Winter 2015 Courses


Listed below are the courses the Department plans to offer in the Winter 2015 quarter. This course list may change.

The Registrar's office has up to date scheduling information for all University of Chicago graduate and undergraduate courses.

Note: College students may only enroll in courses whose first number is 2 without prior permission from the instructor. A College student who has secured prior permission to sign up for a course from the instructor may, in that case and only in that case, enroll in a course whose first number is larger than 2.

Graduate students may only enroll in courses whose first number is 3 or higher.

Note: Letters A and B refer to undergraduate field designations; Roman numerals I-V refer to graduate field designations.

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If you click on the image or link below, you will find an enlargeable image of a chart which perspicuously represents the weekly meeting times of our Winter 2015 Courses. Once the chart has opened in a new window, you can enlarge the image to whatever size you like in order to make it easier to read.

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Winter Courses at-a-glance - PDF

Open to Undergraduatess

PHIL 21600. Introduction to Political Philosophy. (=GNDR 21601, PLSC 22600)  In this class we will investigate what it is for a society to be just. In what sense are the members of a just society equal? What freedoms does a just society protect? Must a just society be a democracy? What economic arrangements are compatible with justice? In the second portion of the class we will consider one pressing injustice in our society in light of our previous philosophical conclusions. Possible candidates include, but are not limited to, racial inequality, economic inequality, and gender hierarchy. Here our goal will be to combine our philosophical theories with empirical evidence in order to identify, diagnose, and effectively respond to actual injustice. (A) B. Laurence.

PHIL 23006. Metaphysics of Society - An Introduction to Levinas's Totality and Infinity. This course is devoted to one of the most important philosophical books of the continental tradition, Levinas's Totality and Infinity. We will propose a systematic reading of Levinas's masterpiece in order to show the main aspects of Levinas's philosophical elaboration. The first aspect of our course will be to insist on the way Levinas takes position in the field of German and French phenomenology, in what consists exactly his technical and systematic critique of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre's conceptualities. We will, for that reason, propose to make Totality and Infinity in resonance with the most important sections of Husserl's Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and a Philosophical Phenomenology, Heidegger's Being and Time and Sartre's Being and Nothingness. This preliminary step will give us the conceptual means required in order to understand the exact philosophical position of Levinas towards the concept of society - that Levinas inherits directly from the French Sociological tradition (Durkheim in particular). Once such a background clarified it will become possible to understand Levinas's own elaboration towards the notion of society and for what reason the social experience coincides for him with a metaphysical experience - in other words in what sense Levinas can claim that the social relationship articulates what Descartes called the Idea of the Infinite. Such a second step will lead us to a last step which constitutes the ultimate demonstrative goal of our course: we will indeed try to show the necessity to overcome with Levinas the universalization of the notion of phenomenon coming from Husserl and Heidegger, to propose, in other words, a deflationist understanding of the notion of phenomenon. Such a deflationist understanding does not imply nevertheless the abandonment of the notion of phenomenon. On the contrary the metaphysics of society that we will propose, will lead us to think society as the fundamental presupposition from which the notion of phenomena coming from the Phenomenological tradition can find its logical meaning. What will be at stake is nothing else than the possibility of thinking anew the notion of Metaphysics in order to overcome the so-called "end of Metaphysics" proclaimed by Heidegger and Derrida. R. Moati.

PHIL 23020. Agency and Self-Knowledge. PQ: Two philosophy courses. (Philosophical Perspectives does not count.) I am, as a rule, able to say what I am thinking, intending, feeling, or doing without seeming to base what I say on observations of my own behavior. Both Ludwig Wittgenstein and (his student) Elizabeth Anscombe were deeply interested in this sort of non-observational self-awareness. In this course, we’ll be comparing and contrasting what Wittgenstein has to say about psychological self-ascription in his late writings with what Anscombe says about our knowledge of our own actions in Intention. (B) D. Finkelstein.

