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CONCEPT AND INTUITION.
ON DISTINGUISHABILITY AND SEPARABILITY

I.

Here are two of the most often quoted passages from Immanuel Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. First:

[...] thought without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.¹

And secondly, in a continuation of this passage:

These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. But that is no reason for confusing the contribution of either with that of the other; rather is it a strong reason for carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the other.

The passages are so well known because Kant laid such massive importance on them. His claims about the strict distinction between these two "sources," even as he emphasized their necessarily intertwined, even inseparable role in knowledge, was the basis of his critique of the entire prior philosophical tradition, elements of which, he famously claimed, either "sensualized all concepts of the understanding" or "intellectualized" appearances.²

But the passages already have a dialectical and somewhat unstable form; both distinctness and necessary intertwining (inseparability in any claim to knowledge) are emphasized. And the duality has a number of different dimensions that become apparent when the claim is considered in different contexts. There is a logical dimension apparent in interpreters interested in how Kant understands the relation between universals and particulars in judgment, or what his theory of intuition can tell us about singular terms. The doctrine of the dual sources of any possible knowledge claim has a much more specific function when considered as an element in the strategy to demonstrate the objective validity of synthetic a priori knowledge in mathematics, natural science and philosophy.

¹ See: Immanuel Kant: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. A 51/B 75.
² See: ibid., A 271/B 327. – In this passage, Locke is of course the chief example of the former; Leibniz the latter.
In that context, the further claim that one can separate out, in transcendental reflection, in each of these required sources, a "pure, formal" and an "empirical, material" element is an indispensable part of such a proof, as Kant sees it. And finally from a much higher altitude one can consider what general model of the basic relation between "mind and world" is therewith presented, and so what sort of idealism one ought or ought not to attribute to Kant.

I have argued in Hegel's Idealism that this last issue is especially important in understanding what sort of idealism one ought to attribute to Hegel, especially since Hegel, throughout his life, characterized his own position by partly involving and appropriating, and partly criticizing, what he took to be the Kantian understanding of the relation between understanding and sensibility, concept and intuition. Passages from his Jena period, especially *Glauben und Wissen*, are particularly striking. He contrasts his own "organic idea of productive imagination" with what he attributes to Kant as, 

[...] the mechanical relation of a unity of self-consciousness which stands in antithesis to the empirical manifold, either determining it or reflecting on it.⁴ This clearly indicates that what Hegel is out to criticize is not the distinction itself, but the way Kant understands the nature of concept-intuition unity in knowledge claims. A "mechanical" sort of application or inductive reflection is what is being rejected. And in that same work, he notes that Kant himself (in the second edition deduction) is led to undermine his own official claims about strictness of the epistemic separability between conceptions and intuitions in experience.

Hence, the original synthetic unity of apperception is recognized also as the principle of the figurative synthesis; i.e., of the forms of intuition; space and time are themselves conceived as synthetic unities, and spontaneity, the absolute synthetic activity of the productive imagination, is conceived as the principle of the very sensibility which was previously characterized only as receptivity.⁵ This sort of difference between Kant and Hegel is supposed to be what accounts for an idealism which sees human understanding as limited to sensible content offered up to it from "outside" thought, as it were — restricted to and by an intuition, non-conceptual manifold or the form of any possible such manifold — and, by contrast, a so-called absolute idealism in which the talk is of thought's "self-determination," "giving itself" its own content, and that seems to mean in some sense "restricting" itself, since such content presumably constrains what can be thought.⁶ There is no reason at all to attribute to Hegel the bizarre claim that human thinking can produce the actual objects about which it makes claims, so none of this implies any abandonment of a distinction between the spontaneous activity of thinking and what is "other than thought," or the material content of thought, but Hegel's statements explaining how all this fits together (what it means for thought to "determine" this content if it does not mean "produce" it) are as baffling and as important as any in his corpus. Here is a typical example from his *Berlin Phenomenology*, as challenging to an interpreter now as they must have sounded then to his first readers. The I is now this subjectivity, this infinite relation to itself, but therein, namely in this subjectivity, lies its negative relation to itself, differentiation, judgment. The I judges, and this constitutes it as consciousness; it repels itself from itself; this is a logical determination.⁷

II.

