

Metaphor, Literal, Literalism

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Abstract: This paper examines the place of metaphorical interpretation in the current Contextualist–Literalist controversy over the role of context in the determination of truth-conditions in general. Although there has been considerable discussion of ‘non-literal’ language by both sides of this dispute, the language analyzed involves either so-called implicit indexicality, loose or loosened use, enriched interpretations, or semantic transfer, not metaphor itself. In the first half of the paper, I critically evaluate Recanati’s (2004) recent Contextualist account and show that it cannot account for the metaphorical–literal dependence characteristic of metaphor. I then turn to Carston’s (2002), and Bezuidenhout’s (2001) Contextualist accounts and show that they place no constraints on metaphorical interpretations. In the second half of the paper I sketch a Literalist theory of metaphor elaborated in Stern (2000) and respond to two kinds of Contextualist criticisms of that account by Camp (2005) and Stanley (2005).

1. Metaphor Among the Non-literals

Since the 70’s it has been the prevailing view among philosophers, linguists, and cognitive scientists that metaphor falls in pragmatics, not semantics. Once one distinguishes between sentence–meaning, or what a sentence says, and speaker’s– or utterance–meaning, or what a sentence can be used by its speaker to mean, it is only natural, for at least three reasons, to categorize metaphor as a kind of use rather than linguistic meaning. (1) The interpretations of metaphors—i.e., expressions used, or interpreted, metaphorically—typically vary from utterance to utterance and therefore cannot, unlike the semantic notion of literal meaning, be individuated by expression–types. (2) Metaphorical interpretations depend on their speakers’ intentions, or what the speakers mean their hearers to recognize as their intention in using the words they do. (3) The truth–conditions or propositional contents of metaphors draw on extra–linguistic associations and presuppositions of varied kinds. Some of these are false but common knowledge, others depend on skills and abilities—like the ability to perceive similarities or what is exemplified or sampled by some object—that are not specific to language. All these factors point one in the direction of pragmatics, use, or general theories of symbols.

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However, all the classic pragmatic or use-oriented characterizations of metaphor—Grice (1975), Searle (1993), Davidson (1984), Cohen (1975), and Sadock (1993)—assume that there is a clear, sharp notion of sentence-meaning, or what is said by a sentence, that contrasts with what it can be used to mean. Sentence-meaning is the propositional content, or truth-conditions, of the sentence uttered, determined by its conventional or linguistic meaning (plus assignment of values to demonstratives, indexicals, and names) for a representative cross-section of utterances in natural language; it is what hearers intuitively understand by the utterance, its so-called literal meaning, and it is the kind of meaning that constitutes the domain of semantics. Pragmatics, then, takes up all the further uses in context of these sentences with their sentence-meaning.

In recent years, the tide has shifted. The ubiquity of non-literal language has come to be much more widely appreciated, leaving it less certain how much natural language is actually literal. Many now recognize how little conventional meaning determines the intuitive truth-conditions, or contents, for most utterances, and how much more is contributed by context and speakers' intentions, and in ways that seem to resist systemization and formalization. This suggests for some theorists that the *paradigm* for the analysis of intuitive truth-conditions, content, and what is said should be *non-literal* language. In that case, even the determination of truth-conditions or content will fall in pragmatics, not semantics.

What are the implications of this change of view for our understanding of metaphor? At a first glance, one would think that this surge of interest by philosophers, linguists, and cognitive scientists in the non-literal would be good news for metaphor. After a long history of relative neglect—Lycan (1999, p. 205) calls metaphor 'the dark side' of the philosophy of language and Blackburn says that its quality of discourse is not 'one of analytic philosophy's brighter achievements' (1984, p. 180)—the agenda of 'serious' philosophy of language finally seems to be coming around to metaphor. But on a closer look the situation is less rosy. For the most part, the non-literal language or meaning on which the contemporary theorists focus consists either in conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts or in utterances whose intuitive, communicated truth-conditions contain 'unarticulated constituents', factors that are not expressed by concrete, phonetically realized linguistic items in their sentential surface structures and instead appear to be directly contributed by context. Examples of unarticulated constituents are the intuitive propositional elements in (1)–(3) corresponding to the parenthetical expressions in their asterisked counterparts (1*)–(3*).

- (1) I had breakfast.

meaning,

- (1*) I had breakfast (today/on some contextually indicated day).
 (2) It's raining.

meaning,

- (2★) It's raining (here/at some contextually indicated location l).
- (3) You are not going to die.

(as spoken by a mother to her son who just cut himself) meaning,

- (3★) You are not going to die (now/in the immediate future).

Everyone agrees that the intuitively understood truth-conditions, or content, of these utterances—what they intuitively say—is richer than anything determined by the conventional meaning explicitly represented in the actual sentences uttered. Therefore, if we count the latter as the literal meaning of the utterance, the contextually enriched meaning should count as non-literal meaning. But this raises the question whether the context autonomously—independently of linguistic constraints—makes this enrichment to what is intuitively said or whether the contextual input is filtered through a more abstract level of linguistic representation that underlies the surface structure of the concrete sentence uttered. In the current controversy, Contextualists take the former position, Literalists or Indexicalists, the latter. A parallel controversy involves contextual operations called 'loosening' and 'semantic transfer' (which corresponds to the classical figure of metonymy). Metaphor, *finally*, comes in but only at the end of the story, and it is explained or analyzed in terms of one of these more basic kinds of operations—enrichment, loosening, or semantic transfer. This attempt to reduce metaphor to one of the other modes of non-literal meaning makes good methodological sense. But the fact is that 'the paradigm case of non-literal meaning', as Recanati (2004, p. 76) calls metaphor, gets relatively short shrift in this story.

In this paper I shall discuss the consequences for metaphor of the current Contextualist-Literalist debate over the effect of context on truth-conditions and over the status of literal and non-literal meaning. I begin with Francois Recanati's (2004) recent variant of Contextualism in order to sharpen the problem that metaphor poses for these accounts. I then turn to a close look at the process of loosening, which Contextualists including Recanati, Sperber and Wilson (1985/6; 1995), Carston (2002), and Bezuidenhout (2001) propose for metaphor. In the second half of the paper, I first sketch a Literalist theory of metaphor, based on Stern (2000), and then turn to Contextualist criticisms of that model. I leave it to the reader to reach a verdict on this match.

2. The Problem of Metaphor for Contextualism

One claim that present-day Contextualists and Literalists—unlike many writers in the past, including Davidson (1984), Rorty (1987), Black (1962, 1993), and Cavell (1967)—do *not* dispute is that metaphors express truths. Everyone also agrees that

these truths are no different in *kind* than those expressed by literal language and that the content of an expression which in fact is used metaphorically differs from what it would have expressed had it been used literally. The controversy begins only when we ask: What determines the truth-conditions of the utterance when it is used metaphorically? For the Literalist, metaphorical interpretations cannot be individuated via, or be determined *simply* by, the linguistic meanings of the concrete words so used (plus assignment of references to demonstratives and names) because the same expression, with the same linguistic meaning, interpreted metaphorically in different contexts can have different truth-conditions. Nor can each metaphorical interpretation in each context count as a different meaning for the expression because, given the indefinite number of different, novel interpretations that can be generated in different contexts, we would thereby rob the notion of meaning of all explanatory power. Furthermore, the multiple metaphorical interpretations of one expression do not fit any of the standard typologies of ambiguity or polysemy (Stern, 2000). The Literalist, then, has two remaining alternatives. Either he can posit a richer underlying linguistic representation whose meaning will determine the truth-conditions of each metaphorical utterance in context or he can restrict semantics to literal meaning and assign metaphorical interpretation to pragmatics. I shall advance the first alternative in section 4; the second alternative has been the preferred solution for most Literalists, including those who adopt the first alternative for other instances of non-literal interpretation (see Stanley, 2004).

For Contextualists like Recanati, the problem of metaphor is entirely different. He begins from the vantage point that *no* 'intuitive' truth-conditions, *nothing* intuitively said by the utterance of *any* sentence, is determined solely by its linguistic meaning independently of context and the speaker's intentions and beliefs. A so-called 'minimal' literal proposition expressed solely in virtue of a sentence's conventional linguistic meaning is either the semanticist's fantasy (because even processes like reference assignment for demonstratives and names must appeal to speakers' intentions) or is explanatorily vacuous. Instead the primary propositions or truth-conditions understood by speakers—where understanding requires *awareness* or *consciousness* of what is said (Recanati's 'Availability constraint')—are already infected by pragmatic processes like enrichment, loosening, and semantic transfer. But if this is so, and if the literal is still taken to be the linguistically determined, what then remains of the intuitive distinction between the literal and non-literal? Is all meaning, everything intuitively said, non-literal? At this point, Recanati could simply abandon the literal/non-literal distinction to folk-linguistics but he doesn't. Instead he defines two notions of the non-literal (and three notions of the literal). The problem raised by metaphor is that it falls under neither of these notions of the non-literal.

To show this, let's briefly review Recanati's typology of literal and non-literal meaning.

1. *T(type)-literal meaning* is the conventional meaning of simple expression-*types*, assigned by rules of the language and inherited by each of its tokens.

2a. *M(inimal)-literal meaning* is the meaning of a token that is either identical to the T-literal meaning of its type or that differs from it only in a way it signals and governs (e.g. referential 'saturation' of a value to an indexical).

2b. *M(inimal)-non-literal meaning* is the meaning of an utterance that is a product of primary but optional pragmatic processes like free enrichment (where each (a) sentence M-non-literally means the (b) sentence):

- (4a) They got married and had children.
 (4b) They got married and *then* had children.

loosening:

- (5a) This dish is raw.
 (5b) This dish is not fully cooked; and

and semantic transfer:

- (6a) The ham sandwich is getting restless.
 (6b) The ham-sandwich-orderer is getting restless.

These processes go beyond the government of T-literal meaning, and (i) operate only on sub-propositional linguistic units, not on prior propositions; (ii) are not necessary for the sentence to express a (minimal) proposition; and (iii) are blind, mechanical, sub-personal, and not consciously available or accessible to speakers and interpreters. (I return to these conditions.) It follows that the M-non-literal outputs of these optional pragmatic processes are meanings that are not inferred from a prior M-literal meaning (which would presuppose its conscious availability); instead they are the primary meanings intuitively said by their utterance. Nonetheless, as Recanati admits, each of (4)–(6), though M-non-literal, is *not* what we intuitively consider 'non-literal'.¹ Why?

3a,b. *P(rietary)-literal and -non-literal meaning*: This last pair of meanings derives from the pre-theoretical idea of primary and secondary meanings: a secondary meaning is one inferred from or conveyed by a (logically) prior meaning through a pragmatic context-dependent process of inference, e.g. conversational implicatures, indirect speech acts, and ironic interpretations. In this sense of secondary meaning, interpretations that are *not* pragmatically inferred from still prior interpretations of the same utterance count as primary. Now, because a secondary meaning is intuitively *non*-literal, Recanati reasons that primary meanings are literal, hence, he calls the latter p(rietary)-literal while secondary meanings are p-non-literal. In what follows I use 'secondary meaning' to refer to p-non-literal meanings.

