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Wittgenstein’s Method: The Third Phase of Its Development (1933–36)

Introduction

Wittgenstein’s interpreters are practically undivided that method plays a central role in his philosophy. This comes as no surprise if we bear in mind the Tractarian dictum: “philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity”.¹

After 1929, Wittgenstein’s method evolved further. In its final form, articulated in *Philosophical Investigations*, it was formulated as different kinds of therapies of specific philosophical problems that torment our life.² But how did Wittgenstein reach that conception?

In order to answer this question, we shall follow the changes in Wittgenstein’s thinking in four subsequent phases and in three dimensions: (i) in logic and ontology; (ii) in method proper; (iii) in style.

1 First Phase – the *Tractatus*

1.1 Criticism of the Diamond-Conant Thesis

Some twenty years ago, a group of American philosophers, Cora Diamond and James Conant among them, suggested a “resolute” reading of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*: the propositions of the *Tractatus* are plain nonsense and nothing beyond that. They are gibberish, with phrases like “piggly wiggle tiggle”.³ The main idea of the book is expressed in 6.54 which reads:

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¹ TLP 4.112.
² PI §§ 133, 255, 593.
³ Diamond 2000, p. 151.
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

This was the real message of the Tractatus.

By way of criticism of the Diamond-Conant thesis, we would like to note that, in fact, the initial task of the Tractatus is quite clear: to advance a new logical symbolism or new “Conceptual Notation” (a term of Frege’s that Wittgenstein widely used in the Tractatus). Of course, the program for a new Conceptual Notation that correctly expresses the logical operations of our thinking and language was first set out by Frege. The latter insisted that we can “compare it[s role] to that which the microscope has to the eye”. In Frege’s hands, however, it was not so radically evolved as in the hands of Wittgenstein.

The leitmotif of the Tractarian Conceptual Notation was that

we can recognize in an adequate notation the formal properties of the propositions by mere inspection [of propositions themselves].

It is already clear at this point that, according to the Tractatus, the task of philosophy is radically different from the task of philosophy as understood by Christian Wolff or Hegel. Philosophy has no autonomous message, no story to tell, and thus has no meaning in itself. It is just like an optical instrument, a means for better seeing (better understanding) the world.

1.2 What are the Tractarian Elucidations?

In order to answer this question, we will review the ways in which we speak about elucidations in life and in ordinary language.

We typically need elucidations when we are confronted with a new appliance (a new gadget). The elucidations tell us how it functions. When we have already learned how the gadget (the logical symbolism, in this case) works, we can throw away the instructions of how to use it. In contrast, science suggests explanations.

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4 TLP 6.54.
5 Frege 1879, p. xi.
6 TLP 6.122.
Special cases of elucidation are the textbooks that teach us how to speak a foreign language. If we want to learn Portuguese, for example, we will buy ourselves a textbook of instructions that will teach us to speak that language which already exists in the literature and on the streets of Luanda, Lisbon and Rio. If, in some point of time, we have already learned to speak that language, we can throw our “book of elucidations” away.

In short, our thesis is that in a similar way Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* teaches – *trains* – its reader to better see how the propositions of science logically relate one to another, how the logic of our everyday language functions, and how logic itself functions. In this way, it serves as a “logical clarification of thoughts”\(^7\) and develops our skill of thinking. Tractarian propositions, however, have no proper content – “no existential import”. Indeed, similar to the learning Portuguese example, human thinking is already there. The thinking-training must not invent it; it just teaches us how to make better use of it.

This interpretation of the Tractarian elucidations fits perfectly well into the description of its propositions as a ladder. To be sure:

(1) We typically throw away the instrument of training after we have reached a new level of command of a certain skill – we have no interest in the instrument which brought us up to that level.

(2) What is important with such instruments is not their content but their form. Perhaps another person might construct a different type of instrument, with the help of which we will be trained in the same skill. In this sense, the propositions of the *Tractatus* do not express something necessary; they are contingent. Diamond is especially insistent on this point. Unfortunately, she drew from it false conclusions: the propositions of the *Tractatus* are gibberish.

