

Theory of Reference

Philosophy 2/33801

Fall 2009

Prof. Josef Stern <j-stern@uchicago.edu>

Off: Stuart 231b; 2-8594; Hrs: Th 3:30-4:30 and by appt.

CA: Nat Hansen <hansenn@uchicago.edu>; Discussion section: TBA

The following book has been ordered at the Seminary Coop:

Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Harvard (NN)

All other readings marked X on the syllabus are available electronically under Course Documents on the course Chalk site. Those marked JSTOR can be downloaded directly from that site (available among the electronic resources on the Library website). Details will be explained in class.

In addition to NN, the following books have been placed on reserve at Regenstein:

J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, Themes from Kaplan (includes Kaplan's Demonstratives)

Alan Berger, Terms and Truth

D. Davidson and G. Harman (1), Eds. Semantics of Natural Language

M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language

_____, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy

Gottlob Frege, Posthumous Writings (PW)

Peter French et al, Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (CP)

H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words

Jeffrey King, Complex Demonstratives

Leonard Linsky, Reference and Modality

Peter Ludow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Language, MIT (RPL)

Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality

Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames, Eds., Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford (S&S)

S. Schwartz, Ed., Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds (N³K)

S. Soames, Beyond Rigidity

_____, Reference and Description

S. Soames and N. Salmon, eds. Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford (S&S)

Requirements: (1) Attendance at and participation in class and the discussion section; (2) For undergraduates there will be one mid-term paper and a take-home final examination. (3) Graduate students will have the option to substitute a term paper for the take-home final; the paper topic must be discussed with and approved by the instructor.

Discussion Sections: Times for the undergraduate discussion section will be discussed in class. There will also be a graduate discussion section which will be scheduled sometime after the first meeting.

Makeup: I will try to schedule an extra class to “make up” for the Monday of first week (which is technically not part of the quarter) when we did not meet. This class will be optional but an opportunity for you to get a full quarter’s course for your money.

First Assignment: For class on Monday Oct. 5, please read both Frege’s “On Sense and Reference” and “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.” Both can be downloaded from Chalk. Of “On Sense and Reference” we will discuss in class only the first half (up to the bottom of p. 220) and the last paragraph of the essay on p. 230. However, you should read through the whole essay for yourself, then re-read the first half. Both essays are very difficult, among the most difficult readings all quarter. But they are also among the most rewarding. We will spend roughly the first two full weeks of the quarter on Frege.

Tentative Syllabus (Subject to change without notice):

Works in brackets are optional but recommended (especially for graduate students). Secondary readings will be discussed selectively in class, and additional readings will be suggested through the quarter.

NOTE: There is almost no chance in the world that we will cover everything in the syllabus. My hope is to get through the bulk of units 1-6. With a miracle, we might be able to cover a topic or reading in 7 or 8. I have included more in the syllabus than we shall be able to do in this quarter in order to give the adventurous and the curious a sense of the beyond—and the course will have succeeded to the extent that some of you do venture there (at your own risk).

1. The Classical Theories of Reference

G. Frege, “On Sense and Reference” (X)

_____, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” (X)

B. Russell, “Descriptions” (X)

_____, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, S&S (X)

“Selection from the Frege-Russell Correspondence,” S&S (X)

Optional Primary and Secondary Reading:

B. Russell, “On Denoting,” in RPL (X)

J. McDowell, “On the sense and reference of a proper name,” Mind Vol. 86 (1977): 159-85. JSTOR

T. Burge, “Sinning Against Frege,” Philosophical Review (1979): 398-442 JSTOR

_____, “Frege on Sense and Linguistic Meaning,” in D.Bell and N. Cooper, eds., The Analytic Tradition (1990) (X)

M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language

M. Kremer, “Sense and Meaning: The Origins and Development of the Distinction,” ms. (X)

2. The Critique of the Classical Theory I: Descriptions

P. Strawson, “On Referring” RPL 335-360 (X)

- K. Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions" RPL 361-382 (X)
 R. Stalnaker, "Pragmatics." §§1, 2, 4, in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds.,
Semantics of Natural Language, 380-397 (X)
 S. Kripke, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference" RPL 383-414 (X)