¹ In fact, (6) is an instance of the classic figure metonymy and is intuitively non-literal.

Notwithstanding Recanati's new labels, these various ways of drawing the literal/non-literal distinction are familiar. T- and M-literality re-work the old idea that the literal is the encoded lexical meaning of an expression. P-literality is a variant on the idea that the literal is the interpretation of an utterance *regardless* of, and invariant across, its further uses or additional inferences drawn from it (Davidson, 1986). However, Recanati's reconstruction of these notions raises one crucial question: Why are M-non-literal meanings (e.g. (4) and (5), generated by free enrichment and loosening) *not* intuitively non-literal in contrast to secondary meanings that *are*?² Recanati's answer is phenomenological: secondary meaning is 'felt' to be 'special'; i.e. 'the language users must be aware that the conveyed meaning exceeds the conventional significance of the words' (2004, p. 75). Recanati calls this feeling or awareness 'transparency' or the 'external duality' of the utterance. In contrast, M-non-literality, and the processes of enrichment or loosening that generate M-non-literal interpretations, are blind, sub-personal, and not consciously available to interpreters. We are aware only of the M-non-literal proposition that is the output of the pragmatic processes, not of a prior M-literal proposition on which those processes operate. Hence, there is no felt duality, and no intuitive non-literality.

One might raise various questions about Recanati's phenomenological criterion for non-literality. But let me put them aside to turn to metaphor. Metaphorical interpretations/meanings are intuitively non-literal if anything is. But they do not fit into either of Recanati's categories of the non-literal. Metaphorical interpretations are not secondary meanings because they are not *inferred* from another (primary, literal) proposition, unlike a conversational implicature or indirect speech act. (I return to Recanati's apparent argument for this claim in section 2.) But a metaphorical interpretation is also not a typical instance of M-non-literal meaning, generated by a primary pragmatic process (like loosening or enrichment), because, unlike M-non-literal meaning, metaphor *is* intuitively non-literal. So, metaphor is *prima facie* neither M-non-literal nor P-non-literal (a secondary meaning). This is the problem metaphor raises for Recanati's Contextualism.³

Recanati's solution is to explain the intuitive non-literality of metaphorical interpretations by analogy to his phenomenological explanation of the intuitive non-literality of secondary meanings. He proposes that metaphors have an *internal* duality felt in the tension or conflict between the M-literal predicate (the literal vehicle 'is a bulldozer') and what it is about (its 'target'), e.g. the referent of the subject term 'Robert' in (7):

(7) Robert is a bulldozer.

² One might balk at classifying such inferred meanings as either literal or non-literal. It might be more accurate to say that *if* implicatures and indirect speech acts *must* be so classified, they are intuitively non-literal rather than literal.

³ The problem is not unique to Recanati, although other Contextualists like Sperber and Wilson, 1985/6 and Carston, 2002 play down the intuitive figurativity of metaphor by placing it on a continuum with loose use.

The felt duality is the falsity, necessary falsity, categorical violation, or semantic anomalousness perceived between the application of the M-literal vehicle to its subject, and this ‘underlying conflict’ or felt ‘discrepancy’ gives rise to the figurativity, or intuitive non-literality, of the M-non-literal metaphorical interpretation.⁴

Let me mention a number of difficulties with this solution. First, as Carston, 2002 has observed, literal categorical falsity or semantic anomalousness is at odds with the standard contextualist explanation of metaphorical interpretation (which Recanati seems to endorse) in terms of the primary pragmatic process of ‘loosening’. On this account, the interpreter first sorts through the totality of features—both lexical/analytic and encyclopedic (i.e. extra-linguistic common knowledge or communally presupposed beliefs)—to which she has access (by decoding the lexical entry of the literal vehicle) and then drops those features not intended to apply to the subject. This operation broadens the extension of the loosened predicate, but it works best, and possibly only, for metaphors whose literal vehicle is possibly true of its subject, e.g.,

(8) Kripke is an alchemist.

We arrive at the metaphorical interpretation of (8)—say, that Kripke can turn the most ordinary or common ideas and intuitions into philosophical gold—through loosening because the features in the lexical entry for ‘alchemist’ (including the presuppositions and encyclopedic knowledge we associate with alchemists) are also *literally* applicable to Kripke (although in fact literally false of him). With literal category mistakes or necessity falsehoods, like (7) whose metaphorical interpretation is that Robert is obstinate, persistent, and insensitive, loosening cannot select the appropriate psychological features since they are not of the set of features that constitute the lexical meaning, including encyclopedic knowledge, associated with the literal vehicle ‘bulldozer’. Carston raises this as a general problem for contextualist explanations that employ loosening. (We will return to this problem in section 3.) But it applies *mutatis mutandis* to Recanati. The more he relies on ‘internal duality’ in order to explain the intuitive non-literality of metaphor, the less he can explain the content of the metaphorical interpretation in terms of loosening. The metaphorical interpretations generated most plausibly by loosening are precisely those without the kind of internal duality that would account for their intuitive non-literality.

Second, the appeal to underlying tension between the literal vehicle and its target is both an old story and one that is now known to be an old wives’ tale. One of the most widely appreciated lessons for metaphor learned over the last twenty years is that in general metaphors are not, and certainly do not need to be, were they taken literally, grammatically deviant, semantically anomalous, category mistakes, or even just plain false. We now recognize the prevalence of twice-true

⁴ By ‘literal vehicle for a metaphor’ I mean the expression, e.g. ‘is a bulldozer’ in (7), as it would be (semantically) interpreted literally.

(Cohen, 1976) and twice-apt (Hills, 1997) metaphors and, in general, the explanatory vacuity of what we might call the 'literal deviance' thesis (Stern, 1983; cf. also White, 2001). There need be *nothing* deviant, irregular or unacceptable—syntactically, semantically, or pragmatically—about the literal meaning of a sentence used metaphorically. Although there is surely *some* reason why we identify an utterance as a metaphor—one main function the literal deviance condition has traditionally played—it has turned out to be a totally red herring as an explanation of metaphorical interpretation.⁵

Third, the very idea of literally deviant meaning underlying metaphor assumes a picture of *non*-deviant conventional, antecedently-fixed meaning also at odds with the Contextualist's fluid, context-sensitive, and 'modulated' (Recanati, 2004, p. 131) conception of meaning, tailored from use to use to fit its circumstances and the needs of communication. The more flexible, adjustable, and mutable the Contextualist makes meaning and interpretation, the less place there is for the rigid meaning structures that would generate the tension Recanati wishes to exploit to account for the felt non-literality of metaphor. He can't throw out the cake and eat it, too (Cf. White, 2001 on Davidson).

Yet, even if 'felt transparency' is the wrong place to look for an explanation of the intuitive non-literality of metaphor, Recanati is on one right track. No account of metaphor will be adequate without explaining the fact that something about the meaning of the literal vehicle remains active in metaphorical interpretation (Davidson, 1984). In more familiar terminology, any account must explain the fact that, and how, the metaphorical depends on the literal. It is not easy to say what this truistic dependence consists in. For example, if the metaphorical depends on the literal, you would think that the metaphorically interpreted, or used, utterance still 'has' its literal meaning. But what is the relevant sense of 'have'? In sections 3 and 4, I will explore this dependence in more depth, but let me end this section with three examples in which active metaphorical/literal dependence is manifest.

First, a metaphorical meaning of an expression is not cognitively independent of its literal meaning in the way in which the multiple meanings of ambiguous expressions like 'bank' are independent or the meaning of an idiom like 'red herring' is independent of the meanings of 'red' and 'herring'. I can know one of these without knowing the other.⁶ But I cannot know, or understand, what is metaphorically said by (7) or (8) without knowing the literal meaning of 'bulldozer' or 'alchemist' (and without holding a variety of beliefs about their literal extension). This is one way the metaphorical meaning of an utterance *depends* on its literal meaning that is not true of other meanings.

⁵ This is not to deny that there are grammatically deviant and literally false metaphors. But its significance remains one of the still outstanding open questions in the field.

⁶ A red herring is a fallacy of irrelevance, so-called because of the reputed practice of hunters who used smoked herrings, which are red, to throw bloodhounds off the scent. It is not difficult to imagine a current speaker who knows that a red herring is an irrelevant argument even if she has never learned that a herring is a fish or (much less plausibly) that red is a color.

Second, there is meaning or informational content carried by a metaphor that is not part of its truth-conditional content but is a function of its literal meaning. Consider, for example, the explanation an anorexic Marie gave to her therapist of why she stopped eating (Danto, 1978; Stern, 2000). She said that her mother forbade her to continue seeing her boyfriend, to which she reacted by saying:

(9) I won't swallow that.

The truth-conditions of (9) as uttered by Marie referring to her mother's interdiction are something like:

(10) Marie won't obey her mother's interdiction.

But (10) cannot exhaust all the information conveyed by (9) without dropping the explanatorily relevant information—the coherent if irrational connection between her utterance and her behavior—carried by the specifically metaphorical mode of presentation of those truth-conditions that is captured in the literal vehicle 'swallow'. This is information conveyed by the metaphor which is not part of its truth-conditions in its context of utterance—and that information seems closely connected to the literal meaning of the word being interpreted metaphorically. The challenge for the theorist is how to incorporate that literal-dependence in the metaphor to capture that information.⁷

Third, the literal meaning of the vehicle remains active in a metaphorical interpretation insofar as it directs its extension to other metaphors. For example, Recanati, 2004 proposes that if we want to make the relatively dead metaphor:

(11) The ATM swallowed my credit card.

'figurative, we have only to belabor the metaphor to make it conspicuous, as in

(12) The ATM swallowed my credit card, chewed it up, and spit it out' (p. 77).

I disagree that there is any belaboring this metaphor. (12) is an interesting complex metaphor precisely because it switches around the normal order of eating, which is to spit something out before chewing it, but in any case to chew before swallowing. Rather (12) relies on a schema, or network of metaphors, to which 'swallow' belongs.⁸ As Goodman, 1976 was perhaps the first to appreciate, metaphors move, or are transferred, in families, not as loners.⁹ By extending

⁷ To say that this explanatory information is not part of the truth-conditions of (9) is not to say that it cannot be expressed propositionally, only that it is not part of the truth-conditions of the given utterance in its context.

⁸ Note that the occurrence of the metaphor 'swallow' in (11) differs from its occurrence in (9) at least insofar as the two belong to disjoint schemata.