The fact that Hegel is objecting to the way Kant understood the distinction between intuition and concept obviously, I would think, does not mean that he is committed to the view that there is no such distinction. (Indeed, what could *that* mean? Again, that we create what we think as we think it? That thought cannot be about particular objects? That there is no way to distinguish the deliverances of sensibility from the intellectual activity of classification, predication and judgment? That we can think whatever we like about the world, regardless of the way the world confronts us in all its details?)⁸ The passages just cited make

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⁶ See: GW 4, p. 327. BK, p. 691. — It is not necessary to rely wholly on the second edition to make such claims. Kant had spoken of "a synthesis of apprehension in intuition," and "a synthesis of reproduction in imagination," and had claimed that "intuition is a necessary ingredient in perception itself." (A 120) in the first edition and these are counterparts to the more "active" sounding notions of the productive imagination and the figurative synthesis in the second edition.

⁷ All of these formulations by Hegel are of course subject to multiple possible interpretations. On this see e.g.: "Die Befreiung als die Logik der Freiheit." In: Hegel-Studien 36 (2001). Pp. 97–115.


⁹ Just on the face of it, someone claiming that "X cannot be representationally significant except as Y-ed" cannot be assumed to be claiming "There are no Xs; there is only Y-ing," or even to be claiming "Xs not playing a representationally significant role means it plays no role whatsoever; has no function within knowledge claims." (I borrow the useful phrase, "representationally significant," from: Robert Pippin: Kant and Non-Conceptual Content. In: European Journal of Philosophy. 13 (2005). 2, pp. 247–296.)
clear that he is very much in agreement with Kant about the necessary cooperation of such elements in knowledge (thus accepting that there are such elements), but that he is objecting to a "mechanical" opposition in favor of an "organic" role for the imagination in understanding the relation between intuition and concept, and that he is enthusiastically applauding those passages in the second-edition deduction where Kant, by Hegel’s lights, follows the logic of his own argument and begins to understand that the concept-intuition distinction is not strictly congruent with the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, that there is an "active" and even conceptual element in the sensible uptake of the world (a claim which, again, hardly disputes that there is any such uptake.) In many passages, Kant seems to be claiming that intuitions are a non-conceptual species of determinate representation, not only functioning epistemically "independent" of modes of conceiving/judging, but only in such "independence" able to render thought (concepts) determinate. The notion of experience as a result of the "application" of a concept to this sort of epistemically independent, passively intuited manifold began to look less credible to Kant, so Hegel seems to assume, and with that alteration the basic model of judgment and of experience at issue would have to look different. (By independent I mean the claim that for Kant intuitions play a cognitively significant role in experience on their own, even when considered in independence of any conceptual determination.) Hegel, I tried to show, also thinks that such a concession by Kant alters what a transcendental deduction could establish and so in that way too begins to motivate a different overall picture of the mind-world relation and of the character of idealism. This basic picture will thus be of crucial importance as well in any understanding of the relation between practical reason and the sensible domain of inclinations, desires, and aversions.

I say that this much in any such interpretation is obvious, but one should be careful. Miriam Wildenauer, in what I regard as quite a distorted, inaccurate, and misleading characterization of my position, is convinced that I need reminding of Hegel’s agreement with the "necessary cooperation" side of the concept-intuition doctrine. But I never denied this, indeed insisted on it (for example, in citing the passage above about an "organic" and not "mechanical" unity of such different epistemic elements.) My claim is that Hegel wishes to stress more, make more out of, the organic unity or organic inseparability of such elements, and that this amounts to claiming that the "blindness" of intuitions considered apart from conceptualization has different implications than Kant allowed, and changes what one can claim about a non-derived concept having an intu-
of intuition cannot be simply identified with pure forms of receptivity, that concept and intuition cannot be so nearly separated at the transcendental level. (In this I was following Sellars’s important commentary in Science and Metaphysics.)