Furthermore, we discern three types of Tractarian elucidations:

(i) First of all, Wittgenstein’s New Symbolism elucidates all problems of the old logic, including Frege’s and Russell’s. When we construct graphically (geometrically) correct symbols, all problems of logic are *eo ipso* resolved. Hence, “we cannot make mistakes in logic”.\(^8\) Moreover, all superfluous entities in logic and philosophy such as logical constants and logical objects will

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7 TLP 4.112; my italics.
8 TLP 5.473.
be put in brackets. A consequence of the latter position was Wittgenstein’s belief that there are no propositions of logic and also no logical truths. Logical propositions are tautologies – a position that can be called a “redundancy theory of logic”.

(ii) More importantly, the New Logical Symbolism elucidates being a means (an instrument) for recognizing (clarifying) the logical properties of all available propositions of science and everyday life.

(iii) Besides propositions that set out the New Symbolism, there are also Tractarian propositions that are elucidations of this Symbolism. Moreover, these propositions form the bulk of the book.

1.3 Tractarian Ontology as Logic

The leading motive behind the conception of Diamond and Conant is the denial that the Tractatus advances metaphysical truths. But our interpretation of the Tractarian method also eschews any metaphysical assumption. In fact, there is no “Tractarian metaphysics”. But what about the numerous “ontological propositions” of the Tractatus, for example, TLP 1–2.063?

In order to answer this question, we will turn back to David Pears who has noted that the logic of the Tractatus is “approximately Aristotelian. [...] The forms revealed by logic are embedded in one and only one world of facts”.9 In other words, Tractarian logic and ontology are identical, an identity best shown in the fact that the general logical form (or the “general form of truth-function”)10 is identical with the general form of compositionality: “such and such is the case”.11

The identity between logic and ontology finds expression in two ways:

(i) Objects, states of affairs and facts have formal properties and relations that are identical with the formal concepts signified by propositional variables and have objects as their value.12

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9 Pears 1987, vol. I, p. 23. Not only the facts, however. Tractarian objects too have a “logical form” that is embedded in them.
10 TLP 6.
11 TLP 4.5.
12 Cf. TLP 4.126.
(ii) “In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all”. 13

Apparently, Tractarian ontology is a part of Wittgenstein’s new Conceptual Notation. Moreover, Tractarian logic can be seen as built up with the help of ontological elements: objects, facts, indefinables – points that the plain man knows quite well. 14 In this way, the elucidation of our thinking is also connected with a lucid and extremely simple picture of the world: something that Diamond and Conant resolutely deny.

Technically, the principle of identity between logic and ontology can be illustrated with the help of the concept of “logical scaffolding”. 15 Logical scaffoldings surround and support every newly constructed picture, or proposition; they, however, have no ontological import. They can help to bring the objects of a state of affairs – in propositions – together. Without it, the construction may be scattered, so that we cannot grasp them in the formation they now build. The point is that (i) language (and thinking) is a construction – an experimental arrangement of possible forms of objects. 16 But (ii) the objects of a state of affairs stick together thanks to their topology alone, not thanks to the logical scaffoldings. This means that there is no mortar between objects that connects them 17 – in the same way in which there are no logical constants between elementary propositions. The logical scaffoldings only support the objects in the state of affairs/proposition from outside and can be “thrown away” any time after the “experiment” of building up a new proposition is over.

2 Second Phase (1929–1932)

(a) Wittgenstein’s Logic and Ontology

After 1929, Wittgenstein’s logic-ontology developed further, without losing its character as an exercise tool or ladder that brings our ability to think up to a higher level of development. Above all, his attitude to mathematics experienced

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13 TLP 2.161; my italics.
14 Cf. § 3 (b), below.
16 “In the proposition a state of affairs is, as it were, put together for the sake of experiment.” (TLP 4.031)
a major change.\textsuperscript{18} While in the \textit{Tractatus} Wittgenstein accepted that logic has primacy over mathematics ("[m]athematics is a method of logic"),\textsuperscript{19} in 1929 he came to believe (arguably, under Brouwer’s influence) that mathematics has a primacy over logic.

In consequence, arithmetical calculus replaced the truth-functions as mediator between elementary and complex propositions. This step was supported by the discovery that from an elementary proposition we can infer other elementary propositions. For example, from “a is now red” there follows “a is now not green”. In contrast, in the \textit{Tractatus} Wittgenstein claimed that all complex propositions (both general and molecular) are truth-functions of elementary propositions.