⁹ This theme has been elaborated by Lakoff (1993) and his co-authors.

metaphors, by drawing out their metaphorical schematic relatives we manifest our grasp of a metaphor. Perhaps this is better evidence of our grasp of the metaphor than by giving a literal paraphrase. But for present purposes the important point is that all these schematic relations are individuated in terms of the literal meaning of the vehicle used metaphorically. If it did not have, or lost, its literal meaning, we would be at a loss to account for the schematic connections between the metaphorically interpreted expressions in (12).

In sum, any explanation of metaphor must take into account its literal meaning in order to capture these ways in which metaphor actively depends on the literal. The problem for Contextualists like Recanati is that they do not have the resources to represent this dependence.

3. Metaphor, Loose Use, and Overgeneration

Contextualists can take one of two avenues to explain metaphor: treat it either as an inferred secondary meaning or as a pragmatically processed M-non-literal meaning. Recanati blocks the first route on the phenomenological grounds mentioned in section 2. But his evidence simply asks us to recognize a 'feeling'. There is, however, an argument we might exploit in this context that shows that metaphor cannot be a secondary meaning if being a secondary meaning presupposes that the utterance always has a prior literal (sentential) meaning from which the metaphorical interpretation is inferred or implicated (Cf. Margalit and Goldblum, 1994; White, 1996, and Levinson, 2001—all of whom directed this objection against Davidson, 1984). On this argument, each of the individual *words* in an utterance like (11) may have, or retain, its literal meaning, while the *sentence* does not, at least if the literal meaning of a sentence is something like its truth-conditions or a proposition (or something that determines these). The argument is that we do not *understand*, or know, what must be the case for the sentence (11) to be *true*, namely, the conditions in which an ATM (literally) swallows credit cards. There is, of course, a sense in which we know *that* the sentence is false, but knowledge of truth-conditions requires that we also know what the world would have to be like for the sentence to *obtain*—and that we do not know. But if we do not *understand* its literal truth-conditions, the purported p-literal meaning of the sentence, we could not have inferred its metaphorical meaning from it. Hence, there is good reason to reject the secondary meaning route but it is not phenomenological, like Recanati's Availability condition, nor even pragmatic, but straightforwardly semantic.¹⁰

Let me add that this argument also counts against Griceans who argue that metaphor is something meant—i.e. implicated—by the utterance as distinct from what the sentence (literally, in the strict sense) says. If the argument is on the right

¹⁰ This argument assumes that some but not necessarily all metaphors are deviant or false in order to refute the claim that all metaphorical interpretations are secondary meanings.

track, it is not clear that something is always (literally) said by the sentence apart from the metaphorically expressed proposition.¹¹ And if nothing is said, then it is also not clear how something else can be meant. Furthermore, the argument also shows that the sense in which 'the metaphorical depends on the literal' cannot be that the metaphorical interpretation (meaning, proposition) of an utterance *U* of a sentence *S* depends on the *proposition* expressed by the *sentence* *S* were it interpreted literally. Even if each of the constituent expressions in *S* retains or has (in some sense) its literal meaning, there may be no compositionally determined literal proposition, or truth-condition, for the whole sentence—at least one that we understand.

Let me return now to the Contextualist explanation of metaphor: if it is not secondary meaning, could it be a case of M-non-literal meaning generated by a primary pragmatic process like loosening? A word first about this pragmatic process. The operation of loosening is employed by Recanati (2004), Carston (2002), and Bezuidenhout (2001) among others, to explain first and foremost the 'loose use' of language, a kind of non-literal talk first studied by Sperber and Wilson (S&W) (1985–6) such as:

- (13) I live in Paris (uttered by someone who lives one block outside the city limits).
- (14) There is a rectangle of lawn in front of the house (where the opposite sides are not equal in length and the corner angles not each 90 degrees).
- (15) The dorm floor is silent (despite some background noise).
- (16) = (5) The dish is raw (not fully cooked).

S&W went on to claim that metaphor differs from loose use only in degree and therefore should be given the same explanation, but they did not themselves employ the pragmatic process of loosening to explain either phenomenon.¹² Only more recent Relevance-theorists, following Carston (1996; 2002), have appealed to the actual process of loosening in order to develop a 'unified' approach that treats enriching (or narrowing the truth-conditions) of utterances (such as (1) and (4)) and loosening (or broadening their truth-conditions) in one uniform way. With both, a non-linguistically controlled pragmatic operation (free enrichment or loosening) is applied to the linguistically encoded proposition or concept to generate the communicated proposition or concept with its intuitive truth-conditions.

¹¹ For a recent attempt to defend the Gricean assumption that something is said by the categorical falsehoods like (11), see Camp, 2004.

¹² S&W (1985–6; 1986/95, 224–237) appeal to notions of interpretive representation and propositional resemblance to explain both loose use and metaphor. Apart from the fact that they assume that one thing can represent another simply in virtue of resembling it despite strong counter-arguments that resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation (see Goodman, 1976), Carston (2002, pp. 320–349) has objected to their asymmetric treatment of loose use and enriched (narrowed) use.

Specifically, loosening takes the encoded concept expressed by the uttered expression and replaces it with an *ad hoc* concept, with a broader extension; the resulting proposition is what is intuitively understood by hearers and was presumably what the speaker intended to communicate.

But what exactly does the operation of loosening involve? Carston speaks of 'relaxing' or 'weakening' the lexically encoded meaning (1996; 2002, p. 336). Recanati (2004) says that there is loosening 'whenever a condition of application packed into the concept literally expressed by a predicate is contextually dropped' (p. 26). This characterization is similar to the idea of feature-cancellation, proposed years ago to explain metaphor (L. J. Cohen and Margalit, 1972; L. J. Cohen, 1993; and Matthews, 1971), and it works fine for a sub-set of loose uses, e.g. for mathematically ideal predicates like 'rectangle' in (14); or graduated predicates like 'raw' in (16), meaning not fully cooked (instead of fully non-cooked), or 'silent' in (15), meaning not noisy above a contextual threshold (instead of totally absent all sound).¹³ These are cases of what we might call 'pure' loose use, and the loosening involved is nothing more than canceling, or relaxing, a degree of satisfaction required for literal use of the predicate.

However, Carston also uses 'loose use' to refer to interpretations that are not simply the result of feature-cancellation or standard-relaxation. The *ad hoc* concept RAW* implicates, not only that something is insufficiently cooked but also that it is inedible and disgusting and the speaker wants it replaced by another better done dish of the same type. Let's call this a case of 'impure' loose use whose *ad hoc* concept RAW* results, not just from feature cancellation but by including a variety of 'contextual implications'. The rub is that we are told nothing about how these implications are derived from context in a way that comports with loosening. Even on a liberal interpretation of the encyclopedic information encoded in a lexical entry, it is implausible that, say, the features of arousing disgust or being something the speaker wants replaced are included in the encyclopedic knowledge associated with the *literal* sense of 'raw,' as Carston's theory predicts. But if these features are not part of the literal lexical entry of 'raw' to begin with, how can they come to be expressed through a process like loosening?¹⁴

Carston's use of loosening already, then, has problems in explaining loose use, but they get worse when loosening is appropriated to account for metaphors such as (11) or:

- (18) (= (7)) Robert is a bulldozer (meaning: aggressive, insensitive, persistent, obstinate, intolerant of others' ideas).
 (19) Little Harriet is a piglet (meaning: filthy yet endearing).

Since these predicates are not graduated, their metaphorical interpretations also cannot be generated by loosening taken simply as relaxation of a standard or dropping a condition. In the case of the category-crossing (18), the various

¹³ See Carston, 2002, pp. 367–8, n. 3 who first acknowledges the similarity of her account to Cohen but then identifies differences that render the similarity superficial, pp. 372, n. 12.

¹⁴ Cf. Stern, 2000, pp. 240–242 on Cohen's feature-cancellation account of metaphor.

psychological properties in the *ad hoc* concept also cannot be drawn from the literal lexical entry of 'is a bulldozer', including its encyclopedic features. In his analysis of (11), Recanati (2004) refers to a second stage in the primary pragmatic process of loosening in which the interpreter 'unreflectively constructs the sense in which the ATM can be said to "swallow" the card by adjusting the meaning of the word to the situation talked about' (p. 76; cf. also 26). But he tells us nothing more about this second stage of 'adjustment' and 'construction'. Neither do S&W (1986), who characterize a parallel second stage as selection from among strong and weak implicatures, nor Carston (1997) who writes that 'certain elements in the encyclopedic entry of BULLDOZER [in (18)] which are *highly accessible* in the particular context are *carried over* into the *construction of the new concept* which, as a constituent of the explicature, warrants the particular implicatures derived' (2002, p. 350), without telling us what it is to be 'highly accessible' or how the elements will be 'carried over' or the new concept 'constructed'.

The problem here is not simply lack of explicitness; the real difficulty is that there is no way to individuate pragmatically derived *ad hoc* concepts unless every feature difference constitutes a different concept. But in that case, as we shall next see, the pragmatic operation of loosening over-generates metaphorical interpretations, differences of interpretation that are not reflected in our intuitive judgments.¹⁵ Furthermore, Carston (2002, p. 321) (appealing to Fodor, 1998) treats each pragmatically derived *ad hoc* (as well as lexically encoded) concept as an *atomic* concept. But that makes it difficult to account for metaphorical/ literal dependence and the way in which the literal remains 'active' in metaphorical interpretation. Although the label for the pragmatically processed *ad hoc* concept that is the propositional constituent for 'bulldozer' in (18) is written 'bulldozer*', 'bulldozer' no more occurs in 'bulldozer*' than 'doze' occurs in 'bulldozer'. Nor can she reconstruct the active metaphorical-literal dependence in terms of the 'on-line processing' history of the metaphorically-loosened concept, or its derivation from a literal encoded concept, so long as she holds, as does Recanati (2004), that primary pragmatic processing is sub-personal, unconscious, and inaccessible to the speaker-interpreter.

To illustrate the problem of overgeneration consider Bezuidenhout's (2001) analysis of the metaphorical interpretation of (20):

(20) Quine demolished Carnap's argument.

which, she argues, is not simply the result of feature-cancellation (e.g. of the patient theme of the verb, say, [+physical]) but also imports all sorts of extra-linguistic presuppositions:

Although the verb 'to destroy' [sic] is not subcategorized for an obligatory following prepositional phrase, talk of demolishing things will bring to

¹⁵ Cf. Stern, 2000, pp. 13, 33ff.; for a similar objection, see Stanley, 2002.

mind various sorts of instruments and implements used in demolition jobs. We may think of wrecking balls and dynamite and huge earth moving equipment. What specifically we think of will depend on the size of the thing to be torn down. A dam wall or a huge building will probably call for large amounts of dynamite, but if it is simply a rickety old wooden outhouse that needs to be torn down, then probably a single person wielding an axe can accomplish the task ... Carnap was a good philosopher whose arguments were generally well constructed. So refuting his arguments would be no easy matter. Presumably Quine was up to the task, being himself no slouch. But Quine and Carnap were also pretty well matched in intellect. For Quine to demolish Anne's arguments would be an easy matter, requiring no heavy-duty logical apparatus. In the case of Carnap, Quine might have to muster argumentative techniques of a more sophisticated sort (Bezuidenhout, 2001, 174-5).

