Winter 2012 Courses

Listed below are the courses the Department plans to offer in the Winter 2011 quarter. This course list may change.

The Registrar's office has up to date scheduling information for all University of Chicago graduate and undergraduate courses.

Note: College students may only enroll in courses whose first number is 2 without prior permission from the instructor. A College student who has secured prior permission to sign up for a course from the instructor may, in that case and only in that case, enroll in a course whose first number is larger than 2.

Graduate students may only enroll in courses whose first number is 3 or higher.

Note: Letters A and B refer to undergraduate field designations; Roman numerals I-V refer to graduate field designations.

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If you click on the image or link below, you will find an enlargeable image of a chart which perspicuously represents the weekly meeting times of our Winter 2012 Courses. Once the chart has opened in a new window, you can enlarge the image to whatever size you like in order to make it easier to read.

Winter Courses at-a-glance - PDF

Open to Undergraduates:

21300. Torture and Contemporary Moral Thought. Recent history has unfortunately made questions of the nature and permissibility of torture a pressing concern for both moral philosophers, and the wider intellectual community. We will first engage with some reports from torture victims, and look briefly at contemporary torture practices, and how torture is defined in international law. Then we will turn to study a large part of the recent academic literature about torture. This literature is authored both by moral philosophers and by academics in other fields, such as political theory, history and law. However, our focus, or “take” on the readings, will be specifically moral-philosophical.
The course has two central aims. Firstly, to bring analytical precision and rigour to the concept of torture itself: sharpening our understanding of torture as distinctive kind of act, or practice – i.e. getting clearer on what torture is; and pinning down the unique form of violation or harm that torture constitutes – i.e. understanding how, why and to what extent, torture is a form of harm, violation or wrongdoing. Secondly, we will use the literature on this topic as a lens through which to see clearly the influence of some important moral theories – their assumptions, methods and approaches – on contemporary thinking about torture, both within moral philosophy and in the wider intellectual sphere. This will be achieved through close critical analysis of some characteristic lines of response to perhaps the most pressing question about torture that we have faced in recent years: Is interrogational torture ever morally permissible? I hope that the course will allows students to clarify and refine their own understanding of, and perspective on, torture in the world today, and to gain a sense of the lay of the land in contemporary moral philosophy, so that they can locate their perspective within the discipline. D. Holiday.

25702. The Sophist. (=SCTH 25700; FNDL 22703)  In this dialogue Plato seeks to catch the Sophist in a conceptual net.  The Sophist is, of course, a master con, and the hunt turns out to be a daring adventure in dialectic in which the most fundmental logical/metaphysical distinctions are introduced and discussed. We shall read the dialogue carefully and study the major contemporary interpretations of it by Michael Frede, Edward N. Lee, Lesley Brown, John McDowell, and others. I. Kimhi.

26000. History of Philosophy II: Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. (=HIPS 26000) PQ: Completion of the general education requirement in humanities required; PHIL 25000 recommended. A survey of the thought of some of the most important figures of this period, including Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. B. Callard.

29700. Reading Course: Philosophy.  Consent of Instructor & Director of Undergraduate Studies.  Students are required to submit the college reading & research course form.  Staff. 

29901.  Senior Seminar I. PQ: Consent of director of undergraduate studies. Required of fourth-year students who are writing a senior essay. Students writing senior essays register once for Phil 29901, in either the Autumn or Winter quarter, and once for Phil 29902,  in either the Winter or Spring quarter.  (Students may not register for both PHIL 29901 and 29902 in the same quarter.) The senior seminar will in fact meet in all three quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout.  J. Bridges, B. Callard. staff. Autumn, Winter.

29902.  Senior Seminar II. PQ: Consent of director of undergraduate studies. Required of fourth-year students who are writing a senior essay. Students writing senior essays register once for Phil 29901, in either the Autumn or Winter quarter, and once for Phil 29902,  in either the Winter or Spring quarter.  (Students may not register for both PHIL 29901 and 29902 in the same quarter.) The senior seminar will in fact meet in all three quarters, and students writing essays are required to attend throughout.  J. Bridges, B. Callard, staff. Winter, Spring.

