benefit. The moral of the story is that political and other institutional arrangements should be designed to keep rational self-interest on the (virtual) sidelines while simultaneously providing credible sanctions for knaves and other enemies of mutual benefit. Some of Pettit’s ideas for what such arrangements might look like can be found in Essay 5 of Part III.

In the case of each of Pettit’s big ideas there are competing accounts in the literature, some of which are much more optimistic on behalf of the views that Pettit attacks than he is. An essay collection like his is not the place to provide a comprehensive assessment of these alternatives. Nor is a short book review. Pettit’s book also includes a discussion of a number of interesting issues I have not addressed here. These include social holism (Part I, Essay 4), moral responsibility (Part II, Essay 5), free speech (Part III, Essay 4), ethics committees (Part III, Essay 5), and the role of the desire for esteem in motivating social co-operation (Part III, Essay 3). This fact brings out two notable features of the book. The first is the wide range of topics on which the author has interesting things to say. The second is the fertility of the author’s mind. Pettit’s book should be worth engaging with even for someone who does not agree with any one of its big ideas.

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In the preface to this important collection of essays, Erich Reck remarks that ‘[a]nalytic philosophy, after proceeding with little regard for its own history initially, has gained a new historical self-consciousness’ (p. ix). With this volume the historical study of the origins of analytic philosophy is brought to a new level of sophistication, one which will set a standard for research and scholarship in the years to come. With important essays by such established figures as Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Sluga, Joan Weiner, Warren Goldfarb, Thomas Ricketts, Cora Diamond, Juliet Floyd, and James Conant, as well as contributions by such relative newcomers as Reck himself, Steven Gerrard, Sanford Shieh, Marco Ruffino, Danielle Macbeth, Ian Proops, and Matthew B. Ostrow, From Frege to Wittgenstein provides a good representation of the breadth and depth of this developing field of scholarship. It is sure to become a standard reference in the field. Several of the essays collected here already have the status of classics.

As its title indicates, the essays in Reck’s volume focus primarily on two
figures: Frege and Wittgenstein (especially the early Wittgenstein). Along the way, other figures come in for significant discussion, most notably Russell, but also, for example, Moore and Lotze. However, the book’s organizational scheme quite properly reflects the focus on Frege and Wittgenstein. The book is divided into four main sections, each comprising three or four essays: ‘Background and General Themes’, ‘Frege’, ‘Frege to Early Wittgenstein’, and ‘Early Wittgenstein’. The essays in each section, however, bear many important relations to those in earlier and later sections, and I will not adhere to the book’s architectonics in my remarks.

The first three essays in the book, by Reck on Wittgenstein’s debt to Frege, Gabriel on Frege and Lotze, and Gerrard on the continuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy—if taken in the order Gabriel, Reck, Gerrard—sketch a philosophical development leading from Kant, to Lotze and nineteenth-century neo-Kantianism, to Frege, and thence to Wittgenstein, both early and late. This development is marked, on the telling suggested by these essays, with a continuous focus on the themes of contextualism and holism, crystallized in Frege’s famous context principle, ‘never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a sentence’ (Gottlob Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1980, p. x). This dictum is taken up and transformed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and repeated in the Philosophical Investigations; one overarching theme of several of the essays collected here is the significance of this inheritance from Frege for the understanding of Wittgenstein, especially the early Wittgenstein.

Conant opens the third section of his long-awaited essay, ‘The Method of the Tractatus’ (already cited widely for years before its appearance in print), with a quotation from Elizabeth Anscombe: ‘almost all that has been published about [the Tractatus] has been wildly irrelevant … [the] cause has been the neglect of Frege’ (p. 380). Conant’s long, careful and detailed exposition of the Tractatus’s claim to provide philosophical illumination through the use of nonsense, of the differing interpretations of this claim, and of the conception of both nonsense and sense involved in this claim, depends crucially on taking seriously the Tractarian form of the context principle, and the related conception of nonsense as arising because we have failed to give a meaning to some of the words we have used (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, 3.3ff., 5.4732–33). Conant attributes to the Tractatus an ‘austere’ conception of nonsense, according to which even the philosophical nonsense of the Tractatus can convey to us only something about ourselves, something which we recognize in recognizing both why we were drawn to the propositions of the Tractatus in the first place, and yet that they are nonsensical, and incapable of doing the work we wanted them to do. This view is contrasted with the ‘substantial’ view of nonsense according to which the nonsensical propositions of the work convey to us deep but ineffable truths about language, thought, the world, and our place in it.
Conant associates this sort of view of nonsense with the idea that nonsense can have, as it were, a nonsensical sense. On the sort of view he criticizes, nonsense can arise because meaningful words are put together in a nonsensical way by violating the syntactical rules for the use of those words. The resulting nonsense reveals to us the deep truths about the world that are encoded in the ineffable syntactical rules that we have violated, rules which must necessarily mirror the structure of the world, if language is to be about the world at all.

