Winter 2014 Courses

Anton Ford teaching a seminar.


Listed below are the courses the Department plans to offer in the Winter 2013 quarter. This course list may change.

The Registrar's office has up to date scheduling information for all University of Chicago graduate and undergraduate courses.

Note: College students may only enroll in courses whose first number is 2 without prior permission from the instructor. A College student who has secured prior permission to sign up for a course from the instructor may, in that case and only in that case, enroll in a course whose first number is larger than 2.

Graduate students may only enroll in courses whose first number is 3 or higher.

Note: Letters A and B refer to undergraduate field designations; Roman numerals I-V refer to graduate field designations.

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Forthcoming: If you click on the image or link below, you will find an enlargeable image of a chart which perspicuously represents the weekly meeting times of our Winter 2013 Courses. Once the chart has opened in a new window, you can enlarge the image to whatever size you like in order to make it easier to read.

Winter Courses at-a-glance - PDF

Open to Undergraduates

PHIL 20000. Introduction to Philosophy of Science. An introductory exploration of some of the central questions in the philosophy of science. These will include: what is (the definition of) a science--such that the natural, formal, and social sciences all count as sciences, but (for example) philosophy and literary criticism do not? How, in the natural sciences, do theory-building and observation relate to each other? Can some of the sciences be reduced to other sciences? (What is reduction of this kind supposed to involve?) What is evidence? What are the old and new problems of induction? What is a scientific (or indeed any other form of) explanation? What is a law of nature? Do the sciences make real progress? (B) B. Callard.

PHIL 21611. Topics in Medical Ethics: Examining the Moral Boundaries of Medicine. (=HIPS 25301). Constant changes in healthcare settings, coupled with rapid advancements in technology, lead to increasingly complicated ethical dilemmas: Who decides what - patients, doctors or family members - and on what basis? What is the telos of the medical profession and how does it bear on what doctors can and cannot provide their patients? Can doctors refuse to provide treatment for conscientious reasons? Are abortions, assisted suicides, organ sales and surrogacy morally permissible? In this course, we attempt to answer these (and other) pressing questions. We will commence the course by analyzing two key concepts which are utilized in medical ethics debates: autonomy and paternalism. We will examine the value of autonomy and its relation to the question of competence, the difference between autonomy and authenticity, and the vexed question of when and how paternalism is justified. We will then discuss questions surrounding the telos of the medical profession, the physician’s duties as derived from this telos, and the circumstances, if any, in which the physician can deviate from this telos. We will also examine circumstances in which physicians can refuse to provide treatment on conscientious grounds. We will then proceed to examine specific medical ethical dilemmas surrounding the beginning and end of life. We will discuss ethical questions pertaining to abortion and parents’ right to refuse medical care for their newborn children, while examining the moral standing of fetuses and newborns. We will also examine ethical questions surrounding the autonomy, wellbeing and interests of demented patients, while raising broader philosophical questions pertaining to the nature of personal identity. Finally, we will discuss the moral permissibility of euthanasia and the right to assisted suicide. We will conclude the course by analyzing some of the key characteristics of markets, as well as their moral limits, and utilize our analysis in order to understand the moral status of organ sales and surrogacy. N. Ben Moshe.

PHIL 21301. Moral Theory. Why be moral? Is there any principled distinction between matters of fact and matters of value?  What is the character of obligation?  What is a virtue?  In this course we will read, think, and write about twentieth century Anglo-North American philosophical attempts to give a systematic account of morality. (A) C. Vogler.

PHIL 23205. Introduction to Phenomenology. The aim of this course is to introduce students to one of the most important and influential traditions in the European Philosophy of the 20th Century: Phenomenology. The main task of this course will be to present Phenomenology’s main concepts and the meaning of Phenomenology’s transformations from Husserl to Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas and Henry.

The fundamental credo of Phenomenology consists in the emphasis laid upon phenomena given to consciousness. This emphasis coincides with the “return to things in themselves” as formulated by Husserl. What can this kind of return actually mean? And what does this claim suggest about philosophical practices prior to phenomenology, idealism or empiricism? In what way, for Husserl, was classical philosophy not able to give access to things such as they are truly given ? And what is the meaning of such idea of « givenness » ? Does Phenomenology fall into the so-called « myth of the Given » ?
No future phenomenologists after Husserl will question the fundamental idea of returning to things in themselves thanks to the phenomenological importance given to phenomena, but they will question the privilege of intentional consciousness postulated by Husserl - Heidegger will expand phenomenology to the ancient question of “Being” (thanks to the existential clarification of the Husserlian concept of Intentionality) and Levinas will question Husserl’s and Heidegger’s approaches of phenomenology - intentional and existential - as falling into the Western problem of Ontology and Totality against Otherness and Ethics. As we will see, even if Phenomenology coincides with the philosophical description of our "Openness to Exteriority", this openness - Intentional, Existential or Ethical - entails necessarily not the abandonment, but a radical redefinition of the concept of Subjective Immanence." R. Moati.

