

documents, the theoretical discussion around the meaning and implications of recognition is as far from over as the social struggles for recognition in the real world.

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***Post-Analytic Tractatus*, edited by Barry Stocker. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, viii+244 pp. ISBN 07546 1297 X hb £60**

Post-Analytic Tractatus continues the discussion on the interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy and its relation to his later philosophy that has been a focus of debate on Wittgenstein in recent years. In contrast to most volumes on Wittgenstein, however, many of the essays in the book have a historical emphasis. Wittgenstein's work is discussed in relation to Kant, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Frege. Less usually, comparisons are also drawn between Wittgenstein and Parmenides, Aristotle, Saussure as well as Heidegger. According to the editor such historical concerns are an expression of the recognition that, rather than emerging out of nothing, the *Tractatus'* undertaking to overcome metaphysics is an event with a historical background. Moreover, instead of constituting a clear break with the tradition, the *Tractatus* is to be seen as concerned with issues addressed in the very tradition it tries to overcome. Together with comparisons with authors outside the analytic canon and discussions of the 'dark' and marginal topic of mysticism, such considerations constitute an attempt to explore the limits of analytic philosophy that has only recently gained historical awareness.

The book's first essay, 'Life, Art and Mysticism' by the mathematician Jan Brouwer (from 1905), is an exceptional choice—even given the just-mentioned purpose of the exploration of the limits of analytical philosophy. The essay criticizes what Brouwer calls 'intellectualism' (including but probably not restricted to the instrumental use of reason) and which he takes to be the cause of 'man's downfall'. In its place Brouwer preaches 'turning into oneself' and, ultimately, the reaching of a transcendent truth that escapes the conceptualizations of language. The editor describes the essay as 'mak[ing] explicit what is left outside the sayable in Wittgenstein' (p. 2) and in this way throwing

light on the *Tractatus*' ethics, aesthetics and mysticism. But unless Wittgenstein is assumed to be fundamentally confused about the notion of the limits of the sayable, it remains unclear what it would be to make explicit something that cannot be said by writing about it—beyond perhaps giving expression to a *temptation* that leads to such nonsensical statements. Instead, the affinities between Brouwer's and Wittgenstein's thought would seem to lie in their shared critical attitude towards the modern Western culture that, according to both, idolizes science, and which the latter characterizes by saying that 'Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features' (Wittgenstein 1998: 7; quoted by Hutto, p. 135).

The rest of the essays in the book contribute to Wittgenstein interpretation in more conventional ways. From the point of view of recent debates on Wittgenstein's philosophy, they can be divided roughly into two groups: those that attribute (either intentionally or perhaps not entirely consciously) theses and theories to Wittgenstein and those that do not, but see him as engaged in an activity of philosophical therapy. The former include Anthony Rudd's 'Logic and Ethics as the Limits of the World' which discusses Schopenhauer's influence on the early Wittgenstein, arguing that Wittgenstein accepted a great deal of Schopenhauer's metaphysics and should be seen as part of the romantic expressivist tradition. In contrast to positivism, it is characteristic of expressivism in this sense that it allows for the manifestation of metaphysical features of reality even though they cannot be the object of representation. More specifically, according to Rudd, Wittgenstein's expressivism is motivated by logical considerations: it is his 'restrictive theory of meaning' (p. 47) that makes him exclude metaphysics from the realm of the sayable. Here, however, the reader is left to wonder what is supposed to exclude what, given that by Wittgenstein's lights such a theory of meaning could itself not be stated in language and would itself be excluded from the realm of the sayable. Ultimately, despite his discussion of expressivism and attention to ethics, Rudd's Wittgenstein emerges as a Kantian linguistic idealist, quite familiar from the secondary literature on Wittgenstein, who posits logic as a transcendental condition of the world.

A similar Kantian reading is also provided by Daniel D. Hutto's 'More Making Sense of Nonsense: From Logical Forms to Forms of Life' which extends the traditional Kantian interpretation to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, offering an explanation of the continuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy in these terms. According to Hutto, whereas the *Tractatus* takes the bounds of sense to be determined by the logical forms of objects, the later Wittgenstein takes them to be fixed by forms of life and grammar (pp. 138–40). But why this would constitute 'an anti-metaphysical reading' (p. 128) of either the early or late Wittgenstein, which one should adopt in Hutto's view, remains unclear. For beyond calling Wittgenstein's statements 'reminders' (p. 131), Hutto gives no reason for why statements about the limits and foundations of language of the type he attributes to Wittgenstein would not constitute metaphysical theses. Accordingly, no answer is given to the question, why the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as portrayed by Hutto, should not be characterized as a matter of Wittgenstein having switched one theory of language for another. A second problem with Hutto's essay is that his critical discussion of Conant and Diamond, and his suggestion to improve upon their therapeutic reading, remains without a solid basis due to his misinterpretation of Conant and Diamond as committed to the strong claim that the *Tractatus* actually succeeded in abandoning philosophical theses rather than merely *aiming* to do so. (This strong claim was rejected already in Diamond 1991: 19.)