Nevertheless, despite all this, Wildenauer claims that I have confused a claim about inseparability with a far stronger (and obviously hopeless) claim about indistinguishability. She does not spell out what she takes the implications of such an indistinguishability claim to be, but I assume it is something like the notion of an intellectual intuition (which I took great pains to distance Hegel from). Remarkably, in a note appended to this claim, that is, her claim that inseparability is not objectionable, but that I impute an indistinguishability thesis to Hegel, she cites me explicitly referring to Kant’s difficulty in maintaining a strict separation between concept and pure intuition, that later idealists might look at this as a “blurring” of the strictness of the distinct roles each should play in cognition (not at all, I note, its elimination), and then yet again, that the issue for me and my Hegel is the problem and status of, and here again I quote her quoting me, a “strict separation claim.” In other words in citing purported textual evidence that I am supposed to be worried about indistinguishability, she cites all the passages which simply confirm that I am, on the contrary, concerned with the separability problem. The fact that I am also concerned with this issue as part of the deduction’s strategy and the resulting nature of the idealism claim has not, for all the frequency with which I mention those issues, risen to salience for Wildenauer. Indeed, no one would guess from reading her account that these are my chief concerns.

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   Contra Wildenauer, all of this is perfectly consistent with Hegel’s robust criticism of Jacobi’s version of Kant’s distinction in Glauben und Wissen.

15 “At the heart of Pippin’s interpretation lies, or so I believe, a confusion of this non-separation thesis with a non-distinction thesis.” (ERI, p. 91.)

16 See: HI, 28.

17 See: Ibid., 29.

18 See: Ibid., 37.

19 In the few passages where the “distinction” between them is at issue, I make clear that what Hegel is criticizing is the strictness of the distinction in Kant, not its existence. See: HI, p. 25. Apparently in support of her interpretation Wildenauer quotes a characterization by Sally Sedgwick about my interpreting Hegel as part of “the Fichtean effort to derive intuitions from concepts.” (ERI, n. 15, p. 88), a simplification by Sedgwick that I had taken pains to deny when the first pronounced it in 1993. See: Robert B. Pippin: Hegel’s Original Insight. In: International Philosophical Quarterly, XXXIII (1993), 3, 285–296. I do not know how the remarks there on p. 291 could be any clearer on this point.

one space and one time and therefore no representation of space and time is
discursive or conceptual. We possess the unique cognitive representation: the
pure intuitions of space and of time.

This latter feature both plays a crucial role in the deduction’s proof of the
objective validity of the categories and also maintains the, let us say, “idealizing”
feature of the claim that space and time are (only) pure subjective forms of
intuition. That is, as is well known, Kant is unwilling to accept as a summary of
his claim for the objective validity of the categories the following formulation:
any experience requires judging, determinate claim-making; were the forms of
objects unthinkable by us, they would be for us “as if nothing.” What it is to be
thinkable by us is for objects and events to manifest the forms of judgment. So
the forms of judgment must be the form of any objects knowable by us. This sort
of argument is said by Kant many times to be incomplete. He is not interested in
(or not only interested in) an exploration of the limits of “the thinkable by
us,” what aspects of mindedness seem indispensable to contentful mindedness
(possible objective purport) as such. He clearly wants to establish that objects do
conform to the categories, not that we must apply the categories to whatever
sensory contact is delivered to us, and therewith to show that synthetic a priori
judgments are possible. Kant is interested in the possibility of synthetic a priori
knowledge and he famously links that possibility question with a new sort of
topic: how objective purport is even possible. But he is not interested in ending
up with a “weak” answer to that basic question, concluding by relying on like
“what we count as representation of an object,” what counts as an object for us.
He is also interested in showing that what we require is, one could say, “met” by
what is immediately given in experience.

We have now to explain the possibility of knowing a priori, by means of the
categories, whatever objects may present themselves to our senses, not indeed
in respect of the form of their intuition, but in respect of the laws of their
combination, and so, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature, and of even
making nature possible.21

What is important here is to understand what is involved in Kant’s strong ob-
jectivity claim, as opposed to subjective unavoidability. This is tricky, because of
of course, as in the quotation, Kant will try to establish such objectivity by insist-
that the categories constitute what any possible relation to an object could
be, and so what any object in possible relation to us could be. The strategy is an
argument about the constitutive role of the categories and that looks yet again
like some subjective imposition model.