From this Bezuidenhout concludes that 'by relying on such non-linguistic assumptions, we arrive at an *ad hoc* concept *demolish**' which is more much than the result of feature-cancellation.¹⁶

It would be more accurate to say that we arrive at any number of different *ad hoc* concepts among which we cannot clearly distinguish one from another; hence, our intuitive judgments about the truth of utterances expressing them will be equally unclear. Although 'demolish' does not obligatorily demand a thematic role for an instrument, Bezuidenhout says that it can 'bring to mind' wrecking balls, dynamite, and axes, and which one will depend on the identities of the demolisher and demolished. True, but it also brings to mind potential dangers to bystanders and the environment, nostalgia for the destroyed past, a lot of dust and dirt, hard-hats and muscles, the personality-types of demolition workers, and so on. Which features, among these innumerable things brought to mind, belong to the interpretation, *ad hoc* concept, or truth-conditions of (20)? Not clear. Suppose, as Bezuidenhout suggests, that the *ad hoc* concept *demolish** in (20) includes the feature of having mustered sophisticated techniques to refute Carnap, like the argument of 'Truth by Convention' employing Huttington's postulates for

¹⁶ Bezuidenhout cites this example as an objection to a distinction drawn in Stern (2000, p. 27) between extended metaphors like (20) whose interpretation is claimed to result just from feature-cancellation (which is context-independent insofar as the features that constitute its interpretation are not drawn from contextual presuppositions) and transferred metaphors like:

(21) Juliet is the sun.

whose interpretations are context-dependent in that they draw on extra-linguistic presuppositions and skills for the features that figure in their content. That distinction does not exclude Bezuidenhout's interpretation of (20) since it would not count as an extended metaphor by its definition of the term, but her interpretation is also no evidence against the distinction. To counter the distinction, Bezuidenhout would have to show that there is *no possible* (pure) extended metaphorical interpretations of sentences like (20).

Euclidean geometry and Lukasiewicz's three postulates for the propositional calculus. In a counterfactual circumstance in which Quine were to 'demolish' Carnap by one simple counterexample, would the utterance of (20) under Bezuidenhout's intuitive metaphorical interpretation be true or false? If every difference of feature counts as a different *ad hoc* concept, hence, content, the answer should be False. But then we end up with too many concepts. And if not every difference counts, we have yet to be told a criterion to distinguish those that matter.

One way to distinguish among contents (including the Contextualist's *ad hoc* concepts) is through the possibility of copying or deletion involved in verb phrase anaphora or ellipsis. The general semantic constraint governing verb phrase anaphoric relations whose antecedent admits multiple interpretations is that the anaphor must always be given the same interpretation as the antecedent. In Stern, 2000 I employ this test in order to motivate underlying abstract semantic structure that would distinguish different semantic types (characters, in Kaplan's (1989) terminology) and contents for literal and metaphorical interpretations of (what would superficially appear to be) one expression. I argue that we find similar unacceptability judgments with mixed literal/metaphorical anaphoric relations, and even with anaphoric relations between different metaphorical interpretations (contents) of one expression (type), as we find with mixed literal/literal anaphoric relations. This suggests that the same semantic constraint governs both. But that means that, in mixed literal/metaphorical utterances, what is superficially one expression with different (literal or metaphorical) uses is in fact two expressions of different types. Suppose 'is a fish' has its literal interpretation in:

(22) The shark in *Jaws* is a fish.

and different metaphorical interpretations in (23) and (24):

(23) Mark Spitz is a fish (e.g. at home in water).

(24) Richard Nixon is a fish (e.g. slippery, hard to catch, and smelly).

Now consider the following examples of verb phrase anaphora:

(25) *The shark in *Jaws* is a fish, and Mark Spitz/Richard Nixon *is, too*.

(26) */? Nixon is a fish, and Spitz *is, too*.

Both (25) and (26) seem to violate the semantic constraint that requires that the antecedent and anaphor have the same interpretation when the one is copied onto the other. In (25) where the interpretation of the antecedent is literal and the anaphor metaphorical (on pain of categorical absurdity), the violation is of type/character. In (26) (which is more acceptable to informants), we have two different *metaphorical* contents (concepts) for one metaphorical expression type (with one

character).¹⁷ Whether the violation is of character/type or of content/concept seems to affect our intuitions of unacceptability: it is possible to cancel the implication of univocality at the level of content, as in (26.1), but not at the level of character/type, as in (25.1), suggesting that (26) is closer to a pragmatic violation.

- (25.1) *The shark in *Jaws* is a fish, and Mark Spitz/Richard Nixon is, too—but not in the same sense/way.
 (26.1) Nixon is a fish, and Spitz is, too—but not in the same sense/way.

Note that, even while (25) and (26) are ill-formed, we try to *impose* an interpretation on the strings despite the violation. However, it is precisely the feeling of play or pun that accompanies such imposed interpretations that gives away their underlying semantical ill-formedness.¹⁸

Against this argument, Bezuidenhout (2001, pp. 171, 181) objects that there is a parallel pattern of infelicitous crossed interpretations employing literal and loose use. Insofar as those cases should be explained pragmatically (and, on her and Carston's view, metaphor is a variant of loose use), there is no need to go semantic

¹⁷ In the terminology of Stern, 2000, the type/character of the metaphorical anaphor in (25) is 'lexicalized' by employing the 'metaphorical expression' 'Mthat["is a fish"]' for the occurrence of 'is a fish' interpreted metaphorically. Hence, the different types, with different characters, of the antecedent ('is a fish') and (italicized) purported anaphor, which is made explicit in logical form as:

(25.2) * The shark in *Jaws* is a fish, and Spitz/Nixon *Mthat*['is a fish'].

In (26) the antecedent and anaphor share the same character/type but have different contents (relative to different sets of contextual presuppositions:

(26.2) *Nixon *Mthat*['is a fish'], and Spitz *Mthat*['is a fish'].

So, in (25) the violation is at the level of character; in (26) at the level of content.

¹⁸ Note that the indefinite description 'a fish' in (25)–(26) shows that Camp (2005, p. 721) is wrong to object that the semantic ill-formedness of the examples used in Stern, 2000 is due to the fact that 'a single definite description ["is the sun"] [is used] to refer to two distinct objects in the same context', and that the same intuitions do not follow with indefinite descriptions. A similar response applies to Bezuidenhout (2001, 180). Camp also objects that infelicities like (25) and (26) also arise with examples like

(25.2) The shark in *Jaws* is a fish. And Mark Spitz is a fish.

(26.2) Nixon is a fish. And Spitz is a fish.

which cross sentence boundaries and therefore need not obey a syntactic constraint forcing a single reading for both tokens of "is a fish" (p. 722). Oddly, my own intuitions find (25.2) more acceptable than (26.2), possibly because the two articulated terms involve different types/characters. But I agree with Camp that the shift in content in (26.2), which would turn on shifting contextual presuppositions, makes its unacceptability much closer to a pragmatic infelicity; cf. Stern, 2000 for similar remarks. Finally, as Camp notes, there can be non-semantic sources for the infelicity of many metaphorical utterances like 'Rosaline is the milky mysterious moon. And a bursting atomic bomb is the sun' whose juxtaposed metaphors rest on different background assumptions. But these examples have no logical bearing on my argument for underlying semantic structure.

to explain (25) and (26) nor need we posit underlying semantic structure. In reply, the first question we need to ask is whether there is in fact a parallel pattern of ill-formed crossed literal/loose interpretations employing the *ad hoc* concepts generated by the Contextualist process of loosening. Consider the literal use of 'is raw' in (27), its loose use in (28), and the mixed sentence (29):

- (27) That slab of fresh slaughtered meat, dripping blood, is raw (totally uncooked).
- (28) The steak the waiter brought is raw (undercooked).
- (29) ?That slab of fresh slaughtered meat, dripping blood, is raw, and the steak the waiter brought is, too.

My own intuitions about (29) are equivocal. If 'is raw' is given a *pure* loose use (i.e. only the degree of satisfaction of the predicate is relaxed), (29) sounds acceptable. If it is not a pure loose use, then I tend to read into the antecedent some of the encyclopedic features that are conveyed by the anaphor, again making (29) more though not fully acceptable. Note, too, that we can form comparatives between literal and loose uses, e.g.:

- (30) The fresh slaughtered meat, dripping blood, is more raw than my well-done steak.

which would also suggest a single concept.

Nonetheless, let's suppose for the sake of argument that (29), with its mixed literal/loose interpretations, is unacceptable. Suppose also that Quine moonlighted as a hard-hat construction worker to supplement his paltry philosopher's salary. On Bezuidenhout's explanation, the literal (31) and metaphorical (32) should also be analyzed as instances of strict and loose (or loosened) use, respectively.

- (31) Quine demolished Carnap's old house.
- (32) Quine demolished Carnap's argument.

From which it should follow that (33) is unacceptable:

- (33) *Quine demolished Carnap's old house and his argument, too.

But suppose that Quine had to use all the sophisticated tools of 'Truth by Convention' to demolish Carnap, but only a quick observation to point out a blatant non sequitur in Anne's argument. Given Bezuidenhout's apparent criteria for individuating concepts, the *ad hoc* concept in (32) also ought to differ from that in:

- (34) Quine demolished Anne's argument.

Yet, what she ought to count, then, as the mixed metaphorical:

(35) Quine demolished Carnap's argument, and Anne's too,

sounds fine. Or suppose little Anne, like David smiting Goliath with his slingshot, refuted Carnap with a powerful, elegant little objection:

(36) Quine demolished Carnap's argument, and Anne did too.

On Bezuidenhout's Contextualist criteria for distinguishing *ad hoc* concepts, (36) contains two different metaphorically expressed *ad hoc* concepts; yet the anaphora is unobjectionable. Thus, not every difference of *ad hoc* concept (individuated according to Contextualist criteria) manifests itself in our intuitive judgments concerning possible VP anaphora. On my view, (33) does indeed cross two different types with different characters, hence, it is unacceptable. (35), on the other hand, involves one metaphorical character and, since the instrument thematic role is not obligatory, the differences between the instruments of demolition does not yield an intuitive difference in truth-conditions or content, hence, it is acceptable.

