Philosophy of Science

Cognitive science studies how minds work by integrating insights from psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, computer science, and anthropology. This interdisciplinary approach raises questions about what counts as an explanation of cognition, how different kinds of models hang together, and how empirical findings bear on philosophical theories of mind.

 The course will begin by examining the behaviorist program, which aimed to explain cognition without appeal to internal mental states, focusing instead on observable stimulus–response patterns. We will consider its motivations and limitations, before turning to the rise of representational theories of mind. These theories explain cognition in terms of internal mental states that represent aspects of the world. They also emphasize the ways these representations can be transformed to guide thought and behavior.

 Topics will include the nature of representation in cognitive science, Marr’s three levels of explanation, the language of thought hypothesis, the role of computational models—including large language models—in cognitive science, the boundary between perception and cognition, and the promises and perils of evolutionary approaches to the mind.

 If time permits, the course will also explore alternative approaches to the study of mind—such as Freud’s psychoanalytic framework and Slime Mold Time Mold’s “The Mind in the Wheel”—as case studies for assessing what counts as a legitimate paradigm in the science of mind. (B)

Ever since the establishment of modern science, a central topic of discussion is whether and how scientific reasoning differs from political, moral, or philosophical reasoning. One of the traditionally identified unique features of science is its ‘ideal’ of being ‘value-free’. The value-free ideal of science states that scientific reasoning from evidence to theory should not be influenced by social, political, or moral values. In recent decades numerous philosophers of science have concerted that the value-free ideal of science is neither attainable nor desirable. Some of the motivations for this criticism are to promote traditionally underrepresented perspectives such as feminism in science and to rethink the social and moral responsibilities of scientists beyond those understood under scientific integrity. The main upshot of this critique is that scientific objectivity must be redefined in a way that does not imply value-freedom. This course will give an outlook on the central ideas and concepts in the science and values debate and beyond it. The core philosophical discussion will focus on the main arguments for the untenability or undesirability of the value-free ideal and their criticisms. The broader context of discussion will include topics such as the science-society relationship, how scientific expertise and scientifically informed policy relates to democratic governance, public trust in science, and misinformation. Some of the questions that this course aims to answer are:

What features of scientific reasoning makes it open/closed to the influence of social, political, or moral values?

Can science be objective without being value-free?

Is the value-free ideal of science attainable?

In which ways is the value-free ideal of science desirable/undesirable?

Is there a clear-cut distinction between scientific and social values?

Should scientific reasoning take the societal implications of research into account?

Should socially-relevant research be governed by special norms?

What is the significance of the objective image of scientific inquiry for public trust in science? (B)

This class will be a survey of major themes in contemporary philosophy of science. Topics will include inductivism, Popper's deductivism, Kuhn’s conception of science, and Bayesianism. Towards the end of the course as a case study we will look at the debate about whether the existence of multiple universes should be considered a genuine scientific hypothesis. (B)

The topic of this class is feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. Questions we will consider include: Is rationality gendered? Are scientific conceptions of objectivity ‘masculine’? What could it mean to make such claims and how could they be justified? What should a feminist conception of knowledge look like? In addressing those questions we will explore the numerous ways that gender, gender roles, and gender identity influence the construction of knowledge and the representation of objectivity. We will investigate competing views about knowledge construction—specifically, empiricism, standpoint theory, and postmodernism—by considering, among other things, how they have informed empirical research in the social sciences, biology, and medicine. A few of the authors we will read are: Sandra Harding, Evelyn Fox Keller, Helen Longino, Louise Antony, Sally Haslanger, Donna Haraway,  Patricia Hill Collins, Catherine MacKinnon, Maria Lugones, and Oshadi Mangena. (B)

This lecture-discussion course will consider the main figures in the history of biology, from the Hippocratics and Aristotle to Darwin and Mendel. The philosophic issues will be the kinds of explanations appropriate to biology versus the other physical sciences, the status of teleological considerations, and the moral consequences for human beings. (B) (II)

This course introduces some of the most important and influential accounts of science to have been produced in modern times. It provides an opportunity to discover how philosophers, historians, anthropologists, and sociologists have grappled with the scientific enterprise, and to assess critically how successful their efforts have been. Authors likely include Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Robert Merton, Steven Shapin, and Bruno Latour. (B)

In this class we examine some of the conceptual problems associated with quantum mechanics. We will critically discuss some common interpretations of quantum mechanics, such as the Copenhagen interpretation, the many-worlds interpretation and Bohmian mechanics. We will also examine some implications of results in the foundations of quantum theory concerning non-locality, contextuality and realism. (B) (II)

We will begin by trying to explicate the manner in which science is a rational response to observational facts. This will involve a discussion of inductivism, Popper's deductivism, Lakatos and Kuhn. After this, we will briefly survey some other important topics in the philosophy of science, including underdetermination, theories of evidence, Bayesianism, the problem of induction, explanation, and laws of nature. (B) (II)

This lecture-discussion course will examine Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's intellectual development, from the time he wrote Sorrows of Young Werther through the final states of Faust. Along the way, we will read a selection of Goethe's plays, poetry, and travel literature. We will also examine his scientific work, especially his theory of color and his morphological theories. On the philosophical side, we will discuss Goethe's coming to terms with Kant (especially the latter's third Critique) and his adoption of Schelling's transcendental idealism. The theme uniting the exploration of the various works of Goethe will be unity of the artistic and scientific understanding of nature, especially as he exemplified that unity in "the eternal feminine." (B) (IV)

This course introduces some of the most important and influential accounts of science to have been produced in modern times. It provides an opportunity to discover how philosophers, historians, anthropologists, and sociologists have grappled with the scientific enterprise, and to assess critically how successful their efforts have been. Authors likely include Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Robert Merton, Steven Shapin, and Bruno Latour. (B)