PHIL 24003. Language and Gender Identity. (=GNDR 28302) You and I might identify as all sorts of things: as an American, a woman, a teacher, a student, a hip hop enthusiast, a vegetarian, a knitter, a computer nerd, a chef, a caucasian, a runner, a news junkie, a bleeding heart liberal, a member of the tea party, a football fan, and so on. Call everything on that list a practical identity. Some practical identities are optional—we can choose or whether or not to adopt them—while others, such as gender, are such that the law requires us to adopt them. But in each of these cases, there is a question as to whether the relevant practical identity has a prescriptive or a descriptive flavor. When I tell you I’m a vegetarian, am I describing the way I am, or laying down a plan for how I’d like to be? Are vegetarians a special kind of person all of whom share a special, deep, common core, or are they just the set of people who happen to follow the convention of not eating meat? Does the way we talk about vegetarianism affect what it means to be a vegetarian—what vegetarians are or could be? This quarter, we will approach these questions through the specific case of gender identity. You might think it’s straightforward to say what it means to be a man: you’re a man just in case you have a Y chromosome, and a woman just in case you have two X chromosomes. But what about an intersex baby who is arbitrarily assigned a gender at birth? Or someone with Klinefelter syndrome, who according to the above definition would be both a man and a woman? What about someone who was born biologically female, underwent sex reassignment surgery as an adult, and now identifies as a man? What about someone who prefers not to adopt any gender identity? There is often a temptation to dismiss these examples as aberrant borderline cases. But the past few decades have seen an explosion of new gender categories, many of which may very well take center stage in our culture sooner than we think. If we decide to write them off, we need to tell some story about how our gender concepts license us to do so. If not, then we are faced with the interesting challenge of explaining what gender now is, in light of these developments. M. Teichman.

PHIL 26000. History of Philosophy II: Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. (=HIPS 26000) PQ: Completion of the general education requirement in humanities required; PHIL 25000 recommended. A survey of the thought of some of the most important figures of this period, including Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. B. Callard.

PHIL 22820. Philosophy and Public Education. This course will critically survey the various ways in which philosophy curricula are developed and used in different educational contexts and for different age groups.  Considerable attention will be devoted to the growing movement in the U.S. for public educational programs in precollegiate philosophy. R. Schultz.

29200/29300-01. Junior/Senior Tutorial. Topic: Bodily Self-Knowledge. Though few philosophers today are moved to defend anything like the mind-body dualism championed by Descartes in the Meditations, it remains an open question how instead we should characterize the relation in which we stand to our bodies. Though, in a sense, there is nothing to us over and above our
bodies, still, we'd like to say, there is more to us than can be understood in terms of our bodies' physical and physiological properties. We are feeling, thinking, self-conscious beings, and, much of the time, this can seem to have little to do with our being bodily beings. There are, of course, significant moments where our mental and bodily lives meet—in, for example, perception and intentional action.
It is through our bodies that we are made aware of the surrounding world and can intervene in it. But there is more than one way to think about what goes on when we perceive or act. One could conceive of it as being a way in which we make use of our bodies. This would make our bodies analogous to tools by which we gain knowledge and achieve our ends. But one could also think of perceiving and acting as moments where we, as feeling, thinking beings, are our bodies, where our mental and bodily lives are one and the same. Should we, then, think of ourselves as having bodies or as being bodies?

In this course, we will approach this question through consideration of the notion of selfknowledge. Each of us stands in a special relation to our mental states and goings-on—to our beliefs, intentions, pains, etc.—in that we can usually just say what it is we're thinking or feeling. We needn't observe or make inferences from our behaviour as others must to know these things about us. Our knowledge of such states and goings-on, one could say, is thus knowledge we have as subject, as the one who is thinking, intending, or feeling. It is knowledge that we have of ourselves from the firstperson standpoint. Now, something which at least seems similar can be said for some of our bodily states. We can, for instance, usually just say where and how our limbs positioned, e.g. left arm raised above the head, bent at the elbow. We needn't look at ourselves to know this. Is this a form of selfknowledge related to the knowledge we have of our beliefs and our pains? Or is it a special form of perceptual knowledge—knowledge, that is, that happens to be of our bodies but could in principle be of bodies other than our own? To think through these issues, we will first consider a number of different approaches to self-knowledge more broadly. Then, we will consider the various positions recent authors have taken in connection with the body, especially as it figures in perception and action. Reflection on these issues should help us see whether and to what extent we should identify with our bodies. Meets with Jr/Sr section. Pre-requisite: Open only to intensive-track majors. No more than two tutorials may be used to meet program requirements. K. Howe.

