PHIL

This lecture-discussion course will examine Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's intellectual development, from the time he wrote Sorrows of Young Werther through the final states of Faust. Along the way, we will read a selection of Goethe's plays, poetry, and travel literature. We will also examine his scientific work, especially his theory of color and his morphological theories. On the philosophical side, we will discuss Goethe's coming to terms with Kant (especially the latter's third Critique) and his adoption of Schelling's transcendental idealism. The theme uniting the exploration of the various works of Goethe will be unity of the artistic and scientific understanding of nature, especially as he exemplified that unity in "the eternal feminine." (B) (IV)

This course introduces some of the most important and influential accounts of science to have been produced in modern times. It provides an opportunity to discover how philosophers, historians, anthropologists, and sociologists have grappled with the scientific enterprise, and to assess critically how successful their efforts have been. Authors likely include Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Robert Merton, Steven Shapin, and Bruno Latour. (B)

This lecture-discussion class will focus on a close reading of Darwin's two classic texts. An initial class or two will explore the state of biology prior to Darwin's Beagle voyage, and then consider the development of his theories before 1859. Then we will turn to his two books. Among the topics of central concern will be the logical, epistemological, and rhetorical status of Darwin's several theories, especially his evolutionary ethics; the religious foundations of his ideas and the religious reaction to them; and the social-political consequences of his accomplishment. The year 2019 was the 210th anniversary of Darwin's birth and the 160th anniversary of the publication of On the Origin of Species. (B) (IV)

This course combines economic theory (the theory of the firm), legal theory (labor law), and labor history, with political philosophy to examine questions of justice for workers that are often ignored in academic political philosophy. The course begins by considering very basic questions from economic theory, including what markets are, and why production in the economy is organized through firms, and what economists have to say about why firms are arranged so hierarchically. Given this background, we next turns to consider injustices at the work, including worker domination, exploitation, and the casualization of employment. We consider responses including universal basic income that decouples access to goods from work; worker organization and resistance through the labor movement and tools such as collective bargaining; and finally, the reorganization of the economy to foster either shared control over firms or worker cooperatives. Along the way we consider the right to strike, the connection of race and labor, and different visions of a more just future for workers. (A)

This course explores how the theory of justice relates to political practice and change. We will examine different theories about the relationship of theory to practice, including utopianism, system failure analysis, and pragmatism. We will consider what role both the idea of a just society and an analysis of the unjust status quo plays in our theorizing about justice. Among topics to be explored include the role of the utopian horizon in practice; how to be a realist without being a cynic; whether the addressee of political philosophy is universal or particular; what the role of the oppressed is in both theorizing and bringing change; and how the political philosopher relates to agents of change. Along the way we will engage with thinkers such as Erik Olin Wright, G.A. Cohen, Elizabeth Anderson, Tommie Shelby, David Estlund, and Pablo Gilabert. Time permitting we may also examine a few historical texts that engage directly with these questions, including Aristotle, Kant, Marx, and Lukács. (A) (I)

In this class we explore the philosophical foundations of human rights, investigating theories of how our shared humanity in the context of an interdependent world gives rise to obligations of justice. Webegin by asking what rights are, how they are distinguished from other part of morality, and what role they play in our social and political life. But rights come in many varieties, and we are interested in human rights in particular. In later weeks, we will ask what makes something a human right, and how are human rights different from other kinds of rights. We will consider a number of contemporary philosophers (and one historian) who attempt to answer this question, including James Griffin, Joseph Raz, John Rawls, John Tasioulas, Samuel Moyn, Jiewuh Song, and Martha Nussbaum. Throughout we will be asking questions such as, "What makes something a human right?" "What role does human dignity play in grounding our human rights?" "Are human rights historical?" "What role does the nation and the individual play in our account of human rights?" "When can one nation legitimately intervene in the affairs of another nation?" "How can we respect the demands of justice while also respecting cultural difference?" "How do human rights relate to global inequality and markets?" (A) (I)

This course examines the conception of language of the early Wittgenstein though the lens of six common distinctions in the philosophy of language: (1) meaningful sentences vs. meaningful words; (2) semantic content vs. syntactical form; (3) meaningful signs vs. signs; (4) act vs. content; (5) forceful vs. forceless content; and (6) language vs. thought. We will see that the Tractatus challenges familiar ways of construing these distinctions. Specifically, it rejects the view that the second term of each distinction is the conceptually more basic case, while the first term is a composite phenomenon obtained by adding some extra ingredient to the second term. Rather, the second term of each pair, insofar as it is a genuine phenomenon, presupposes in various different ways the other term (sometimes because it is only an abstraction, sometimes because it is a derivative phenomenon, and sometimes because its specification involves derivative notions), or has instead exactly the same status (as in the case, arguably, of language and inner thought). This means that the Tractatus opposes the idea that the full-blown phenomenon of language (that is, language used by some speaker to say something that makes sense) can be reconstructed from a number of more fundamental ingredients. Rather, the full-blown phenomenon of language is the starting point in terms of which each of the aforementioned distinctions, if at all defensible, can be properly vindicated. (B) (IV)

Words, it might seem, are for saying things, communicating bits of information. And, of course, they are for that. However, there all sorts of things that we can do with the use of language that go beyond simply saying things. We can, for instance, make a promise, forbid someone from doing something, or exclude someone from our community. These are all different kinds of “speech acts” we might perform, and they form the topic of speech act theory. This class, a venture into speech act theory, will look at these different types of speech acts while seeking to develop a unified framework for thinking about them based on the thought, variously spelled out by the theorists we’ll read, that speech acts work by shifting the norms to which speakers take themselves to be bound. We will start with the philosophical foundations of speech act theory, starting with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein before turning to J.L. Austin’s seminal How to Do Things with Words. We will then turn to contemporary developments of speech act theory, focusing on one area where it has been most fruitfully applied and developed in recent years: social, and especially feminist, philosophy. Specific topics in this latter part of the course will include silencing and other forms of discursive injustice, consent and other kinds of sexual negotiation, derogatory, exclusionary, and oppressive speech, acts of protest, and expressions of solidarity, with work from Rae Langton, Jennifer Hornsby, Jennifer Saul, Quill Kukla, Mary Kate McGowan, Cassie Herbert, Matthew Chrisman, Graham Hubbs, and Mark Lance among others.

How do we know whether our perceptual experiences really are of a real world outside of us? What determines the identity of a person over time? What does it take to be conscious, and how can we tell whether someone or something is? Could radically different languages lead to radically different forms of experience and thought? These are key questions in the philosophical fields of epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, and Philosophy of Language. In this course, we’ll explore these questions (and more) as they arise in works of science fiction and consider the main philosophical proposals for tackling them with an eye to these works. The main works with which we’ll engage will be the films “The Matrix,” “Moon,” “Ex Machina,” and “Arrival,” though there will be many supplementary works of science fiction. Philosophical readings will be drawn from both historical and contemporary sources. (B)

Is love, in the deepest sense of the word, something that occurs only between “persons”? Contemporary philosophers often think so. And they tend to understand “personhood”, moreover, in terms of the possession of the special psychological capacity for self-reflective reasoning. But this conception of personhood notably excludes some cognitively disabled humans, infant humans, and non-human animals from the category of “persons”. This raises the questions: who can love, and who can be loved? To answer these questions, we will put some influential philosophical conceptions of love and “personhood” into conversation with other contemporary philosophical work, as well as personal memoirs, literature, and film, that speak to the possibility of loving “non-persons”: infants, neonates, and fetuses; the severely cognitively disabled; and non-human animals. (A)