PHIL 26000. History of Philosophy II: Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. (=HIPS 26000) PQ: Completion of the general education requirement in humanities required; PHIL 25000 recommended. A survey of the thought of some of the most important figures of this period, including Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. A. Schechtman.

PHIL 26200. Intensive History of Philosophy, Part II: Aristotle. In this class, we will read selections from Aristotle's major works in metaphysics, logic, psychology and ethics. We will attempt to understand the import of his distinct contributions in all of these central areas of philosophy, and we will also work towards a synoptic view of his system as a whole.  There are three questions we will keep in mind and seek to answer as readers of his treatises: (1) What questions is this passage/chapter trying to answer?  (2) What is Aristotle's answer?  (3) What is his argument that his answer is the correct one?  Note: This course, together with introduction to Plato (25200) in the Autumn quarter, substitutes for and fulfills the Ancient Philosophy History requirement for the fall quarter: students can take these courses instead of taking PHIL 25000. Students must take them as a 2 quarter sequence in order to fulfill the requirement, but students who already have fulfilled or do not need to fulfill the Ancient Philosophy History requirement may take the one quarter of the course without the other. A. Callard.

27000. History of Philosophy III. German Idealism. PQ: Completion of the general education requirement in humanities. This course is an introduction to German Idealism, through readings of Kant’s first and second Critiques, Fichte’s Vocation of the Scholar and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. We will . We will focus especially on the concept of “recognition” and examine why for Kant and Fichte the social recognition - the recognition of the Other as a free agent - becomes intelligible thanks to practical reason. Once this background clarified, we will then discuss Hegel’s famous “Master-Slave Dialectic” and try to explain the meaning of the so-called “struggle for recognition” in the economy of the Phenomenology of Spirit. R. Moati.

29200/29300-01. Junior/Senior Tutorial. Topic: Ideological Critique: Marx, Nietzsche, and the Frankfurt School.  Meets with Jr/Sr section. Pre-requisite: Open only to intensive-track majors. No more than two tutorials may be used to meet program requirements. The term ideology is often used synonymously with ‘ethos’ or ‘world view.’ However, in philosophy it is generally used more narrowly as a pejorative term that identifies false or unwarranted beliefs, which serve the interests of some dominant group, and which are generally contrary to the interests of those who hold them. An ideological critique typically attempts to expose ideological beliefs and to explain how they can exist at all—why anybody would ever come to hold such beliefs and what could sustain their being held.

In this course, we will examine several of the most important ideological critiques: Marx's claim that religion, ethics, and legal systems are “ideological humbug” that arise from and sustain relations of production; Nietzsche's claim that contemporary morality is life-denying and that it originates in a trick played on the strong by the weak some 2000 years ago; and the Frankfurt School's claim that fascism, state capitalism, and mass culture are all forms of social domination enabled by a means-ends rationality that emerged out of the Enlightenment.

While each of these accounts is of independent interest, in this course they will also serve as case studies of the method of ideological critique more generally. In each instance we will be concerned with the following questions: What exactly is an ideological belief? Is there ever anything besides deliberate deception that could explain someone holding such a belief? Are there actually such things as real interests such that we could hold beliefs that are contrary to them? Can someone hold a single ideological belief, or are these beliefs the sort of things that only come in large packages? If we suspect that vast constellations of our beliefs might be ideological, is there any sure method of sorting out which ones are and which ones are not, or might our whole way of approaching these issues itself be hopelessly tangled in ideological thinking?  J. Edwards.

