of some of these themes in Aristotle and the Stoics. We will also draw readings from contemporary epistemology where relevant.

Topic: The Principle of Sufficient Reason: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (instructor: A. Pitel)

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is the principle according to which nothing is without a ground or reason why it is, or alternately that every truth or fact is explicable. While the PSR was of central importance to figures in the history of philosophy (most notably Spinoza and Leibniz), it has fallen into philosophical disrepute, as it is alleged that the PSR has (at least) the following unhappy consequences: necessitarianism, modal plenitude, the existence of a self-caused being, and monism. Still, appeals to explicability are pervasive in contemporary philosophy. For example, the view that consciousness is grounded in physical or functional features of the world, or that modality can be understood in terms of existence or linguistic convention, are motivated by the idea that otherwise such phenomena would be inexplicable. However, philosophers today are often happy to make use of appeals to explicability without either accepting the PSR (and its associated baggage) or providing a principled account of what facts must be explicable and what can be inexplicable or merely brute. In this course we will read historical and contemporary work on the PSR, and hopefully say something about whether contemporary philosophy can have its cake and eat it too. We will begin with readings from Spinoza and Leibniz, and then continue into more systematic discussion concerning the relation between the PSR and necessitarianism, monism, and recent literature on grounding and metaphysical explanation. Finally, we will close with a brief discussion of Kant, focusing on the relation between Kant's restriction of legitimate uses of the PSR to objects in space and time and his famous claim that the objects we can know are mere appearances and not things in themselves. In addition to the historical figures mentioned above, we will read work by Robert Adams, Shamik Dasgupta, Michael Della Rocca, Samuel Levey, Martin Lin, Beatrice Longuenesse, Gideon Rosen, Jonathan Schaffer, Anat Schechtman, and Peter Van Inwagen.

Topic: Knowledge in Plato's dialogues (instructor: J. Mendelsohn)

In this course, we will examine the discussions of knowledge (epistēmē in Greek) in Plato's dialogues. The course will center around a close reading of the Theaetetus, Plato's most sustained dialogue on the topic of knowledge, but we will also draw readings from the Meno, Charmides, Sophist, Republic, Phaedo and Protagoras. While knowledge will be our focus, we will find that Plato explores the topic of knowledge by examining a number of related cognitive states and processes, including insight, perception, understanding, inquiry, teaching and learning, justification and expertise. Following Plato, we will consider each of these concepts in turn by reflecting on their treatment in the dialogues. Some of the questions we will ask are: Does Plato defend a theory of knowledge as justified true belief? How is perception related to knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus? Why does Plato think there is a special problem about knowing negative statements? Why does Socrates in the Charmides identify self-knowledge with the virtue of temperance? How does Plato view the relationship between knowledge and understanding? What consequences does this view have for the nature of teaching and learning, and is this view of pedagogy attractive? If we have time, we will go on to look at the reception of some of these themes in Aristotle and the Stoics. We will also draw readings from contemporary epistemology where relevant.

The philosophical ideas and methods of Immanuel Kant's "critical" philosophy set off a revolution that reverberated through 19th-century philosophy. We will trace the effects of this revolution and the responses to it, focusing in particular on the changing conception of what philosophical ethics might hope to achieve. We will begin with a consideration of Kant's famous Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in which the project of grounding all ethical obligations in the very idea of rational freedom is announced. We will then consider Hegel's radicalization of this project in his Philosophy of Right, which seeks to derive from the idea of rational freedom, not just formal constraints on right action, but a determinate, positive conception of what Hegel calls "ethical life". We will conclude with an examination of three great critics of the Kantian/Hegelian project in ethical theory: Karl Marx, Søren Kierkegaard, and Friedrich Nietzsche.

In this class, we will read selections from Aristotle's major works in metaphysics, logic, psychology and ethics. We will attempt to understand the import of his distinct contributions in all of these central areas of philosophy, and we will also work towards a synoptic view of his system as a whole. There are three questions we will keep in mind and seek to answer as readers of his treatises: (1) What questions is this passage/chapter trying to answer? (2) What is Aristotle's answer? (3) What is his argument that his answer is the correct one?