Furthermore, in 1929 Wittgenstein embraced the view that the inventing of new calculi is synthetic a priori. From this point on, problems of creativity gained prominence in Wittgenstein’s writings. Connected with Wittgenstein’s increased interest in creativity was the change of his attention from propositions stating facts to propositions exercising force; or from indicative to imperative propositions.\textsuperscript{20}

The most significant part of this transformation was that human actions were put at the centre of philosophy of language – a step further stimulated by Piero Sraffa’s insistence that Wittgenstein’s logic must also explain such means of communication as gestures. Now Wittgenstein elaborated a logic–ontology that not only starts from making pictures of states of affairs; it also starts from learning model-actions and language expressions. In short, he did not merely explore the problem of how we form sentences but also how we form actions.

\textbf{(b) Method}

In 1929–32 Wittgenstein’s method developed in the direction of extensive use of analogies, comparisons, descriptions, etc., and of striving for a clear, or perspicuous, representation of all cases under examination. In these years, he also stopped exploring ideal languages and showed more interest in ordinary language: the latter is in order as it is and is not to be improved. Wittgenstein also changed his attitude to science. Whereas in the \textit{Tractatus} he claimed that what can be said are only the propositions of science, in \textit{Philosophical Remarks} (see its motto!) he openly criticized the method of science and opposed to it the methods of conceptual analysis.

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Hintikka 1993.

\textsuperscript{19} TLP 6.234.

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Kenny 1973, p. 121.
(c) Style
A characteristic of the second phase of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development was that now he showed an inclination to abandon the linear way of expression and gradually adopted the dialogue form, above all, a dialogue with himself.

All these changes, however, failed to satisfy Wittgenstein. Another phase of his philosophical development was to come.

3 Third Phase (1933–1936)

Today it is widely accepted that “the Philosophische Bemerkungen [...] displays many signs of Wittgenstein’s contact with the Positivists and their influence upon him”.\(^2\) Apparently, under this influence, Wittgenstein partly forgot that his philosophy is only a method of training our thinking. Among other things, this explains the claim he repeatedly made in this period that to understand a proposition means to understand the method of its verification.

This point speaks against Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka's assertion that 1929 – the year he changed his view about mathematics and logic – was Wittgenstein’s \textit{annus mirabilis}.\(^2\) the year in which he elaborated the ideas that were later to become his leading ideas in the \textit{Philosophical Investigations}. Alternatively, Wolfgang Kienzler states that the major turn in Wittgenstein's philosophy occurred in 1931: in that year Sraffa directed Wittgenstein's attention to the fact that the logical form of gestures is much more complicated that the \textit{Tractatus} assumed.\(^3\)

In this essay we defend the view that Wittgenstein’s \textit{annus mirabilis} was 1933, not 1929 or 1931. The decisive turn in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is clearly discernible in \textit{The Big Typescript} and especially in \textit{Philosophical Grammar}, written in 1932/33 and drastically revised at the end of 1933 and the first weeks of 1934.

Here is our story in more detail.

\(^{21}\) Grayling 1988, p. 64.
\(^{22}\) Cf. Hintikka 1986.
(a) Theory-Method

According to the Principle of Representing that lies at the centre of Wittgenstein's logic and ontology of 1921, propositions and thoughts are facts. A state of affairs can be articulated (delivered), without loss of information, by any fact of the same multiplicity. Apparently, multiplicity is the hinge element that connects mind (language) and reality. It secures their identity.

As noted above, after 1929 Wittgenstein added actions into his ontology and logic. We learn both language and actions in a drill. Enriching his logic-ontology in this way, the character of the hinge elements that connect logic and ontology widened considerably. The model-action and the following action have not only the same multiplicity but they also have the same method, and follow the same rule. It was precisely this enrichment that caused the first substantial change in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

In short, in 1933 Wittgenstein adopted the view that philosophy is a kind of criticism of the conventional conception of thinking and intention. Words like “understanding”, “meaning”, “interpreting”, “thinking” are not inner processes; they are not processes at all. In particular, they are not to be seen as a “hypothesized reservoir out of which the visible water flows”. We learn to use these words (concepts) in a drill. Understanding an action, or a sentence (or a word), is best demonstrated in its actual use by the person who follows the action (or learns the sentence, the word). In this sense the phrase “meaning is use” became Wittgenstein’s leading mantra.