The moral I draw from these examples is that the Contextualist explanation of metaphor based on loosening overgenerates *ad hoc* concepts and therefore metaphorical interpretations. If anaphoric relations hold only between occurrences of one semantic type, or expressions with the same character, and if loosened use of an expression (type) is still a use of the same expression (type), then mixed literal/loosened (hence, metaphoric) anaphoric relations ought to obtain. Furthermore, unlike Bezuidenhout's examples, only differences in the values assigned to *obligatory* thematic roles of a metaphorically interpreted expression seem to distinguish among contents or concepts. Certain aspects of metaphorical interpretation thereby show themselves to be autonomous of—precisely because they serve as constraints on—interpreters' metaphorically relevant intentions, beliefs, and mental associations. It is not at all clear how general formal conditions of these kinds can be formulated in terms of use, intentions, or mutual beliefs and expectations.¹⁹ The phenomena thus suggest that there is semantic structure underlying metaphorical interpretation of the kind that interacts in general with syntax and logical form, e.g. with the conditions that govern verb phrase anaphora. But if so, contrary to Contextualism, we must attribute underlying, phonetically unrealized semantic structure to metaphors in order for the requisite conditions to apply.

To conclude this section, I want to propose that loose use does not run parallel to metaphor but perpendicular to it. (13)–(16) are all examples of sentences that

¹⁹ Camp (2005) claims that it is possible to explain the 'infelicity' of (25) and (26) pragmatically in terms of what hearers are led to expect of the anaphor on hearing the antecedent and in terms of relevant resemblances. Her vague albeit brief suggestions do not, however, begin to do justice to the *generality* of the *formal* constraints in question that abstract away from the substance of the expectations and resemblances. And the more general and formal one makes such pragmatic explanations the less distinguishable will they be from semantic conditions. On Camp's comparison of her pragmatic explanation to my Grice-like rules of 'interpretation' (Inconsistency and Redundancy), see Stern, 2000, pp. 141–3.

admit both strict and loose use of an expression interpreted literally. But there are also strict (literal) and loose uses of the same expression when it is interpreted metaphorically. For example, 'is raw' interpreted metaphorically in:

(37) The student's thoughts in the first draft of his paper were raw,

can be used either strictly (i.e. not worked out at all) or loosely (i.e. less than fully worked out). Moreover, the mixed literal/metaphorical (38) and (39) are both unacceptable even if we understand each antecedent-anaphor pair either exclusively strictly or exclusively loosely.

(38) *That slab of meat dripping blood is raw, and so are Jack's thoughts.

(39) *The steak Jack ordered is raw, and so are the thoughts in his final draft.

In short, the strict (literal)/loose and literal/metaphorical distinctions do not coincide. And in neither (38) nor (39) can we cancel the violation by adding 'but not in the same sense' which suggests that the difference in literal/metaphorical interpretation of the expressions is at the level of their types (characters) rather than simply in their concepts (contents), as the Contextualist explanation in terms of loose use would imply.

4. A Literalist Theory of Metaphor

In sections 2 and 3 I raised two main objections to Contextualist accounts of metaphor: (1) they cannot account for the intuitive non-literality that distinguishes metaphor from other pragmatically processed (M-non-literal) interpretations and (2) their explanations over-generate metaphorical interpretations characterized as atomic *ad hoc* concepts. Furthermore, Contextualists do not seem to have the resources to explain how metaphor 'depends' on the literal. For the same reason, they also cannot distinguish between information conveyed by the metaphorical mode of expression that properly belongs to the truth-conditions of an utterance in a context, and information that does not (see the second and third cases at the end of section 2). Unless they treat metaphor as a secondary meaning (which requires recognizing a prior literal meaning), there is no place for information conveyed by literal meaning in their typology.

Two motivations for Literalism are to capture this extra-propositional literal information carried by metaphorical utterances and to express constraints on metaphorical interpretation that block over-generation. Its point is not to insist, come what may, that linguistic meaning determines, or exhausts, propositional content or what is intuitively said by an utterance (Recanati, 2004, p. 160ff.). Rather it aims to show how underlying linguistic structure both constrains the expression of speakers' intentions and enables the expression of more information than that conveyed in the truth-conditions of what is explicitly articulated in the actual sentence uttered.

The language resources, or types of linguistic representations, that will suffice for this job are a matter for empirical investigation. Meaning, or interpretation, is necessarily the meaning, or interpretation, of a symbol or representational form, and semantics is concerned specifically with speakers' knowledge of the principles of meaning or interpretation of linguistic forms in virtue of which they are able to communicate. Either these representations consist exclusively of linguistic elements or they are hybrids of linguistic and contextual elements. Some of them are the concrete events of human speech, sentences uttered or structures close to the surface of utterances of which speakers are conscious; others contain linguistic structures and syntactic information that are considerably richer and more abstract. Without documenting the point, empirical linguistic research over the previous half-century has shown the existence of such abstract linguistic structure to be necessary (and highly productive) in order to explain speakers' rich understanding of speech. I shall therefore assume as a general principle that something like the underlying linguistic level of logical form, which includes phonetically unrealized variables, structures, and thematic information, is necessary for adequate semantic interpretation and is accessible, even if not consciously, to speakers and interpreters.²⁰

This general conception of the role of linguistic structure in interpretation oriented my semantic account of metaphor in Stern, 2000. Its central idea is that metaphorical interpretation can be treated as a kind of context-dependent interpretation on the classical model of demonstratives and indexicals. By analogy to David Kaplan's (1989) Dthat-descriptions that 'lexically' represent the demonstrative interpretations of definite descriptions, I proposed that an expression ϕ interpreted metaphorically should be analyzed as the 'metaphorical expression' 'Mthat[ϕ]'. 'Mthat' is an operator at the level of logical form which, when prefixed to a (literal) expression ϕ , yields a context-sensitive expression 'Mthat[ϕ]' whose tokens in each context c express a set of properties presupposed in c to be m(etaphorically)-associated with the expression ϕ , such that the proposition $\langle \dots \{ \text{Mthat}[\phi] \}(c) \dots \rangle$ is either true or false at a circumstance.²¹ The set of properties presupposed to be m-associated with ϕ are so associated in a variety of ways: either as a stereotypical or normal property of ϕ 's, through

²⁰ It is not obvious that Contextualists share this assumption. Recanati's conception of Minimalism invariably takes the relevant linguistic meaning that determines his minimal propositions to be that read off the surface structures of sentences uttered in concrete speech, ignoring the role of abstract understood elements at a 'deeper' or more abstract level of linguistic representation. This assumption is especially evident in his discussion of Travis' examples (p. 149, n. 46); cf. Stern, 2003.

²¹ According to Kaplan's (1989) semantics for demonstratives, for each expression \mathcal{O} , $\{\mathcal{O}\}$ denotes the character of \mathcal{O} ; $\{\mathcal{O}\}(c)$ denotes the content of \mathcal{O} in the context c ; and $\{\mathcal{O}\}(c)(w)$ the extension (referent, truth-value) of \mathcal{O} uttered (and interpreted) in c and evaluated at the world w . Thus, if \mathcal{O} is a predicate, then $\{\mathcal{O}\}(c)$ denotes a property and $\{\mathcal{O}\}(c)(w(c))$ denotes the extension of \mathcal{O} uttered in the context c at (the world of) that context.

exemplification by ϕ 's, or in more idiosyncratic ways. For example, (21) (repeated here):

(21) Juliet is the sun,

in which 'is the sun' is interpreted metaphorically, will now be represented at the level of its logical form as containing the corresponding metaphorical expression:

(21.1) Juliet Mthat['is the sun'].

The metaphorical expression 'Mthat[ϕ]' has a non-constant character, i.e. a meaning or rule (or function) that in different contexts yields different contents, i.e. different truth-conditional factors (for predicates, properties). Thus, knowing the character of a metaphor is like mastering a general skill of interpretation. It is a rule or function mastered by speakers that enables them, for each expression ϕ that can be interpreted metaphorically in a sentence S , to map the properties presupposed to be metaphorically associated with ϕ in c into a subset of properties that determines the truth-value of utterances of S in c . Exactly how that rule is applied to each context (including identification of the relevant m -associated properties) is not specified in the semantics but in the pragmatics. However, we can distinguish two sets of presuppositions at work in each context of metaphorical interpretation. The first set of p (roductive)-presuppositions is associated with the vehicle interpreted metaphorically; these include presuppositions about the m -associated properties, and it is from these presuppositions that all the properties that are metaphorically expressed by Mthat[ϕ] are drawn. The second set of f (ilter)-presuppositions is associated with the linguistic and extra-linguistic environment of the metaphorical expression; its function is to filter out properties generated by the p -presuppositions that cannot be appropriately said in the context.²²

With this formal apparatus, we can also now begin to explain how the metaphorical 'depends' on the literal and why it remains 'active' in the metaphorical interpretation—although this explanation will also reveal a limitation of our semantic theory. As we have just said, the m -associated presuppositions on which the character, or meaning, of a metaphorical expression Mthat[ϕ] operates are individuated according to the *expression* ϕ (the literal vehicle), not according to the extension (referent) or intension (property) of ϕ .²³ So, one set of presupposed properties will be m -associated with the (literal) term 'dog', another with (the

²² See Reinhart, 1970. These two kinds of *interpretive* presuppositions should be distinguished from those in light of which we judge whether what is said by the metaphor is an appropriate thing to assert/question/request, etc. in that context.

²³ Stern, 2000, pp. 108, 221, 293–4. Although the m -associated presuppositions for exemplificational metaphors involve properties presupposed to be exemplified by the referent of the literal vehicle, which property is exemplified also depends on how the referent is (qualitatively) presented by the literal vehicle (Stern, 2000, p. 155).

co-referential and even co-intensional) ‘canine’; one with ‘mongrel’, another with ‘cur’; one with ‘sweat’, another with ‘perspiration’; one with ‘Tully’, another with ‘Cicero’ in metaphors like:

- (40) Bush is no Cicero;
 (41) Bush is a Tully,

thereby yielding their different metaphorical interpretations. This is the root idea behind our explanation of metaphorical–literal dependence.

Now, when we turn to articulate this idea in terms of our semantic theory, the natural move is to look to the character of the (literal) vehicle ϕ which is interpreted metaphorically to work out the relativity of the m -associated presuppositions to the expression (with its literal meaning). And *prima facie* this is the right direction in which to turn. Neither the content nor extension of $M_{\text{that}}[\phi]$ is compositionally determined by the content or extension of ϕ , but the character of $M_{\text{that}}[\phi]$ is individuated by the character of ϕ . Two metaphorical expressions $M_{\text{that}}[\phi]$ and $M_{\text{that}}[\delta]$ have different characters iff ϕ and δ have different characters. Moreover, this is the case despite the fact that the character of $M_{\text{that}}[\phi]$ is semantically simple insofar as it is parametric (like an indexical, e.g. ‘I’); $M_{\text{that}}[\phi]$ ‘depends’ on (the character of the literal vehicle) ϕ because the set of m -associated presuppositions to which it is parametrically sensitive is itself individuated by (the character of) ϕ . So, the formal notion of character *prima facie* does the needed work to express the expression–relativity of the relevant presuppositions on which the metaphorical interpretation depends.