To avoid this interpretation Kant reminds us again that the pure forms of in-
tuition are also pure intuitions, that is, representations of the immediate aspects
of any possibly received manifold. This allows him to say “from the side of giv-
enness, sensibility” as it were, that there could not be such deliverances not sub-
ject to the unity made possible by categories. We have a way of representing the
domain of the immediately, sensibly given as such (because it has a pure form
accessible as a pure intuition, a distinct representation) and so can claim that
the categories not only prescribe the unity required for objective purport at all
to any manifold, but also that any manifold, given especially its temporal aspects,
requires categorical unity if it is to provide any possible content for thought.

All synthesis, therefore, even that which renders perception possible, is subject to
the categories; and since experience is knowledge by means of connected
perceptions, the categories are the conditions of the possibility of experience
and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience.22

Something like this might be what Kant has in mind when he mentions the
otherwise mysterious notion of “transcendental content.” At any rate, Kant be-
gins to illustrate this with his famous house example at B 162 and this continues
as a style of argument throughout the Principles.

This is a very brief summary, but I need this much of Kant’s attempt on the
table to be able to return to the question of what it means in this context for the
strict separability of concept and intuition to break down somewhat and how
that issue is related to the Deduction and idealism problem. For if it turns out
to be impossible to consider the intuited manifold “purely” and as a separable
component of any knowledge claim, if “what presents themselves to the senses”
must be considered already conceptually articulated and conceptual articula-
tion cannot be considered an immediately given aspect of the manifold as such,
them the a priori claim about the fixed, necessary conditions of receptivity and
thereby strong objectivity in experience cannot be made. In Hegelian terms, this
means that there cannot be a fixed, a priori determinable separation between
the subject of experience on one side and some formal consideration of all
possible deliverances of sensibility on the other; or, more familiarly, the subject
and the object side of this equation are far too intertwined (more than the offi-
cial Kant realized, apart from the hints in the B-deduction), to allow one to
say that what the subject side requires from the object side is met by the object
side.

Again this is so sketchy as to be like a cartoon in a way, but it allows us to
return to the idealism issue. For in a footnote to the B 160 discussion Kant
concedes, in effect, that this picture of a separable pure intuition allowing us to

21 See: Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. B 159f.; see also B 138.
22 See: Ibid., B 160f.
23 See: Ibid., A 79/1 B 105.
consider any possible manifold "from the side of the given, the object" is misleadingly simplified. For under these assumptions we are still only considering the formal features of an intuited manifold, we have not yet established that the intuitional content of the deliverances of sensibility must exhibit the conceptual structure required for categorical ordering. So in the note he claims,

Space, represented as an object [...] contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains combination of the manifold, given according to the forms of sensibility, in an intuitive representation; so that the form of intuition gives only a manifold, the formal intuition gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize that it precedes any concept, although as a matter of fact, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible.34

It is this claim about how the "understanding determines sensibility" that, I claimed, provides Hegel with his beginning alteration of the official Kantian idealism claim towards a version more in keeping with Kant's spirit, as exhibited here: that thought is not merely presented with and then applied to and restricted by, a thoroughly non-conceptual sensory manifold. The manifold is already conceptually articulated; concepts are engaged in our "sensory uptake" of the world, and the separation claim and the strategy it grounds and the mind-world picture it assumes must now all be qualified, even re-thought.

Now, it is possible to cite a list of passages where Kant says, in effect, that "Objects can appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding."35 But the question of what Kant means when he claims it is possible to "intuit an object" independently of concepts is not thereby settled. On the face of it Kant only seems to be repeating that the intuitional aspects of any object perceived cannot be attributed to the results of the understanding's determination; he is not saying that a cognitively significant pre-conceptual experience of an object is possible. It is thus somewhat misleading to raise the issue in the contemporary terms of non-conceptual content, as some contemporary commentators have done. Kant is not really talking about non-conceptual or any sort of intuitional content in the passages at issue, but rather about the non-conceptual, formal aspects of any relation to an object. And no conceptual holist need affirm that reference must be fixed wholly conceptually, where conceptually is understood roughly as descriptively. There is a demonstrative use of concepts too.

