Philosophy of Mind

This lecture-discussion course will trace the development of psychology from the early modern period through the establishment of behaviorism in the 20th century. In the early period, we will read Descartes and Berkeley, both of whom contributed to ideas about the psychology of perception. Then we will jump to the 19th century, especially examining the perceptual psychology in the laboratory of Wundt, and follow some threads of the development of cognitive psychology in the work of William James. The course will conclude with the behavioristic revolution inaugurated by Chicago's own John Watson and expanded by B. F. Skinner. (II)

Topic: Language, Time, and Nature (instructor: M. Teichman)

Many philosophers have thought that studying the way we speak can lead to philosophical insight--that investigating language can itself be a way of doing philosophy.  This tutorial will investigate whether that is a viable endeavor.  We will look at Quine's influential argument to the effect that one can draw philosophical conclusions from linguistic investigations, followed by one its most serious criticisms.  Then, to answer that criticism, we will examine two topics in some depth.  First, through texts by such authors as Leibniz, Russell, Kenny, and Emmon Bach, we will consider whether tense and grammatical aspect have anything to tell us about the nature of time.  Second, through texts by such authors as Aristotle, Kripke, and Carlson, we will consider whether loose commonsense generalizations have anything to tell us about the status of natural or artificial kinds.  We will conclude the course by revisiting the major line of criticism against linguistic philosophy and considering whether, based on these two case studies, there is anything to say in response.

Topic: Rationality and Animal Minds (instructor: A. Browne)

The topic of animal minds has often proved divisive among philosophers.  Rene Descartes claimed that believing brutes think is ``the greatest of all prejudices we have retained from infancy'', while David Hume found no truth more evident than that ``beasts are endow'd with thought and reason as well as men''.  In this course we will be looking at a recent version of this controversy, one that stems from the idea that the concept of rationality should be central to our understanding of the mind and its place in nature. Our main concern will be where the minds of non-rational animals fit in this picture.  Along the way we will consider such questions as what it is to have a mind and how we recognize another, how our intellectual capacities differ from those of other creatures, and why philosophers have been led to say seemingly implausible things about the minds of non-human animals.  Authors we will read include Frege, Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, John McDowell, David Finkelstein, Jason Bridges, Susan Hurley, Elizabeth Camp, Alasdair MacIntrye, and Matthew Boyle.

Topic: Language, Time, and Nature (instructor: M. Teichman)
Many philosophers have thought that studying the way we speak can lead to philosophical insight--that investigating language can itself be a way of doing philosophy.  This tutorial will investigate whether that is a viable endeavor.  We will look at Quine's influential argument to the effect that one can draw philosophical conclusions from linguistic investigations, followed by one its most serious criticisms.  Then, to answer that criticism, we will examine two topics in some depth.  First, through texts by such authors as Leibniz, Russell, Kenny, and Emmon Bach, we will consider whether tense and grammatical aspect have anything to tell us about the nature of time.  Second, through texts by such authors as Aristotle, Kripke, and Carlson, we will consider whether loose commonsense generalizations have anything to tell us about the status of natural or artificial kinds.  We will conclude the course by revisiting the major line of criticism against linguistic philosophy and considering whether, based on these two case studies, there is anything to say in response.

Topic: Rationality and Animal Minds (instructor: A. Browne)

The topic of animal minds has often proved divisive among philosophers.  Rene Descartes claimed that believing brutes think is ``the greatest of all prejudices we have retained from infancy'', while David Hume found no truth more evident than that ``beasts are endow'd with thought and reason as well as men''.  In this course we will be looking at a recent version of this controversy, one that stems from the idea that the concept of rationality should be central to our understanding of the mind and its place in nature. Our main concern will be where the minds of non-rational animals fit in this picture.  Along the way we will consider such questions as what it is to have a mind and how we recognize another, how our intellectual capacities differ from those of other creatures, and why philosophers have been led to say seemingly implausible things about the minds of non-human animals.  Authors we will read include Frege, Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, John McDowell, David Finkelstein, Jason Bridges, Susan Hurley, Elizabeth Camp, Alasdair MacIntrye, and Matthew Boyle.

