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cally trained that we both regain our sense of mystery... and our sense of the common (for that some ideas are "unreasonable" is, after all, a common fact—it is only the weird notions of "objectivity" and "subjectivity" that we have acquired from Ontology and Epistemology that make us unfit to dwell in the common). 18

In saying that philosophy makes us "unfit to dwell in the common," Putnam follows Wittgenstein in viewing philosophy as an activity that places us not only at odds with what we ordinarily say and do, but also, what is more important, in a position from which we are unable to recover our sense of the ordinary. We become able to view the ordinary only through the lens of a philosophical theory: we lose our sense of the genuineness of our conviction in the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) or truth (or falsity) of certain actions or claims. Our former, prephilosophical conviction now appears to us to be only the consequence of our youthful, unreflective, metaphysical naiveté (and hence an effort at self-deception seems to be a necessary precondition of recovering such conviction). Thus the price of intellectual honesty appears to be the abandonment of many of our ordinary ways of talking and thinking. Putnam's summary statement of his disagreement with Rorty over this issue (in Chapter 1, Part Two) encapsulates the philosophical attitude that informs especially the essays concerned with specifically ethical and political matters in this volume: "I hope that philosophical reflection may be of some real cultural value; but I do not think it has been the pedestal on which the culture rested, and I do not think our reaction to the failure of a philosophical project—even a project as central as 'metaphysics'—should be to abandon ways of talking and thinking which have practical and spiritual weight."

Putnam links the hastiness with which Rorty draws revisionist implications from the failure of traditional philosophical projects with a second moment of hastiness—one that issues from the other of Rorty's "two broad attitudes": namely, the contempt with which Rorty dismisses long-standing philosophical controversies. Putnam suggests that this particular failing is, to some extent, characteristic of analytic philosophers: "Rorty's analytic past shows up in this: when he rejects a philosophical controversy, as, for example, he rejects the 'realism/anti-realism' controversy, or the 'emotive/cognitive' controversy, his rejection is expressed in a Carnapian tone of voice—he scorns the controversy" (Chapter 1, Part Two). Putnam's disagreement with Rorty here reflects a further difference in their respective interpretations of the teachings of the later Wittgenstein, as well as that of the major figures of the movement called Ordinary Language Philosophy (Austin, Bouwsma, Wisdom, and Ryle) whose philosophical methods most closely resembled Wittgenstein's. Rorty takes it that the work of these figures, and especially that of Wittgenstein, shows us that what we should do is simply dismiss the problems that have most exercised philosophers over the past few centuries. The texture of Rorty's attitude toward philosophical controversies that concerns Putnam here is evident in the following passages from Rorty's review of The Claim of Reason by Stanley Cavell:

Austin, Bouwsma, Wittgenstein, Wisdom, and Ryle all suggested that we just shrug off the claims which Berkeley and Descartes and Moore made on us—that we teach epistemology as the history of some bad ideas. Now Cavell tells us that, unless we take these claims very seriously indeed, we shan't get the full benefit of what Wittgenstein and Austin (in particular) can do for us. We mustn't, he tells us, shrug off skepticism too easily, for then we may miss the truth of skepticism... .

But if [Cavell]... is not concerned about being professional, why worry about "American philosophical life"? The latter phrase can only refer to current trends in fashionable philosophy departments. Among intellectuals generally, Wittgenstein is in fact being read and used more and more. It is only within certain philosophy departments that he, and "Oxford philosophy," are vitiœ juœ. Such parochial matters should not concern Cavell... One would have expected him to conclude that Wittgenstein would be better served by forgetting "events within American philosophical life" than by recapturing them. 6

This is the voice of a man who is angry about his education. He has come to the conclusion that the history of epistemology has been a "history of some bad ideas." His overwhelming emotion, when faced with the traditional problems of philosophy, is one of impatience—a desire to get on to something more fruitful. Rorty's interest in Wittgenstein therefore is an interest in someone who has managed to put this history behind himself—someone who will enable us to put this history behind ourselves, so that we may distance ourselves from the pain of its pointlessness. Thus he feels that there is an inconsistency in Cavell's being interested in Wittgenstein's work and in the problems that preoccupied the great historical figures and still preoc-
cupy “professional” philosophers: “What Cavell wants us not to miss is, to be sure, as important as he thinks it is. But does he have to drag us back through Berkeley and Descartes to see it?”

What Rorty wants to know is why philosophers like Cavell and Putnam do not simply confine themselves to stating what is wrong with the traditional views. Why do they insist on motivating the issue from within, dragging us back through the messy details of the traditional philosophical problems? Rorty feels their attachment to the tradition is a mark of their unfaithfulness to Wittgenstein’s teaching. Putnam wishes to contest this reading of Wittgenstein. Rorty’s reading of Wittgenstein is both a fairly representative and a widely circulated one—with the significant difference that Rorty celebrates what most philosophers deplore in this version of Wittgenstein: namely, the conclusion that the problems of philosophy can be, and should be, “shrugged off.” Putnam’s reading of Wittgenstein owes much to the writings of Cavell. On Cavell’s reading, Wittgenstein’s primary philosophical virtue is precisely his patience—his willingness to head straight into a confused tangle of issues and to crisscross back and forth across the same piece of philosophical landscape until gradually some perspicacious overview of the terrain can be achieved. Putnam shares with both Rorty and Wittgenstein a deep distrust of analytic philosophy’s self-understanding of the integrity of its own projects. He aligns himself with Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein and against Rorty’s, however, in order to justify an important presupposition of the philosophical practice that pervades the essays collected here: there is no substitute for (and hence philosophically no more pressing task than) providing a detailed and convincing exposition of where and how the central projects of analytic philosophy come apart on themselves, and where and how they misrepresent our lives.

Wittgenstein has his interlocutor ask: “What is your aim in philosophy?” He responds: “To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.” Rorty’s recommendation appears to be that one should leave the fly in the fly-bottle and get on with something more interesting. On Rorty’s reading of Wittgenstein, the enlightened philosopher should simply dismiss the traditional problems and leave them to those who are less enlightened. The implication would appear to be that these are not necessarily our problems and that to be free of them all we need to do is learn to lose interest in them. This suggests that we can “just shrug off the claims which Berkeley and Descartes and Moore made on us”—as if what we required in order to liberate ourselves from the tangle of issues that has dominated the history of philosophy were primarily a sheer act of will. Contrast this with Wittgenstein’s description of our relation to a philosophical problem: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”

A philosophical picture holding us captive—this is roughly the opposite of something we can simply decide to “shrug off.” The recognition that we are stuck does not by itself provide a means of liberation. However, part of what Wittgenstein means by saying that a picture holds us captive is that we cannot recognize our picture of things as a picture—a fixed image that we have imposed—and it is our inability to recognize this that renders us captive. The fly is trapped because he does not realize that he is in a fly-bottle; in order to show him the way out, we first need to show him that we have an appreciation of where he thinks he is, that we are able to understand his view from the inside. In order to show the metaphysician anything, we need to take his questions seriously and register an awareness of what the world looks like from his point of view. On this reading of Wittgenstein, the central virtue of philosophy, as he conceives it, is responsiveness: a willingness always to make the other’s questions real for oneself. This, however, is precisely the feature of Putnam’s and Cavell’s practice at which Rorty bristles: “One would have thought that, once we were lucky enough to get writers like Wittgenstein and Nietzsche who resist professionalization, we might get some criticism which didn’t remain internal to philosophy.”

Rorty craves a critique of the tradition that remains external to philosophy. Wittgenstein’s aim in philosophy was to change his readers and with them the tradition in which they participate—this is something that can only be undertaken from within the tradition. Rorty is not interested in transforming the tradition, but rather in simply breaking with it. Hence his picture of the “edifying” philosopher is of someone who “can be only reactive,” who “falls into self-deception whenever [he] tries to do more than send the conversation off in new directions.” Putnam, is, above all, concerned to distance himself from this feature of Rorty’s picture of “edifying philosophy,” as he says in Chapter 1, Part Two: “I think that what is important in philosophy is not just to say, ‘I reject the realist/antirealist controversy,’ but to show that (and how) both sides misrepresent the lives we live with our concepts. That a controversy is ‘futile’ does not mean that the rival pictures are unimportant. Indeed, to reject a controversy
without examining the pictures involved is almost always a way of defending one of those pictures (usually the one that claims to be ‘antimetaphysical’)."

A further important difference between Rorty’s and Putnam’s respective readings of Wittgenstein emerges here in Putnam’s remark that what the philosophical critic needs to learn to do is to show how both sides of a typical philosophical controversy tend to “misrepresent the lives we live with our concepts.” The point is not only that certain features of our everyday lives tend to become distorted when viewed through the lens of a philosophical theory, but, more important, that the nature and character of this distortion are themselves important subjects for philosophical reflection. The specific fashion in which our image of what it is to be human tends to be deformed under the equally specific pressures brought to bear upon it by the demands of our philosophical theories is itself deeply revelatory of part of what it is to be human—that is, to be subject to such cravings to deny one’s humanity. Part of what Wittgenstein’s work calls upon its reader to do is to acknowledge the attraction such cravings can exercise for him and hence also to recognize the depth of his resistance to such an acknowledgment. In his review of Cavell, it becomes clear that this is the feature of Cavell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein that irritates Rorty the most, as well as the one that most separates his own vision of what philosophy should become from the one that Putnam entertains. Rorty says that what frustrates him about Cavell is his insistence that the philosophical questions that have exercised the tradition reveal “something important about human beings.” Putnam explicitly aligns himself with Cavell, and against Rorty, on this issue: “I think philosophy is both more important and less important than Rorty does. It is not a pedestal on which we rest (or have rested until Rorty). Yet the illusions that philosophy spins are illusions that belong to the nature of human life itself, and that need to be illuminated. Just saying, ‘That’s a pseudo-issue’ is not of itself therapeutic; it is an aggressive form of the metaphysical disease itself” (Chapter 1, Part Two).