Conant rejects this sort of explanation of the *Tractatus’s* philosophical method. To suppose that nonsense can arise from the combination of meaningful words in illegitimate ways is to neglect the context principle: for we cannot so much as recognize the words as meaningful unless we recognize them as contributing to the sense of a proposition in which they occur. The *Tractatus* uses a distinction between sign and symbol to make this point: ‘In order to recognize the symbol in the sign, we must consider the significant (*sinnvoll,* sense-ful) use’ (*Tractatus*, 3.328). The *Tractatus* therefore does not subscribe to the account of nonsense sketched above. Rather, Wittgenstein says that ‘if [a proposition] has no sense, this can only be because we have given no meaning to some of its constituent parts’ (*Tractatus*, 5.4733). The context principle bars us from recognizing a proposition as nonsensical by recognizing the meanings of the words that make it up and then recognizing that they are put together in a way that conflicts with those meanings. ‘Only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning’ (*Tractatus*, 3.3).

Conant’s interpretation of the *Tractatus* sees Wittgenstein as working through the consequences of the basic Fregean insight expressed in the context principle, even when working through this insight exposes inherent tensions and instabilities in Frege’s own position—Conant sees Frege’s discussions of the ‘concept horse’ problem as exhibiting a tendency, found also in many interpretations of the *Tractatus*, to waver between austere and substantial conceptions of nonsense. Thus, for Conant, Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is shaped by a profound encounter with Frege’s thought, in which the context principle plays a crucial role. Other authors in *From Frege to Wittgenstein* take a quite different view. Danielle Macbeth, in ‘Frege and Early Wittgenstein on Logic and Language’, takes Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* to have a radically different conception of meaning from Frege, one which makes it impossible for Wittgenstein’s criticisms to get a grip on Frege. On her reading, Wittgenstein’s account of meaning ‘takes a sentence to be contentful in virtue of its picturing a state of affairs’, whereas Frege’s later view is ‘an inferentialist one’ (p. 201). We can learn from Frege, she thinks, that ‘the conception of meaning which we find in the *Tractatus* … confuses two different logical distinctions, that between concept and object, and that between sense and meaning’ (p. 221).

Macbeth’s reading of Wittgenstein, however, makes no mention of the importance of the context principle in the *Tractatus*. Frege’s mature theory of sense and meaning involves an assimilation of names and sentences, the latter viewed as names of truth-values. This assimilation, which is thoroughly
rejected in the Tractatus, has often been seen as violating the context principle, which requires a distinction between the sentential contexts within which names have meaning, and the names which acquire meaning in those contexts. Macbeth also does not discuss the seemingly inferentialist connotations of the Tractatus’s conception of logical space (Tractatus, 3.4). Further, she does not consider the difficulties that arise for Frege in trying to coherently state the fundamental distinction between concept and object, difficulties which on Conant’s account are an important inspiration for the philosophical method of the Tractatus. Thus by emphasizing different aspects of both Frege and the Tractatus, very different judgements about the relationship between them can be arrived at.

Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts also address the question of Wittgenstein’s indebtedness to Frege in their contributions to this volume. In ‘Wittgenstein’s Understanding of Frege’, Goldfarb argues, against ‘those who claim for Frege an influence [on the Tractatus] far surpassing that of Russell’ (p. 185), that Wittgenstein had a relatively superficial understanding of Frege, even if Wittgenstein and Frege arrive at similar and related views ‘independently’ (p. 187, emphasis in original). For Goldfarb, Wittgenstein’s project was much more fundamentally one of working through, and out of, the position he had inherited from Russell, than of working through, and out of, Fregean views.