29200/29300-02. Junior/Senior Tutorial. Topic: Reason, Desire, and the Good. Meets with Jr/Sr section. Pre-requisite: Open only to intensive-track majors. No more than two tutorials may be used to meet program requirements. If I show no regard for the feelings of others, you might describe me as callous or cruel, but would it also make sense to describe me as irrational? Some philosophers have denied this, claiming that I only have reason to do whatever serves my existing motivations. If I have no desire to act morally, then I have no reason to do so either. Other philosophers have argued that a person who ignores moral considerations is guilty of a kind of rational defect; such a person is failing to see the importance of something that any fully rational agent would recognize. In this class, we will use this debate as an entry point into some of the most important and influential work in contemporary moral philosophy. We will look at Bernard Williams's attempt to pull morality and rationality apart, and the attempts of Aristotelians (Philippa Foot, John McDowell, Warren Quinn) and Kantians (Christine Korsgaard) to put them back together again. In the final section of the class, we will consider a very different perspective on the debate by taking up Iris Murdoch's claim that the failure to show due regard for others is not so much a failure of reason as a failure of love. M. Hopwood.

29700. Reading Course. Consent of Instructor & Director of Undergraduate Studies; Students are required to submit the college reading & research course form. Staff.

29901-01, 02. Senior Seminar I. PQ: Consent of director of undergraduate studies. Note(s): Required of fourth-year students who are writing a senior essay.  Students writing senior essays register once for PHIL 29901, in either the Autumn or Winter Quarter, and once for PHIL 29902, in either the Winter or Spring Quarter. (Students may not register for both PHIL 29901 and 29902 in the same quarter.) The senior seminar meets all three quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout. K. Davey, Staff.

29902-01, 02. Senior Seminar II. PQ: Consent of director of undergraduate studies. Note(s): Required of fourth-year students who are writing a senior essay.  Students writing senior essays register once for PHIL 29901, in either the Autumn or Winter Quarter, and once for PHIL 29902, in either the Winter or Spring Quarter. (Students may not register for both PHIL 29901 and 29902 in the same quarter.) The senior seminar meets all three quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout. K. Davey, Staff.

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Open to Graduates and Undergraduates

PHIL 20120/30120. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. (=FNDL 20120) PQ: At least one previous Philosophy course. A close reading of Philosophical Investigations. Topics include: meaning, justification, rule following, inference, sensation, intentionality, and the nature of philosophy. Supplementary readings will be drawn from Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics and other later writings. (B) (III) J. Bridges.

PHIL 20610/30610. Goethe: Literature, Science and Philosophy. (=HIST 25304/35304, GRMN 25304/35304, CHSS 31202, HIPS 26701) This lecture/discussion course examines Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s intellectual development, from the time he wrote Sorrows of Young Werther through the final stages of Faust. Along the way, we read a selection of Goethe’s plays, poetry, and travel literature. We also examine his scientific work, especially his theory of color and his morphological theories. On the philosophical side, we discuss Goethe’s coming to terms with Kant (especially the latter’s Third Critique) and his adoption of Schelling’s transcendental idealism. The theme uniting the exploration of the various works of Goethe is the unity of the artistic and scientific understanding of nature, especially as he exemplified that unity in “the eternal feminine.” German is not required, but helpful. R. Richards.

PHIL 21600. Introduction to Political Philosophy. (=GNDR 21601, PLSC 22600)  In this class we will investigate what it is for a society to be just. In what sense are the members of a just society equal? What freedoms does a just society protect? Must a just society be a democracy? What economic arrangements are compatible with justice? In the second portion of the class we will consider one pressing injustice in our society in light of our previous philosophical conclusions. Possible candidates include, but are not limited to, racial inequality, economic inequality, and gender hierarchy. Here our goal will be to combine our philosophical theories with empirical evidence in order to identify, diagnose, and effectively respond to actual injustice. (A) B. Laurence.

PHIL 23305/33305. History of Aesthetics. Readings from Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, and Collingwood among others. (A) (I) T. Cohen.

PHIL 23412/33412. Martin Heidegger’s "Being and Time". (=SCTH xxxxx) The course will be devoted to this book. We shall pay special attention to Heidegger’s understanding of the human being as being-in-the-world, which we shall place, historically and conceptually, in relation to ideas concerning the being of the human in German idealism and in classical Aristotelian philosophy. I. Kimhi.