Putnam’s last sentence echoes Wittgenstein’s remark that “the philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.” Part of what the treatment of an illness requires is compassion; only here we have to do with an illness one of whose symptoms is a form of uncompassionateness—obliviousness to the other. Putnam’s observation that Rorty’s terms of philosophical criticism offer no possibility for therapeutic progress harks back to Wittgenstein’s famous com-

parison of his philosophical approach to therapy.” The pertinent feature of the analogy here is the role that the virtue of responsiveness plays in both. Wittgenstein says that only those words which occasion genuine self-understanding are the words we seek in philosophy: “We can only convince the other of his mistakenness [in philosophy] if he acknowledges [what we say] as genuinely expressing his feeling—if he acknowledges this expression as (genuinely being) the correct expression of his feeling. For only if he acknowledges it as such is it the correct expression. (Psychoanalysis.)”

Eliciting the other’s acknowledgment requires correctly identifying the sources of his philosophical insistence. The measure of the accuracy of a diagnosis is the degree of illumination it ultimately is able to afford one’s interlocutor. It is a criterion of one’s having arrived at the right words in philosophy that the other is able to recognize himself in those words—to recognize the accuracy of one’s description of him as grounds for dissatisfaction with himself. “Just saying, ‘That’s a pseudo-issue’ is not of itself therapeutic”; it will only infuriate him. Insofar as he truly is in the grip of a pseudo-issue, simply denying what he says will not constitute intellectual progress: the negation of a pseudo-proposition is also a pseudo-proposition. One does not free oneself from a metaphysical picture simply by asserting the negation of a metaphysical thesis. Unless one carefully examines the character of a given philosophical position’s seductiveness to those who are attracted to it, as well as the character of the disappointment it provokes in those who reject it—what allows for it to appear initially so innocent and yet the implications of its failure so precipitous—one’s gesture of rejecting the picture will inevitably represent a further form of participation in it and victimization by it. Our “antimetaphysical” rejection of one moment will prove to be, as Putnam says, “just another way of defending” another, often slightly more entrenched, moment in the metaphysical dialectic. There is a tremendous pressure to formulate our rejection in terms of a counterthesis and to latch firmly onto the ensuing formulation, convinced that it affords the only available refuge from the position from which we wish to escape. Hence each philosophical position bears the stamp of another—ironically, the one from which it most seeks to be free. As Putnam says in Chapter 16, “Very often, the problem in philosophy is that a philosopher who knows what he wants to deny feels that he cannot simply do so, but must make a ‘positive’ statement; and the positive statement is frequently a disaster.”

This way in which we fixate on a counterthesis, Wittgenstein sug-
ggests, is one of the sources of “the dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.” A number of the essays collected here are specifically concerned to resist this temptation to lapse into one of a number of classical forms of counterassertion, to indicate a way out of the spiraling dialectic of insistence and counterinsistence; and these essays are often, in addition, concerned to indicate explicitly that their task is one of struggling against philosophical temptation. The power and longevity of a given philosophical temptation are themselves something that calls for philosophical reflection. When particular philosophical theories are able repeatedly to resurrect themselves after their obituaries have been written several times over, it no longer suffices simply to rehearse the same old arguments. Putnam takes it as evident “that the brilliant thinkers who propound such theories are in the grip of an intellectual yearning worth taking seriously.” Part of the task of philosophical criticism, therefore, becomes to identify and isolate the source and character of the yearning. This requires the cultivation of a nose for what occasions philosophical fixation and, as in therapy, an ear for when someone is inclined to insist a little too loudly that something must be the case. Putnam writes: “It is just these philosophical ‘musts,’ just the points at which a philosopher feels no argument is needed because something is just ‘obvious,’ that . . . [one] should learn to challenge.” Precisely those claims that a philosopher finds most trivial are the ones we are to learn to look on with suspicion. In Wittgenstein’s words: “The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.”

The conception of philosophy that emerges from this—an activity isolating decisive moments in philosophical conjuring tricks—can seem to be a purely negative one. Furthermore, given the outcome of the traditional agenda of analytic philosophy, it can seem as if the only space left for accomplishment in philosophy is occupied exclusively by such negative tasks. Putnam writes in Chapter 3:

Analytic philosophy has great accomplishments, to be sure; but those accomplishments are negative. Like logical positivism (itself just one species of analytic philosophy), analytic philosophy has succeeded in destroying the very problem with which it started . . .

But analytic philosophy pretends today not to be just one great movement in the history of philosophy—which it certainly was—but to be philosophy itself. This self-description forces analytic philosophers . . . to keep coming up with new “solutions” to the prob-
lem of the Furniture of the Universe—solutions which become more and more bizarre, and which have lost all interest outside of the philosophical community. Thus we have a paradox: at the very moment when analytic philosophy is recognized as the “dominant movement” in world philosophy, it has come to the end of its own project—the dead end, not the completion.

If one accepts this description of the outcome of the history of analytic philosophy, then the question naturally arises: is there a serviceable positive conception of philosophy that can inherit our aspirations to the subject?

Philosophy as the Education of Grown-ups

At a number of crucial junctures in the essays collected here, Putnam pauses to invoke the words of his Harvard colleague Stanley Cavell. This leads one to speculate on the significance of Cavell’s work for Putnam. Regarding Cavell’s most recent book, Putnam writes: “If there is one contemporary thinker whose work I could recommend to every sensitive and intelligent young person who is thinking about the future of philosophy . . . it is Stanley Cavell.” This suggests that, for Putnam, Cavell’s work represents a place to begin thinking about the future of philosophy—a source of suggestions for ways to begin addressing the present condition of philosophy. We have already heard Putnam say that analytic philosophy, the tradition of philosophy in which he has worked most of his life, has come to a dead end. This suggests that the subject requires a change of direction—one that nevertheless represents a stage in the same journey.

Putnam writes that “the phenomenon called ‘analytical philosophy’ is best understood as part of the larger phenomenon of modernism” and that “the strains and conflicts in analytical philosophy reflect the strains and conflicts in modernism generally.” In what sense does the present condition of philosophy reflect the crossroads in the development of modern art that we call modernism? Cavell writes: “The task of the modernist artist, as of the contemporary critic, is to find what it is his art finally depends upon; it doesn’t matter that we haven’t a priori criteria for defining a painting, what matters is that we realize that the criteria are something we must discover, discover in the continuity of painting itself.”

If we put these passages from Putnam and Cavell together, we have the following suggestion: the task of the contemporary analytic phi-
The philosopher is to find out what the practice of philosophy depends upon. It doesn’t matter that we haven’t a priori criteria for defining what philosophy is; what matters is that we realize that these criteria are something we discover through an examination of both our current practice of philosophy and the historical continuity of the subject. (Of course, this works in both directions: what we are presently willing to recognize as philosophy will influence the criteria elicited, and the criteria we elicit will give us an occasion to reflect on what we are willing to count as philosophy.) This suggests that it has only become necessary at this particular juncture in the development of “analytic philosophy” that it allow that philosophy is to become its own central question. For Cavell, this is in itself an indication that analytic philosophy represents a peculiar moment in the history of philosophy—one in which the distinction between philosophy and metaphysics achieves an illusion of clarity. Cavell writes: “If I deny a distinction, it is the still fashionable distinction between philosophy and metaphysics, the philosophy of philosophy. ...” 108

If it is internal to philosophy that what philosophy is always remains a question for it, then the burden of modernism in the arts is that the arts have come to assume the condition of philosophy. If the phenomenon of “analytic philosophy” has only just come to recognize itself as part of the phenomenon of modernism, then it would seem to follow that there is a sense in which the institution we call “analytic philosophy” has only just come to acknowledge that it partakes of the condition of philosophy—it has only just come to know itself as philosophy. Analytic philosophy’s own self-understanding has had, in particular, an investment in repressing its differences from science. Putnam argues that “the self-image and self-definition of analytical philosophy have too long been accepted uncritically.” 109 He suggests that, according to its own self-definition, analytic philosophy has the following three salient characteristics: (1) it is nonideological; (2) it consists of piecemeal problem solving; (3) it can pursue its investigations independently of any concern with questions of value: “a concern with literature, the arts, culture, and the history of culture, [are] at best optional for an analytical philosopher.” 110 All three characteristics serve to encourage the image of analytic philosophy as a cousin of the sciences. Putnam contests the accuracy of analytic philosophy’s self-image on all three counts:

The fact is that Carnap and the logical positivists were intensely ideological philosophers, even if their ideology did not take the form of overt politics or moralizing. The arguments that analytical philosophers discussed were sometimes piecemeal arguments, but very often they were produced by philosophers who were highly ideological in the sense that Carnap was. Without the motor of a certain amount of ideology which kept producing arguments that divided analytical philosophers into sides, analytical philosophy could hardly have kept going: it has already begun to lose shape as a tendency, with the demise of logical positivism. The fact that analytical philosophers were not interested in cultural history does not mean that they escaped being a part of it. 111