Optional Primary and Secondary Reading:

- H. P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation, in Studies in the Way of Words
 D. Graff, "Descriptions as Predicates," Philosophical Studies (2001) 102: 1-42.
 S. Neal, "Context and Communication," in RPL
 P. Ludlow and S. Neale, "Descriptions," in M. Devitt and R. Hanley, eds.
Blackwell Handbook in the Philosophy of Language

3. Formal Semantics, Modal Logic, and Possible Worlds
 A. Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of
 Semantics" (X)
 S. Kripke, "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic," repr. in L Linsky, ed.,
Reference and Modality (OUP) (X)
 _____, NN, Preface
4. The Critique of the Classical Theory II: Names and Demonstratives
 S. Kripke, NN, Lectures I and II
 D. Kaplan, Demonstratives, Preface, Chapters I, IV, V, (H) "Afterthoughts":
 568-581 (X)

Optional Primary and Secondary Reading:

- J. Almog, "Naming without Necessity," J. Philosophy (April 1986): 210-242
 JSTOR
 S. Soames, Beyond Rigidity (Oxford)

5. The New Theory of Reference I: the Causal Theory of Names
 S. Kripke, NN, Lecture II
 G. Evans, "The Causal Theory of Reference," RPL 635-655 (X)

Optional Primary and Secondary Reading:

- K. Donnellan, "Speaking of Nothing," Philosophical Review 83 (January 1974):
 3-31 JSTOR)
 D. Kaplan, "Quantifying In," esp. Part IX (X)
 J. Almog, "Semantical Anthropology," in P. French et al, Midwest Studies IX:
 479-490 (X)

6. The New Theory of Reference II: Demonstratives and Direct Reference
 D. Kaplan, "Dthat," RPL 669-692 (X)
 _____, Demonstratives, "Afterthoughts": 582-597 (X)
 _____, "Words," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. 64 (1990): 93-
 119 (X)
 J. Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," Nous 13 (1979): 3-21 JSTOR
 _____, "Frege on Demonstratives," RPL 693-7816 (X)

Optional Primary and Secondary Reading:

- G. Evans, "Understanding Demonstratives" RPL 717-744
 T. Burge, "Belief De Re," Journal of Philosophy (1977): 338-62 JSTOR
 J. Stern, Metaphor in Context (MIT), chapter 3, 77-104.
 D. Braun., "Structured Characters and Complex Demonstratives," Philosophical Studies 74 . (1994): 193-219. (X)
 _____, "What Is Character?" J. of Philosophical Logic 24 (1995): 227-240. (X)
 _____ "Demonstratives and Their Linguistic Meanings," Nous 30 (1996): 14-173 JSTOR
 R. Stalnaker, (1978), "Assertion," in Context and Content
 S. Predelli, Contexts (2005)
7. Propositional Attitudes, Cognitive Significance, and Direct Reference
 S. Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief" RPL 875-920 (X)
 M. Crimmins and J. Perry, "The Prince and The Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs" RPL 963-990 (X)
 H. Wettstein, (1986), "Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?," Journal of Philosophy 83: 185-209 JSTOR.
 Soames, S., "Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content," RPL 921-962. (X)
 Richard, M. (1988), "Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief," in S&S (1988):169-196. (X)
 _____ (1990), Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
8. Complex Demonstratives
 M. Davies, "Individuation and Semantics of Demonstratives" RPL 745-767
 J. King, Selections from Complex Demonstratives
 _____, "Singular Terms, Reference, and Methodology in Semantics", 2006, Philosophical Issues volume 16: Philosophy of Language (supplement to Nous), Blackwell, Oxford, 141-161.