At this point, one can move in a direction like McDowell's in Mind and World and elsewhere, and to some extent like Sellars. One can point out that the main value of this picture of a conceptually articulated sensory uptake (where the engagement of concepts in sensation does not mean full fledged judging) is to make clear how we are not doomed either to a causal theory and a picture of non-conceptual content inconsistent with the normative nature of inference and judgment, or a "frictionless spinning in the void," a coherentism like Davidson's. Kant, understood in this sort of "Hegel-leaning" direction, simply gives a better overall picture here of how empirical knowledge works. Perceptual knowledge is also a corporeal process, of course, but that too need not lead us down the path towards neuro-epistemology and hard naturalism as long as we remember that human nature is a second nature too, that visual acuity and discernment can be educated to discern what needs discerning.

But if we want to retrace the Hegelian path from these reflections, we need another component not prominent in McDowell. For even though Hegel has in effect given up the Kantian strategy for demonstrating the objective validity of the categories, he still maintains, I argued, that the very possibility of objective purport requires a conceptual projection of possible experience, the normative authority of which cannot be tied to an empirical derivation (or empirical "deduction" as Kant would say). He also thinks that principles, norms for action are not in some way rationalized strategies for the satisfaction of desires and interests, nor are they formal legislations by pure practical reason. So the issue of the authority or legitimacy of non-derived (and non-instrumental) norms, once this mind-world model changes from Kant's (or the genuine "spirit" of Kant is emphasized) extends very far in Hegel. The main point now is that this shift leaves in place reflective question about the status of the normative authority of concepts and principles understood in this way. Does that mean we are left with some (for Hegel quasi-psychological) claim about subjective indispensability, an enterprise of frictionless spinning? Or a metaphysical claim about the "conceptual structure" or reality in itself? It should not since the outcome of Hegel's take on the deduction is supposed to involve an altered way of seeing the "subject and object" relation, such that interpretations like these will seem to have made several distorted assumptions. The course of his attempt to convince us of this and to illuminate this altered sense of the mind-world relation is, I argued, the task of the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is also indicated in summaries like this from the Encyclopedia.

\[\text{Philosophy, then, owes its development to the empirical sciences. In return it gives their contents what is so vital to them, the freedom of thought -- gives them in short an apriori character. These contents are now warranted necessary, and no longer depend on the evidence of the facts merely, that they were so found and so experienced. The fact as experienced thus becomes an il-}\]

\[\text{34 See: Ibid., B 160 n.}\]
\[\text{35 See: Ibid., A 98; B 122, see also A 90, B 122, and B 145.}\]
lustration and a copy of the original and completely self-supporting activity of thought.26

More recently, thanks to McDowell, the contemporary manifestation of the issue revolves around what might be called the “Evans-Sellars” problem, for Gareth Evans and Wilfrid Sellars, or how the directness, givenness and “uncontrolled” quality of perceptual experience (resulting in presumed nonconceptual content) can be squared with Sellars’s critique of the “Myth of The Given,” the insistence that percepts of any sort must play their role in cognition within the space of reasons, not “from the outside” or causally. (Or, squared with the Davidsonian credo that the only thing that can serve as support for a belief is another belief.)27 But, as the Phenomenology’s “Introduction” also makes very clear, Hegel realizes that his own version of, let us say, the (avant la lettre) Sellarsian side of all this, creates its own distinct skepticism problem, the problem of grounding in some other way (other than by appeal to pure intuition, the separable form of all givenness) the normative authority (= objective validity) of non-derived, normatively constraining elements in experience.28 In a general sense the “experience” of consciousness contributes toward breakdown or loss of normative authority in what had functioned as empirically unchallengeable and something like Kant’s problem about synthetic a priori judgments must be addressed, but now without Kant’s account of the pure (separable) forms of intuition.