Putnam’s burgeoning interest in recounting various chapters in the recent history of analytic philosophy (which pervades the essays in this volume) is often in the service of highlighting the gap between analytic philosophy’s own image of itself and the actual character of its practice and development. It also, however, serves a further aim: “to help us see analytical philosophy once again as a humanistic discipline, and its problems and themes as common problems and themes in the humanities.” 112 Putnam’s insistence that philosophy is one of the humanities is meant, first of all, to register the extent to which philosophy must raise for itself anew at each moment the question of what its aspirations should be, as well as how they are best to be achieved. Second, however, it is meant to underscore the significance of the fact that the philosophical endeavor is a literary one as well—an individual quest for a certain mode of writing:

I propose that each philosopher ought to leave it more problematic what is left for philosophy to do, but philosophy should go on. If I agree with Derrida on anything, it is on this: that philosophy is writing, and that it must learn now to be a writing whose authority is always to be won anew, not inherited or awarded because it is philosophy. Philosophy is, after all, one of the humanities and not a science. We philosophers inherit a field, not authority, and that is enough. It is, after all, a field which fascinates a great many people. If we have not entirely destroyed that fascination by our rigidities or by our posturings, that is something for which we should be truly grateful. 113
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This suggests a further sense in which Cavell’s work may be exemplary for Putnam: namely, in the way in which he writes philosophy—in the conception of philosophical authorship that his work embodies. This is not to say that Putnam admires Cavell’s “style.” The concept of style, Cavell himself has argued, has no clear application to modernist work. A clear distinction cannot be drawn here between ways of writing and ways of thinking. This brings us back to a remark of Putnam’s that we encountered earlier: “Of course, philosophical problems are unsolvable; but as Stanley Cavell once remarked, ‘There are better and worse ways of thinking about them.’” Putnam goes on in this essay to connect this point with the question of the future of philosophy—the grand question ‘After Metaphysics What?’—and to suggest that this is not a question that admits of a stable answer: “No one philosopher can answer that question. ‘After metaphysics’ there can only be philosophers—that is, there can only be the search for those ‘better and worse ways of thinking’ that Cavell called for.” To say that this question regarding the future of philosophy is one we should not evade—one that we must continue to take seriously, although it admits of no single satisfying answer—is simply to say that it is itself a philosophical question: a question of, not simply a question about, philosophy. Hence it is itself a question about which “there are better and worse ways of thinking.”

The passage from Cavell that Putnam is referring to throughout these remarks is from his book Themes out of School. It is one that attempts to address the question “what makes philosophy philosophy?”:

I understand it as a willingness to think not about something other than what ordinary human beings think about, but rather to learn to think undistractedly about things that ordinary human beings cannot help thinking about, or anyway cannot help having occur to them, sometimes in fantasy, sometimes as a flash across a landscape; such things, for example, as whether we can know the world as it is in itself, or whether others really know the nature of one’s own experiences, or whether good and bad are relative, or whether we might not now be dreaming that we are awake . . . Such thoughts are instances of that characteristic human willingness to allow questions for itself which it cannot answer with satisfaction. Cynics about philosophy, and perhaps about humanity, will find that questions without answers are empty; dogmatists will claim to have arrived at answers; philosophers after my heart will rather wish to convey the thought that while there may be no satisfying answers to such questions in certain forms, there are so to speak, directions to answers, ways to think, that are worth the time of your life to discover.

Having accepted the fact that the questions of philosophy, when they present themselves in certain traditional forms, do not admit of satisfying answers, we can see that the significance of this passage from Cavell lies in the path it glimpses between the prevailing alternative responses to this fact, namely, cynicism and dogmatism. In the distinction that Putnam draws between vision and argument, he remarks that philosophy cannot live on argument alone. Both the dogmatist and the cynic resist this conclusion. The dogmatist insists that he has argument(s) that can settle our questions in philosophy; the cynic, in his dissatisfaction with what argument can establish, affects an air of indifference, concluding that reason can shed no light on these questions. What we require in this situation, Cavell says, is not answers for our questions but “directions to answers”—a form of progress that does not culminate in the assertion of a thesis but in a change of perspective. Such writing must change the way its reader views the problems. In a review article on Themes out of School (which quotes this same passage from Cavell), Arnold Davidson offers the following reflection on the character of Cavell’s own philosophical writing: “Cavell writes not primarily to produce new theses or conclusions, nor to produce new arguments to old conclusions, but . . . to excavate and transform the reader’s sensibility, to undo his self-mystifications and redirect his interest. This is a distinctive mode of philosophizing, one which has its own special rigor, in which the accuracy of description bears an enormous weight. In aiming to transform a sensibility, one must capture it precisely, and if one’s descriptions are too coarse, too rough or too smooth, they will hold no direct interest, seeming to have missed the mark completely.” Davidson goes on to describe the burden of Cavell’s writing as one of diagnosing failures that are lapses, not of intelligence, but of “philosophical sensibility.” Earlier we saw Putnam equate what he called our need for “vision” in philosophy with a need for orientation. This, he says, echoing Davidson on Cavell, is “a matter of developing a sensibility”: “Finding a meaningful orientation in life is not, I think, a matter of finding a set of doctrines to live by, although it certainly includes having views; it is much more a matter of developing a sensibility. Phi-
philosophy is not only concerned with changing our views, but also with changing our sensibility, our ability to perceive and react to nuances.”

This is a task philosophy shares with aesthetic and moral reflection: something one might call the task of criticism—the activity which aims, in Cavell’s words, to “make its object available to just response.” If it is characteristic of philosophy that it leads us to doubt whether we know what we cannot help but know, it is equally characteristic of the activity of criticism that it elicits conviction by attaining a vantage point from which something we cannot help but know reappears to us, once again, as obvious. But how can a claim be obvious if not everyone finds it obvious? When what is hidden to us lies right before our eyes, it is our conviction that it must lie elsewhere—somewhere hidden from view—that renders it invisible. This, according to Wittgenstein, is the structure of philosophical confusion. Hence Wittgenstein says that what we require in philosophy is not explanation but description. Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations, Cavell writes, are “investigations of obviousness.” Putnam suggests, at one point, that moral confusion has a similar structure: “When a situation or a person or a motive is appropriately described, the decision as to whether something is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ frequently follows automatically.” Everything depends here on achieving the “appropriate description,” on one’s ability to find the right words. “The sorts of descriptions that we need” in situations requiring ethical evaluation,” Putnam writes, “are descriptions in the language of a sensitive novelist.” Such descriptions seek to help us to see the world differently, to render what is right before our eyes visible to us. They aim, Putnam argues, to engage and cultivate our sensibility—our capacity for vision. Philosophers, in regarding a capacity for argument as the touchstone of rationality, have tended to paint a distorted picture of moral reasoning, thereby contributing to a distorted image of what it means more generally to be reasonable. Rather than disparaging moral reasoning for not aligning well with the philosopher’s narrow conception of reasoning, Putnam argues, we should learn to recognize it as paradigmatic of “reasoning in the full sense of the word,” which “involves not just the logical faculties, in the narrow sense, but our full capacity to imagine and feel, in short, our full sensibility.”

The narrowness that characterizes the picture of moral reasoning Putnam opposes here parallels the narrowness in the picture of philosophical reasoning which his remarks about the role of vision in philosophy sought to redress: both narrow the space of the reasonable through their insistence that in order for someone to be reasonably convinced of something his conviction must be produced by a chain of argument. Philosophers tend to impose an unreasonable ideal of reasonableness upon us, one that requires the mutilation of our actual capacities for sustaining reasonable conviction. Putnam argues that the philosophical project of formalizing the activity of interpretation is an instance of this: “Not only is interpretation a highly informal activity, guided by few, if any, settled rules or methods, but it is one that involves much more than linear propositional reasoning. It involves our imagination, our feelings—in short, our full sensibility.”

If interpretation involves our full sensibility, then cultivating our capacities for interpretation involves cultivating our sensibility. A philosophical ideal of rationality that distrusts any form of conviction that is not based on argument will see such an appeal to sensibility as, at best, irrelevant to the enterprise of seeking truth. Such a view will concede that an appeal to sensibility can produce conviction, but not rational conviction. A temperamental bias in favor of certain truths is a merely subjective ground for conviction—something we should learn to overcome in the interest of truth. What the prevailing philosophical ideal of rationality oculcudes, according to Putnam, is that “temperament is subject to criticism.” Part of Putnam’s recent interest in William James (as documented in the chapters devoted to him in this volume) is tied to the ways in which his work challenges this ideal of rationality through his claim that by obscuring the role played by sensibility in the attainment of philosophical conviction—placing it beyond the reach of criticism—philosophers have tended to make themselves the victims of their own individual temperaments. James writes:

Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries when philosophizing to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it.
James concludes: “The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of temperaments.” Putnam describes this as “the most shocking claim that James makes”—shocking, that is, to a “professional philosopher” who wishes to restrict himself in philosophy to criticizing questions of argument and principle. The implication that Putnam, following James, draws from the fact that temperament loads the outcome of a philosophical controversy for each of us is not that the philosopher should somehow learn to transcend the influence of his temperament, but rather that he should learn to take responsibility for it. This requires acknowledging the role that temperament plays in consolidating his conviction (hence a willingness to speak in the first-person singular) as well as subjecting it to criticism (hence a willingness to explore the character and sources of his experiences of philosophical compulsion). Insofar as every philosophical author aspires to elicit the conviction of his reader, this places as a condition on good philosophical writing that it seek to educate. This commits one, Putnam concludes, to a certain ideal of education: “Philosophy is not only concerned with changing our views, but also with changing our sensibility... Philosophers are, ideally, educators—not just educators of youth, but of themselves and their peers. Stanley Cavell once suggested as the definition of philosophy—‘the education of grown-ups.’ I think that is the definition I like best.”