29200/29300-02. Junior/Senior Tutorial. Topic: Hegel on Agency. Meets with Jr/Sr section. Pre-requisite: Open only to intensive-track majors. No more than two tutorials may be used to meet program requirements. Hegel holds that human agency is both an individual and a social phenomenon: that the relation between subject and world that we call an action is possible only if it is also, in some sense, a relation between subjects. In this course, we will try to understand this difficult but intriguing (and highly influential) claim by reconstructing Hegel’s central arguments for it in his Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right. The first part of the course will be devoted to a close reading of the Reason chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. We will try to reconstruct the answer Hegel provides there to the question: what is it for some worldly happenings to count as my action? Since Hegel thinks seeing the answer to this question involves coming to see what it is for an agent to be unified both with herself and with other agents, during the second part of the course we will try to reconstruct Hegel’s view of intra- and intersubjective unity. This will involve understanding Hegel’s (in)famous distinction between morality and ethical life, for which our central texts will be drawn from the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right. The class will conclude by considering the relevance of the Hegelian position we have reconstructed for contemporary ethics. B. Pierce.

29200/29300-0. Junior/Senior Tutorial. Topic: Form and Matter in Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Meets with Jr/Sr section. Pre-requisite: Open only to intensive-track majors. No more than two tutorials may be used to meet program requirements. Kant famously claims that the moral worth of an action lies in its being motivated by the thought of duty instead of happiness or self-interest. In contrast to other ethical positions, his view is grounded on the thought that the most important feature of an action is not how the agent or anyone else stands to benefit from it, but the reason or principle that serves as the basis for its being chosen. With the articulation of the centerpiece of his view, the categorical imperative, Kant declares further that such principles are to be evaluated on the basis of their rational "form" and not their sensible “matter." The purpose of this course will be to better understand the meaning of and relationship between these concepts—form and matter—as they are used in the major works of Kant's Practical Philosophy, with a view to bringing out the very core of his position.
Cultivating this understanding will involve touching upon a series of interrelated topics, including 1), Kant's understanding of the human subject as rational but sensibly dependent, and so as a subject whose practical thinking necessarily involves both form and matter; 2) the supreme principle of pure practical reason, more famously known as the Categorical Imperative, which is expressive of the form of practical reason; 3) the Highest Good, what Kant calls "happiness in proportion to virtue", which is expressive of the matter or object of practical reason; and 4) the nature of the unity of form and matter, the understanding of which requires that we examine how our rational and sensible capacities interact and condition one another in the practical context.
This course will presuppose no prior knowledge of Kant’s philosophical system. It should be of use to both sympathizers and critics of Kant, as the main issues to be addressed relate directly to the standard objections brought against his view.
Readings will be drawn from across Kant's major practical works. The majority of our time will be spent discussing the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), but texts such as the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793) will also be consulted. J. Tizzard.

29700. Reading Course. Consent of Instructor & Director of Undergraduate Studies; Students are required to submit the college reading & research course form. Staff.

29901-01, 02. Senior Seminar I. PQ: Consent of director of undergraduate studies. Note(s): Required of fourth-year students who are writing a senior essay.  Students writing senior essays register once for PHIL 29901, in either the Autumn or Winter Quarter, and once for PHIL 29902, in either the Winter or Spring Quarter. (Students may not register for both PHIL 29901 and 29902 in the same quarter.) The senior seminar meets all three quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout. K. Davey, Staff.

29902-01, 02. Senior Seminar II. PQ: Consent of director of undergraduate studies. Note(s): Required of fourth-year students who are writing a senior essay.  Students writing senior essays register once for PHIL 29901, in either the Autumn or Winter Quarter, and once for PHIL 29902, in either the Winter or Spring Quarter. (Students may not register for both PHIL 29901 and 29902 in the same quarter.) The senior seminar meets all three quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout. K. Davey, Staff.

