latter is mainly responsible for what Lom considers the ancient Pyrrhonians’ political indifference. This indifference, coupled with the Pyrrhonians’ attempt to destroy reason (a polemical interpretation of ancient Pyrrhonism) “may also allow political nightmares to breed in the night” (45). In Hobbes, Lom identifies a kind of methodical doubt whose aim is not that of Descartes’s of finding certain truth but to combat the pride of men. This pride leads to different and conflicting views of the sumnum bonum that disturb the civil order. Its destruction through skepticism facilitates the acceptance of the sovereign’s decisions and thus the attainment of peace. Lom notes the similarity of Hobbes’s position on doubt with Sextus’s (the subordination of the skepsis to the goal of tranquility) and points out a number of interesting and still little explored parallels between Hobbes and Montaigne, whose skeptical and moral views are examined in chapter 5. According to Lom, Montaigne, like Sextus, is little interested in politics and his attack on cruelty and defense of toleration do not issue from his skepticism but from moral values that remain outside the scope of doubt, notably Montaigne’s desire for peace. Lom’s analysis of Diderot is interesting and original. He places the French philosophe in the tradition of “constructive skepticism” (expression labeled by Popkin to characterize the skepticism of Gassendi and Mersenne about knowledge of essences but opened to a hypothetical science of phenomena). Lom focuses on Diderot’s Rameau Nephew, where he identifies limits to Diderot’s doubt not unlike those he sees in Nietzsche’s: a desire to justify action and commitment to freedom and coherence which, once universalized, would lead to a full-fledged non-skeptical ethics.

These and other interesting results of Lom’s investigation could be significantly improved had he neither identified skepticism with doubt nor taken a non-historical approach to the philosophers examined. The identification of skepticism with doubt is correct as far as Cartesian skepticism is concerned but inappropriate for ancient skepticism and other forms of Renaissance and early modern skepticism. Lom’s “conversations with history” (75) do not take into account the intellectual contexts of the philosophers concerned. He gives an abstract definition of skepticism and then examines philosophers from different times regardless of their historical backgrounds to show that skepticism may be associated with different political and moral positions. Had he taken context into account and not so narrowly defined skepticism, most of the so-called “limits of doubt” would be seen as cohering within the skeptical tradition. The issue of intellectual integrity for instance, which Lom finds central in Nietzsche and Diderot, is the most essential aspect of ancient skepticism according to Montaigne. Its appearance in Diderot’s and Nietzsche’s skepticism seems to attest Popkin’s thesis that it is above all through Montaigne and his disciples that skepticism becomes crucial in modern philosophy.

José R. Maia Neto

Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil


Collected in this volume are papers from the 1999 conference “Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy,” along with a few other relevant papers.

Ray Monk’s and James Conant’s papers frame the others and provide terms of criticism appropriate to them. Both authors investigate the relationship between philosophy and biography. (When I say “biography,” I mean both biography and autobiography.) Each finds in Wittgenstein an elucidation of a variety of understanding needful for appreciating the variety of understanding at which biography aims. Monk argues that the variety of understanding that consists in seeing connections (between the life and work of the biographed person) is the variety of understanding at which generally biography aims. Conant argues that it is the variety of understanding that consists in a changing of aspect (of the philosophical work of the philosopher biographed) at which specifically philo-
sophical biography aims. Each of these Philosophical Investigations varieties of understanding is among the conceptual inheritors of the Tractatus notion of showing. (That notion does not die conceptually intestate in the Tractatus.) Much might be said about the filaments of relation that run among Tractatus showing and the two Philosophical Investigations varieties of understanding, but I’ll not say it here. I will say that the arguments of Monk and Conant are convincing. Wittgenstein is a fitting subject for biography and philosophical biography, and his philosophical work is needful for the subjects of biography and philosophical biography. So this volume is justified; it is not concessive to the cult of personality that has formed around Wittgenstein.

The distinction between biography and philosophical biography emerges in Monk’s paper. But the notion of philosophical biography develops fully in Conant’s: philosophical biography is “a mode of representation of the life of an individual philosopher that aspires to facilitate the understanding of that individual qua philosopher” (16). It depicts a philosopher’s life in order to confer “a sort of understanding that itself has a claim to being termed philosophical” (16). Conant distinguishes two responses to philosophical biography, the reductivist’s and the compartmentalist’s. The reductivist favors philosophical biography, but believes that philosophical biography aims at finding the secret of the philosopher’s work. The secret, for the reductivist, is external to the philosopher’s work: some fact about the philosopher’s upbringing (e.g., Schopenhauer’s troubled relationship with his mother) or physical or psychological limitations (e.g., Wittgenstein’s putative dyslexia) or sexuality or class (e.g., Foucault’s homosexuality). Although the reductivist treats such facts as the near end of an Ariadne’s thread running through the philosopher’s work, such facts look too external to be a proper guide. So it is easy to reject reductivism for compartmentalism—for treating all external facts about the philosopher as irrelevant to the philosopher’s work. (“Philosopher X lived and wrote. Now look at her argument.”) The result is a “deadlock”: either we think that the understanding of the philosopher’s work lies “wholly outside” the work or “wholly inside” it (19). To break the deadlock, we have to reject its nvisus formativus—the idea that the question of the possibility of philosophical biography requires a general answer. We should instead work philosopher-by-philosopher, conceding that there is no obvious relationship between the philosopher’s work and life (as there arguably was in ancient philosophy), and considering what type of intimacy, if any, there might be between the two for a particular philosopher.