The passage from Cavell that Putnam is referring to is from The Claim of Reason:

In philosophizing, I have to bring my own language and life into imagination. What I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may imagine them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the lines in which it meets in me.

This seems to me a task that warrants the name of philosophy. It is also the description of something we might call education. In the face of the questions posed in Augustine, Luther, Rousseau, Thoreau... we are children; we do not know how to go on with them, what ground we may occupy. In this light, philosophy becomes the education of grownups.

To claim that philosophy is the education of grown-ups is to suggest both that its audience is everyone and that its curriculum can never be definitively settled (no subject of human concern being in principle extracurricular to the interests of philosophical reflection). But how is education to proceed under these circumstances? Cavell writes: “In philosophizing, I have to bring my own language and life into imagination.” Putnam echoes this in his remark that “what is important in philosophy” when treating a philosophical controversy “is to show that (and how) both sides misrepresent the lives we live with our concepts.” The implication is that the philosopher in each of us drives us out of communication with the person we ordinarily are in “the lives we live with our concepts.” (Putnam follows Wittgenstein in also giving the name of “philosophy” to the activity that brings us back into communication with the lives we ordinarily lead.) Putnam argues in a number of the essays collected here that analytic moral philosophy, in particular, has been haunted by a failure to bring our language and our everyday lives into imagination: “There is a weird discrepancy between the way philosophers who subscribe to a sharp fact/value distinction make ethical arguments sound and the way ethical arguments actually sound. (Stanley Cavell once remarked that Stevenson writes like someone who has forgotten what ethical discussion is like.)”

The passage from Cavell's The Claim of Reason that begins by saying that in philosophizing one must bring one's own language and life into imagination is offered as a reflection upon Wittgenstein's famous remark that “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.” The imagining of one's form of life is the activity Cavell describes as the “convening of my culture's criteria”—a confronting of the culture with itself, “along the lines in which it meets in me.” It involves mapping out for oneself the topology of the obvious, the points at which one's justifications run out. If one is not yet on familiar terms with philosophy this is apt to be an experience of either bafflement or chagrin; if one is, it is apt to be one of exhilaration or irritation. Of course, it is, and always will be, the birthright of every philosopher to continue to press his questions at this point. Part of the point of bringing the life I live into imagination is to recover a sense of the peculiarity of my questions, something a familiarity with philosophy can deaden. In focusing in imagination on where such questions can come alive for me, I clarify what weight they are able to bear in my life. Such reflections, Putnam indicates, will often uncover a point beyond which the philosopher's call for justification ceases to grip us. If I simply shape up to his questions as perfectly ordinary questions about what I am able to call into question (this,
of course, may not be the way he wants me to shape up to them) then I may find that the doubt which he wishes to press appears to make no sense in the way in which he wishes to press it. Putnam writes: “These are cases in which I find I have to say: ‘I have reached bedrock and this is where my spade is turned.’”

Putnam is invoking here a passage from Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*:

“How am I able to obey a rule?”—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”

This passage has been interpreted in very different ways by different commentators. Some have invoked it to support a reading of Wittgenstein in which justification is simply a function of consensus within a community—as if Wittgenstein were saying here: This is the right (justified) thing to do here because this is, after all, what we do. Putnam comments: “That Wittgenstein here uses the first-person—where my spade is turned—is very important; yet many interpreters try to see his philosophy as one of simple deference to some ‘form of life’ determined by a community. On this see . . . Stanley Cavell’s discussion in *The Claim of Reason.*” Putnam takes Wittgenstein’s use of the first-person singular here to contest the consensus-theory reading of the passage; he takes it for granted that Wittgenstein is not an author who would be careless about such matters. Saul Kripke is the interpreter of Wittgenstein whom, above all, Putnam has in mind here as someone who tries “to see his philosophy as one of simple deference to some ‘form of life’ determined by a community.” Kripke writes: “In Wittgenstein’s own model . . . if the community all agrees on an answer and persists in its views, no one can correct it . . . If the corrector were outside the community, on Wittgenstein’s view he has not the ‘right’ to make any correction.” According to this view, therefore, truth and warrant amount to nothing more than matters of brute *de facto* communal agreement. Putnam reports: “Cavell has suggested to me that this makes it sound as if Wittgenstein thought that truth and warrant are a matter of *etiquette*—wanting to find a justified (or a true) hypothesis is like wanting to use the same fork my ‘cultural peers’ use, on such a story. But Wittgenstein would not have thought this is a description of our form of life at all!”

What would Wittgenstein have considered a description of our form of life? How does our form of life differ from a set of rules of etiquette? This question dovetails with another. How does philosophy involve the education of our sensibility? How are these two questions related? Both inquire after the character of what we take to be obvious and what we experience as compelling; both inquire against the background of our shared experience of necessity in everyday life and our inability in philosophy to achieve a shared sense of how deep such necessities go. In philosophy the fact that “this is what I do” appears to be a brute convention, floating free of any justificatory ground. Bringing our life back into imagination helps us to recover our sense of the extent to which we are and are not bound by such “conventions.” The passage in *The Claim of Reason* that Putnam invokes in the quote given above addresses itself to this issue:

The conventions we appeal to may be said to be “fixed,” “adopted,” “accepted,” etc., by us; but this does not now mean that what we have fixed or adopted are (merely) the (conventional) names of things. The conventions . . . are fixed not by customs or some particular concord or agreement which might, without disrupting the texture of our lives, be changed where convenience suggests a change . . . They are, rather, fixed by the nature of human life itself, the human fix itself, by those “very general facts of nature” which are “unnoticed only because so obvious,” and, I take it, in particular, very general facts of human nature . . . Here the array of “conventions” are not patterns of life which differentiate human beings from one another, but those exigencies of conduct and feeling which all humans share.

Cavell says here that the “conventions” to which Wittgenstein wishes to draw our attention are not of a sort that differentiate human beings from one another. It follows that the concept of a “form of life” should not be understood just in broadly ethnographic terms as the set of rules or customs which distinguish one cultural group from another. Yet this is how the vast majority of commentators have tended to read Wittgenstein. Furthermore, certain passages appear to support their claim that Wittgenstein’s idea of a form of life is meant to comprehend an ethnographic dimension. In a recent essay Cavell suggests that it is possible to distinguish two different directions in which Wittgenstein inflects his notion of a form of life, calling these “the ethnological or horizontal sense” of form of life and “the biological or vertical sense.” The former inflection encourages the idea that
the sense of “agreement” at work in Wittgenstein’s appeals to our
“agreement in a form of life” is a conventionalized, or contractual,
sense of agreement. The latter inflection of the idea of a form of life,
however, contests this. Cavell writes:

The idea [of a form of life] is, I believe, typically taken to emphasize
the social nature of human language and conduct, as if Wittgen-
stein’s mission is to rebuke philosophy for concentrating too much
on isolated individuals ... an idea of Wittgenstein’s mission as
essentially a business of what he calls practices or conventions.
Surely this idea of the idea is not wrong, and nothing is more important.
But the typical emphasis on the social eclipses the twin preoccupa-
cation of the *Investigations*, call this the natural, in the form of “nat-
ural reactions” (no. 185), or in that of “fictitious natural history”
(p. 230), or that of “the common behavior of mankind” (no. 206).
The partial eclipse of the natural makes the teaching of the *Investi-
gations* much too, let me say, conventionalist, as if when Wittgen-
stein says that human beings “agree in the language they use” he
imagines that we have between us some kind of contract or an
implicitly or explicitly agreed upon set of rules (which someone else
may imagine we lack).¹⁴⁸

The stratum of conventionality that is at issue in this vertical inflec-
tion of the idea of a form of life is one—for us, as we stand now—that
is pitched deeper than the level of the social. These are
“conventions” from which, at present, we are not able to imagine
freeing ourselves. But to picture the matter thus, imagining ourselves
as shackled to contingencies, is to picture our form of life as a set of
constraints that bind us and against which we chafe. Although this is
not Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein, it is something like its mirror-
image. Instead of viewing us as victimized by brute conventions,
Kripke’s Wittgenstein pictures us as enforcers of them, “licensed” to
victimize one another. Not only do we bring our necessities into exis-
tence through our agreements, but these are conceived of as agree-
ments from which we can, in principle, withdraw. Wittgenstein paus-
es at one point to ask himself whether this view (which is in essence
the one Kripke attributes to him) is, indeed, one he wishes to encou-
grage: “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true
and what is false?—It is what human beings say that is true and false;
and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in
opinions but in form of life.”¹⁴⁹

Kripke interprets Wittgenstein’s use of agreement here on the par-
adigm of a contract from which, at any moment, we could, in prin-
ciple, indecorously withdraw. (Kripke’s view differs from a more tra-
ditional contractarian view in that agreement will not break down
through a withdrawal of consent but through a change in the incli-
nations to which we are subject. Agreement of the relevant sort arises
on Kripke’s view because we happen to be inclined in the same ways.)
To say that human agreement decides what is true and what is false
is to say that these are things on which we agree and to which we
agree. Kripke here imposes on Wittgenstein’s text a certain picture of
what (the relevant form of) agreement comes to. Wittgenstein contests
such a picture in the passage quoted above by saying that human
beings agree in a form of life. (The English words “agreement in” in
this passage translate Wittgenstein’s German word *Uebereinstim-
men*.) Cavell comments: “The idea of agreement here is not that of
coming to or arriving at an agreement on a given occasion, but of
being in agreement throughout, being in harmony, like pitches or
tones, or clocks, or weighing scales, or columns of figures. That a
group of human beings *stimmen* in their language *ueberein* says, so
to speak, that they are mutually voiced with respect to it, mutually
attuned top to bottom.”¹⁵⁰ Such agreement does not rest on mere
agreements or mere conventions. Talk of “mere conventions” imme-
diately suggests the sorts of agreement which might, “without dis-
rupting the texture of our lives,” simply be changed (or broken off)
“where convenience suggests a change.” The agreement of which
Wittgenstein speaks, Cavell suggests, is not only not one that can be
abrogated at will, it is one concerning which we can form no coherent
conception of what it would mean to abrogate it. To withdraw from
the relevant form of “agreement” here would entail shedding one’s
capacity to harmonize with others, becoming completely dissonant
with one’s fellow beings. The attempt to imagine one’s distancing one-
selves from one’s form of life is, on this view, not a task that one is
obviously equal to. It is tantamount to envisioning one’s withdrawal
from the human race and entering into a condition in which one is
stripped of the natural reactions and propensities that we share with
others and which permit us to lead a shared life.