In his 'Wittgenstein's Onto-Logic' Barry Allen describes the *Tractatus* as taking up (unknowingly) the problems of the logic of being (in a Heideggerian sense, in distinction from an 'ontic logic of entities') and as addressing questions concerning the possibility of

truth that go back to Parmenides and Aristotle. Wittgenstein's answer to the problem of the possibility of truth is given in terms of the sameness of the form of language and reality, whereby the notion of sameness is explicated as a relational one. That is, as Allen explains with the help of a comparison with Saussure, the identity of a sign or an object of representation is determined by its role in a system—an economy of differentiation—rather than atomistically (pp. 220, 221). Wittgenstein's later philosophy, in its turn, deconstructs this theory, and thereby the Western metaphysics, explaining the possibility of truth by reference to contingent practices. In contrast to more conventional accounts of Wittgenstein in the analytic key that tend to ignore any broader historical connections, this description of Wittgenstein in relation to the tradition of metaphysics is refreshingly interesting. Allen's discussion of later Wittgenstein's deconstruction of his early thought, however, remains somewhat thin. Again the question might be raised to what extent Allen's account manages to do justice to Wittgenstein's goal of abandoning philosophical theorizing, for example, how the view attributed to the later Wittgenstein differs from pragmatism.

I will now turn to essays in the book that pay more attention to the problem of philosophical theories and theses in Wittgenstein's work. In contrast to Hutto, a more accurate portrait of Conant and Diamond is given by Diarmuid Costello who provides a summary of their as well as Hacker's positions and the dispute between them. But beyond his employment of the Cavellian term 'perfectionism' in describing the *Tractatus*, and his passing suggestion that the book's literary style provides a reason for seeing it as transcending the divide between the analytic and continental approaches to philosophy, Costello's essay remains an overview of aspects of the debate on the *Tractatus* rather than an original contribution to it. Although his essay appears at first to possess great potential for employment as reading in advanced undergraduate seminars, its usefulness is somewhat diminished by his a little too unquestioning acceptance (in the coda of the essay) of Hacker's controversial criticism of Conant and Diamond in the widely-read collection *New Wittgenstein* (Hacker 2000). Given how fluently Costello otherwise describes the debate between Conant and Diamond and Hacker, it is a pity that this part of the essay has not gone through an equally long digestion process as its other parts.

A third discussion of Wittgenstein in Kantian terms is offered by Barry Stocker's 'Transcendence and Contradiction in the *Tractatus*' which interprets the *Tractatus* as 'a continuation of the Kantian project of exposing and dissolving dialectical illusion' (p. 191). This time Wittgenstein is not attributed transcendental philosophical theses which he intends to hold onto. Rather, he is seen as engaged in an activity of dissolving nonsense from the inside in a Kierkegaardian fashion, i.e. by treating illusions as if they were not illusions in order to reveal their illusory character, whereby Wittgenstein's purpose is to show the impossibility of metaphysics (pp. 199, 209, 210). Unlike Kant for whom dialectics constitutes merely a part of philosophy, for Wittgenstein dialectics, according to this interpretation, covers all of philosophy (p. 195). Read together, the Kantian essays in the volume testify to the diversity of possible comparisons between Kant and Wittgenstein, the last one being clearly the most original treatment of the topic.

Kelly Dean Jolley's essay, 'Frege at Therapy', examines the roots of the later Wittgenstein's therapeutic approach in Frege, attempting to 'highlight the lessons Wittgenstein learned from Frege—regardless of whether or not Frege self-consciously taught those lessons' (p. 86). To clarify Wittgenstein's analogy between philosophy and therapy, Jolley also makes use of remarks by Wittgenstein's student Rush Rhees on Frege and Wittgensteinian philosophical therapy, whereby one basic insight is (in Rhees' words)

'that philosophical mistakes are often not refutable falsehoods, but confusions; [...] We cannot refute nonsense by straightforward logical process; as Frege said, logic cannot deal with nonsense, but only characterise it as being nonsense' (quoted by Jolley on p. 85). The last section of this interesting paper characterizes elucidation in the *Tractatus* as a forerunner of philosophical therapy in the later Wittgenstein.