29200/29300 - 01. Junior/Senior Tutorial. Topic: Passionately Minded: Emotion, Objectivity and Rationality. No more than two tutorials may be used to meet program requirements. Topics for this small, discussion-oriented seminar vary. In the philosophical literature on emotions, one often finds the following two apparently attractive ideas:

  1. Emotions are are about the world: they present the world to be a certain way. They exhibit what philosophers call intentionality.
  2. Emotions are resistant to reasons: they don't necessarily—or even reliably—track our best judgments about how the world actually is. Emotions have a unique capacity for standing in the way of an appreciation of the facts, distort our judgments and give rise to illusions.

Although there is no obvious tension between these ideas, philosophers who take the first idea as their starting-point have tended to formulate optimistic theories of the relationship between objectivity and emotion, and ended up downplaying or denying the second idea. So-called cognitive theories of the emotions all  exhibit some degree of such optimism; the most extreme form of which is the idea that emotions constitute a genuine and indispensable source of knowledge of the world. By contrast, philosophers impressed by the second thought have often taken it as an occasion for pessimism about the role of emotions in our access to objective reality. In its most pure case, such pessimism takes the form of the claim that emotions don't even purport to present an objective world. This latter claim, so-called non-cognitivism, thus denies or explains away the first idea.
In this course we'll examine the arguments (both classical and contemporary) for cognitivism and non-cognitivism, with the aim of clarifying the terms of the debate and hopefully make steps towards developing a position which holds on to the insights in both ideas. S. Bäckström.

29200/29300 - 02. Junior/Senior Tutorial. Topic: I and Thou: Ethics and the Intrinsically Relational. No more than two tutorials may be used to meet program requirements. Topics for this small, discussion-oriented seminar vary.
The concept of the second person has recently been of increasing interest in a number of fields of philosophy.  This course is in moral philosophy; our approach to the concept of the second person will be guided by the question of what understanding of interpersonal relations can most robustly support all the direct moral relations we bear to others.  The inadequacy of accounts that explicitly or, more frequently, implicitly treat our relations to others as little different from third-personal relations, differing only in the obtaining of a few additional conditions will be a theme for us.  In contrast, we will try to understand second person relations as quite distinctive, having a unique form, one more instructively comparable with first-person thought than commonly recognized, and will be exploring the value of properly recognizing and emphasizing the latter to moral philosophy. S. Shortt.

29200/29300 -03. Junior/Senior Tutorial. Topic: Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysics of Causality. No more than two tutorials may be used to meet program requirements. Topics for this small, discussion-oriented seminar vary. This course is an introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, one of the most important texts in the history of philosophy.  Kant observed that his philosophical predecessors’ attempts to establish necessary, metaphysical truths about the nature of things (and particularly, the world, the soul, and God) led to intractable disputes, the likes of which did not arise in other sciences such as mathematics or physics, where disagreements were short-lived and progress was demonstrable.  To his mind, this embarrassing state of affairs in philosophy called for a critical assessment of our (human) cognitive capacities.  He therefore undertook to analyze our (human) capacities to acquire (or generate) knowledge, in order to determine whether and how finite creatures like us could come to know contentful, necessary truths about the nature of things.  The fruits of this critical project include theories concerning human perception, space and time, mathematics, causation, theology, human knowledge, philosophical methodology, and much else besides.  This course will focus on Kant’s views concerning causation – in particular, his defense of the claim that every event has a cause.  Indeed, it was Hume’s skeptical attack on this causal principle which Kant famously claimed “awakened me from my dogmatic slumbers”.  By tracing how various of Kant’s doctrines converge in support of this causal principle, we will endeavor to develop a nuanced understanding of his theories of intuition and judgment, as well as a general overview of his critical system as a whole. D. Smyth.