Play is a pervasive, and often underappreciated, feature of the lives of humans and many other animal species. It's also a lot of fun. In this course, we will consider the nature and significance of play, with a particular focus on the distinctively human form of play called games. The course will focus on three interrelated themes. (1) What are play and games? Drawing on thinkers like Johan Huizinga, Roger Caillois, and Bernard Suits, we will develop a vocabulary that allows us to tackle this question analytically, and to draw salient distinctions between kinds of play and games. We will also ask why humans and other animals play, and what form the answer to that question should take. (2) What is the value of playing? Sen and Nussbaum classify play as one of the basic human capabilities. Suits argues that playing games is central to the ideal human life. In investigating the significance of play to human life, we will also consider the ethics and aesthetics of playing. (3) How can thinking about play cast light on other human activities? Wittgenstein famously talks about linguistic activity in terms of games. Rawls uses games to think more generally about rule-governed institutions. And Huizinga argues that both artistic and religious activities are structurally indistinguishable from play. Could play be even more central to human experience than we suppose?

This is a class addressing the possibility of self-directed ethical change. Can you make yourself into a different person from the person that you are? Some readings from hist. of phil (Kant/ Nietzsche) but mostly contemporary readings from autonomy/moral psychology literature.

This course is an exploration of the analytic tradition in philosophy. We will have three goals. First and foremost, we will philosophize in the analytic style. Second, we will try to get a sense of the history of the tradition, beginning with Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, continuing through the logical positivist and ordinary language movements and the subsequent repudiation of these movements (by Strawson, Rawls, Searle, Nagel, Kripke, Lewis, and many others), and ending with a review of the current state of play. Third (and drawing on the history), we will try to answer these meta-questions: what is distinctive about analytic philosophy? How does it relate to the history of the subject? (Was Descartes an analytic philosopher? If not, why not?) What in the philosophy of Hegel, Bradley and others were Moore and Russell reacting to? What is the difference between analytic and continental philosophy? (Why was Husserl a continental philosopher while Frege--his interlocutor--was not?)

In this class we will investigate what it is for a society to be just. In what sense are the members of a just society equal? What freedoms does a just society protect? Must a just society be a democracy? What economic arrangements are compatible with justice? In the second portion of the class we will consider one pressing injustice in our society in light of our previous philosophical conclusions. Possible candidates include, but are not limited to, racial inequality, economic inequality, and gender hierarchy. Here our goal will be to combine our philosophical theories with empirical evidence in order to identify, diagnose, and effectively respond to actual injustice. (A)

In one of his most widely read pieces of writing—the chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding called “Of Identity and Diversity”—John Locke writes: “[S]ince consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person…” Locke’s theory of personal identity has puzzled, annoyed, and inspired readers since it was published in the second edition of his Essay, in 1694. The main aim of this course will be to arrive at a reading of it that (1) situates it in the context of earlier philosophers’ writings about selves and souls, (2) is informed by an understanding of Locke’s own views concerning consciousness and memory, among other things, and (3) carefully considers objections that later writers—most famously Butler and Reid—made to Locke’s theory. In this endeavor, we’ll be aided by two excellent recent books: Udo Theil’s The Early Modern Subject (2011) and Galen Strawson’s Locke on Personal Identity (2011). Along the way, we’ll devote some time to considering one or two recent neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity. (B)

A major theme in modern philosophy is to try and understand the relationship between our view of ourselves as thinking, feeling creatures experiencing the world with our more scientific view of ourselves as mere biological creatures responding to environmental stimuli in accordance with the laws of physiology, physics and chemistry. Are these two views of human life at odds with each other? If not, why not? We will explore the views of the 20th century French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty on these and related questions, focusing on his seminal work, 'The Structure of Behavior.'