

Moral Psychology

Schedule

1. 31 March OVERVIEW

Aim for the historical part: recover a non-moralized view of the mind, one whose psychological categories do not correspond with moral ones.

2. 7 April REASON & PASSION IN HOBBS

(1) The role of definitions in reasoning and science. (2) Passions as an example of science: how each passion is a consequence of adding terms together. (3) Look at the laws of nature to anticipate the next session.

Leviathan, chapters 1-9, 14-15, 46, especially chapters 5, 7-9, 46.

3. 14 April REASON & MORALITY IN HOBBS

A law of nature is defined as a “precept or general rule, found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life ...”. What does that mean? Two interpretations. (1) Darwall’s “instrumentalist” interpretation: it means that the theory of the laws of nature consists in showing that the laws of nature are rules given by reason for meeting one’s aim of staying alive. (2) Deigh’s “definitionist” interpretation: it means that the theory of the laws of nature consists in discovering whether the laws of nature are all consequences of the definition.

(1) Stephen Darwall, *The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’: 1640-1740* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 1-13, 53-79. (2) John Deigh, “Reason and Ethics in Hobbes’s *Leviathan*” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 34, no. 1 (1996): 33-60.

4. 21 April REASON & PASSION IN HUME

(1) Look at the direct and the indirect passions for the relationship between belief and passion. (2) Critically examine the arguments about the relationship between reason and passion in 2.3.3 and 3.1.1.

A Treatise of Human Nature Book 2, Part 1, Sections 1-5 (indirect passions); 2.3.9.1-9 (direct passions); 2.3.3, 3.1.1 (reason and the will).

5. 28 April REASON & ACTION IN HUME
Was Hume a “skeptic” about “practical reason” or not? Pay special attention to how each author uses the words in quotation marks.
(1) Jean Hampton, “Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason?” *Hume Studies* 21, no. 1 (1995): 57-74. (2) Elijah Millgram, “Was Hume a Humean?” *Hume Studies* 21 (1995): 75-93. (3) Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, “Kantian Tunes on a Humean Instrument: Why Hume Is Not Really a Skeptic About Practical Reasoning.” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 27, no. 2 (1997): 247-70.
6. 5 May MOTIVATIONAL COGNITIVISM
(1) Thomas Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism*, chapters 1-3, 5-6. (2) R. Jay Wallace “How to Argue About Practical Reason” *Mind* 99, no. 395 (1990): 355-85.
7. 12 May COGNITIVISM, VIRTUE AND KNOWLEDGE
John McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Harvard University Press, 1998): 50-73. This is the essay “Virtue and Reason,” originally published in *The Monist* 62 (1979): 331-50.
8. 19 May PSYCHOLOGISM ABOUT REASONS FOR ACTION
(1) Jonathan Dancy, *Practical Reality* (Oxford University Press, 2000), chapters 4-6. (2) R. Jay Wallace “Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 67, no. 2 (2003): 429-35.
9. 26 May THEORETICAL ANALOGUES
Hannah Ginsborg, “Reasons for Belief” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (forthcoming).
- 10.2 June PRESENTATIONS
11. 11 June PRESENTATIONS

Course Information

All readings will be available through the Regenstein Library's reserve system.

Any edition of Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Hume's *Treatise* will do. The best are the Hackett edition of *Leviathan*, edited by Curley and the Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the *Treatise*, edited by David and Mary Norton.

The Nagel and Dancy books will be available through the Seminary Coop; they should be available in a few weeks.

Announcements and comments on lectures will be posted on the web at this address:

<http://humanities.uchicago.edu/faculty/mgreen/MoralPsychologySo5/>

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A 15-20 page paper is required for credit. You will be asked to make a 5-10 minute presentation about your paper in the last two weeks. Papers are due Friday, 17 June.