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Open to Graduates and Undergraduates

PHIL 20117/30117. Tractarian Themes in the History of Philosophy. (=SCTH 30103). The course will take up a number of themes that are central to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as they arise in the history of philosophical thought about logic— themes that arise out of questions such as the following: What is the status of the basic law(s) of logic?; Is it possible to draw a limit to logical thought?, What is the status of the reflecting subject of logical inquiry?; What is the relation between the logical and the psychological?; What, if anything ,is the relation between the following two inquiries into forms of unity: “What is the unity of the judgment (or the proposition)?" and “What is the unity of the
judging subject?”; What (if any) sort of distinction between form and matter is relevant to logic?; How should one understand the formality of logic?; How, and how deeply, does language matter to logic? Topics will include various aspects of Aristotle's logical theory and metaphysics, Descartes’s Doctrine of the Creation of Eternal Truth, Kant on Pure General and Transcendental Logic, Frege on the nature of a proper Begriffsschrift and what it takes to understand what that it is, and early Wittgenstein’s inheritance and treatment of all of the above. Secondary readings will be from Jan Lukasiewicz, John MacFarlane, Clinton Tolley, Sebastian Roedl, Matt Boyle, John McDowell, Elizabeth Anscombe, Cora Diamond, Peter Geach, Matthias Haase, Thomas Ricketts, and Peter Sullivan. (III or V) J. Conant, I. Kimhi.

PHIL 21625/31625. Human Dignity. This advanced undergraduate course will examine the notion of human dignity, with a special eye towards its role in contemporary human rights discourse. The course begins by tracing the historical development of the idea of human dignity both in philosophy and in law, and from there it moves on to examine contemporary usages. Questions to be examined include the following: What is the meaning of "human dignity"? Is it basic to morality? What is the relationship between human dignity and human rights? Does respect for human dignity require the abolition of capital punishment and/or the permission of assisted suicide, among other practices? Is it an inherently religious idea? What grounding might it have in secular ethics? A. Etinson.

PHIL 21701/31621. Human Rights and Human Diversity. (HMRT 26151/36151) It is no secret that human beings frequently disagree on matters both large and small. Our neighbors hold religious beliefs that we do not. They disagree with us on scientific matters, such as the reality of climate change. They have different life priorities. And they have moral intuitions that often differ strikingly from our own. At the level of whole communities, these differences seem to grow even starker. The highly visible ideological conflicts between the nations of Western Europe and North America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia on matters of religious freedom, freedom of expression, democracy, gender equality, gay rights, and the rights of children serve as a constant reminder of this. This is the reality in which defenders and practitioners of human rights have to operate. And it is therefore important to think about how these disagreements and differences should impact both our understanding and implementation of human rights, if at all. That is the aim of this course. A. Etinson.

PHIL 22000/32000. Introduction to Philosophy of Science. (=CHSS 33300, HIPS 22000, HIST 25109/35109) We will begin by trying to explicate the manner in which science is a rational response to observational facts. This will involve a discussion of inductivism, Popper’s deductivism, Lakatos and Kuhn.  After this, we will briefly survey some other important topics in the philosophy of science, including underdetermination, theories of evidence, Bayesianism, the problem of induction, explanation, and laws of nature. (B) (II) K. Davey.

PHIL 23408/33408. Introduction to Being and Time. (=FNDL 23408) The aim of this course will be to introduce to one of the most important and discussed work pertaining to the continental field of the Philosophy of the XXth Century: Heidegger's Being and Time. Our course will be structured by two main movements. On the one hand we will introduce to the main and fundamental concepts developed by Heidegger in his work through analytic sessions devoted to the most important sections of Sein und Zeit. On the other hand, we will follow the way Sein und Zeit was received and discussed in the field of French Contemporary Continental Philosophy - especially through Derrida's and Levinas's interpretations and discussions of Sein und Zeit. The double structure of our itinerary obeys to a philosophical necessity which will take the form of a leading question: is it possible to think beyond the primacy of the horizon of Being - drawn by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit - anything like an "Otherwise than Being"? And if so, we will have to elucidate why and in what sense such an alternative horizon of sense does not entails the abandonment of the Heideggerian Question of Being, but leads, on the contrary, to the full explanation of the background without which the Question of Being raised by Sein und Zeit becomes unintelligible. R. Moati.