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Open to Graduates and Undergraduates:

20118/30118. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (=GRMN 20118/30118) This course will have four foci: 1) a close reading of the Tractatus and related writings by Wittgenstein, 2) a review of the history of the reception of the Tractatus in both Austro-German and Anglo-American philosophy, 3) an overview of the most recent debates in the secondary literature on the Tractatus, and 4) an assessment of how best to interpret the overall aims, methods, and doctrines of the Tractatus. Some attention will also be given to the following topics: Wittgenstein's early criticisms of the views of Frege and Russell, the relation between Wittgenstein's pre-Tractatus writings and the Tractatus itself, and the relation between Wittgenstein's early and later thought. Readings will include texts by Frege, Russell, Ramsey, Carnap, Anscombe, Geach, McGuiness, Hacker, Goldfarb, Ricketts, Diamond, Kremer, Sullivan, White, and Floyd. (III) J. Conant.

21210/31210. Philosophy and Literature. This course is a reading of works by a variety of contemporary authors who deal with the question of whether, and how, fiction and philosophy are related to one another. (A) T. Cohen.

21580/31580. Libertarianism. Is capitalism justified on the grounds of natural liberty? Is the legitimate exercise of political power limited by our pre-political rights, especially our property rights? Indeed, is the sole function of a just government to safeguard such rights? We will work towards answers to these questions by evaluating the tradition in political philosophy that has tended to answer them in the affirmative—Libertarianism. We will begin with John Locke, the father of this tradition, devoting several weeks to a close reading of his Second Treatise of Government. We will attend to both his method and his substantive political conclusions. We will consider his distinctive use of a social contract thought experiment involving a moralized conception of practical reason, as well as his defense of private property and limited government. We will then consider the works of contemporary Libertarians such as Robert Nozick and Michael Otsuka who take inspiration from Locke’s method but diverge sharply from one another in their political conclusions. Finally, we will consider contemporary critics of the entire tradition, such as G.A. Cohen, and consider the merits of alternative approaches within the social contract tradition. (A) (I) B. Laurence.

22215/32215. Cicero's De Finibus and Hellenistic Ethics(=CLCV 25807/35807, LAWS 54201, RETH 34200) Cicero's dialogue De Finibus (On Ends) is his attempt to sort out the major arguments for and against the ethical theories characteristic of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and the "New Academy."  It thus provides us with some of our best information about the views of these schools, as well as with critical arguments of great interest.   We will read extracts from the dialogue in Latin, focusing on Epicureanism (Books I and II) and Stoicism (Books III and IV), and we will study the entire work in translation, along with relevant primary sources for the views of the schools (the surviving letters of Epicurus, central texts of Greek and Roman Stoicism).  The course will thus aim to provide a solid introduction to the major ethical theories of the Hellenistic period. 

The course is open to all who have had five quarters of Latin, or equivalent preparation.  Translation will always take place during the first hour, and students without Latin are invited to take the course for an R or audit, arriving after that time and doing all the readings in translation.  In some cases Independent Study numbers may be arranged for students who want to do some of the course requirements (paper and exam essays) without Latin. (IV) M. Nussbaum. 

22705/32705. Central Problems in the Philosophy of Biology. (=HIST 25010/35010; HIPS 22711, CHSS 35010) The course will address central issues in philosophy of biology. We will begin by discussing the nature of evolutionary theory, focusing on issues of adaptation, selection vs. drift, units of selection and the concept of species. We shall then look into some central ideas in the philosophy of science -- such as reduction and laws -- and examine their application in biology. Last, we will discuss causal concepts such as mechanism, function and teleology. The format of the course will be short lectures followed by presentations by students and discussion. (B) C. Bloch.

22950/32950. Foundationalism and its Critics: Epistemic Foundationalism is the view that all of our knowledge rests ultimately on a foundation of non-inferentially justified belief (thus, for example, in the context of Cartesian epistemology, certain judgments can be justified directly on the grounds of the “clarity and distinctness” of their contents). In this course, we will examine the various arguments that have been offered against epistemic foundationalism, and we will consider some of the most well-known attempts to articulate an anti-foundationalist conception of epistemology. Readings for the course will include writings by Peirce, James, Sellars, Davidson, Quine and Putnam among others. (B) (III) A. Vasudevan.