PHIL 23416/33416. Theories of Judgments and Propositions. (=SCTH xxxxx) The course is an historical survey and conceptual introduction to fundamental philosophical questions concerning the nature of the logos (judgments, proposition) that have stood at center of philosophy since the contributions of Plato and Aristotle .   This survey will give us an opportunity to reflect on the idea of philosophical history and the nature its continuity.  We shall discuss theories of the logos in Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Medieval and Early modern philosophy, Kant and German idealism, Frege and Wittgenstein.  The course is intended for graduate students, no special background is required. I. Kimhi

PHIL 23903/33903. Painting, Phenomenality, Religion. (=DVPR 39104, SCTH xxxxx, ARTH 29104/39104) Painting raises philosophical questions, if only because one can wonder why some particular pieces of the overall visible may attract more visual attention than others, which appear nevertheless just besides the former.  In fact, this privilege comes mostly from the radical (although subtle) difference between common law phenomena (objects) and saturated phenomena.  Among them, the two main rival postulations are idol and icon.  Concerning the idol, one may ask what precisely is its function?  How far can it reach the thing itself even more than objective knowledge (the examples of Courbet and Cezanne will be privileged)?  Concerning the icon, one may open the road to theological questions:  how far can the invisible God be aimed at through visible images?  Is iconoclasm the only option?  What theological arguments could support the claim for icons (Nicene Council II)?  Can the concept of icon be extended to other issues than “the icon of the invisible God” (Colossians 1, 15)? Winter. J. Marion.

PHIL 25112/35112. Philosophy, Talmudic Culture, and Religious Experience: Soloveitchik. (= DVPR 35112, RLST 25112, HIJD 35112) Joseph Soloveitchik was one of the most important philosophers of religion of the twentieth-century.  Firmly rooted in the tradition of Biblical and Talmudic texts and culture, Soloveitchik elaborated a phenomenology of Jewish self-consciousness and religious experience that has significant implications for the philosophy of religion more generally.  This course will consist of a study of some of his major books and essays.  Topics to be covered may include the nature of Halakhic man and Soloveitchik’s philosophical anthropology, the problem of faith in the modern world, questions of suffering, finitude and human emotions, the nature of prayer, the idea of cleaving to God.  Soloveitchik will be studied both from within the Jewish tradition and in the context of the classical questions of the philosophy of religion.  Some previous familiarity with his thought is recommended. (I) A. Davidson.

PHIL 27500/37500. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. (-HIPS 25001, CHSS 37901, FNDL 27800). PQ: Consent of instructor required. This course will be devoted to an intensive study of selected portions of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The focus of the course will be on the Transcendental Analytic and especially the Transcendental Deduction.  We will begin, however, with a brief tour of some of the central claims of the Transcendental Aesthetic.  Some effort will be made to situate these portions of the first half of the Critique with respect to the later portions of the book, viz. the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method.  Although the focus of the course will be on Kant’s text, some consideration will be given to some of the available competing interpretations of the book. The primary commentators whose work will thus figure briefly in the course in this regard are Lucy Allais, Henry Allison, Stephen Engstrom, Johannes Haag, Robert Hanna, Martin Heidegger, Dieter Henrich, John McDowell, Charles Parsons, Sebastian Roedl, Wilfrid Sellars, Peter Strawson, and Manley Thompson. Our interest in these commentators in this course will always only be as a useful foil for understanding Kant’s text. No separate systematic study will be attempted of the work of any of these commentators.  Of particular interest to us will be topics like Kant’s criticisms of traditional empiricism, the distinction between sensibility and understanding, and his account of the relation between intuitions and concepts. The aim of the course is both to use certain central texts of recent Kant commentary and contemporary analytic Kantian philosophy to illuminate some of the central aspirations of Kant’s theoretical philosophy and to use certain central Kantian texts in which those aspirations were first pursued to illuminate some recent developments in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. (B) (V) J. Conant.

PHIL 29400/39600. Intermediate Logic. (=CHSS 33600, HIPS 20500) In this course, we will prove the soundness and completeness of deductive systems for both sentential and first-order logic. We will also establish related results in elementary model theory, such as the compactness theorem for first-order logic, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem and Lindstrom’s theorem. (B) (II) A. Vasudevan.

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Open to Graduate Students

PHIL 31111. Rawls. This course will study John Rawls’s two great works of political philosophy, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, trying to understand their argument as well as possible. We will also read other related writings of Rawls and some of the best critical literature.  Assessment will take the form of an eight-hour take-home final exam, except for those who gain permission to choose the paper option, who will write a 20-25 page paper. (I) M. Nussbaum.

49900. Reading & Research. Staff.

50100. First-year SeminarOpen to grad students. Prerequisites: Enrollment limited to first-year graduate students. This course meets in Autumn and Winter quarters. J. Bridges.