PHIL 24208/34208. Cicero on Friendship and Aging. (=FNDL 24208, LAWS 52403, LATN 28614, LATN 38614, RETH 38614)  [This is a Latin course that presupposes five quarters of Latin or the equivalent preparation. Others interested in taking it may register for an Independent Study and have different requirements, more writing and no Latin, but they will take a final exam (different).]
Two of Cicero’s most enduring works are De Amicitia (On Friendship) and De Senectute (On Old Age).  We will read the entirety of both works in Latin and study their relationship to Cicero’s thought and life.  Other readings in translation will include related works of Cicero and quite a few of his letters to Atticus and other friends. 
The first hour of each course meeting will be devoted to translation, the rest to discussion, in order to give opportunities for auditors who are reading in translation.  The requirements include a midterm, a final exam, and a paper.  Anyone from anywhere in the university may register if you meet the prerequisite. M. Nussbaum. 

PHIL 24301/34301. Science and Aesthetics in the 18th-21st Centuries. (HIST 25506/35506, CHSS 35506) One can distinguish four ways in which science and aesthetics are related during the last two centuries. First, science has been the subject of artistic effort, in painting and photography and in poetry and novels (e.g., in Goethe’s poetry or in H. G. Wells’s Island of Doctor Moreau). Second, science has been used to explain aesthetic effects (e.g., Helmholtz’s work on the way painters achieve visual effects or musicians achieve tonal effects). Third, aesthetic means have been used to convey scientific conceptions (e.g., through illustrations in scientific volumes or through aesthetically affective and effective writing). Finally philosophers have stepped back to consider the relationship between scientific knowing and aesthetic comprehension (e.g., Kant and Bas van Fraassen). In this course, we will consider these four modes of relationship. The first part of the quarter will be devoted to Kant, reading carefully his third critique; then we will turn to Goethe and Helmholtz, both feeling the impact of Kant, and to Wells, a student of T. H. Huxley. We then consider more contemporary modes expressive of the relationship, especially the role of illustrations in science and the work of contemporary philosophers like Fraassen. (B) (I) (II) R. Richards.

PHIL 25115/35115. Topics in the Philosophy of Religion: The Challenge of Suffering from Job to Primo Levi. (=HIJD 35115, DVPR 35115, ITAL 25115/35115, RLST 25115, JWSC 26115). PQ: All students interested in enrolling in this course should send an application to by 12/01/2014. Applications should be no longer than one page and should include name, email address, year and major for undergraduates, department or committee for graduate students. Applicants should briefly describe their background and explain their interest in, and their reasons for applying to, this course.

This course will focus on authors from the Jewish tradition, although some attention will be given to Catholic and Protestant perspectives, as found, for example, in liberation theology and in certain forms of religious existentialism. We will look at the various ways in which contemporary philosophers of Judaism have dealt with suffering, evil and God, especially after the experience of the Shoah. We will examine the often repeated claim that Judaism has approached the philosophical and religious challenges of suffering more through an ethics of suffering than on the basis of a metaphysics of suffering. After an introductory discussion of Maimonides on the Book of Job, readings for the course may come from authors such as E. Lévinas, J.B. Soloveitchik, Y. Leibowitz, H. Jonas, A. Lichtenstein, D.W. Halivni, D. Shatz, and E. Berkovits. The course will culminate in a philosophical analysis of some of the most important writings of Primo Levi. A. Davidson.

PHIL 25706/35706. Phaedo. (=FNDL 25706) This class will be a close reading of Plato’s Phaedo, which is a dialogue about what it means to die, and what kinds of things escape death. In addition to interesting ourselves in the –dramatic and philosophical—structure of the dialogue as a whole, we will carefully examine each of Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul. We will also read some contemporary philosophical literature both on the Phaedo itself, and on the problem of the afterlife. (IV) A. Callard.

PHIL 29425/39425. Logic for Philosophy. PQ: Elementary Logic or equivalent. Key contemporary debates in the philosophical literature often rely on formal tools and techniques that go beyond the material taught in an introductory logic class.  A robust understanding of these debates---and, accordingly, the ability to meaningfully engage with a good deal of contemporary philosophy---requires a basic grasp of extensions of standard logic such as modal logic, multi-valued logic, and supervaluations, as well as an appreciation of the key philosophical virtues and vices of these extensions. The goal of this course is to provide students with the required logic literacy. While some basic metalogical results will come into view as the quarter proceeds, the course will primarily focus on the scope (and, perhaps, the limits) of logic as an important tool for philosophical theorizing. (B) M. Willer.