24010/34010. Meaning and Reference. In this course we address one of the central and most fascinating philosophical questions about linguistic meaning: what is the relationship between meaning and reference? We will study a range of classical and contemporary theories about the semantics of referring expressions such as proper names, definite descriptions, and indexicals. Readings will include Frege, Russell, Strawson, Kripke, Donnellan, and Kaplan, among others. Throughout, we will try to reach of a better understanding of how questions about meaning and reference connect with a range of topics that are central to philosophical theorizing, including the connection between propositional attitudes and the explanation of action, the role of the principle of compositionality in formal semantics, the question of whether there is a level of mental experience that is epistemically transparent, the relation between thought and language, the nature of fictional and non-existent objects, and the interaction between semantics and pragmatics. (B) (II) M. Willer.

24130/34130. Anscombe on Action and Ethics. PQ: At least 1 prior course in philosophy. G. E. M. Anscombe’s 1957 book, Intention, inaugurated the field of inquiry known as the philosophy of action. Though human action had always been an important philosophical topic, it had usually been discussed in a specifically ethical context, where questions of right and wrong were of primary importance. Anscombe sought a provisional isolation of the topic of action, on the grounds that modern ethics was confused about some of its fundamental concepts. In her influential essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Anscombe went so far as to say that it was no longer profitable to do ethics, and that it would not become so again until one regained some clarity about “what type of characteristic a virtue is… and how it is related to the actions in which it is instanced,” an account of which in turn presupposed an account of “what a human action is at all, and how its description as ‘doing such-and-such’ is affected by its motive and by the intention or intentions in it.” Nevertheless, over the course of her career, Anscombe wrote copiously on recognizably ethical topics—e.g., on war; on murder; on the authority of the state; on the nature of a promise; and on the doctrine of double effect. In this course, we will consider Anscombe’s theory of action alongside her ethical writings, each in part for its own sake, but guided by the question how the philosophy of action is related to ethics. (A) (I) A. Ford.

24920/34920. Varieties of Historicism: Gadamer and Rorty. (=GRMN 24920/34920) Espousing the idea that our standards and criteria for understanding and evaluation are historical in nature, hermeneuticists and pragmatists have had to contend with accusations of relativism and even nihilism. This course explores central works of Gadamer and Rorty in light of examples of this kind of criticism.  However, while there is significant common ground between Gadamer and Rorty, they have different resources available to them, and their response to this critical challenge is not the same. We will explore and critically evaluate the similarities and the differences in their respective responses to such criticisms. B. Ramberg.

29400/39600. Intermediate Logic. (=CHSS 33600; HIPS 20500) This is a course in the science of logic. It presupposes a knowledge of the use of truth-functions and quantifiers as tools: such as the art of logic. Our principal task in this course is to study these tools in a systematic way. We cover the central theorems about first-order logic with identity: completeness, compactness, and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems. We introduce any necessary set-theoretic and mathematical apparatus as required. We also study the topic of definition in more detail than is customary in such courses, culminating with a proof of Beth's theorem on implicit and explicit definitions. (B) (II) M. Kremer.

29410/39410. Logical consequence. PQ: Elementary Logic or equivalent. This course will discuss philosophical issues connected with the notion of logical consequence. We will begin with the accounts of logical consequence given by Bolzano (1837) and Tarski (1936). According to Tarski, A is a logical consequence of B if there is no interpretation of the non-logical expressions in A and B such that the latter is true and the former is false. We will look at Etchemendy’s (1990) criticism of Tarski’s account, and at some replies to this criticism. We will also consider proof-theoretic accounts of logical consequence, such as the one put forward by Dag Prawitz. (B) (II) M. Malink.

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Open to Graduate Students:

47212. Cavell on Literature (=GRMN 47212, CMLT 47200, SCTH 47212).  This course is a successor course to the seminar on Cavell's The Claim of Reason offered in Fall Quarter 2011. Students may participate in this seminar, however, without having taken the Fall seminar. The aim of this seminar is to delineate and assess Cavell's contributions to literary studies. In particular, we shall consider: 1) Cavell's theory of interpretation and criticism (mainly in terms of the essays in Must We Mean What We Say); 2) his theory of genre (Pursuits of Happiness; Contesting Tears); his theory of tragedy (essay on King Lear in Must We Mean What We Say) and, more generally, his reading of Shakespeare (Disowning Knowledge); his interpretation of Romanticism, especially of Emerson and Thoreau.(I) J. Conant, D. Wellbery.