I rehearse Conant’s details because they provide a useful way of responding to other papers in the volume. Monk’s paper is a paper by a working philosophical biographer. Monk’s concern with the understanding sought in biography leads him to be concerned with the limitations of philosophical biography and his own limitations as a philosophical biographer. Kelly Hamilton’s paper minutely investigates the connections between Wittgenstein’s training as an engineer and his Picture Theory. However, Hamilton tends to reductivism: Wittgenstein’s training is too much the external secret to understanding the Picture Theory; the relata are not brought into the intimacy that would make the details most interesting. Louis Sass’s paper is too wide-ranging to be briefly summarized, but in it Sass works to find a non-reductivist connection between Wittgenstein’s response to his personal disquietudes and his response to philosophical disquietudes. Alfred Nordmann’s paper provides a manageable piece of philosophical biography: Nordmann argues that the movements of thought displayed in Wittgenstein’s 1930s diaries are internal to the movements of thought displayed in his philosophical writings. Joachim Schultz’s paper follows Nordmann’s, but does not progress as far. Schultz’s interest is the connection between Wittgenstein’s letters and his philosophical work. But Schultz never leaves biography and moves successfully into philosophical biography. Hans-Johann Glock’s paper appeals to Wittgenstein’s intellectual biography in order to establish a “Rationalist” Wittgenstein. Glock’s intellectual biography is not philosophical biography. His exposition of “Irrationalist” interpreters of Wittgenstein is confused, and the confusion predictably infects his exposition of his “Rationalist” interpretation. The volume ends with two papers on Wittgenstein’s Jewishness, one by Brian McGuinness and one by David Stern. McGuinness’s paper has no ambition to philosophical biography—it is straight biography,
answering questions about Wittgenstein’s ancestry and documenting the ways Jewishness was understood during Wittgenstein’s life. Stern’s paper does more than McGuinness’s to bring Wittgenstein’s Jewishness into an intimate relationship with his philosophical work. Stern argues that Wittgenstein saw in the question of (his) Jewishness the same kind of knot that he saw in philosophical problems.

My responses to the other papers in the volume are also "placings" of those papers in the framework provided by Monk and Conant. How those papers are placed in that framework, however, is not a final judgment on their value as papers. There is something, and sometimes much, to be learned in each paper—but not always something or much of philosophical biographical interest.

Kelly Dean Jolley

Auburn University


For present-day philosophers, the division between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy is a fact of life. In this elegant little book, Michael Friedman studies its origins. In earlier essays, collected in his Reconsidering Logical Positivism (1999), Friedman argued that Carnap and other logical empiricists are best understood as adapting their Neokantian heritage to, among other things, the rapid developments in logic and physics. In A Parting of the Ways, Friedman broadens the scope of this interpretation by applying it to the works of Cassirer and Heidegger.

The book starts by portraying the 1929 conference in Davos, where Carnap attended the famous debate between Cassirer and Heidegger on the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. Although the differences between the three were clear by that time, Friedman makes clear that there were informal debates and considerable mutual respect between them. The second chapter shows how the intellectual relationship between Heidegger and Carnap cooled, as their respective right-wing and left-wing allegiances manifested in the changing political climate.

In the next chapters, the works of the three philosophers are interpreted against the background of Neokantianism. Friedman first identifies the main problem facing the Neokantians: they sought to explain the applicability of the categories of the understanding to objects of experience without appealing to pure intuition. The Southwest and Marburg branches of Neokantianism accorded different roles to logic and mathematics in their solutions to this problem, yielding “a fundamental disagreement over the philosophical centrality of logic” (25). Friedman then shows how Heidegger developed the views of the Southwest school by adding elements of Husserl’s phenomenology and how problems in both approaches led him to relinquish the ideal of objective knowledge in Being and Time. Carnap and Cassirer worked in the tradition of the Marburg school and continued the search for objectivity, albeit in different directions. Carnap sought to secure objectivity by showing the constitutive role of logic in human knowledge, exemplified in the constitution system of Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Cassirer sought objectivity in a gradual mathematization of knowledge, with mathematical physics as the most advanced stage. In his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, he postulated stages of objectification, covering the entire scope of human life.

In the final three chapters, Friedman completes the comparison started in the first part. Surprisingly, a large part of the chapter on Carnap and Cassirer is devoted to the interaction between Schlick and the latter; the remainder mainly concerns Cassirer’s 1942 response to Carnap’s physicalism of the early 1930s. Friedman offers some insightful comments, but his earlier focus on the later 1920s wavers. The chapter on Cassirer and Heidegger restores it by reconstructing the Davos debate and its aftermath. In the final chapter, Friedman sums up his results. He identifies the opposition between analytic and continental