However, this explanation assumes that the notion of character is fine-grained enough to capture all differences among expressions, or their linguistic meanings, that are necessary to distinguish among different sets of m -associated presuppositions related to those expressions. This is not always true. The strengths of the notion of character are its power to capture and constrain context–dependence *and* that it is much closer than truth–conditional content to linguistic meaning, hence, to the expression itself. But its weakness is that it does not generalize well to context–*independent* expressions. Recall that *all* expressions, not only demonstratives and indexicals, are assigned characters (as well as contents and referents). But context–*independent*, or eternal, expressions like ‘dog’ have constant (or stable) characters that determine the same content in all contexts. Thus any two eternal expressions that have the same content in all contexts will also have equivalent characters. And to make matters even worse: if the content of a directly referential term like a proper name just is its referent (or, for a simple predicate, a property), then a constant character determines the same content *and* the same referent in all contexts—and all three notions, character, content, *and* referent, in Kaplan’s words, collapse onto one another (Kaplan, 1989, p. 562; Stern, 2000, p. 293). It follows that pairs of eternal, simple, *co-directly referring* proper names (‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’) or general expressions (‘cur’ and ‘mongrel’)

will have the same referent and content in all contexts and, hence, the same character. But this leads to a serious problem for our semantics. For if the character of the metaphorical expression $M_{\text{that}}[\phi]$ is individuated by the character of ϕ , and if ϕ is an eternal expression that co-directly refers with another eternal expression μ , then ϕ and μ also have the same content in all contexts, hence, the same (constant) character. Hence, $M_{\text{that}}[\phi]$ and $M_{\text{that}}[\mu]$ will also have the same character. But insofar as each of 'cur' and 'mongrel,' or 'Cicero' and 'Tully', have different meanings manifest in their associations to different sets of presupposed m-associated properties, the identical *characters* of ' $M_{\text{that}}[\phi]$ ' and ' $M_{\text{that}}[\mu]$ ' will be inadequate to distinguish between them, to pick out the different presupposed sets of properties.²⁴

In sum, there is a tension here between our philosophical claim that the relevant set of m-associated presuppositions is individuated by (the linguistic meaning of) the literal vehicle, the *expression* or *word*, not by the property it expresses or by its extension, and our formal semantics that employs a notion of character that is not fine-grained enough to capture the relevant notion of meaning to distinguish among all (eternal) expressions. One might draw different morals from, or propose different solutions to, this problem. One alternative is to assign different characters to any two different expressions insofar as there is some contextual parameter (namely, presuppositions) to which they are differently sensitive (at least in the context of the M_{that} -operator). But this would yield properties (as their contents) that are more fine-grained than the possible worlds analysis that underlies Kaplan's semantics. A second alternative, drawn by Hills, 2002, concludes on the basis of this problem that the analogy between demonstratives and metaphors breaks down. This moral seems to me too drastic if only because demonstratives or, more precisely, Kaplan's d_{that} -descriptions suffer from the same problem. ' D_{that} ["the oldest cur in the world on Dec. 12, 2005"]]' and ' D_{that} ["the oldest mongrel in the world on Dec. 12, 2005"]]' have the same content and character; but they have different meanings which will affect their behavior, and inter-substitutivity, among other places, in attitudinal contexts. Instead, the moral I draw is that these problems reflect the limitations of formalization in semantics to express intuitive philosophical distinctions. The situation is not unique to metaphor. We cannot capture the very real philosophical difference between rigid designation and direct reference in possible worlds semantics, or the difference between singular propositions and those that contain rigid conceptual complexes. Similar tensions also arise in our analyses of quotation, direct and indirect (Stern, 2000, p. 103). In all these cases either we can revise the philosophical claim in order to accommodate our formal resources or we can hold onto the philosophical thesis, try to make it maximally explicit and precise using available formal apparatus, but, where we cannot formally

²⁴ This problem is forcefully presented in Hills, 2002 but it was already raised in Stern, 2000, p. 293; my response here elaborates the line taken there.

cash out a philosophically valuable intuition, we should acknowledge the limits of formalization.

In any case, there are also several other important differences between metaphor and demonstratives/indexicals and their respective semantic accounts. (i) Kaplan's logic of demonstratives was constructed with singular demonstrative terms in mind (not, say, for predicate demonstratives), hence, the values of his demonstratives/indexicals are individuals. The primary semantic unit of metaphor, on the other hand, is the predicate, hence, the basic values are properties. (Cf. Nunberg, 1995. Metaphorical singular terms are in turn analyzed in terms of predicates; see Stern, 2000, pp. 225–9.) (ii) Kaplan's *dthat*-descriptions directly refer to the things *denoted* by their embedded descriptions in their contexts; the properties directly expressed by metaphorical expressions are not determined denotatively but instead, like the referents of indexicals, parametrically. (iii) The contexts of Kaplan's demonstratives and indexicals are tuples of speakers, times, locations, and worlds; those of metaphor, also include sets of presuppositions (i.e. propositions) or presupposed properties.

These differences notwithstanding, the analogy between metaphors and indexicals/demonstratives rests on three parallels:

(1) For both demonstratives/indexicals and metaphors we must distinguish the pre-semantic, semantic, and post-semantic roles of the context. In its first pre-semantic role, context functions to assign sound events to expression-types, to determine *that* an expression is to be interpreted one way or another, with one or another particular type of meaning (character).²⁵ For metaphor, in other words, context in its pre-semantic role serves to determine *that* a given utterance is to be interpreted metaphorically rather than literally, not *what* its interpretation is. In its second semantic role, context and specifically the contextual presuppositions function as the argument for the character of an expression, yielding its truth-conditional content in the context. In its third, post-semantic role, context, especially the facts or circumstances of the context (though also presuppositions about those facts) enable us to evaluate whether the content is right or wrong to assert in those circumstances. In most cases, this judgment of the metaphor depends, at least in part, on its truth-value. But aptness, aesthetic value, and other criteria for success may also enter at this stage.

²⁵ Bezuidenhout, 2001 objects that since \emptyset and $M_{that}[\emptyset]$ are different expression types, I must deny that 'one and same *expression type* can be both literally and metaphorically interpreted' (p. 178, my emphasis). True, but one and the same *utterance* can be assigned to both literal and metaphorical *types*. Bezuidenhout also charges that to posit distinct literal and metaphorical types is to make an 'invidious distinction between literal and metaphorical interpretation that does not seem to exist' (p. 179). Now, I do make a distinction between metaphorical and literal interpretations—so does everyone but deconstructionists—but there is nothing 'invidious' about it. Literal and metaphorical expression-types are treated equally; indeed since each has its own type, there is no discrimination against one or the other. Moreover, contrary to what Bezuidenhout (p. 179) claims, '*Mthat*' introduces, no 'interpretive mechanism' that is not already necessary for demonstrative interpretation (e.g. '*Dthat*'); the only cost is one additional entry in the lexicon.

(2) The characters of indexicals (more so than demonstratives) and metaphors function, not to self-sufficiently determine the content of their utterance, but both to direct and to constrain the role of the (semantic) context insofar as it contributes to content.²⁶ For both indexicals/demonstratives and metaphors, it is therefore crucial to distinguish the stage of interpretation (at which character + context operate) from the stage of evaluation (at which content + circumstance operate). We must distinguish between the content *actually* metaphorically/demonstratively expressed by an utterance in its context and the content that it *would* metaphorically/demonstratively express in some other context; and we must distinguish between the truth-value of the proposition *actually* metaphorically/demonstratively expressed were it evaluated at a *counterfactual* circumstance and the truth-value of the propositional content it *would* have metaphorically/demonstratively expressed at that counterfactual circumstance.

(3) Both indexicals/demonstratives and metaphors obey the Actual Context Constraint (ACC). That is, the contents of both indexicals/demonstratives and metaphors are always fixed relative to their context of utterance, even when embedded in modal and attitudinal contexts.

In sum, this account of metaphor, like Literalist explanations of other phenomena, is based on the assumption that extra-linguistic contextual effects on truth-conditional content should be traced to an element in logical form or the syntactic structure of the linguistic representation underlying the utterance.²⁷ In the remaining two sections, I address two Contextualist objections against this Literalist account of metaphor.

²⁶ On meaning, or character, as directions, see Strawson, 1950.

²⁷ However, unlike some Literalist accounts, e.g., Stanley, 2000, the element in logical form that I posit for metaphorical interpretation—the Mthat-expression—is a narrow, though hybrid, demonstrative-indexical, not simply a variable. Stanley's reason for taking the underlying elements to be variables is in large measure because his arguments turn on the possibility of quantificationally binding the underlying element, and only variables, not narrow indexicals, are bindable. It is not clear whether such considerations would apply to metaphor. However, I would also argue that even in Stanley's examples, in order to capture the explanatory and causal role of the underlying element, it is necessary to represent the underlying element as an indexical, not simply as a variable. If my utterance of:

(2) It is raining,

is to explain why I am taking out my umbrella and raincoat, it is not enough to claim that underlying it is:

(2') It is raining at I;

what is needed is:

(2'') It is raining here,

for reasons given in Perry, 1979. Stanley's own reasons for insisting that narrow indexicals are not bindable are also not clear. It is true that the overt indexicals in natural language do not have bindable inflections or variants, but we use 'he', 'then', and 'there' with the meaning of 'I', 'now', and 'here' in bound constructions and, with a little philosophical imagination, we can invent formal devices for this purpose, e.g. Casteneda's (1967) 'he*'.

5. Other Figures

The general form of the first Contextualist objection runs as follows: ‘The Literalist claims that a certain linguistic argument or evidence L implies that metaphor is (at least in part) semantic. But if so, the same argument or evidence L should entail that another figure F also falls in semantics. However, even the Literalist claims that F is pragmatic. Therefore L is not reason or evidence to take metaphor to be semantic’.

For example, Camp (2005) argues that ‘it is difficult, if not impossible, to hear just one conjunct of:

(42) John is a real genius, and Sam is too.

as ironic. But Stern dismisses a semantic analysis of irony out of hand’ (see Stern, 2000, pp. 232–3); therefore, she concludes that I ‘need an independent motivation for the claim that [examples like (25) and (26) above] demand a distinctive, semantic explanation’. Similarly, Stanley (2005) argues that if examples like (25) and (26) support a semantic analysis of metaphor, similar reasoning should apply to:

(43) John: Bill is a fine friend.
Sally: Sue is too.

where John’s utterance is intended ironically, in which case ‘Sally’s utterance must be understood ironically as well. But this does not show that irony is semantic [in support of which he also cites Stern *ibid.*]... So, such ellipsis facts do not demonstrate that a phenomenon is semantic’.