To bring our form of life into imagination thus involves imagina-
tively exploring the limits of what is conceivable to us. In running up
against these limits, we expose to view the ground of what Cavell calls
our “mutual attunement” with others, and what Wittgenstein calls
our “agreement in judgment.” The fact of such attunement rests on
the brute fact of our ability to see what another person sees, feel what
he or she feels, follow her lead, catch on to the direction in which he wishes to point. Our capacity to catch on in these ways is a necessary precondition of our being able to participate in civilization. Wittgenstein writes: "If a child does not respond to the suggestive gesture, it is separated from the others and treated as a lunatic." Yet an exploration of the ground of our capacities for agreement with others will also yield moments of inexplicable dissonance with others, when we become opaque to one another. Hence, Putnam argues, any exploration of our mutual attunement in judgment must always be conducted in the voice of the first-person singular. Yet it will continue to be a voice that speaks in the name of our judgments, of us, and of what we are capable of sharing—where the "we" represents whoever is able to recognize himself or herself in the descriptions proffered. (It is a voice that claims to articulate what is obvious and yet invisible to us; hence it can seem to speak from a position of unforgivable arrogance.) Each time Wittgenstein reports that his spade is turned, he invites us to consider whether the same is true for us. In reporting that he has reached bedrock—arrived at a moment of obviousness—his own aim is not to bully us with the assertion of a dogma, but rather to issue an invitation to us to gauge the range of our mutual agreement in judgments. Putnam writes: "Recognizing that there are certain places where one’s spade is turned; recognizing, with Wittgenstein, that there are places where our explanations run out, isn’t saying that any particular place is permanently fated to be one of these places, or that any particular belief is forever immune from criticism. This is where my spade is turned now. This is where my justifications and explanations stop now."

There is a widespread tendency to read such moments in Wittgenstein as if they amounted to a declaration that justification simply amounted to an appeal to a brute fact of communal agreement (at least for the time being). In declaring that his spade is turned, however, Wittgenstein is not announcing the absence of justifications so much as a perplexity concerning what could count as a further justification here. His spade does not uncover a gaping void, it hits solid rock—it is turned back. He is standing on firm ground. He has reached a point at which it is no longer obviously possible to continue to dig any deeper. If pressed at such a point, nevertheless, to give a justification for what he does, Wittgenstein writes: "Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’"

Cavell finds that Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein can be understood as shifting the position of the idea of inclination here—as if there were no significant difference between Wittgenstein’s own formulation and something like the following: “Then I am licensed to say: ‘This is simply what I am inclined to do.’” Once Kripke has armed himself with such a formulation of Wittgenstein’s remark, he then goes on to interpret inclination as the fundamental court of appeal for Wittgenstein. On this reading, Wittgenstein is seen to be endorsing the idea that all justification amounts to an appeal to the presence of a community-wide inclination. On such a view, establishing norms of correctness simply amounts to determining whether any (potential) member of a community shares the same inclinations to respond in certain ways that the rest of the community has. The nature of his inclinations is the ground upon which it is decided whether he should be ruled in or ruled out of the community. Such a conception of what validates our community’s norms, Putnam argues, cannot allow adequate room for the possibility of genuine progress. Any modification of the norms of the community would amount to nothing more than a mere change in the direction of our collective inclinations; there would no longer be any meaningful sense, however, in which the change could be thought of as an improvement. In a number of the essays collected here, Putnam follows Cavell in challenging the adequacy of Kripke’s view of Wittgenstein’s (or, as Putnam prefers to call him, Kripkenstein’s) account of the character of human agreement (as well as in contesting the attribution on Kripke’s part of any such account to Wittgenstein). Against such a view, Putnam writes: “From within our picture of the world . . . we say that ‘better’ isn’t the same as ‘we think it’s better.’ And if my ‘cultural peers’ don’t agree with me, sometimes I still say ‘better’ (or ‘worse’). There are times when, as Stanley Cavell puts it, I ‘rest upon myself as my foundation.’”

The passage from The Claim of Reason that Putnam is alluding to here turns out to be the one that immediately precedes the passage that climaxes with the conclusion that philosophy can be thought of as “the education of grownups.” It begins by reflecting on the significance of the fact that Wittgenstein’s parables in Philosophical Investigations are pervasively concerned to depict scenes of instruction; it ends by reflecting on those moments in such scenes of instruction when one’s spade is turned:

Wittgenstein’s stories using mathematical imagery . . . read, from a step away, as though their characters are children. It is appropriate, in writing so fundamentally about instruction, and in which a cen-
tral character is the child, that we have dramatized for us the fact that we begin our lives as children. Those tribes of big children can put us in mind of how little in each of us gets educated.

When my reasons come to an end and I am thrown back upon myself, upon my nature as it has so far shown itself, I can, supposing I cannot shift the ground of discussion, either put the pupil out of my sight—as though his intellectual reactions are disgusting to me—or I can use the occasion to go over the ground I had hitherto thought forgone. If the topic is that of continuing a series, it may be learning enough to find that I just do; to rest upon myself as my own foundation. 155

The difference between ourselves and half-grown children is one of degree, not of kind. The asymmetry of our positions in the scene of instruction breaks down at a certain point. The philosophical hunger for justification is tied to a fantasy that this asymmetry could be prolonged indefinitely, that some equivalent of our parents will never cease to occupy a position of authority for us. There is a part of each of us that is horrified at the thought that we might play some role in determining what is right and wrong: we want to be instructed by authorities. Yet even at those moments when the child's source of authority finally runs out of things to say, when we come to a juncture at which we have to say to the child, “this is what we do,” that, too, can provide instruction. By marking the limit at which his question begins to lose its sense, we help to teach the child the sense of those questions that can be asked about us and about what we do in the world and why we do it. Thus the child learns who we are and what a world is. We thus bear a terrifying responsibility for the shape of the world the child comes into. We initiate him into a (the, our) world; but there comes a point at which we exhaust our authority. Cavell continues: “But if the child, little or big, asks me: Why do we eat animals? or Why are some people poor and others rich? or What is God? or Why do I have to go to school? or Do you love black people as much as white people? or Who owns the land? or Why is there anything at all? or How did God get here? I may find my answers thin, I may feel run out of reasons without being willing to say ‘This is what I do’ (what I say, what I sense, what I know), and honor that.” 156

In the face of such questions, I am a child—a child in a world without grown-ups to educate me. In such a world, each of us is confronted with the task of occupying both the position of teacher and that of pupil. There comes a point at which we bear the responsibility for initiating ourselves into our world. In the face of the questions pressed by the child in us—a child that still requires education—and in the absence of a community of our elders, we are left wondering whether our questions even make sense. Still too much of a child to accede to a posture of authority with respect to our childlike questions, too much of an adult to simply ignore them, each of us struggles with the twin perils of becoming either a precocious child or a dismissive adult—either a dogmatist or a nihilist. In the face of this challenge, Cavell proposes that philosophy be understood as the task of living with these questions, that it stand as the name of our willingness to acknowledge the confused child in each of us. Our reveilion toward philosophy is a mark of our shame in the face of the incompleteness of our education. Our attraction to philosophy is a mark of our sensitivity to our own needs. We need to learn to overcome our shame at the childishness of the questions we are moved to ask; yet we also need to resist overindulging the child in ourselves, humoring his every whim. The difficulty in educating the child in oneself is in some ways the difficulty that all parents experience: to attend to him without spoiling him. Faced with the task of rearing ourselves, unsure of what authority we can lay claim to, what ground we may occupy, “in this light,” Cavell writes, “philosophy becomes the education of grown-ups. It is as though it must seek perspective upon a natural fact which is all but inevitably misinterpreted—that at an early point in a life the normal body reaches its full strength and height. Why do we take it that because we then must put away childish things, we must put away the prospect of growth and the memory of childhood?” 157

This is the definition of philosophy—the education of grown-ups—that Hilary Putnam says he favors most. If the presence of a confused and inquisitive child within each of us is a constitutive feature of our being human, then this definition has the virtue of securing a permanent role for philosophy in our lives. Even those who believe that the human being can, in principle, outgrow the child within himself should be willing to concede that there is no discernible limit to the extent of either his present confusion or his present propensity to inquire. Insofar as an acknowledgment of this fact excites in us an appetite for education, and insofar as such an acknowledgment is a precondition of a reflective life, surely Putnam is right to conclude that philosophical discussion “is not going to disappear as long as reflective people remain in the world.”

