PHIL 29200 Junior Tutorial
Topic: The Principle of Sufficient Reason: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (instructor: A. Pitel)
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is the principle according to which nothing is without a ground or reason why it is, or alternately that every truth or fact is explicable. While the PSR was of central importance to figures in the history of philosophy (most notably Spinoza and Leibniz), it has fallen into philosophical disrepute, as it is alleged that the PSR has (at least) the following unhappy consequences: necessitarianism, modal plenitude, the existence of a self-caused being, and monism. Still, appeals to explicability are pervasive in contemporary philosophy. For example, the view that consciousness is grounded in physical or functional features of the world, or that modality can be understood in terms of existence or linguistic convention, are motivated by the idea that otherwise such phenomena would be inexplicable. However, philosophers today are often happy to make use of appeals to explicability without either accepting the PSR (and its associated baggage) or providing a principled account of what facts must be explicable and what can be inexplicable or merely brute. In this course we will read historical and contemporary work on the PSR, and hopefully say something about whether contemporary philosophy can have its cake and eat it too. We will begin with readings from Spinoza and Leibniz, and then continue into more systematic discussion concerning the relation between the PSR and necessitarianism, monism, and recent literature on grounding and metaphysical explanation. Finally, we will close with a brief discussion of Kant, focusing on the relation between Kant's restriction of legitimate uses of the PSR to objects in space and time and his famous claim that the objects we can know are mere appearances and not things in themselves. In addition to the historical figures mentioned above, we will read work by Robert Adams, Shamik Dasgupta, Michael Della Rocca, Samuel Levey, Martin Lin, Beatrice Longuenesse, Gideon Rosen, Jonathan Schaffer, Anat Schechtman, and Peter Van Inwagen.
Topic: Knowledge in Plato's dialogues (instructor: J. Mendelsohn)
In this course, we will examine the discussions of knowledge (epistēmē in Greek) in Plato's dialogues. The course will center around a close reading of the Theaetetus, Plato's most sustained dialogue on the topic of knowledge, but we will also draw readings from the Meno, Charmides, Sophist, Republic, Phaedo and Protagoras. While knowledge will be our focus, we will find that Plato explores the topic of knowledge by examining a number of related cognitive states and processes, including insight, perception, understanding, inquiry, teaching and learning, justification and expertise. Following Plato, we will consider each of these concepts in turn by reflecting on their treatment in the dialogues. Some of the questions we will ask are: Does Plato defend a theory of knowledge as justified true belief? How is perception related to knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus? Why does Plato think there is a special problem about knowing negative statements? Why does Socrates in the Charmides identify self-knowledge with the virtue of temperance? How does Plato view the relationship between knowledge and understanding? What consequences does this view have for the nature of teaching and learning, and is this view of pedagogy attractive? If we have time, we will go on to look at the reception of some of these themes in Aristotle and the Stoics. We will also draw readings from contemporary epistemology where relevant.
Meets with Jr/Sr section. Open only to intensive-track majors. No more than two tutorials may be used to meet program requirements.