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PHIL 36706 (=MAPH 34320). Eros and Reason: Philosophical Perspectives. There is a long and venerable philosophical tradition which not only distinguishes considerations of love from considerations of reason, but which regards the two as fundamentally opposed.  On this traditional view, “love is blind” and to allow oneself to be led by considerations of love is to risk straying from the sunlit path of rational truth.  Yet there have also been prominent dissenters to this view of love, who have variously regarded a loving engagement with the world as a precondition for the successful operation of reason, or chosen to eschew reason in favor of eros, or argued that love is capable of a unique form of insight that outstrips our powers of ratiocination. Still others claim that the logic of eros is fundamentally continuous with our rationality. Adjudicating these debates involves reflecting on how we ought to conceive of our erotic investments – i.e. what we should take such relations to consist in – and asking what role they play in our mental life. Moreover, as these conceptions may be subject to historical shifts, we must ask whether and how such changes in our self-conception may affect the very constitution of the self we are attempting to describe.
With an eye on these metadiscursive questions, we will track this dialectic between love and reason as it works itself out both in historical texts and in more recent work.  Our historical readings will draw on Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus, Augustine’s Confessions, Descartes’s The Passions of the Soul, and Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature, among others. We will also draw on work by Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, Iris Murdoch (including her novel The Sea, the Sea), Jonathan Lear, and Martha Nussbaum. D. Smyth.

Open to Graduate Students

PHIL 43111. Mental Causation. How is the concept of causation to be applied in reflection on the activities of thought? In what way or ways should thoughts be understood as causally related to each other, and in what way or ways should they be understood as causally related to elements of the material world?  We pursue these questions through the close reading of a range of historical and contemporary writings, including works by Descartes, Mill, Ryle, Winch, Anscombe, Davidson, Dretske and Hornsby.  A guiding theme will be the conflict within the tradition between two broad approaches to these questions: one that attempts to derive the role of causation in thought from reflection on what thoughts themselves imply or otherwise commit their thinkers to, and another that seeks to impose causal patterns on thought’s activity drawn from models and considerations external to it. (III) J. Bridges.

49900. Reading & Research. Staff.

50100. First-year SeminarOpen to grad students. Prerequisites: Enrollment limited to first-year graduate students. This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters. J. Bridges.

PHIL 50602. Hegel’s Logic of the Concept. A discussion of the third and final part of Hegel’s Science of Logic. (V) R. Pippin.

PHIL 51830. Topics in Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy. The topic for Winter 2015 is “Freedom and Responsibility, Contemporary and Historical.”  We will begin by canvassing the major philosophical positions in the Anglophone literature on free will and moral responsibility over the past half-century, with readings drawn from some or all of P.F. Strawson, G. Strawson, R. Kane, H. Frankfurt, G. Watson, and others.  In the second half of the seminar we will step back to look at the treatment of these same issues by major figures in the history of philosophy, including M. Frede’s A Free Will:  Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, as well as primary texts by some or all of Hume, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Sartre.  The seminar is open to philosophy PhD students without permission; to J.D. students with instructor permission; and to others with instructor permission. M. Forster, B. Leiter.

PHIL 51200. Workshop: Law and Philosophy: Free Speech and Its Critics.(=LAWS 61512, RETH 51301, HMRT 51301, PLSC 51512, GNSE 50101) PQ: Students are admitted by permission of the two instructors.  They should submit a c.v. and a statement (reasons for interest in the course, relevant background in law and/or philosophy) to the instructors by e mail.  Usual participants include graduate students in philosophy, political science, and divinity, and law students. The Workshop will consider important philosophical defenses of free speech and critics of those rationales. Topics will include the idea of the "marketplace of ideas," autonomy interests in free speech, the harms of speech, and the problem of propaganda and other manipulative speech.  Note: This is a seminar/workshop many of whose participants are faculty from various related disciplines.  It admits approximately ten students.  Its aim is to study, each year, a topic that arises in both philosophy and the law and to ask how bringing the two fields together may yield mutual illumination. Most sessions are led by visiting speakers, from either outside institutions or our own faculty, who circulate their papers in advance.   The session consists of a brief introduction by the speaker, followed by initial questioning by the two faculty coordinators, followed by general discussion, in which students are given priority. Several sessions involve students only, and are led by the instructors. Students write a 20-25 page seminar paper at the end of the year.  The course satisfies the Law School Substantial Writing Requirement.   There are approximately four meetings in each of the three quarters.  Students must therefore enroll for all three quarters. Autumn, Winter, Spring. B. Leiter, M. Nussbaum, A. Green.