In light of his endorsement of this definition of philosophy, what stands out most in the essays collected here is Putnam’s insistence that
his education not be allowed to come to an end, that it marks a betrayal of the philosophical calling to decide the question once and for all concerning what can or should belong to philosophy's curric-
ulum—what it is that we grown-ups require in the way of education. I am thinking here not only of Putnam's unwillingness to allow his possibilities for philosophizing to be funneled by the constraints of his own original philosophical education (the resources of which he no longer finds equal to the tasks at hand) but of two further features of his practice that are in evidence in this volume as well. The first is his faithfulness to his original motivations to the subject— to what excited him about, to what attracted him to, and to what he hoped for from philosophy—at a point in the history of our culture when so many of philosophy's official practitioners have come to accept the idea that compromising their original sense of excitement and hope is simply an inevitable part of the cost of the professionalization of their subject. The second is Putnam's commitment to Kant's thought that the philosopher, in the ideal, should approximate the archetype of the teacher—someone who is able to minister to the youthful soul in each of us, who is able to preserve (in a fashion that does not deceive us) our fragile sense that both hope and excitement are not completely inappropriate responses to our condition. Although many of the essays in this volume are concerned with matters of detail regarding some specific controversy, some particular topic in contemporary philosophy, in each case the guiding concern is how the terms of the controversy in question have come to deform our overarching conception of human flourishing. To this extent, the conception of philosophy that informs these essays can be said to be, in many respects, a remarkably classical (though no longer an orthodox) one—one, that is, that harks back at least to Plato and Aristotle—which sees philosophy's fundamental task to lie in the quest for the good life.
Notes

Introduction

1. This is the first of two volumes of Putnam's philosophical papers to be published by Harvard University Press. The present volume contains recent essays in the areas of metaphysics, value theory, and American philosophy; the forthcoming volume will collect Putnam's recent work in the areas of history of philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind and language.

2. "Before Kant it is perhaps impossible to find any philosopher who did not have a correspondence theory of truth . . . It is impossible to find a philosopher before Kant who was not a metaphysical realist, at least about what he took to be basic or reducible assertions." Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 56–57.

3. "Kant offered a radically new way of giving content to the notion of equality, a way that builds liberty into equality . . . That the truths of religion—which for Kant are the most important truths—should be by their very nature problematic is a good thing, not a bad one . . . What Kant is saying, to put it positively, is that we have to think for ourselves . . . and that fact is itself the most valuable fact about our lives. That is the characteristic with respect to which we are all equals. We are all in the same predicament, and we all have the potential of thinking for ourselves with respect to the question of How to Live . . . Freedom of thought is essential, because the fundamental characteristic with respect to which we are equal, our so to speak 'respect of equality,' is precisely our need for, our capacity for, free moral thinking." Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987).


5. It will emerge in the course of this introduction that there are good reasons to be more cautious than I am allowing myself to be here about referring to Putnam's internal realism as a "metaphysical position."

6. Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, p. 60. Chapter 2 of the present volume offers important clarifications of certain aspects of Putnam's "internal realism."

Putnam criticizes Williams's notion of the absolute conception in Chapter 11 of the present volume on the grounds that it presupposes an incoherent theory of truth as correspondence to a preexistent unconceptualized reality.

8. This phrase actually stems from David Wiggins. Putnam appropriates it approvingly in Chapter 15 of the present volume and then clarifies the ontological character of his appropriation of Wiggins's phrase in Chapter 16: "Whereas Bernard Williams and David Wiggins claim that truth in morality is one thing (true 'humanly speaking') and something else ('absolute truth') in science, pragmatism urges that truth humanly speaking is all we've got."

9. I am here partly paraphrasing and partly quoting phrases from the concluding paragraph of Chapter 11 of this volume. Putnam, in turn, is partly paraphrasing and partly quoting remarks from John Dewey's Logic.

10. From the penultimate paragraph of Chapter 10 of this volume.

11. Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p. 44.
12. Ibid.; see the passage quoted in note 3.
13. Ibid., p. 48.
15. Putnam also challenges certain prevalent assumptions concerning the place of rules in the scheme of Kant's moral philosophy: "The central purpose of Kant's ethical writing, in fact, is not to issue detailed rules at all, but to give us a normative picture of the activity of arriving at such rules." (Chapter 13.)

16. In particular, Putnam argues that Kant does not view the categorical imperative and the principle that we should seek to bring about the greatest possible happiness as simply incompatible moral principles: "In Kant's picture there are two principles which guide us in arriving at moral rules: the formal (categorical) imperative, which directs us to act so that the maxim of our action might be one to which others could be imagined as consenting, and the principle of the highest good, identified first with my own private virtue and happiness and eventually with the happiness of all mankind in a world governed by just institutions." (Chapter 13.)

17. Ibid. Putnam goes on to clarify this point by explaining Kant's concern to be that the principle of the highest good remain always subordinate to the categorical imperative: "The formal imperative always takes precedence, for Kant, over the material imperative (to seek the highest good). Our duty is not to pursue a utopian vision by manipulative, dishonest, or cruel means, but to pursue an idealistic vision by moral means."

18. Although Putnam does qualify this claim with the concession that "Aristotle's picture is strong precisely where Kant's picture is weak." Specifically: "Where Kant's picture is defective, the problem lies with Kant's dualistic picture of happiness ... the dualism of a transcendental and empirical self results in a portmanteau conception of happiness, happiness as moral 'gratification' plus satisfaction of the 'inclinations.'" (Ibid.)

19. The remark of Kant's that Putnam particularly builds on here is to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason, A141/B180–181, where Kant remarks that the "schematism of our understanding in its application to appearance" is "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze."

21. The inability of any form of physicalism or materialism to account for intentionality plays an important supporting role in the arguments of a number of the essays in this volume. See, in particular, Chapter 5 of this volume.

23. Ibid., p. 39.
24. Ibid.
25. Perhaps most noteworthy in this regard is Chapter 11.

28. I am indebted to Georg Picht's essay "Philosophie oder vom Wesen und rechten Gebrauch der Vernunft" for drawing my attention to these passages in the First Critique. Although my reading of these passages has been influenced by Picht's essay, it also departs from his interpretation in a number of respects. The essay appears in Hier und Jetzt, Band I (Stuttgart: Verlagsgemeinschaft Ernst Klett, 1980); see especially pp. 11–12.

29. Quine's work is discussed in Chapters 20 and 21 of this volume. This feature of his work comes under fire in Chapter 20.

30. Consider, for example, the following remarks from Quine's essay "Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People?" in his Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 193: "What I have been discussing under the head of philosophy is what I call scientific philosophy ... By this vague heading I do not exclude philosophical studies of moral and aesthetic values. Some such studies, of an analytical cast, can be scientific in spirit. They are apt, however, to offer little in the way of inspiration or consolation. The student who majors in philosophy primarily for spiritual comfort is misguided and is probably not a very good student anyway, since intellectual curiosity is not what moves him."

32. Critique of Pure Reason, A840a/B867a. I prefer the Mueller translation here. Kemp Smith renders the passage as follows: "By 'cosmical concept' [Weltebegriff] is here meant the concept which relates to that in which everyone necessarily has an interest."
33. This is again the Mueller translation. Kemp Smith puts it: "to be found in that reason with which every human being is endowed."

34. Ibid., Avii. First sentence of the Critique of Pure Reason.
35. Ibid., A295/B352.
36. As, for example, in the penultimate paragraph of Chapter 10, in which Putnam adduces the metaphysical realist's notion of “a concept-independent, perspective-independent reality” as an instance of “transcendental illusion.”


38. Ibid., A297/B333.

39. Ibid., A838/B866. “Es gibt aber noch einen Weltbegriff [conceptus cos- nicus], der dieser Benennung jeher zugehört hat.”

40. Ibid., A839/B867.


42. “An Interview with Hilary Putnam,” Cogito, 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 85, 90.

43. Putnam has recently evinced interest in Kierkegaard on a number of oc- casions, as, for example, in the following pertinent remark: “I admire Kierkegaard for his insistence on the priority of the question, ‘How shall I live?’” (ibid., p. 90). See also his remarks on Kierkegaard in “Bringing Philosophy Back to Life,” in U.S. News and World Report, April 25, 1988, p. 56. For a brief comparison of Kierkegaard and James, see Putnam’s remarks in Chapter 16.

44. The latter half of this formula is explicitly articulated at one point in Putnam’s writing: “If science is a philosophy, it suffers from being all metaphysics and no ethics; and metaphysics without ethics is blind” (Meaning and the Moral Sciences, p. 92). Putnam elsewhere explicitly invokes Kant in this connection: “I admire Kant, not just for his undoubted genius, but for his breadth of vision—his concern with religious and social as well as theoretical, epistemological and metaphysical questions, and his ability to integrate all of those concerns.” “An Interview with Professor Hilary Putnam,” Cogito, 3 (Summer 1989).

45. Wolfgang Stegmüller finds himself admiring in Putnam precisely what Putnam says here that he admires in Kant. In the middle of a chapter devoted to an ex- position of Putnam’s work, Stegmüller writes: “In the Final Analysis he [Putnam] is perhaps the only philosopher of the present time who still has something like a complete perspicuous overview” (Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Band II [Kroener Verlag, 1987], p. 345; my translation).