Note: This course meets twice a week during weeks 1-6.  In this class we will draw together work on vagueness that has been done, over the last forty years, within philosophy, linguistics and formal logic. The overarching aim is to develop a coherent picture of what may appear to be (increasingly) diverging approaches to a single central theme.  Among those from whose work we will draw are (in alphabetical, not thematic, order): Dummett, Edgington, Fine, Graff-Fara, Greenough, Raffman, Shapiro, Van Rooy, Varzi, Williamson, Wright.  I will also draw on my own work, distant as well as more recent.  Through much of the course the context dependence of vague predicates will play a prominent part.  Students enrolled in the course will be expected to write an essay (of about 3000 words), which will be due at the end of the quarter. (II)

This course will introduce students to the basic ideas of psychoanalysis -- the unconscious, transference, fantasy, acting out, repetition -- in the context of the traditional philosophical questions of what it is to be a human being and what the good life is for humans. Extensive reading from Freud as well as selections from Plato, Aristotle, Sartre and others.

Topic: Relativism and Universalism (instructor: A. Luboff)
Are our normative claims about what is good, what is right, even what is true, constrained to a particular culture, or way of life?  Or, are there universal principles to which all people, of all places and times, either (implicitly or explicitly) adhere, or should adhere? In this course, we will examine the rich, complex relationship between these two views, relativism and universalism.  Our readings will draw from both philosophy and anthropology, giving us the opportunity to consider closely the interplay between theory, examples and context. Authors include M. Krausz, D. Wong, C. Geertz, R. Shweder and M. Nussbaum.

Topic: Knowledge and the Concept of Mind (instructor: N. Koziolek)

What is knowledge? How do we acquire it? Do we really have any? These are, typically, taken to be the central questions of epistemology, i.e., the theory of knowledge. But attempts to answer them are intimately connected with the arguably broader issue of how to understand the nature of the mind. Different conceptions of mind suggest different answers to these questions, different answers—indeed, even approaches—to these questions encourage different conceptions of mind. In this course, we will trace out some of the connections between epistemology and philosophy of mind as they appear in the history of epistemology, with a focus on the late twentieth century. We will consider both the analytic approach to epistemology instituted by Edmund Gettier, including the now well-known criticisms of the approach due to Timothy Williamson, as well as the more historically oriented approach represented in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and his followers, including Donald Davidson and John McDowell.

Topic: Relativism and Universalism (instructor: A. Luboff)
Are our normative claims about what is good, what is right, even what is true, constrained to a particular culture, or way of life?  Or, are there universal principles to which all people, of all places and times, either (implicitly or explicitly) adhere, or should adhere? In this course, we will examine the rich, complex relationship between these two views, relativism and universalism.  Our readings will draw from both philosophy and anthropology, giving us the opportunity to consider closely the interplay between theory, examples and context. Authors include M. Krausz, D. Wong, C. Geertz, R. Shweder and M. Nussbaum.

Topic: Knowledge and the Concept of Mind (instructor: N. Koziolek)

What is knowledge? How do we acquire it? Do we really have any? These are, typically, taken to be the central questions of epistemology, i.e., the theory of knowledge. But attempts to answer them are intimately connected with the arguably broader issue of how to understand the nature of the mind. Different conceptions of mind suggest different answers to these questions, different answers—indeed, even approaches—to these questions encourage different conceptions of mind. In this course, we will trace out some of the connections between epistemology and philosophy of mind as they appear in the history of epistemology, with a focus on the late twentieth century. We will consider both the analytic approach to epistemology instituted by Edmund Gettier, including the now well-known criticisms of the approach due to Timothy Williamson, as well as the more historically oriented approach represented in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and his followers, including Donald Davidson and John McDowell.