The point is that assuming specific processes of “understanding”, or “knowing”, would be of no help. Indeed, if we accept that they explain our learning actions, or sentences (or words), then another jump will be needed: from “knowing” to doing. This is a typical tertium quid argument later used in Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule-following: we cannot articulate the unique way in which the rule is to be followed – in order to do that, we would need another rule which would show how to follow the first rule.

Ultimately, in 1933 Wittgenstein elaborated a philosophy that functions as a method of examining philosophical, or philosophically pregnant, statements with the objective to eliminate any form of essentialism or duplicationism in

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25 The evolution of this enrichment is clearly seen in Waismann 1967.
26 Other examples are “wishing”, “expecting”, “believing”, etc.
27 Cf. BBB, p. 3.
28 PG §10.
29 Similar claims were already made in PR, p. 59.
30 In fact, Wittgenstein had used the tertium quid argument already in LWL, pp. 67–68.
them.\textsuperscript{31} By way of elucidation, we would like to note that while essentialism (reductionism is one of its forms) claims that one entity determines all variants of the object under analysis, duplicationism accepts that these variants are autonomous entities. The task of the philosopher is similar to that of a judge: he judges between two parties in litigation over philosophical puzzles:

> Our only task is to be just. That is, we must only point out and resolve the injustices of philosophy.\textsuperscript{32}

More often than not, the litigation is between essentialists and duplicationists.

Our last remark will be that the new method of examining our language was a direct continuation of the Tractarian program for philosophical activity that eliminates superfluous metaphysical and logical entities and improves our ability to think and judge.

\section*{(b) Method}

The second, even more substantial change in Wittgenstein’s method was inaugurated at the beginning of the “Philosophy” Chapter of the \textit{Big Typescript}. It can be described as follows.

In the \textit{Tractatus} Wittgenstein echoed Leo Tolstoy’s claim that the intellectual (the man of letters) has no more knowledge than the plain man\textsuperscript{33} – the plain man knows how things work quite well. The intellectual can simply better articulate that knowledge. That is his task and also his mission. Similarly, Wittgenstein’s philosopher has two objectives: (i) to explicate this common knowledge;\textsuperscript{34} (ii) to attend by this explication not to violate the common-sense understanding of how things work. In other words, he would not use concepts and conceptions that make sad work of the authentic intuitions of ordinary man.

Wittgenstein subscribed to these two principles in all periods of his philosophical development. His new insight in 1933 was that philosophy is not only a matter of knowledge but also of will. The point is that

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{31} Cf. Milkov 2003a, p. 86.
\item \textsuperscript{32} \textit{BT}, p. 420.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Cf. for example: “Men have always thought that there must be a sphere of questions whose answers – a priori – are symmetrical and united into a closed regular structure.” (TLP 5.4541) Good philosophy must make this thought explicit, preserving its authenticity.
\item \textsuperscript{34} We already referred to this point in the penultimate paragraph of § 1.3, above.
\end{itemize}
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The very things that are most obvious can become the most difficult to understand. What has to be overcome is not a difficulty of the intellect, but of the will.\textsuperscript{35}

In fact, this insight was the ultimate turning point from what is sometimes being called the “early” Wittgenstein to the “later” Wittgenstein. It was the decisive step towards the \textit{Philosophical Investigations}.

An important consequence of this change in method was that it prepared Wittgenstein’s transition from seeing the role of the philosopher as an “elucida-
tor” to seeing him as a “therapist”. Indeed, in \textit{The Big Typescript} and \textit{The Blue Book} Wittgenstein still spoke about one method and did not mention the word “therapy”. But he started to persistently claim that philosophy brings “peace of mind [\emph{Beruhigung}]”\textsuperscript{36}; that we are often caught up in philosophical “traps”, or that we feel philosophical “spasms” and are to be set free from them. He also spoke about “the bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language”.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{(c) Style}

In contrast, in 1933–36 Wittgenstein’s style of expression changed little: he widely used the dialogue form but still preserved some systematic and linear elements. Moreover, in some sections of \textit{The Blue and Brown Books} Wittgenstein showed a tendency to build theory. For example, he introduced the concepts “craving for generality”, “family likeness” and “language-games” on one and the same page of \textit{The Blue Book}.\textsuperscript{38} \textit{The Brown Book}, in its turn, advanced a con-
sistent list of language-games, together with their elucidations and comments.\textsuperscript{39} Another point that confirms Wittgenstein’s respect for linear order in style until 1936 is that he did not stop Waismann from further work on a systematic presen-
tation of his (Wittgenstein’s) philosophy.\textsuperscript{40}

