

# NATHAN BAUER

COLLEGIATE ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AND HARPER-SCHMIDT FELLOW,  
HUMANITIES COLLEGIATE DIVISION, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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5845 South Ellis Ave.  
Gates-Blake 330  
Chicago, IL 60637

phone: (773) 702-1713  
email: nathanbauer@uchicago.edu

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## EDUCATION

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*Ph.D., Philosophy*: University of Chicago (2008)  
*B.A., Philosophy*: McGill University (1999)

## AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

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Kant, Analytical Kantianism

## AREAS OF COMPETENCE

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Early Modern Philosophy, History of Analytic Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy

## AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

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*H.B. Earhart Fellowship*: Earhart Foundation, 2005-06 and 2006-07

*Ames Dissertation Fellowship*: Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, 2004-05

*Manley Thompson Memorial Prize*: Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, 2002  
Awarded by the Department of Philosophy for the best third-year graduate essay

*Century Fellowship*: University of Chicago, 1999 to 2004

The University of Chicago's most prestigious fellowship for entering graduate students in philosophy, granting five years of funding along with opportunities for stand-alone teaching

## DISSERTATION

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*Kant's Transcendental Deductions of the Categories*

Committee:

James Conant (director), Michael Kremer, Robert Pippin, Sebastian Rödl (Basel)

Brief Abstract:

I examine the account Kant provides, in the Transcendental Deduction, of our relation to the world as thinkers. Kant is often read as presenting an indirect model of this relation, with our thought acting upon content given independently through the senses. I argue that this model is flawed, both as a reading of Kant and as a philosophical account in its own right. By way of a close examination of the first and second edition versions of the Deduction—and consideration of Kant's reasons for rewriting this central argument—I show that Kant actually rejects this indirect model, correctly seeing it as leading inevitably to skepticism. Instead he defends a direct model of our cognitive relation to the sensible world, one in which objects are given to us through a sensible faculty that is already conceptually-shaped. Properly understood, Kant's account in the Deduction is very relevant to contemporary topics in epistemology and can be invoked in addressing skepticism regarding perception and the intentionality of thought.

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**PUBLICATIONS AND WORK IN PROGRESS**


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- “Kant’s Subjective Deduction” (forthcoming, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*)  
 “Kant’s Conceptualism: The Developmental Approach” (under review, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*)  
 “Again into the Breach: Kant’s Rewriting of the Deduction” (in progress)  
 “Subjective and Objective Aspects of Duty in Kant’s *Groundwork*” (in progress)

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**PRESENTATIONS**


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- “Kant’s Conceptualism,” Contemporary Philosophy Workshop  
 University of Chicago (February 21, 2006)  
 “A New Reading of Kant’s Subjective Deduction,” Eastern Study Group, North American Kant Society  
 University of Pennsylvania (April 23, 2005)  
 “Kant’s Subjective Deduction,” Contemporary Philosophy Workshop  
 University of Chicago (February 22, 2005)  
 “Kuhn and the Dogmas of Empiricism,” Contemporary Philosophy Workshop  
 University of Chicago (November 21, 2002)

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**TEACHING EXPERIENCE**


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Instructor (responsible for course design and execution):

- Philosophical Perspectives on the Humanities*: Fall 2009 (University of Chicago)  
*American Philosophy*: Spring 2009 (Rowan University)  
*Early Modern Philosophy*: Winter 2009 (Temple University)  
*Philosophical Perspectives on the Humanities*: Spring 2004 (University of Chicago)  
*Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*: Winter 2004 (University of Chicago)

Course Assistant (responsible for leading weekly discussion sessions and grading papers):

- Analytic Philosophy*: Michael Kremer, Spring 2003 (University of Chicago)  
*History of Philosophy II* (Early Modern): Daniel Garber, Winter 2002 (University of Chicago)  
*History of Philosophy I* (Ancient): Rachel Barney, Autumn 2002 (University of Chicago)

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**REFERENCES**


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*Dr. James Conant*

Chester D. Tripp Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago  
 (jconant@uchicago.edu, <http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/conant.html>)

*Dr. Robert Pippin*

Raymond W. and Martha Hilpert Gruner Distinguished Service Professor, Committee on Social Thought and Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago  
 (r-pippin@uchicago.edu, <http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/pippin.html>)

*Dr. Michael Kremer*

Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago  
 (kremer@uchicago.edu, <http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/kremer.html>)

*Prof. Dr. Sebastian Rödl*

Professor am Philosophischen Seminar, Universität Basel  
 (Sebastian.Roedl@unibas.ch, [http://pages.unibas.ch/philosophie/mitarbeiter\\_0506/roedl.html](http://pages.unibas.ch/philosophie/mitarbeiter_0506/roedl.html))