PHIL 51404. Global Inequality. (=PLSC 51404, RETH 51404, LAWS 92403). Non-law students are welcome but need permission of the instructors, since space is limited.  Global income and wealth are highly concentrated. The richest 2% of the population own about half of the global assets. Per capita income in the United States is around $47,000 and in Europe it is around $30,500, while in India it is $3,400 and in Congo, it is $329. There are equally unsettling inequalities in longevity, health, and education.
In this class, we ask what duties nations and individuals have to address these inequalities and what are the best strategies for doing so. What role must each country play in helping itself? What is the role of international agreements and agencies, of NGOs, and of corporations in addressing global poverty? How do we weigh policies that emphasize growth against policies that emphasize within-country equality, health, or education?
In seeking answers to these questions, the class will combine readings on the law and economics of global development with readings on the philosophy of global justice. A particular focus will be on the role that legal institutions, both domestic and international, play in discharging these duties. For, example, we might focus on how a nation with natural resources can design legal institutions to ensure they are exploited for the benefit of the citizens of the country. Students will be expected to write a paper, which may qualify for substantial writing credit. M. Nussbaum, D. Weisbach.

PHIL 54606. Seminar: Semantics. Topic: Subjectivity. (=LING 42100). Linguists and philosophers have traditionally examined the role of language and thought as a medium for (mis)representing objective facts about the world we are living in. However, language is also an important tool for sharing subjective perspectives with others, and clearly not all thoughts are objective. Taking subjectivity as a sui generis phenomenon that does not reduce to another instance of descriptive talk and thought has repercussions that go beyond the traditional distinction between linguistics and philosophy: it impacts both the way that linguists tend to think to about the nature of linguistic meaning and philosophical attempts to understand the nature of normative thoughts. This is the second in a two-course sequence that addresses the resulting challenges in a systematic manner, to be offered jointly by Professors Chris Kennedy and Malte Willer. The first course will be taught in Fall 2014 by Malte Willer and will focus on foundational philosophical issues surrounding subjectivity in language and thought, including issues pertaining to normativity and general considerations about the shape a theory of natural language meaning must have to take the phenomenon of subjectivity seriously. The second course will be taught in Winter 2015 by Chris Kennedy and will focus on linguistic issues surrounding subjectivity, including a rich variety of empirical questions and the impact that treating subjectivity as a sui generis phenomenon has for theoretical linguistics. 

Despite their slight differences in focus, both courses are interdisciplinary by design and will appeal to linguists and philosophers alike. Students may take either one of these courses for credit without taking the other for credit. The two-course seminar is also the launching event for a three-year interdisciplinary working group on the nature of subjectivity in language and thought, led by Chris Kennedy and Malte Willer and funded by the generous support of the Neubauer Collegium for Culture and Society. Anyone who is interested in participating in this working group is strongly encouraged to attend the seminar. With M. Willer. C. Kennedy.

PHIL 55502. Socratic Intellectualism. We will read selections from, and secondary literature on, some early Socratic dialogues in order to engage with a set of Socratic theses on desire, motivation, and value: (1) Everyone desires the good (or: what he believes to be good?) (Meno, Gorgias, Lysis) ; (2) Everyone does what he believes (or knows?) to be best (Protagoras, Apology) (3)  It is better to be wronged than to do wrong (Gorgias, Apology) (4) Only good men do wrong voluntarily (Hippias Minor)
(5) Courage/Moderation is Wisdom (Laches, Protagoras, Charmides). We will want to examine these views both for consistency; for their individual merits; and in order to see whether we can put them together into a distinctively Socratic ethical point of view. (IV) A. Callard.

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