All that changed in 1936, a development we shall discuss in § 4.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{35} BT, p. 407.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 416, 421.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 425.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} BBB, p. 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} However, Wittgenstein did not try to build up the whole ordinary language through adding ever new elementary language-games. Rather, particular language-games are similes that help us to clarify our conception of language. Cf. Schulte 2005, pp. 85f.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Cf. VW, pp. xxvi–xxx.
\end{itemize}
3.1 The Character of the 1933 Turn

It is noteworthy that it is difficult to speak about “turns” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In fact, his philosophical development was more evolutionary than revolutionary. Wittgenstein often employed ideas he introduced in earlier periods of his development in texts compiled after his alleged “turn”. We already met this point of style in notes 25 and 26: the slogan “meaning is use” as well as the application of the tertium quid argument, which became central in Wittgenstein’s method only in 1933, were already elaborated in 1930–33.41 Already in 1932 Wittgenstein noted: “Our method resembles psychoanalysis in a certain sense”.

Our main claim here is that the revolutionary turn in Wittgenstein’s thinking of 1933 was not a matter of a discovery but rather a waking up from the “dogmatic slumber” that he had fallen into while collaborating with the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. Indeed, Wittgenstein started to speak about “calming [beruhigen]” our feelings when doing philosophy as early as 1930.42 Even his correction of Tolstoy on the place of the will in philosophy was first made in 1931.43 These “discoveries”, however, were first ordered in a consistent method in 1933.

But what did make Wittgenstein wake up?

3.2 History of the 1933 Turn

That Wittgenstein’s turn of 1933 had the character of a change in perspective is supported by its putative history which will be the subject-matter of the present sub-section.

Despite the fact that Wittgenstein acknowledged influences on himself from twelve writers, today many interpreters believe that, especially after 1921, he was hardly susceptible to outside impacts, with Spengler and Sraffa being the only exceptions in this respect. Our point here is that, at least to some extent, Wittgenstein’s turn of 1933 was occasioned – if not caused – by Susan Stebbings’ paper “Logical Positivism and Analysis”, read to the British Academy as a Henriette Hertz lecture on 22 March 1933 and shortly afterwards published as a brochure.

41 Ibid., p. 69.
42 Cf. WA, vol. 2, p. 3.
43 CV, p. 17.
Stebbing’s paper, in turn, made considerable use of Richard Braithwaite’s piece “Philosophy [in Cambridge in 1933]”,\(^{44}\) which she read when still unpublished. She, however, was much more disapproving than Braithwaite was\(^{45}\) and it can be comfortably seen as nothing but a list of Wittgenstein’s muddles. In short, it confronted the “good philosophy” of Moore and Russell with the “bad philosophy” of Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. Stebbing identified the latter to such an extent that she spoke about Wittgenstein in 1932 following the latest publications of the Vienna Circle.

Her main argument against Wittgenstein was the danger of solipsism in his “insisting that the verification of a proposition which I assert must be in my own experience”.\(^{46}\) Indeed, in *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein intensively discussed the verification principle that regulates the relation between facts and propositions.\(^{47}\)

To be sure, there is no evidence that Wittgenstein read Stebbing’s paper. It is reasonable to assume, however, that part of its contents were leaked to him through his friends and students. The immediate reaction was his notorious letter to the editor of *Mind*, written on 27 May 1933, in which he “disclaim[ed] all responsibility for the views and thoughts which Mr. Braithwaite [and so also Miss Stebbing] attributes to [him]”.\(^{48}\)

In this connection it is to be noted that at the time Wittgenstein was facing considerable resistance and also solitude in Cambridge. In January 1929 he returned to Cambridge only to find that Charles Broad did not accept his philosophy, nor did Frank Ramsey who considered it “scholastic”. And while G. E. Moore attended his lectures, he was everything but Wittgenstein’s disciple. In fact, in 1929–32 nobody in Cambridge was ready to work along Wittgenstein’s lines. In these years Wittgenstein found devoted followers only in his native Vienna, in particular, in the person of Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann.