46. See, for example, Lecture III of The Many Faces of Realism.

47. See Chapter 7 of the present volume.

48. See Chapter 15 of the present volume.

49. See, for example, “Dreaming and ‘Depth-Grammar,’” in Mind, Lan- guage, and Reality. The paper is an attack on a claim put forward in a book by Norman Malcolm, a famous student of Wittgenstein’s, to the effect that waking testimony provides the sole criterion of dreaming, along with the further claim that if some further physiological criterion of when someone is dreaming were to be discovered, it would involve the creation of an entirely new concept, hence entail a change in the meaning of the word “dreaming.” Putnam argues that Malcolm’s picture of language (as governed by criteria that stipulate strict rules for verifying the correct application of concepts) presupposes an artificially sharp separation of our semantical ability (our ability to speak intelligibly) from our overall reasoning ability (in particular, our ability to draw inductive inferences). Although Putnam makes it clear at the outset of the paper that his interest in Malcolm’s views is in part tied to their supposed connection with certain “famous arguments of Wittgenstein,” it remains an open question for him whether Malcolm’s interpretation is “faithful to what Wittgenstein had in mind”: “His arguments are . . . of interest in that they can be read as simple versions of some famous arguments of Wittgenstein’s as he is interpreted by Malcolm. If this inter- pretation of Malcolm’s is faithful to what Wittgenstein had in mind, then these famous arguments are bad arguments and prove nothing. But this relation to Wittgenstein’s philosophy may, in the present year, be a further reason for finding Malcolm’s book interesting to discuss” (p. 304).

50. “Analyticity and Aporia: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine,” in Realism and Reason. In this paper Putnam criticizes the interpretations of Wittgenstein put forward by Michael Dummett and Barry Straw in their grounds that both the resulting views entail what Putnam takes as a problematic conclusion, namely, that mathematical truth and necessity simply “arise in us” as an artifact of our human forms of life. It is worth pointing out that, at this point in his career, Putnam takes considerably more care at the outset of his essay to distin- guish between Wittgenstein himself and the views of Wittgensteinians: “Just what Wittgenstein’s contention is, in connection with philosophers’ opinions, theories, and arguments on the topic of mathematical necessity, has been a subject of con- siderable controversy. Clearly he thinks the whole discussion is nonsensical and confused, and whether he offers any explanation at all of why we think there is such a thing as mathematical necessity and of what the difference is between mathematical and empirical statements, is a subject on which there seems to be a great deal of disagreement among his interpreters.

“I shall not attempt to do any textual exegesis here. I know what the (several) views of Wittgenstein are, even if I do not know for sure which, if any, was Wittgenstein’s; and what I shall try to show is that not even the most sophisti- cated of these ‘Wittgensteinian’ views is tenable” (p. 115).


52. Ibid., p. 90. Putnam goes on to qualify this remark by adding: “With the possible exception of [William] James” (pp. 90–91).

53. “I find myself entirely mystified by people who think that ‘ordinary lan- guage philosophy’ is a position . . . Wittgenstein did not employ arguments, in the traditional philosophical sense, at all” (Mind, Language, and Reality, p. 134).

54. Realism and Reason, p. 183.


56. “An Interview with Stanley Cavell,” in The Senses of Stanley Cavell, ed. Richard Feldman and Michael Payne (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1989), pp. 47–48. It is worth noting that this feature of Cavell’s reading of Witt- genstein—namely, that on his view philosophy is not something that could coher- ently be thought of as coming to an end at some point in cultural time—is one that Putnam himself has had occasion to insist upon in seeking to distinguish Cavell’s reading from that of certain other “Wittgensteinians”. “Cavell’s thought can . . . sound closer to that of some Wittgensteinians than it is. While there is a sense in which Cavell is a ‘Wittgensteinian’—The Claim of Reason offers a pow- erful and sympathetic interpretation of some of the central ideas of Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations, and references to Wittgenstein appear early and late in Cavell's writing—the 'end of philosophy' interpretation of Wittgenstein is foreign to Cavell's thought (and to Wittgenstein's as well, if Cavell reads him correctly). On an 'end of philosophy' reading of Wittgenstein, wanting to transcend our own human position is a kind of philosophical neurosis, and the only task that remains for philosophy is to 'cure' us. Once cured, we shall be able to live in the ordinary, untroubled by skeptical/metaphysical impulses, however disguised. But this is not Cavell's view at all"("An Introduction to Cavell," in Pursuits of Reason: Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavell, ed. F. Cohen, P. Guyer, and H. Putnam [Lubbock, Tex.: Texas Tech. University Press, 1990]).

57. The idea that the activity of philosophizing, as it is exemplified in Wittgenstein's work, is not one that ever comes to an end is something that Wittgenstein insists upon on a number of occasions. See, for example, Zettel, no. 447.

58. The later Wittgenstein's most celebrated work is titled Philosophical Investigations and is famous for offering a trenchant criticism of his own early work.

59. Representation and Reality, p. xii.


62. Hence Wittgenstein has his interlocutor ask: "Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important?" (Philosophical Investigations, no. 118).


64. Representation and Reality, p. xii. It is worth remarking that there is a point of considerable divergence between Putnam and Wittgenstein here as well, insofar as Putnam speaks of the philosopher's task lying in making the full mystery of the problems of philosophy manifest, while Wittgenstein says his ultimate aim is to make the problems (each time they arise) completely disappear.

65. Daniel Dennett's hilarious publication, The Philosophical Lexicon, offers the following definition: "Ininary, n. (from hilarity term) A brief but significant period in the intellectual career of a distinguished philosopher. 'Oh, that's what I thought three or four hilaries ago.'" (The Philosophical Lexicon, American Philosophical Association, 1987, p. 11).

66. Richard Rorty has also compared Putnam with Russell: "Putnam is, among contemporary analytic philosophers, the one who most resembles Russell: not just in intellectual curiosity and willingness to change his mind, but in the breadth of his interests and in the extent of his social and moral concerns" (a quote from the dust jacket of Realism and Reason). The following remark of Putnam's about A. J. Ayer, from Chapter 3 of this volume, suggests that Putnam might have some reservations concerning Rorty's and Passmore's comparison: "Sir Alfred Jules Ayer has been somewhat of a paradox—always against the fashion, always rebellious, yet, also . . . old-fashioned in his philosophical demeanor. Although his views have changed considerably since he wrote Language, Truth, and Logic, he continues to philosophize in the style and spirit of Bertrand Russell. If that style and spirit no longer speak to the concerns of practicing philosophers, that is, I suspect, a fact of cultural importance and not just an event for professional philosophers to note." The opposition quietly implied here between "practicing philosophers," on the one hand, and "professional philosophers," on the other, comes close to offering what amounts to an only slightly more tactful version of Thoreau's observation about professional philosophers in Walden: "There are nowadays professors of philosophy but not philosophers. Yet it is admirable to profess because it was once admirable to live."


68. Ibid., p. 92.

69. Ibid., p. 97.


71. Pages from the Critique of Pure Reason such as the following highlight the feature of Kant's conception of the "functional dialectic of human reason" echoed in the work of the later Wittgenstein and (a fortiori) the latest Putnam: "The first step in matters of pure reason, marking its infancy, is dogmatic. The second step is sceptical; and indicates that experience has rendered our judgment wiser and more circumspect. But a third step, such as can be taken by a fully matured judgment . . . is now necessary, namely to subject to examination, not the facts of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers . . . This is not the censorship but the criticism of reason, whereby not its present bounds but its determinate limits, not its ignorance on this or that point but its ignorance in regard to all questions of a certain kind, are demonstrated . . . Skepticism is thus a resting-place for human reason, where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings and make survey of the region in which it finds itself . . . But it is no dwelling-place for permanent settlement" (A761/B789). The analogy between Wittgenstein and Kant (and Putnam) here depends upon a rejection of Saul Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's work as proposing a "skeptic solution" (see his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language). Two essays that explicitly contest Kripke's reading, both of which influenced Putnam's understanding of Wittgenstein, are worth consulting in this connection: Cora Diamond's "Realism and the Realistic Spirit" in The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), and Stanley Cavell's "The Argument of the Ordinary: Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and Kripke" (chap. 2 of Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990]).


73. I find myself in these remarks either borrowing on or paraphrasing sentences about Wittgenstein which grew out of a conversation I had with Putnam and which occur in my introduction to "An Interview with Stanley Cavell," in The Senses of Stanley Cavell (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1989), pp. 27–28.
74. Philosophical Investigations, no. 133. I have emended the translation.

75. I am here paraphrasing a remark from a passage of Stanley Cavell's which is one that Putnam either echoes or alludes to at a number of junctures in the essays collected here. It runs as follows: "We question what we cannot fail to know in order not to seek what it would be painful to find out. This, of course, does not suggest that skepticism is trivial; on the contrary, it shows how profound a position of the mind it is. Nothing is more human than the wish to deny one's humanity, or to assert it at the expense of others. But if that is what skepticism entails, it cannot be combatted through simple 'refutations'" (Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 109).

76. See, for example, Rorty's "Pragmatism and Philosophy," the introduction to his Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).


78. From Chapter 1, Part Two, Putnam's remark here about "when we are allowed to use words like 'know,' 'objective,' 'fact,' and 'reason'" echoes Wittgenstein's remark that "if the words 'language,' 'experience,' 'world' have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words 'table,' 'lump,' 'door'" (Philosophical Investigations, no. 97). It is also worth contrasting the attitude toward our ordinary linguistic practice embodied in what Putnam calls Rorty's "philosophical revisionism" with the attitude expressed in the following passage from Wittgenstein: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.