PHIL 50601. Hegel’s Science of Logic. (=SCTH 50601) PQ: Prior work in Kant's theoretical philosophy is a prerequisite. Hegel's chief theoretical work is called The Science of Logic. An abridged version is the first part of the various versions of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. We shall read and discuss representative passages from both versions, and attempt to understand Hegel's theory of concepts, judgment, and inference, and the place or role of such an account in his overall philosophical position. Several contemporary interpretations of these issues will also be considered. (V) R. Pippin.

PHIL 51200. Workshop: Law and Philosophy: Life and Death. (=LAWS 61512, RETH 51301, HMRT 51301, PLSC 51512, GNSE 50101) PQ: Students are admitted by permission of the two instructors.  They should submit a c.v. and a statement (reasons for interest in the course, relevant background in law and/or philosophy) to the instructors by e mail.  Usual participants include graduate students in philosophy, political science, and divinity, and law students.  This is a seminar/workshop many of whose participants are faculty from various related disciplines.  It admits approximately ten students.  Its aim is to study, each year, a topic that arises in both philosophy and the law and to ask how bringing the two fields together may yield mutual illumination. Most sessions are led by visiting speakers, from either outside institutions or our own faculty, who circulate their papers in advance.   The session consists of a brief introduction by the speaker, followed by initial questioning by the two faculty coordinators, followed by general discussion, in which students are given priority. Several sessions involve students only, and are led by the instructors.    Students write a 20-25 page seminar paper at the end of the year.  The course satisfies the Law School Substantial Writing Requirement.   There are approximately four meetings in each of the three quarters.  Students must therefore enroll for all three quarters. Autumn, Winter, Spring. M. Nussbaum, S. Conly.

PHIL 51506. Practical Reason.  (SCTH 50911).  This course will be devoted to recovering an understanding of practical reason that was developed over the course of a long tradition in practical philosophy, extending from Plato and Aristotle up through Kant. The primary text will be Kant’s Critique of practical Reason, but readings will also include selections from Kant’s other writings and from recent literature relating to practical reason. The main aim will be to understand the idea that reason has a practical application, which constitutes a capacity for a distinct type of knowledge, practical knowledge, whose object is the good. Topics that will need to be investigated include (on the epistemological side) reason and rational knowledge and the difference between theoretical and practical knowledge, and (on the psychological side) perception and desire, and feeling and action. Some prior familiarity with Kant’s ethics (and Aristotle’s ethics) will be helpful, but is not required. S. Engstrom.

PHIL 51512. Deliberation. Deliberation is practical reasoning, as opposed to practical reason—all intentional actions manifest practical reason, but only some require deliberation.  What is deliberation? Here are the basics: deliberation is a kind of thinking.  It takes time.   Unlike daydreaming, riddle-solving or theoretical contemplation, it is never done for its own sake.  It seeks an answer to the question, “What should I do?,” in circumstances in which the answer to that question is not immediately obvious. We will be interested both in the question of how we decide between available options (‘weighing reasons’) and how we generate for ourselves those very options.  Some Topics:
--The connection between deliberation and morality
--How dispositions to respond to reasons (character) contribute to deliberation
--How we know when we should deliberate  and when we have deliberated enough
--Whether there is anything (the good?  morality? virtue?) in the light of which we always deliberate
--The concept of a deliberative ‘frame’ as a way of marking off the subset of reasons that a particular act of deliberation concerns itself with
--How deliberation handles incommensurable values
--The principle of instrumental reason as a (the?) rule of deliberation
(I) A. Callard

PHIL 51830. Topics in Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy.  (=LAWS 78603) PQ: Ph.D. students may register without instructor consent. All others by instructor permission only. The topic for Winter 2014 will be "Ideology."  What makes moral, political, economic, or legal ideas "ideological," in the pejorative sense associated with the Marxian tradition?  How do facts about the genesis of an ideology bear on its epistemic warrant?  What is the relationship between ideology and "false consciousness"?  How can an individual be mistaken about his interests?  What concept of interests is needed for the theory of ideology and false consciousness?  We will use some aspects of contemporary economics as a case study for the theory of ideology.  Readings from some or all of Hegel, Marx, Horkheimer, Adorno, J. Elster, R. Geuss, M. Rosen, G. Becker. M. Forster, B. Leiter.

