PHIL

In one of his most widely read pieces of writing—the chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding called “Of Identity and Diversity”—John Locke writes: “[S]ince consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person…” Locke’s account of personal identity has puzzled, annoyed, and inspired readers since it was published in the second edition of his Essay, in 1694. One of our aims in this course will be to find a coherent and attractive reading of it, a reading that takes account of influential objections to it offered by later writers. A related goal—one that will take us beyond the discussion of Locke and his commentators—will be to see what sense and what philosophical use we can make of Locke’s prima facie odd-sounding suggestion that an essential and distinctive feature of persons is a capacity to extend consciousness backwards in time. In pursuing the latter goal, we’ll read and discuss Sigmund Freud’s justly famous “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” as well as regions of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in which the author remarks on the distinctive authority that is exhibited by (some) statements that take a first-person past tense form (e.g., “Last Thursday, I was furious with you”; “For a few months during my senior year of college, I intended to go to law school”; “I meant what I just said as a compliment”). Our aim throughout will be to understand the logical (or grammatical) features of, and relationships between, memory, consciousness, first-person authority, and personhood. (B)

This course explores the role that mathematics plays in Plato's philosophy with a special focus on the concept of incommensurability. We will be reading Platonic dialogues in which mathematical practice figures prominently and our goal will be to inquire into the ways that mathematical practice is similar to philosophical practice and the ways it can serve as a useful exemplar. We will also inquire into the ways that mathematics falls short of philosophy, which will give us a better sense of what the philosophical goals are. Finally, we will consider the challenges presented by mathematical incommensurability and we will investigate the ways that this concept is appropriated by Plato for philosophical purposes.

Texts will include: Meno, Republic 5-7, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Statesman. We will read some secondary literature on Plato (e.g. S. Menn, H. Benson, T. Echterling) and on the mathematics of the time (W. Knorr, J. Klein) but not every time. (B)

Paradoxes are conflicts in our own thought. Many of the most fundamental, frustrating, disturbing, and exciting concerns in philosophy and the sciences are to be found where paradoxes arise. In this course we will investigate paradoxes in logic, in metaphysics, in ethics, in action theory, in epistemology, and elsewhere. We will also try to understand the nature and sources of paradox—since the very possibility of paradoxes is, itself, a paradox. (B)

Wittgenstein describes the theory of what cannot be said by means of propositions but is only shown as ‘the cardinal problem of philosophy.’ We shall ask how can the notion of showing, which is not familiar from tradition, can be regarded as the cardinal concern of philosophy. We shall discuss traditional accounts of philosophical understanding (e.g., Plato’s theory of form of the Good, Aristotle’s account of the Nous of simples, Absolute Idealism) in light of ‘the theory of what cannot be said but shown.’

The aim of the course will be to consider some of the most influential treatments of skepticism in the post-war analytic philosophical tradition—in relation both to the broader history of philosophy and to current tendencies in contemporary analytic philosophy. The first part of the course will begin by distinguishing two broad varieties of skepticism—Cartesian and Kantian—and their evolution over the past two centuries (students without any prior familiarity with both Descartes and Kant will be at a significant disadvantage here), and will go on to isolate and explore some of the most significant variants of each of these varieties in recent analytic philosophy.  The second part of the course will involve a close look at recent influential analytic treatments of skepticism. It will also involve a brief look at various versions of contextualism with regard to epistemological claims.  We will carefully read and critically evaluate writings on skepticism by the following authors: J. L. Austin, Robert Brandom, Stanley Cavell, Thompson Clarke, Saul Kripke, C. I. Lewis, John McDowell, H. H. Price, Hilary Putnam, Barry Stroud, Charles Travis, Michael Williams, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (B) (II)

The topic of this course is Karl Marx's theory of socio-economic class. Its purpose is to gain insight into Marx's claim that understanding classes helps us understand politics. Though it is one of the topics for which his name is most remembered, his view of class is often misrepresented. For instance, it is often said that, for Marx, capitalist society consists of only two classes—the so-called proletariat (workers) and the bourgeoisie (capitalists). Like classical economists before him and heterodox economists after him, however, Marx believes that modern societies consist of at least three classes: workers, capitalists, and landlords or rentiers, as well as other marginalized groups. And he even disaggregates those classes into the smaller groups which constitute them (e.g., productive and unproductive labor; industrial, commercial, and financial capital, etc.). By examining selections from his mature political-economic writings, we will reconstruct Marx's theory of social classes and consider his application of that theory in some of his significant case studies, such as the American Civil War, as well as later developments of his theory by some influential successors. Themes which we will address include the relation between economy and politics, class, race, and gender, and agency and structure in historical development. We will also try to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of Marx's view with an eye to contemporary questions. (A)

Developments in recent years have clearly shown a resurgent interest in “fascism”. While it designates a phenomenon which might concern everyone, it is also a term used more often in the manner of an insult than a precisely defined concept. One might even say it is what W.B. Gallie once called an essentially contested concept—not because many claim it for themselves today, but on the contrary, because virtually everyone denounces it in their own specific way. In this course, students will consider what “fascism” means by engaging with several influential explanations of it. We will read and discuss more contemporary philosophical views (Stanley, Eco), historical perspectives and documents (Paxton), but also classic perspectives from political theory (Arendt), philosophy (Burnham), and critical theory (Horkheimer, Adorno, Pollock), as well as political economy (Neumann, Sohn-Rethel, Gerschenkron, Fraenkel, Kalecki). With an eye to its historical and contemporary applications, our purpose throughout will be to reconstruct the arguments which we will consider in order to develop a rigorous concept of “fascism”.

Most of us, most of the time, must show up to work every day in order to get the money we need to survive. Although this fact seems commonplace, it raises important questions about human rights and human freedom. Are people under capitalism forced to labor? What about people who perform dangerous jobs out of economic desperation? And, if people are forced to work, is that in any sense a violation of their rights? On the one hand, some argue that egalitarian societies should recognize a right not to work. On the other, some argue that people should have a right to perform work, or at least work that is meaningful and freely chosen. In this class, we will read, write, and think about what contemporary philosophers have to say about each of these questions.

This course will be an introduction to Bayesian epistemology. (B) (II)

In this course we will explore some of the central questions in epistemology and metaphysics. In epistemology, these questions will include: What is knowledge? What facts or states justify a belief? How can the threat of skepticism be adequately answered? How do we know what we (seem to) know about mathematics and morality? In metaphysics, these questions will include: What is time? What is the best account of personal identity across time? Do we have free will? We will also discuss how the construction of a theory of knowledge ought to relate to the construction of a metaphysical theory-roughly speaking, what comes first, epistemology or metaphysics? (B)