Our hunch is that it was precisely Susan Stebbing’s criticism that gave Wittgenstein the impulse needed to distance himself from the discussions with his Vienna friends and to start his project anew. It woke him up from his dogmatic slumber. This conjecture is supported by the fact that after March 1933, that is, immediately after Braithwaite and Stebbing’s criticism, Wittgenstein made a

\(^{44}\) Braithwaite 1933.
\(^{45}\) Cf. Milkov 2003b.
\(^{46}\) Braithwaite 1933, p. 27.
\(^{47}\) Cf. § 2, above, first paragraph.
change in his philosophy that seemed as if it had been specifically designed to face the criticism of Stebbing and Braithwaite. This change led to the transformation of his philosophy that we have already discussed in §3(a) and can be easily traced in *Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932–1935*. After lecture 26, he practically stopped speaking of “verification”, “visual field”, and “private language”. Instead, Wittgenstein devoted a great deal of space to the rejection of the private language argument and increased criticism of essentialist and reductionist conceptions in psychology and mathematics.

In the summer of 1933 Wittgenstein initiated a revision of *The Big Typescript* on which parts of *Philosophical Grammar* and the *Blue Book* were also based. As already seen, in these works he began to prepare his “new book”, *Philosophical Investigations*, more especially its *Urfassung* (MS 142).

This turn also paid back on a didactic and social level. Soon after his conversion, Wittgenstein found devoted followers in the person of his students Rush Rhees and Francis Skinner and also of John Wisdom. Wisdom’s paper “Philosophical Perplexity” (1936), in particular, was the first public evidence that Wittgenstein’s turn had followers in Cambridge.

## 4 Fourth Phase

The fourth phase of the development of Wittgenstein’s method was copiously prepared by him in 1936 in a long period of meditation in which he wrote his *Confessions*. In general, Wittgenstein was convinced that only a preliminary exercise in confessing his sins could make him hope to reach the level of sincerity needed to write good philosophy. However, Wittgenstein never applied this principle so consequentially as in the summer of 1936.

**(a) Style**

Unfortunately, these preparations produced more changes in style than in content. Indeed, the 1936 radical transformation affected above all Wittgenstein’s form of exposition. The transformation is clearly discernible in *Eine philosophische Betrachtung* (the German translation and revision of the *Brown

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49 Cf. AWL, p. 31.

50 Cf. Wisdom 1953.
in which Wittgenstein’s style turned polyphonic. Typically, three voices take part in a dialogue on a specific philosophical problem: that of a scientist, of common sense, and of the mediator. The task of the mediator is to show the two parties that they have lost the point of the opposite side. Embracing this style of expression, Wittgenstein completely abandoned the project to present his ideas in a linear book form. Instead, he produced an “album” of such dialogues.

(b) Method
In parallel, Wittgenstein stopped speaking about “method”. Instead, he was now convinced that he had “methods”, or more precisely, “therapies”. It is worth noticing, however, that this was an even later idea. Indeed, §133d was added later to the Urtext of Philosophical Investigations in autumn 1937. §§255 and 593, in which Wittgenstein spoke about “philosophical disease”, were written down much later.

(c) Logic and Ontology
In respect of theory, Wittgenstein’s turn brought only a few new elements. Very roughly, his anti-essentialism and anti-duplicationism radicalized further, thus transforming Wittgenstein into perhaps the most slippery of all “fishes” called philosophers.

Unfortunately – as we read in the “Preface” to Philosophical Investigations – the exposition of Wittgenstein’s method still remained unsatisfactory after his turn of 1933.

Epilogue
Our concluding remark is that Wittgenstein’s ceaseless efforts to elaborate a new method in philosophy was part of the project for a new, “analytic”, philosophy, started by him and by Russell in 1912. (Note that this project bears only a remote family likeness to what we today understand by “analytic philosophy”).

51 A related style of exposition was already employed in belles-lettres, for example by F. M. Dostoyevsky. Cf. Bakhtin 1984.
53 MS 116, p. 186.
Very roughly, Wittgenstein’s ultimate objective was to help his readers to develop a better ability to judge. Hence, it is intrinsically misleading to connect it only with therapy, as Diamond and Conant do. Wittgenstein started to speak (and think) about philosophy as a kind of worry first in the early 1930s, developed the theoretical grounds of his new conception of philosophy as therapy in 1933, but introduced the term “therapy” only in 1937.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{55} Ideas expressed in §1 were delivered at the Open Sections of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society 2011 Joint Session in Brighton (Sussex). Thanks for stimulating remarks are due to Guy Stock, Chon Tejedor and Carolyn Wilde.