PHIL

Thomas Aquinas is sometimes labeled an “intellectualist,” because of the priority that he assigns to intellect or reason in human life. Nevertheless he treats love as a fundamental principle, not only of human life but of absolutely all life and even all reality, and he thought and wrote extensively about it.  In this course we will read and discuss sizeable passages, from several of his works, concerning the nature of love in general, its various kinds, its causes and effects, how it exists in different subjects — human, angelic, divine, and even non-rational — and what it has to do with morality, virtue, and happiness. As regards the history of the topic, the we shall especially want to consider how Aquinas’s thought on love relates to that of Aristotle and to the Platonic tradition. (A)

Any language contains terms that apply truly, and in the same sense, to indefinitely many things; for instance, species- or genus-terms, such as hippopotamus or animal. How things admit of such “universal” terms has engaged philosophers ever since Plato, who proposed participation in the forms. In the third century, the Neoplatonist Porphyry wrote an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, in which he raised, but did not even try to answer, three metaphysical questions: whether genera and species are real or only posited in thoughts; whether, if real, they are bodies or incorporeal; and whether, if real, they are separate entities or belong to sensible things. At the beginning of the medieval period, another Neoplatonic thinker, Boethius, took up Porphyry’s questions. He offered a strict definition of universals, explained the difficulty of the questions, and proposed (without fully subscribing to) what he took to be Aristotle’s way of answering them. Boethius’s treatment oriented the approach to universals by philosophers up through the 12th century. The tools at their disposal, however, were mostly those provided by ancient logical works; and perhaps for this reason, the discussion reached a kind of impasse. But then there appeared translations of numerous hitherto unknown writings of Aristotle and Arab thinkers. Aristotle’s hylomorphism and his doctrine of (what came to be called) abstraction, together with the notion of “common nature” proposed by Avicenna (also a Neoplatonist), seemed to show a way out of the impasse. But they also raised new questions of their own—partly because of their sheer difficulty, and partly because of theological pressures, in the late 1200s, against the standard Aristotelian account of individuation by “matter.” The topic of universals thus tracks various other prominent themes in medieval metaphysics. We will look at background passages in Aristotle and Porphyry, and study texts of some of the most important authors, including Boethius, Abelard, Avicenna, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham. (B) (III)

What is the relationship between physical processes in the brain and body and the processes of thought and consciousness that constitute our mental life? Philosophers and others have puzzled over this question for millenia. Many have concluded it to be intractable. In recent decades, the field of cognitive science--encompassing philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, linguistics and other disciplines--has proposed a new form of answer.  The driving idea is that the interaction of the mental and the physical may be understood via a third level of analysis: that of the computational. This course offers a critical introduction to the elements of this approach, and surveys some of the alternatives models and theories that fall within it. Readings are drawn from a range of historical and contemporary sources in philosophy, psychology, linguistics and computer science. (B) (II)

This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters.

This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters.

In this seminar we engage in an in-depth examination of a focused philosophical topic—in a manner akin to that of a graduate seminar. Readings are challenging, but there is no presumption of prior expertise in the course topic.

We will be interested in the special and problematic notion of an attitude toward the world as a whole, and in some questions that arise in contexts where people face what they experience as the end of their world or its vulnerability to destruction.  Readings will include texts from Freud, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, as well as more contemporary readings from Cora Diamond, Jonathan Lear, Brian O’Shaughnessy, and others.

This will be a careful reading of what is widely regarded as the greatest work of modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Our principal aims will be to understand the problems Kant seeks to address and the significance of his famous doctrine of "transcendental idealism". Topics will include: the role of mind in the constitution of experience; the nature of space and time; the relation between self-knowledge and knowledge of objects; how causal claims can be justified by experience; whether free will is possible; the relation between appearance and reality; the possibility of metaphysics. (B) (IV)

Moral philosophers have approached their subject, the virtuous life, from different perspectives. More specifically, the ancients ask: What constitutes, and what kind of conduct advances, our happiness? while the moderns tend to ask: How is it right, or our duty, to act? The two perspectives may lead to very similar conceptions of what to do and what not to do. Nevertheless, not only as philosophers, but as agents, too, we seem to approach the project of living well quite differently, depending on whether we prefix it by should or would. – This course is to examine what is involved in the basically Aristotelian view that happiness is the central idea that ought to guide both ethical enquiry and moral orientation. What, then, do we mean by the word? What might happiness consist in – and how can we know this? Can it be attained in this life? Is good conduct conducive to it, or could it even consist in good conduct? Can the “quest for happiness” be a source of moral obligation? Does it not rather, at least occasionally, mean egoism and compete with the dictates of conscience? What do you ultimately mean to live for? – These and related questions will be discussed against the background of (chiefly contemporary) readings. (A) (I) (IV)

Emotions figure in many areas of the law, and many legal doctrines (from reasonable provocation in homicide to mercy in criminal sentencing) invite us to think about emotions and their relationship to reason.   In addition, some prominent theories of the limits of law make reference to emotions. (Thus Lord Devlin and, more recently, Leon Kass have argued that the disgust of the average member of society is a sufficient reason for rendering a practice illegal, even though it does no harm to others.  J. S. Mill and Herbert Hart argue against this view, but preserve a role for some emotions in the law.) Emotions, however, are all too rarely studied closely, with the result that both theory and doctrine are often confused.  

The first part of this course will study major theories of emotion, asking about the relationship between emotion and cognition, focusing on philosophical accounts, but also learning from anthropology, psychology, and psychoanalytic thought.  We will ask how far emotions embody cognitions, and of what type, and then we will ask whether there is reason to consider some or all emotions “irrational” in a normative sense. 

We then turn to the criminal law and select areas of constitutional law, asking how specific emotions figure in doctrine and theory: anger, fear, compassion, disgust, guilt, and shame. Legal areas considered will include self-defense, reasonable provocation, mercy, victim impact statements, sodomy laws, sexual harassment, shame-based punishments, equal protection, the role of constitutions in warding off fear, shame, and stigma.

Other topics will be included as time permits. (A) (I)