Ricketts’s ‘Wittgenstein Against Frege and Russell’ is largely a reply to Goldfarb. Ricketts, as his title makes clear, recognizes the truth in Goldfarb’s rejection of views that see Fregean influence as vastly more important for understanding the Tractatus than Russelian influence. For Ricketts, Wittgenstein is mounting a critique of both Frege and Russell ‘from within his own distinctive approach to language and logic’. This approach, ‘in contrast to Frege and Russell … places sentences at the center’ (p. 227). Ricketts’s subtle and impressive essay substantially advances the debate, showing how Wittgenstein’s views develop in response to both ‘the great works of Frege’ and ‘the writings of my friend Bertrand Russell’ (Tractatus, Preface). Ricketts’s argument could be strengthened, however, by bringing more explicitly into play the importance of the context principle for both Frege and Wittgenstein. A study of the development of Wittgenstein’s thought, from his early ‘Notes on Logic’ through the Notebooks and the Prototractatus to the Tractatus itself, shows, I think, that the context principle came to play a more and more significant role in Wittgenstein’s thinking over the course of his writing of the Tractatus. This helps to support a story according to which Wittgenstein’s thinking was initially shaped by Russell’s project (as Goldfarb argues) but developed through the influence of a deepening engagement with Frege’s thought (as Ricketts argues) into, finally, a simultaneous critique of both earlier philosophers, in which as Goldfarb suggests ‘the program of Fregean judgment-based analysis, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with the end product of Russelian object-based analysis, when its implications are strictly followed out’ (p. 197).
Any such reading of the *Tractatus* will take one of Wittgenstein’s main criticisms of Frege to be that, in Ricketts’s terms, Frege insufficiently ‘places sentences at the center of the philosophy of logic’ (p. 227). As we have seen above, Frege’s mature theory of sense and meaning can be taken to undermine his commitment to the context principle, by assimilating sentences to names of truth-values. Yet, Frege might be defended from this accusation: to the end of his career, he insisted that ‘What is distinctive about my conception of logic is that I begin by giving pride of place to the content of the word “true”, and then immediately go on to introduce a thought as that to which the question “Is it true?” is in principle applicable’ (Gottlob Frege, *Posthumous Writings*, ed. H. Hermes et al., trans. Peter Long and Roger White, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, p. 254. Written in 1919.). Thus, Frege would say that sentences are not *merely* names; their role as expressing thoughts and meaning truth-values can only be understood against the background of Frege’s mature conception of judgement as the recognition of a thought as true. Only sentences can be used in the expression of a judgement; and Frege’s claim in ‘On Sense and Meaning’ that ‘it is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the thing meant’ (Gottlob Frege, *Collected Papers*, ed. Brian McGuinness, trans. Max Black et al., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, p. 163) can be seen as an echo of the context principle, as Tyler Burge has pointed out.

In ‘On Sense and Meaning’, Frege cautions against conceiving of the relationship of thought and truth as one of ‘subject to predicate’. Frege argues that the ascription of truth adds nothing to the content of the thought—in ‘“The thought that 5 is a prime number is true” … nothing more has been said than in “5 is a prime number”’. He takes this to show that ‘the relation of the thought to the True may not be compared with that of subject and predicate’ (*Collected Papers*, p. 164). Elsewhere, Frege argues more explicitly from this that truth is *sui generis* and undefinable, and even that truth is not a property at all.

Several papers in this collection take up these arguments of Frege’s. Hans Sluga, in ‘Frege on the Indefinability of Truth’, provides a very useful and illuminating account of the development of Frege’s views on truth and judgement from his early *Begriffsschrift* account of a logic of judgement, through his first attempts at a more developed account of judgement, to the sense–meaning distinction, and finally the later arguments concerning the undefinability of truth. Sluga makes a plausible case that the formulation of these arguments in ‘The Thought’ (1918) is in part a response by Frege to the manuscript of the *Tractatus* which Wittgenstein had sent to him, and the ‘picture theory of truth’ which Frege found there.

Sanford Shieh, in ‘On Interpreting Frege on Truth and Logic’, attempts a careful analysis of the argument in ‘The Thought’ for undefinability of truth, building on and criticizing earlier work of Dummett and Ricketts. Shieh argues for the plausibility of attributing to Frege a view of truth as a property
which is ‘quasi-supervenient on assertion and judgment’ (p. 110). He goes on to argue that while this conception of truth is required if Frege’s argument is to stand up to criticism, it conflicts with Frege’s own conclusion that truth is simple and unanalyisable. Unfortunately, Shieh’s analysis is marred by his claim that Frege ‘nowhere explicitly denies truth the status of a property’ (p. 10). While this claim is essential to the plausibility of ascribing the quasi-supervenience view to Frege, it is simply false. Shieh seems to have considered only Frege’s remarks on the subject in ‘The Thought’. But in fact, not only does Frege say in ‘On Sense and Meaning’ that the relation of thought to truth is not that of subject and predicate, in ‘Logic and Mathematics’ he quite explicitly claims that ‘truth is not a property of sentences or thoughts’ (Posthumous Writings, p. 234).