PHIL 51832. Interpretation:  Legal, Literary and Philosophical Aspects.   (=SCTH 50912). “Interpretation” is called for in a wide variety of everyday and specialized domains.  Part of what attracts philosophical attention to the concept of “interpretation” are two implications which deployments of it usually seem to carry:  first, that there is a clarifying response to a meaning that is already there (i.e., “interpretation” is not pure invention); second, that, nonetheless, some creativity or innovation may be involved (i.e., “that’s one interpretation”).  How can both of these things be true?  How can the clarification or preservation of a meaning that is already there also involve innovation?  This puzzle is related to others which tend to inform contemporary debates about “interpretation”:  Is there such a thing as an objectively correct interpretation?  Can there really be a plurality of conflicting (but equally good) interpretations?  Is every take on the meaning of a text an interpretation of it, or are some meanings available without interpretation?  A further question concerns the unity of interpretation:  Does “interpretation” describe a distinctive form of understanding and explanation which, as some have claimed, picks out and structures the domain we call the “humanities”?  Or is “interpretation” rather a loose collection of different techniques for elucidation, which vary according to the type of thing being interpreted?  Taking up these questions, we will examine the concept of interpretation as it functions in a few different domains – e.g., law, literature, self-understanding – before turning to the broader question of the unity of interpretation across the humanities.  Readings will be from Wittgenstein, Kripke, Derrida, Gadamer, Iser, Sartre, Walter Benn Michaels, Charles Taylor, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Atonin Scalia, Alexander Nehamas, Stanley Cavell, Richard Moran, among others. M. Stone.               

PHIL 53300. Philosophy of Language Seminar: Quotations, Pictures, Words. (=LING 53300, DVPR 53302) This seminar will examine one of the primary devices by means of which we talk about language ad mental content. Topics will include the varieties of quotation: direct, indirect, mixed, pure, and non-literal (scare-quotes); various current theories of direct and indirect quotation; the relation between quotation and meaning; context-sensitivity and quotation; and the pictorial character of quotation. More generally, the seminar will investigate quotation as a phenomenon on the border between semantics and pragmatics and between linguistic and non-linguistic modes of representation. Readings will be drawn from authors such as Frege, Quine, Tarski, Davidson, Bennett, Cappelen and Lepore, H. Clark, Recanti, Garcia-Carpintero, Geurts, C. Potts, Kaplan, T. Parsons, Predelli, BUrge Peacocke, Brandom, Reimer, Richard, Saka, Sperber and Wilson, and Washington. (II) J. Stern.

PHIL 53420. The Concept of Revelation Between Philosophy and Theology. (=DVPR 55400) The main issues raised by the notion of "Revelation" are quite well-known. First, understood as the "deposit of faith", it has appeared somehow lately in the history of Christian theology; then, it has imposed itself mostly within a highly questionable dichotomy between revealed truths and truths conveyed by reason or nature, a distinction implying by the way the autonomy and primacy of philosophy; last, in its modern interpretation as propositional Revelation missed the hermeneutical and historical dimensions of biblical reports. – What revised concept of "Revelation" could be proposed? – Theologically, one should pay close attention to the fact that, in the New Testament  (no matter whether in the Synoptics, Paul or John), apocalypsis refers first and mostly to the dis-covery un-covering the coming Kingdom of God, the musterion tou theou and the final salvation of the believers: therefore that it implies an eschatological event, both coming and yet to come, future oriented much more than a past and everlasting input of information. – Philosophically then, one may focus more on phenomena understood as events, rather than as objects, in order to build a renewed and consistent concept of a phenomenon of revelation in general. J. Marion.

PHIL 55510. Knowing How. In “Knowing How and Knowing That” (1945) and The Concept of Mind (1951), Gilbert Ryle famously argued for a sharp distinction between practical and propositional knowledge. This distinction was settled philosophical orthodoxy for several decades, but has more recently come under attack, beginning with J. Stanley and T. Williamson’s “Knowing How” (2001). Responses to their arguments have spawned a rich literature, from such authors as S. Schiffer, A. Noe, P. Snowdon, A.W. Moore, I. Rumfitt, K. Setiya, J. Hornsby, and many others, leading up to Stanley’s recent book Know How (2011). This course will delve into this literature, beginning with a careful reading of Ryle, briefly considering early responses to his arguments, and then turning to a discussion of Stanley and Williamson, their allies, and their critics. (III) M. Kremer.

PHIL 56802. Spinozistic Metaphysics. This seminar will focus on Spinoza’s and subsequent Spinozistic metaphysics, and in particular on substance monism. We will examine the arguments that lead to such a position, its implications, as well as objections and alternatives to it. (V) A. Schechtman.

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