James Conant's 'Why Worry about the *Tractatus*?' can be read as examining more closely the distinction between falsehoods and confusions that Rhees (as quoted by Jolley) draws attention to. Conant questions the idea that nonsense is explainable as something 'logically contradictory' or even 'surely false' (p. 174), arguing that what he calls 'standard readings' of Wittgenstein assume such a problematic conception of nonsense. (In this volume, for example, Hutto characterizes nonsense as an 'irreconcilable contradiction' (p. 130); cf. also Stocker's essay.) Corresponding to this kind of a conception of nonsense, the standard readings fail to disengage themselves from modeling Wittgenstein's philosophical practice on the assertion/rejection of truths/falsehoods, Wittgensteinian grammatical statements being comprehended as some sort of quasi-truths. But the status of such quasi-truths remains unclear, and was, according to Conant, critiqued already in the *Tractatus*. Thus, the standard readings, in Conant's view, misconstrue the continuities and discontinuities between Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy, a topic to the discussion of which Conant's essay is intended as a prolegomenon. (More precisely, this prolegomenon consists of the problematization of variants of the standard reading in the case of the so-called private language argument and *On Certainty*, where this problematization serves the purpose of raising anew the question of where the continuities and discontinuities of Wittgenstein's philosophy might lie.) Nevertheless, the challenge Conant's essay poses to the standard readings is somewhat obscured by the abstractness of his characterization of such readings. As a consequence, anyone inclined to a reading of the standard type is likely to find it relatively easy to avoid taking up the challenge, i.e. to explain why Conant's characterization of the standard reading does not apply to his/her interpretation.

In her 'Saying and Showing: an Example from Anscombe', Cora Diamond illustrates by reference to an example from Anscombe how a philosophical claim can be 'created by a failure to carry out the task of clarifying what [one oneself] is saying' (p. 165). The purpose of this discussion is to exemplify and elucidate a 'piecemeal approach' to philosophical problems and to separating sense from nonsense which Diamond finds in the *Tractatus* and contrasts with a doctrinal approach. A highly engaging part of the essay is her down to earth explanation of the Tractarian employment of tautologies for the purpose of clarifying the inferential behaviour of expressions. Being motivated by the observation that 'It is sometimes useful to move forward an inch at a time' (p. 151), Diamond's essay forms an interesting pair with Conant's rather more programmatic essay. Together these essays bring to view two quite different sides of the new interpretation of Wittgenstein that is associated with their names.

Michael Kremer's 'To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth?' discusses solipsism in the *Tractatus*. Instead of taking it as an epistemological or a metaphysical thesis, Kremer argues Wittgenstein's solipsism to be ethically motivated. 'Solipsism is an intellectual, moral and mystical exercise aimed at bringing about a change in one's spiritual life' (p. 59). Accordingly, Kremer's discussion is intended to illuminate the ethical purpose which the book has according to Wittgenstein. Here the question about the truth of solipsism emerges as a question about the truth of a certain path for life rather than a propositional truth or a philosophical ineffable quasi-truth (p. 63). The *Tractatus*' ladder, argues Kremer, is not only the ladder of philosophical nonsense,

but also of 'our own desires, and the illusions they enmesh us in' (p. 79). Thus, according to Kremer, the dissolution of philosophical doctrines the *Tractatus* seeks to bring about has a counterpart in the dissolution of self-centred solipsism into selflessness. While it seems clear that no interpretation of the significance of solipsism for Wittgenstein can claim conclusiveness, having partly to be based on external biographical material, it is to be counted to the benefit of Kremer's reading that it manages to connect logic, ethics and mysticism—matters which Wittgenstein evidently took to be connected—in a principled manner informed by considerations of Wittgenstein's methodology.

On the whole *Post-Analytic Tractatus* emerges as an interesting and welcome addition to the literature on Wittgenstein. Although all contributions might not quite rise to the same level, there are several that merit reading and re-reading. One might be tempted to criticize the Introduction for promising more on the front of the exploration of the limits of analytic philosophy than the book delivers. But ultimately that just leads to the question: what should one understand by such an exploration in the first place, and what would Wittgenstein's role in it be? It is, then, a merit of this book that it raises that question.

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