Cora Diamond, in ‘Truth Before Tarski’, places Frege’s arguments for the peculiar status of truth as an indefinable non-property in the context of a broader problematic about truth common to Russell, Frege, and the early Wittgenstein. Following Hans Sluga, she suggests that the influence of Tarski has caused us to lose sight of the philosophical problems concerning truth which moved the founders of analytic philosophy; and, borrowing from many philosophers to create what she calls a ‘pasticcio’ (she names Sluga, Ricketts, Geach, Goldfarb, Hylton, Floyd, and van Heijenoort in her subtitle), she helps us to recover those problems and to appreciate them anew. She sketches a predicament in Russell’s philosophy, arising from the fact that we can understand false relational propositions. Russell’s initial account of truth as a property of propositions, conceived of as objectively existing complex entities, seems to require that in a false relational proposition aRb, a and b in some sense be related to each other by the relation R, while yet not being so related. She traces the development of both Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s thought in response to this predicament. She sees Wittgenstein’s thought as responding to the insight in Frege’s argument for the peculiar status of truth—talk in the Tractatus of ‘a sentence as having a relation to reality’, which Sluga sees Frege as criticizing in ‘The Thought’, ‘is meant in the Tractatus to dissolve from within’ (p. 261). The early Wittgenstein and Frege share, on her account, a view according to which the word ‘true’ has a content which cannot be defined or analysed but only ‘unfolded’—for Frege, in the laws of logic, for Wittgenstein, in our grasp of ‘the general form of everything that can sensefully be said’, and so also in our grasp of how in general to operate with sentences, which is made explicit in the ‘general form of a proposition’ (p. 272).

From Frege to Wittgenstein contains a number of other valuable essays which I have not been able to address here, including Marco Ruffino’s and Joan Weiner’s studies of two of the most controversial sections of Frege’s Grundgesetze (10 and 32), Ian Proops’s and Juliet Floyd’s careful analyses of the Tractatus’s accounts of inference and arithmetic, and Matthew Ostrow’s discussion of the liberating aim of the Tractatus. Like the essays I have discussed above, all of these papers repay careful study. In sum, From Frege to Wittgen-
stein is an important addition to the literature on early analytic philosophy. It is unfortunate that the book is only available at present in hardcover, at the rather steep price of £45.00 ($75.00). It is therefore perhaps worth noting, for those who are fortunate enough to have access to this service through their university libraries, that the book can also be accessed through Oxford Scholarship Online, at www.oxfordscholarship.com.

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Rodin’s excellent book is a model of how to do applied ethics, and it makes an important contribution to our understanding of the ethics of war. Much current discussion in this area is about whether the tradition of Just War Theory is too restrictive in the grounds it recognizes for going to war justly—for example, whether humanitarian intervention should be allowed, in addition to the traditional ground of defence of the nation against foreign aggression. In contrast, in this book Rodin asks whether the idea of a right of national defence, as conceived in the Just War Theory and in current international law, stands up to rational scrutiny. By careful discussion of defensive rights in general, and especially the individual right of self-defence, he argues that it does not. But the striking conclusion is by no means the most impressive feature of the book; what is most impressive is the judicious consideration of a wide range of issues—in normative ethics and in law, but also, where relevant, empirical issues—in making his case. At the end one is left feeling that no element was redundant or simply showy.

Rodin’s approach is to begin by trying to clarify the idea of rights in general, then defensive rights as a general class of rights, then the idea of the personal right of self-defence in particular. He assumes that this latter right exists, and seeks the best account of it. This task occupies the whole of the first part of the book. He ends up defending an account of the right of self-defence as: (a) a simple Hohfeldian liberty (it entails no duties on the part of other individuals); (b) providing a justification, not an excuse, for killing others in self-defence (p. 29). With regard to (a), Rodin acknowledges that some would insist that rights necessarily involve some claims on others. Nevertheless, he argues that the Hohfeldian liberty of self-defence is properly thought of as a right because it functions in deliberation and in law as an ‘established exception’ to the background prohibition against killing, which exception serves to