

Practical Inference

Logic is interested in the UNASSERTED propositions.

(Wittgenstein)

I will write in appreciation of, but some dissent from, this paragraph of von Wright's:

Now we can see more clearly, I think, wherein the claim to logical validity of the practical inference consists. Given the premises

X now intends to make it true that E

He thinks that, unless he does A now, he will not achieve this and excluding, hypothetically or on the basis of investigations, that he is prevented, then his actual conduct, whatever it may 'look like', either is an act of doing A or aims, though unsuccessfully, at being this. Any description of behaviour which is logically inconsistent with this is also logically inconsistent with the premises. Accepting the premises thus forces on us this understanding of his conduct — unless for some reason we think that a preventive interference occurred right at the beginning of his action.¹

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[1] G.H. von Wright, 'On So-Called Practical Inference', *Acta Sociologica*, **15/1** (1972): 49.