As Camp notes, examples of VP ellipsis like (25)–(26) function as evidence of formal constraints on possible metaphorical interpretations that go unexplained by use-theorists like Davidson (1986) who sees no interpretative regularities for metaphor even to explain (Stern, 2000, pp. 69–71). As we mentioned in section 3, one kind of constraint on VP anaphora requires sameness of character (violated in cases of mixed literal/metaphorical anaphora like (25)), a second requires sameness of content (violated in cases of mixed metaphorical/metaphorical content anaphora like (26)). Only where the violation is of character do we strictly speaking see a semantic constraint at work; violations of content like (26) are more pragmatic and cancelable.

In contrast, irony is not semantic by anyone’s account. How, then, should it be explained? In Stern, 2000 (pp. 232–8), I distinguish two general classes of figures: M-figures (including metaphor, simile, metonymy) and I-figures (including irony, meiosis, hyperbole, under/overstatement). Both classes are context-dependent. But M-figures are operations on sentence-types that assign them non-constant characters that, in turn, yield (for each of their tokens) contents in contexts while I-figures are operations on contents (in contexts) to yield different contents (in contexts). So, in a case of mixed literal/ironic anaphora, e.g., (42), the antecedent

and (copied) anaphor will nonetheless have the same type (character) but different contents—similar to the mixed metaphorical/metaphorical (content) (26). And in both (26) and (42), it is possible to cancel the implication of univocality, as in (26.1) and:

(42.1) John is a real genius, and Sam is too—but not in the same sense/way.

With mixed literal/metaphorical anaphora, however, the antecedent and anaphor have different characters or types, a semantic difference that cannot be cancelled. Therefore, Camp's and Stanley's arguments from irony do not suffice to show that the ellipsis facts are not evidence that there is semantic structure underlying metaphor.

Stanley (2005) also offers a second set of objections from another figure, 'deferred reference', to show that metaphor is not semantic, e.g.,

(44) The ham sandwich is getting annoyed.

whose subject description refers to the person who ordered the ham sandwich. He argues that, despite the fact that the deferred referent is the value of the antecedent in anaphoric relations like:

(45) The ham sandwich wants his bill now.

and despite the fact that it is impossible to get mixed readings of VP anaphora as in:

(46) Bill served a ham sandwich, and John did too.

where one occurrence refers to the orderer and the other to the sandwich itself—despite all this evidence, deferred reference is really not semantic. Why? His argument goes like this: If this evidence shows that deferred reference is semantic, it will also suffice to show that metaphor is semantic. And indeed he gives two examples parallel to (45) and (46) using metaphor that are perfectly acceptable. However, 'On a standard view of metaphor, metaphor is not semantic'. So, if the metaphorical meaning or referent is not part of the semantic content of its sentences, the evidence from deferred reference 'should not lead us to believe that deferred reference is semantic'.

The classical name for deferred reference is metonymy, the figure in which a term for one entity stands for an associated entity, such as:

(47) The pen is mightier than the sword.

which says that publishing is more effective than military force, or:

(48) Bush bombed Saddam.

which says that the armed forces controlled by Bush bombed the country controlled by Saddam Hussein.²⁸ So, we might paraphrase Stanley's argument as follows: If evidence E shows that metonymy is semantic, then the same evidence should suffice to show that metaphor is semantic. But 'on a standard view' metaphor is not semantic. Therefore, metonymy is not semantic.

Stanley is right that metaphor and metonymy stand and fall together: both are M-figures. But one philosopher's *modus tollens* is another's *modus ponens*. If it is indeed the case, as the initial evidence suggests, that metonymy is semantic, that would be further evidence that metaphor is semantic. Since Stanley gives no evidence for the 'standard view' of metaphor, what are his arguments for denying that deferred reference, or metonymy, is semantic, despite the *prima facie* evidence that it is? (In what follows I will follow Stanley's usage of 'deferred reference'.) Apart from the argument from irony already canvassed, he gives two main 'theoretical' arguments.²⁹

First, one might think that deferred reference is semantic because the literal meaning of the vehicle 'the ham sandwich' 'provides a guide to its deferred meaning', the person who ordered the ham sandwich. However, Stanley objects, the literal meaning of 'x has a nice handwriting' in a reference letter also 'guides' us to the implicature that x is a bad philosopher. In both cases, the literal meaning is *employed*. But that does not show that it *linguistically controls* the deferred meaning and, in order for the deferred meaning to count as semantic, its content must be *constrained* by the literal meaning: in particular, the deferred referent must be something of which the literally meant expression is true.

As I said in section 4, I agree that the function of linguistic meaning is to constrain the speaker's intentions, i.e. to demarcate the range of possible contents that can be communicated by a given linguistic form. The issue over which Stanley and I disagree is whether deferred reference is or is not linguistically constrained. Surely mere 'guidance by literal meaning', stated so vaguely, is not sufficient to render an interpretive phenomenon semantic. But Stanley's example, Grice's 'x has nice handwriting' in a letter of reference, is irrelevant to metaphor, since its implicature (that x is a bad philosopher) is a secondary meaning, calculated by an inference from a prior proposition whose communication flouts a maxim. For metaphors (and metonyms), as we saw in section 3, there is in general no prior literal proposition that is the semantic content of the utterance, what it says, from which an implicature to what the speaker meant (its metaphorical or deferred

²⁸ Recanati, 2004, p. 26 calls this figure by the name of 'semantic transfer'. Related figures to metonymy are metalepsis in which we refer to something by means of a term for something else to which it is remotely related, either causally or spatially, and synecdoche, which is based on part/whole, individual member/class and material/thing relations.

²⁹ Stanley also argues that, if an adequate theory of some phenomenon e.g. deferred reference (or metaphor), turns out to be completely unconstrained by conventional meaning and restricted only by pragmatics, then the phenomenon is not semantic; as proof, he cites Sag (1981). Whether or not Sag's is an 'adequate' theory, there may, of course, be others in the literature Stanley does not discuss which involve semantic constraints.

meaning) could be inferred or calculated. Stanley needs a better example of non-semantic guidance to compare to metaphor.

Furthermore, despite Stanley's assertion to the contrary, deferred reference (like metaphor) is semantically constrained. Note, first, that deferred reference is context-dependent. Depending on the context in which (44) is uttered, 'the ham sandwich' might refer to the person who *made* or *sold* or *ate* the ham sandwich, not just the one who *ordered* it. So, as a first stab, the definite description:

(49) The ham sandwich.

in (44) should be represented at the level of logical form by:

(49.1) (The x) (x R the ham sandwich).

where the value of the relation R can vary from context to context, e.g. taking Ordering in one context, Making in another. To capture its context-dependency, we might also mimic our analysis of metaphor, inventing an operator 'Def' that maps the literal referent onto the contextually-determined deferred referent.³⁰

(49.2) (The x) (x Def['is a ham sandwich']).

Yet while the deferred meaning/referent may vary with context, once we fix its interpretation in a context, it remains fixed. Not only can't we get mixed literal/metonymic interpretations of (46) where the antecedent is the sandwich and the anaphor its orderer, we also can't get mixed deferred/deferred interpretations where the antecedent is interpreted as an *orderer* and the anaphor as a *maker*. Likewise, 'Two ham sandwiches are getting annoyed' (Stanley, n. 4) cannot mean that one ham sandwich *orderer* and one *maker* are getting annoyed; the two must either be both orderers or both makers.³¹ If deferred reference was simply pragmatic, not semantic, it is a good question why these mixed readings are impossible, no matter what the particular mixed contents happen to be.

Stanley also claims that the literal meaning of 'ham sandwich' does not constrain its deferred meaning/referent because the semantic content of 'ham sandwich'

³⁰ This is only a first approximation to a semantic analysis of deferred reference/ metonymy as an operator on the model of 'Mthat.'. Here I take the primary unit of metonymy, like metaphor, to be a predicate, although the former is typically a singular term. In a full analysis, as with nominative metaphor, we would presumably need to embed the description within a Dthat-description in order to capture its rigidity; see Stern, 2000, pp. 225-9. It is also an open question whether the Def operator takes the referent of the description as its argument, or its character (as with 'Mthat'.). My main interest here is to secure rather than save the phenomena and to show that there are *prima facie* constraints on deferred reference/ metonymy.

³¹ As this example shows, metonymy is not limited to singular terms.

need not be true of the deferred referent. True, but it does not follow that the literal meaning of the phrase does not constrain its deferred referent. Suppose that a certain restaurant's specialty is ham sandwiches but it also has a clientele that observes the Jewish dietary laws (which prohibit ham). So, the restaurant serves them kosher vegetarian ham-substitute sandwiches that look and taste like the real thing. To avoid confusing them, we can imagine a rule in practice in the restaurant that says:

- (50) Ham sandwiches sit on the right side of the restaurant, kosher sandwiches on the left.

It is their consumers, not the sandwiches, who sit on the different sides, but what is crucial to determining the identities of the deferred referents—and constrains their respective semantic contents—is precisely the semantic content of the literal terms. One might, in other words, say that deferred meaning, or metonymy, no less than metaphor, depends on the literal meaning of its vehicle.

Stanley's second objection is that any expression can be used metaphorically and any term can be used for deferred reference. Therefore, neither has to do with the 'semantics of any particular construction'. Instead, both metaphor and deferred reference are *uses* of linguistic constructions with one semantic meaning to communicate something different.

Yes and No. Not every expression can be used metaphorically to express just anything and not every term can be used with deferred reference to refer to anything—and this *even apart* from pragmatic constraints. As we have now seen, there are semantic constraints on both metaphor and deferred reference imposed by the meaning of the literal vehicle. As for the construction-specificity of metaphor and deferred reference: Apart from the configurational constraints (exemplified by (46)) on deferred co-reference, the objection assumes that the only constructions to be taken into account are those phonetically realized in the surface structures of sentences uttered, i.e. articulated constituents. But if our analysis of metaphor and metonymy is on the right track, there are abstract constructions at the level of logical form specific to both metaphorical and metonymical interpretation, no different in principle from the abstract constructions posited by Literalists (e.g. Stanley, 2000, 2002; Stanley and Szabo, 2000) to constrain other contextual effects on semantic content.

In sum, a close examination of deferred reference confirms rather than refutes the hypothesis that metaphorical interpretation falls in part under semantics.

6. The Actual Context Constraint

Even a Contextualist like Recanati (2004, p. 159) concedes that there are *some* expressions in natural language whose referential value is context-dependent and determined semantically, or linguistically, rather than pragmatically. Let's grant

him that this class of expressions is smaller, even much smaller, than many assume, that it includes only the pure indexicals ('I', 'now', 'here'), not even demonstratives ('he', 'that') whose value depends on the speaker's referential intentions, and let's also grant that this linguistic process ('referential saturation') is not representative of any general way in which context contributes to or shapes content or truth-conditions. With all of these qualifications in hand, let's focus on one feature of this special case of saturation, what I earlier called the Actual Context Constraint (ACC): namely, that the referential value or content of a pure indexical is always fixed relative to features of its actual context of utterance, and contributes an invariant element to the proposition expressed, regardless of the circumstance at which that proposition is evaluated, hence, even when the indexical is embedded in a modal context.³²

If metaphors also obey the ACC, that would be powerful evidence in favor of a Literalist theory of metaphor according to which, underlying metaphorical interpretation, there is an abstract indexical-like linguistic form that imposes this constraint. In Stern (2000) I argued that we do see the ACC in action in examples like:

(51) Juliet might be the sun.

which is true in the circumstance of its context of utterance just in case there is some possible circumstance in which she has whatever feature is actually metaphorically expressed by 'is the sun' in its speaker's or interpreter's context, relative to our actual *m*-associated presuppositions related to 'is the sun' (and 'Juliet'). It is not enough for the *actual* truth of (51) that there be some possible circumstance in which whatever would be expressed metaphorically by 'is the sun' in that possible circumstance is true of Juliet in that circumstance.