Finally, the fact that Wildenauer says that her sweeping characterizations and objections are also directed at McDowell is disquieting.29 McDowell emphatically sizes how much of the Kantian distinction he preserves, between what is merely “wrung” out of one in direct contact with the world, and what we do in taking it up and judging, as well as how much of that distinction is preserved in “his” Hegel.30 His point is not to challenge that distinction, but to deny that the “wrung out of us” side of things can be cashed out in terms of some notion of non-conceptual content, causal affectation, pure passivity or simple “givenness.” McDowell wants to distinguish between a concept’s actualization in a perceptual representation with objective purport, and the exercise of a concept in a full-fledged judgment. In neither case is there any “collapse” into a self-determining “Vernunft.” I tried to show that Hegel conceives of what had been for Kant separable intuitions as instead an unusual species of conceptual representations, representations that can pick out particulars by virtue of a kind of demonstrative use within a rule-governed linguistic community.31

In this regard it is supremely ironic, given the enthusiasm with which Wildenauer associates herself with Michael Friedman’s narrative of the German tradition,32 that Wildenauer ought to be addressing her impatient correctness at Friedman’s characterization of the post-Kantian idealism tradition. He (not I) is the one who says that the post-Kantian idealists “rejected” outright Kant’s distinction between concept and intuition, and that they embraced a wholly self-determining “Vernunft” operating without empirical constraint.33 On my view, what Hegel alters is the way we think about such a constraint, and thereby how we think about non-empirical concepts and their objectivity and therewith the nature of idealism, but that Hegel has not rejected the fundamental distinction between sensibility and thought and that he even preserves elements of Kant’s skeptical problem about non-derived concepts.

IV

But Wildenauer sometimes writes as if conceding that Hegel, on my terms, has a problem about such authority is to concede that he has nothing to say about it in these terms. So in her own voice, she goes in a different direction


27 Kant can clearly be cited as the originator of both sides of this debate. Those more dualistically inclined about the separable twin sources of knowledge usually stress the transcendental aesthetic as, on its own, the true basis for Kant’s idealism, the more holistically inclined focus on the B-edition deduction, and especially the footnote at B 160 n. Much of what Kant says can be interpreted in both ways. In his famous claim at A 79/B 104f. that “the same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition [...]” he could be taken to mean “creates the unity among (already determined, separable, independently functioning intuitions)” (the dualist view) or “in intuition” as “in the very possibility of there being representationally significant intuited content at all.” — Wildenauer is clearly in the former or dualist group but she gives no indication of any appreciation of the difficulties posed for that position by the Hegelian-Sellarsian-Davidsonian-McDowellian challenge.

28 If concept and intuition are radically inseparable, then not only is a pure or foundational empiricalicism excluded, but Kant’s doctrine of transcendental formalism is also being rejected and we will need another way to account for concept determinacy and (especially in Hegel) basic conceptual change. — For the relevance of this issue to similar questions in Brandom’s appropriation of Hegel, see n. 7 in: B. Brandom: Hegel. — In: The European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2005), 3, p. 381-408.

29 See: ERI, n. 19, pp. 91f.

30 See his remark that Hegelian reason “includes as a moment within itself the receptivity that Kant attributes to sensibility.” — In: John McDowell: Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality. — In: Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998), 466.

31 This would be in Chapter Six of FL. Wildenauer does not mention this attempt to interpret Hegel’s own way of preserving the distinction between the deliverances of sensibility and the spontaneity of understanding.

32 See: ERI, p. 104.

and launches into a very compressed, hasty, unusual invocation of a paragraph in Hegel’s Begriffsmik, apparently in the attempt to create some sort of parallel Kantian transcendental world inside Hegel’s Logic and Realphilosophie. In §213, Hegel tells us that the “ideal content” of the Idea is the concept in its determinations (“Bestimmungen”), and that it’s “real content” is the “exhibition which the concept gives itself in the form of external Being-There [...]” (Wildenauer does not quote the complete sentence and does not indicate the ellipsis just indicated, but Hegel goes on in the same sentence to say something very unusual, that since this latter form or “Gestalt” is “included within the ideality of the concept, in its power [Macht],” the concept maintains itself “sich (...) erhält”) in it [this latter form].) Ignoring this latter, odd claim, Wildenauer then goes on to argue that this “form of external Being-There” functions exactly like the Kantian pure forms of intuition.