79. "For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is" (Philosophical Investigations, no. 124).


81. Wittgenstein's remark can be found in Lecture XXV of Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. Cora Diamond. Putnam invokes this remark in Part Two of Chapter 1. The context of the remark runs as follows: "If we then translate the words 'It is true . . . ' by 'A reality corresponds to . . . '—then to say a reality corresponds to them would say only that we affirm some mathematical propositions and deny others . . . If this is all that is meant by saying that a reality corresponds to mathematical propositions, it would come to saying nothing at all, a mere truism; if we leave out the question of how it corresponds, or in what sense it corresponds.

We have here a thing which constantly happens. The words in our language have all sorts of uses; some very ordinary uses which come into one's mind immediately, and then again they have uses which are more and more remote . . . So you forget where the expression 'a reality corresponds to' is really at home—what is 'reality'? We think of 'reality' as something we can point to. It is this, that" (pp. 239–240).

Wittgenstein summarizes the aim of this discussion of "reality" in the following aphorism from the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics: "Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, that is the hardest thing" (revised edition, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988, p. 325). Cora Diamond (in her essay cited in note 61) makes this remark the centerpiece of her interpretation of the later Wittgenstein. Partially because of the influence of Diamond's essay, an appeal to the sense of "realism" at play in this remark—in which realism can be understood as a posture Wittgenstein aspires to achieve—plays a crucial role in Putnam's claim that his own "realism with a small 'r'" inherits an aspiration (to achieve a certain perspective on the ordinary) which he finds in Wittgenstein's later writings.


83. I am drawing here on remarks from the second paragraph of Chapter 8 of this volume.


85. Chapter 1 of this volume, Part Two, first paragraph.

86. Chapter 7, penultimate paragraph.

87. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 176, 177.

88. Ibid., p. 177.

89. Philosophical Investigations, no. 309.

90. Ibid., no. 115.

91. Wittgenstein offers the following image for how in philosophy one can be held captive by oneself: "A human being is imprisoned in a room, if the door is unlocked but opens inwards, he, however, never gets the idea of pulling instead of pushing against it" (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, original edition, p. 125).

92. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 181.

93. Contrast the preceding quotation from p. 181 of Rorty (about Nietzsche and Wittgenstein) with the following remark from Cavell: "Only masters of a game, perfect slaves to that project, are in a position to establish conventions which better serve its essence. That is why deep revolutionary changes can result from attempts to conserve a project, to take it back to its idea, keep it in touch with its history . . . It is in the name of the idea of philosophy, and against a vision that it has become false to itself, or that it has stopped thinking, that such figures as . . . Nietzsche . . . and Wittgenstein seek to revolutionize philosophy" (The Claim of Reason, p. 121).


95. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. xxxi. Rorty amplifies the terms of his charge as follows: "Cavell switches with insouciance from the narrow and professional identification of 'philosophy' with epistemology to a large sense in which one cannot escape philosophy by criticizing it. . . ." He takes for granted that the 'philosophical problems' with which we infect the freshman by assigning Descartes and Berkeley are something the freshman really needs—not just so that he can understand history, but so that he can be in touch with himself, with his own humanity" (p. 181).

96. Philosophical Investigations. no. 255.
97. *Philosophical Investigations*, no. 133: “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.”


100. The penultimate paragraph of Chapter 1 offers an example of the temptation to latch onto a counterassertion: “In this situation it is a temptation to say, ‘So we make the world,’ or ‘our language makes up the world,’ or ‘our culture makes up the world’, but this is just another form of the same mistake. If we succumb, once again we view the world—the only world we know—as a product. One kind of philosopher views it as a product from a raw material: Unconceptualized Reality. The other views it as a creation ex nihilo.”


102. Ibid., p. 109.


104. I say “can seem to be a purely negative one” because, of course, the experience of attaining such elucidatory insight—loosening the grip of a picture that held one captive—can be a liberating one. An initial sense of deprivation often gives way to a sense of having attained new resources of self-understanding and a sense of newly won freedom outside the conditions that had formerly been imposed through one’s attachment to a fantasy. It is an experience not of loss, but of conversion: a shifting of one’s senses of significance and reality.

105. From the dust jacket for Stanley Cavell’s *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*.


108. Ibid., p. xvi.


110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., p. 179. This topic is linked for Putnam with questions surrounding the relationship between philosophy and literature. This is also another connection in which he sees Cavell’s work as helping to point the way: “For Cavell it is a matter of course that philosophy needs arguments (that is why it is impossible to assimilate his work to ‘Continental philosophy’ in the current French mode); but it is also a matter of course that argument without cultural vision is empty (which is why it is impossible to assimilate him to present-day ‘analytic philosophy’). If a philosopher aims at getting across a vision of what our culture might be, what we might be, then he cannot express his thought in neat formulas (any philosophy that can be put in a nutshell belongs there). For Cavell, the fact that literature and argument have come to be seen as opposed is itself a cultural tragedy. The practice of seeing literature and argument as opposed is tragically mistaken, and not just because ‘literature’ (as usually conceived) and ‘argument’ (as usually conceived) can be mutually supportive; it is that seeing them as opposed (or as at best irrelevant to one another) leads us to have distorted conceptions of both argument and literature” (“An Introduction to Stanley Cavell”).

113. From Chapter 7 of this volume.


115. Chapter 1, Part Two, second paragraph.

116. Ibid., sixth paragraph.

117. Ibid., sixth paragraph.


120. Ibid., p. 237.


122. Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?*, p. 46.

123. Cavell writes that, when pressed to justify a claim at which it has arrived, “a critical position will finally rest upon calling a claim obvious” (ibid., p. 311). The integrity of such a procedure is rendered particularly suspect when a claim to obviousness is interpreted as a claim to certainty, as Cavell suggests has often happened in the history of modern epistemology: the “effect has been to distrust conviction rather than to investigate the concept of the obvious” (p. 312). Putnam’s recent work explicitly declares that it seeks to restore our capacities for conviction from the corrosive effect of this history.

124. Ibid., p. 312. Hence also Wittgenstein’s remark: “Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us” (*Philosophical Investigations*, no. 126).

125. From Chapter 11 of this volume.

126. Ibid.

127. See the third paragraph of “Taking Rules Seriously,” Chapter 13 of this volume. In “An Interview with Hilary Putnam,” Putnam remarks: “Part of Wittgenstein’s appeal to me is that he is a writer as much as a philosopher” (p. 91).


129. From Chapter 8 of this volume.

130. From Chapter 16 of this volume.


132. Ibid.

133. In Chapter 16.


136. From Chapter 1, Part Two.

137. Especially Chapters 11 and 12.

138. From Chapter 11 of this volume. The reference is to a passage in which Cavell describes C. L. Stevenson as suffering from “an amnesia of the very concept of justice” (*The Claim of Reason*, p. 283).


142. Putnam, *The Many Faces of Realism*, p. 91. It is therefore significant for
Putnam that Cavell's reflection on what is involved in the activity of imagining a form of life insists relentlessly upon a use of the first-person singular: "In philosophizing, I have to bring my own language and life into imagination. What I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may imagine them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the lines in which it meets in me."

144. Chapter 1, Part Two, note 19.
148. Ibid., p. 41.
154. From Chapter 1, Part Two.
156. Ibid., p. 125.
157. Ibid. Cavell continues: "The anxiety in teaching, in serious communication, is that I myself require education. And for grownups this is not natural growth, but change."
158. I would like to thank Steven Affeldt, Bill Bristow, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, Mary Ellen Geer, and Lindsay Waters for their comments on earlier drafts of this introduction.

1. Realism with a Human Face

1. This is denied, however, by the so-called Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is discussed later in this chapter.


3. In what follows, I am deliberately identifying states with their descriptions to simplify the exposition.

4. The defense to the objection described in the texts is von Neumann's. Bohr himself would have said that the transition $A \rightarrow A^*$ is a purely formal one, which has no meaning apart from a particular experimental situation. If the experimental situation is that a measurement is made at time $t$ to find out if the atom decayed or not, then the appropriate classical picture is that the atom was already in state $A$ or in state $B$ (that is, it had already emitted radiation or it had not) and the measurement finds out which, but this is only a "classical picture," albeit the one appropriate to that experimental situation. The question "But what state is the atom in at time $t$ if no measurement is made?" is scientifically meaningless, in Bohr's view.

6. More precisely, the Dirac equation, or whatever successor that equation may have when quantum mechanics and relativity theory are finally reconciled.
7. Strictly speaking, the states $A$ and $B$ would have to be replaced by appropriate states of the entire cosmological universe in this argument, on the Many-Worlds Interpretation.
9. Actually, another problem remains with the Many-Worlds Interpretation: namely, the difficulty of interpreting the notion of probability if all possible worlds are equally "real."
10. This has been proposed by Itamar Pitowsky. See his communication in *Physical Review Letters*, 48 (1982): 1299.
11. Strictly speaking, this sentence is paradoxical only on the supposition that (1) every Cretan other than the speaker tells at least one lie—otherwise the sentence is straightforwardly false; and (2) the speaker himself always utters the truth, with the possible exception of this one occasion—otherwise, if the first supposition holds, the sentence is straightforwardly true. It is to avoid these empirical suppositions that the paradox needs to be reformulated as it is above.
14. For example, if I am sincerely convinced that I had eggs for breakfast, it makes sense to ask if I am right, but no sense to ask if I have a "justification."
15. Readers of *Reason, Truth, and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) will recognize that each of these principles played a role in the argument of that book.