Camp (2005) has recently challenged both the ACC applied to metaphor and the assumption that we can,

distinguish suppositions that specify the circumstances of evaluation from 'actual' contextual presuppositions. Without a way to tease these two sets of suppositions apart, though, there is no force to Stern's claim that 'like the character of an indexical, the character of the metaphor constrains its content by limiting its contextual source to actual presuppositions—even when we evaluate its truth in non-actual circumstances' (Stern, 2000, p. 197) (p. 726).

³² On the ACC, see Kaplan, 1989 for whom it is a direct consequence of the directly referential status of demonstratives and indexicals. Kaplan dubs any operator that would shift the saturation of an indexical to some other non-actual context a 'monster', i.e. a device utterly alien to, indeed impossible in, *natural* language. For a recent challenge to the ACC, see Schlenker, 2003. I intend to discuss his critique elsewhere but his objections, as far as I can see, do not bear on the present argument.

Her counterexamples are subjunctive conditionals in which the antecedent specifies counterfactual presuppositions (hence, a non-actual context) relative to which a metaphor in the consequent is interpreted. For example, suppose Paris replies to Romeo's (21) with (52):

- (52) (i) As matters stand, Juliet's no sun.
 (ii) If she had married me, though, she might have been the sun.
 (iii) She could have been the leading lady of Verona, and all the other ladies would have deferred to her.

Camp supposes that the content contributed by 'is the sun' (in (ii)) is very different than it is for Romeo's utterance (21).³³ Romeo treats Juliet's virtues, like the sun's light, as 'natural and original'; according to Camp, 'Paris's utterance attributes the possibility of a highly artificial importance to her, roughly of being the center of Veronese social life'. She proposes that Paris's 'imagined-Juliet raises different resemblances with the sun to salience, and thereby determines a different metaphorical content, than actual-Juliet does' (p. 725)—contrary to the ACC. She also gives a second counterexample in which Benvolio responds with

- (53) If we were living after a nuclear apocalypse, then Juliet could have been the sun. After all, she's pale, cold, and distant, and that's how the sun would be then. But I can say she sure isn't the Tuscan sun.

Again, Benvolio's utterance contributes a content metaphorically expressed by 'is the sun' fixed relative to the counterfactual presuppositions, or context, specified in the antecedent of the conditional, not relative to the presuppositions *m*-associated with 'is the sun' in its actual context, hence, contrary to the ACC.

In reply, I would argue that neither (52) nor (53) violates the ACC (even if Camp is right about their interpretations) because the counterfactual subjunctive antecedent of a conditional *alters* the prior context of interpretation. That is, with all such conditionals, first we 'actualize'—add to the initial actual context set of presuppositions—the subjunctively expressed antecedent of the conditional and, then, cued by its subjunctive mood which is a conventional device (in English) for indicating that prior presuppositions to the contrary are being (temporarily) suspended, simultaneously drop conflicting prior contextual presuppositions. (For

³³ I have added the small roman numerals for expository purposes. Camp does not say how she interprets (52i). Presumably Paris is not simply denying that Juliet is literally the sun. Is he then denying that she is the sun, under its metaphorical interpretation relative to Romeo's context? Call that interpretation of the metaphor *P*. In that case, 'As matters stand' would seem to be referring to the circumstances of evaluation, not the context of interpretation. So (48i) states that in the present circumstances of evaluation, Juliet is not *P*—contrary to Romeo's assertion, both agreeing on the content of (21) in that context. As a follow-up to (52i), the antecedent of the conditional in (ii) would be best understood then, contrary to Camp's analysis, as supposing a counterfactual circumstance of evaluation, not a counterfactual context of interpretation.

more details, see Stern, 2000, pp. 207–8, following Stalnaker, 1968, 1972.) Relative to the altered—what is *then* the *actual*—context of utterance, the metaphorical interpretation of the consequent of the conditional obeys the ACC.

But Camp's two counterexamples (52) and (53) also differ from each other in a way that illustrates how one might solve the more general problem she raises as to how to 'tease apart' those presuppositions that specify the circumstances of evaluation from those that constitute the 'actual' context of interpretation. Note that the antecedent of (52) supposes a counterfactual claim associated, not with the literal vehicle for the metaphor, 'the sun', but rather with the subject 'Juliet', part of the linguistic environment of the metaphor. In (53), the counterfactual presuppositions are ones associated with 'the sun'. This difference parallels the distinction we drew in section 4 between two sets of presuppositions in the interpretive process: the p(roductive)-presuppositions associated with the literal vehicle for the metaphor and the f(ilter)-presuppositions associated with its environment. The p-presuppositions supply the pool of properties or associations that are candidates for interpretations of the metaphor. However, since those presuppositions over-generate, the f-presuppositions filter out inappropriate candidates; the f-presuppositions themselves do not introduce new properties.

Now, the antecedent of (52) ascribes counterfactual properties to Juliet, so it is related to the environment of the metaphor and, if it adds a supposition to the interpretation of the metaphor, it ought to fall among the f-presuppositions that promote and demote candidate properties but do not themselves add new ones. It is very hard to see, then, how the counterfactual supposition of (52) could yield the significantly different metaphorical interpretation of 'is the sun' purported by Camp.³⁴ What seems more plausible is that the antecedent of (52) is not functioning at all as part of the interpretive context that generates interpretations, but rather as part of the evaluative context in which we determine whether the content expressed by the metaphor is true or false. Given a more or less shared interpretation *P* of 'is the sun' (something like being unparalleled among her peers and being the center to whom everyone else defers), the disagreement between Romeo and Paris is over the question whether, as Romeo says, the proposition that Juliet is *P* is *actually* true or whether it would only be true in the counterfactual circumstance Paris entertains. On the other hand, the antecedent of (53), which supposes

³⁴ In order to get the very different properties Camp wants to express of Juliet, what she needs is really a different metaphor with different associations, e.g. this reply by Paris:

As matters stand, Juliet's no sun. If she had married me, though, and become the leading lady of Verona, all the other ladies deferring to her, she would have been the Tiffany lamp to outshine all others..

Here Paris first denies the truth of the metaphor (21) with the content it expresses in Romeo's context. Then he proposes a different metaphor, with a different content (say, the kinds of artificial social properties Camp suggests), which relative to the counterfactual circumstances stated in its antecedent, is true of Juliet.

counterfactual properties associated with the metaphorical vehicle ‘the sun’, adds new p-presuppositions to the initial context, thus enabling a very different interpretation for the metaphor relative to the altered actual context.

In sum, (52) and (53) do not show that the ACC does not hold for metaphor. And by paying close attention to the distinctions between p- and f-presuppositions and between interpretive and evaluative presuppositions, we can begin to sort out what belongs to the context of interpretation and what belongs to that of evaluation.³⁵

I will conclude with two additional alleged counterexamples to the ACC, which is equivalent to the claim that metaphors cannot be bound by an operator:

(54) In no remotely conceivable way am I a rose!³⁶

This sentence is ambiguous. On one reading it says that there is no possible (= conceivable) way in which the *world* might be in which I am a rose, where ‘am a rose’ is interpreted metaphorically in its actual context of utterance *c*, relative to the presupposed m-associated properties for ‘is a rose’ that obtain in its actual context *c*.

(54.1) $—(\exists w)(\{I\}(c)(w) \in \{M_{\text{that}}[\text{‘is a rose’}]\}(c)(w))$

Here the metaphorical interpretation is fixed according to the ACC and is not bound by an operator. On a second reading, (54) means that there is no possible set of presuppositions, that is, there is no possible context, in which ‘I am a rose’ could be interpreted to express a truth in the circumstance of that same context. That is,

(54.2) $—(\exists c)(\{I\}(c)(w(c)) \in \{M_{\text{that}}[\text{‘is a rose’}]\}(c)(w(c)))$

Again, no violation of the ACC.

A second interesting example is

(55) Juliet and Achilles are each diamonds in their own different ways.

which Camp (2005) says should be unacceptable if the metaphorical interpretation of ‘diamond’ is determined semantically ‘because the very same occurrence of ‘diamond’ must be assigned multiple contents simultaneously’ (p. 721). For reasons of space, I cannot give a full analysis of the logical form of (55) which would involve syntactic details (about ‘each’ and binding) beyond the scope of this paper. But an informal account will suffice to show why Camp’s conclusion does not

³⁵ Camp (2005) also criticizes my analysis of metaphors in belief- and attitudinal-contexts which conform to the ACC. Reasons of space prohibit a full response to her criticism but a full discussion would have to take into account Schlenker, 2003; see n. 24 above)

³⁶ I owe this example to David Hills.

follow. Suppose that ‘being a diamond in a way’ (interpreted metaphorically) is to be (diamond-like) precious or (diamond-like) unscratchable or (diamond-like) sparkling and so on, where each of these is interpreted metaphorically to express some way W_i . Let c be the context of utterance of (55), namely a context set of p -presuppositions m -associated with ‘is a diamond’ and f -presuppositions related respectively to ‘Juliet’ and ‘Achilles’. What (55) says is that:

$$(55.1) \quad (\exists W_i) (\exists W_j) (W_i = \{\text{Mthat}[\text{‘is a diamond’}]\}(c) \ \& \\ W_j = \{\text{Mthat}[\text{‘is a diamond’}]\}(c) \ \& \ W_i \neq W_j \ \& \ W_j \ \& \ W_{j,a})$$

On this analysis, (55) is interpreted relative to one, the actual, context set of presuppositions, and the different f -presuppositions related to ‘Juliet’ and ‘Achilles’ account for the different ways in which each of them is (metaphorically) a diamond. Thus, one, we avoid violating the ACC and, two, we avoid having to assign simultaneously multiple contents to the one occurrence of the metaphor because *no* particular content is assigned. We merely assert that there exist the two different ways that are the content of ‘is a diamond’ when metaphorically ascribed to Juliet and Achilles, respectively. The only remaining question is how a Contextualist could possibly analyze (55) without the resources of the character of the underlying metaphorical expression ‘Mthat[ϕ]’ that is so essential to the Literalist explanation.

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