It is hard to know how to respond to such a suggestion since in this breath-taking series of mere declarations, Wildenauer does not even hint at how she views such crucial interpretive problems as the status of the Logic within the Encyclopaedia project, the relation between the Logic in general and the Realphilosophie, the relation of the last part of the Begriffsmik to the earlier sections of that section and the book. 34 Hegel’s own views on the radical “autonomy” of the Logic clearly give her some pause, but she presses ahead constructing a Hegelian account of what she calls “logical forms of immediacy” within the Logic (in a general sense exactly what my interpretation was suggesting). 35 In her bewildering account, we end up with some strange entities, “logical proto-forms of objective relations between actual entities” and even “abstract proto-forms of [sic, accentuation R. B. P.] our forms of sensibility” 36 and “abstract form of indexical reference”. 37 These are difficult terms to understand (Hegel are difficult enough) although one can certainly agree whole-heartedly with such claims as “It is only within a much larger framework that the resources of demonstrative reference can be used without conceptual incoherence.” 38 I tried to demonstrate the same thing in the terms provided by the Phenomenology and in general this sort of objection to the possibility of some sort of “independent” (or separable?) immediacy is part and parcel of what Hegel means by idealism. At any rate, who would want to deny that Hegel has left us with an interpretive task – how to understand the “transition” from whatever he means by “logic” to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit? Or that such a tri-partite structure clearly descends in some way from Kant’s understanding of the relation between the critique and the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals? At any rate, what seems to me most interesting in Hegel’s claims (and the most difficult to understand) are the many references to the concept “giving itself” its own actuality, and what he means when he says that the forms of “external Being-There” that Wildenauer is interested in are included (“eingeschlossen”) “in” the “ideality” and “power” of the concept. This language is especially problematic for someone like Wildenauer, given her attempt to find so much Kantianism “inside” the Logic, since Hegel’s language here seems designed to flaunt its differences with Kant’s deepest assumption, that the human intellect is discursive, can “give itself” no content. 39

I conclude that the first part of her article, the criticism of Hegel’s Idealism, presents an inaccurate and distorted picture of my interpretation; that is, that she attacks a straw man; and the second more constructive part does not address the most difficult and potentially interesting of Hegel’s many unusual claims. Rather it simply lays another level of terminological obscurity over what are already difficult, idiosyncratic formulations by Hegel. 40

34 Kant’s talk of the understanding “determining sensibility inwardly” raises similar problems with his own discursivity thesis.

40 Wildenauer’s haste in her dismissal is also apparent in frequently heard, equally sweeping critiques by others of what McDowell calls the “unboundedness of the conceptual,” what Hegel calls “the self-determination of the Concept.” One hears that since animals consciously perceive, but without the ability of welding concepts, standing behind judgments etc., and since as we resemble animals in our sensory embodiedness, we must also rely in similar ways on cognitively significant but not apperceived non-conceptual content. Or that the mere fact that the richness and detail of our sensory experience can exceed the power of our current conceptual arsenal to discriminate, means that nonconceptual content must play a cognitively significant role in experience. Or that veridical illusion and the perspicuity of Müller-Lyer appearance demonstrates a reductively nonconceptual, cognitively significant aspect of experience (or real “subjectivity” in our mental lives). Or (incredibly) that someone committed to McDowell-Hegel holism would have to be committed to the claim that no increase in empirical knowledge, no addition to our conceptual arsenal, is ever possible because, putatively, the claim is that our current concepts wholly determine what is accessible in experience. I do not believe any of these charges are true, but it would obviously be a separate and longer discussion to show that.

35 Apart from referring to the Seinlogik discussion of “Dasein.”

36 Again to bellow the obvious, where “within” does not “within the pages of the book” (in the sense in which Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic is a section within the Kritik), but “within” the “self-determining movement of the Concept.”

37 See: Ibid., 97.

38 See: Ibid., 100.

39 See: Ibid., 102.