49900. Reading and Research. Staff.

50100. First-Year Seminar. PQ: Limited to first-year students in the Philosophy PhD program. Over the course of the next two quarters, we will read, write, talk, and think about important work in 20th Century and recent Anglophone practical philosophy, focusing in a region of ethics called "moral theory."  Following John Rawls, most contemporary ethicists take it that Henry Sidgwick was the first great modern Anglophone moral theorist.  Moral theory is concerned with the justification of morality.  Morality is generally taken to be that region of ethics that concerns our obligations to others.  Justifying it is generally taken to require showing how it is rational to do what morality demands when it normally is more pleasant or profitable to do something else instead—in more traditional terms, it concerns looking at situations in which acting well appears to come apart from faring well.  There is a real question about siding with acting well when it looks to come apart from faring well because reason is supposed to help us to fare well.

The dominant approaches in moral theory these days are: neo-Kantianism, which argues, in various ways, that requirements of morality are requirements of reason, neo-Humeanism, which argues, in various ways, that morality and reason achieve rapprochement through the workings of custom, conscience, and sympathy (or some other suitably agreeable feeling); and neo-Aristotelianism, which argues that the proper operation of reason lines up with virtue, and that human nature makes this so.

This map of the contemporary landscape does not coincide perfectly with how things went in the first half of the last century, when the two dominant approaches were utilitarianism (nowadays treated as a variety of neo-Humeanism) and intuitionism (which nowadays might crop up as an element in neo-Humeanism or neo-Aristotelianism).  We will start early and work our way up toward work that has been significantly influential for faculty and students at Chicago. Autumn, Winter. C. Vogler.

50601. Hegel's Science of Logic. (=SCTH 50601). PQ: Prior work in Kant's theoretical philosophy is a prerequisite. Hegel's chief theoretical work is called The Science of Logic. An abridged version is the first part of the various versions of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.We shall read and discuss representative passages from both versions, and attempt to understand Hegel's theory of concepts, judgment, and inference, and the place or role of such an account in his overall philosophical position. Several contemporary interpretations of these issues will also be considered. (V) R. Pippin.

51610. Hermeneutics and Translation-Theory. The general aim of this course is to consider the question of variations in conceptual schemes and the resulting challenges faced in interpretation and translation, together with the implications for such diverse areas as epistemology, the methodology of the human sciences and intercultural relations. To this end, parts of the course will be devoted to considering Homer's conceptual scheme; the hermeneutical theories of Herder, Schleiermacher, and Dilthey; and some recent philosophical work bearing on the topic, such as that of Donald Davidson. (On the other hand, Heidegger and Gadamer will not play a significant role in this course.) M. Forster.

51112. Thinking and Being: Part I. (=SCTH 55601) This course is the first course in a two-course sequence of graduate seminars to be offered by the instructor. Students may take either the first half or the second half of the two-course sequence for credit or both. Students who wish to take only the second course for credit next quarter must at least audit this course. This course will involve a close examination of the merits and weaknesses of the philosophical arguments and conceptions discussed in the first half of the instructor’s unpublished book manuscript Thinking and Being.  While keeping an eye on the development of post-Fregean conceptions of logic, the first part of this two-part seminar will primarily be concerned to distinguish and trace four different possible philosophical positions regarding the relation between the psychical and the logical as they unfold over the course of the history of philosophical thought about the nature of logic: psychologism, logopsychism, psycho/logical dualism, and psycho/logical monism. There will be accompanying readings drawn from a variety of pertinent primary texts in the history of philosophy, including Plato’s Sophist, portions of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and De Interpretatione, and selections from Maimonides, Descartes, and Spinoza. We will pay close attention to Plato’s conception of the relation between judgment and truth and his doctrine of non-being. We will read some of the leading secondary literature on Plato’s Sophist, including articles by Peter Geach, Edward N. Lee, John McDowell, G. E. L. Owen, and David Wiggins.  We will be especially concerned with Aristotle’s understanding of the principle of non-contradiction, his distinction between being in activity (being in energeia) and being in capacity (being in dunamis), his conception of a two-way capacity, and his treatment of contradictory pairs. We will read some of the leading secondary literature on these topics in Aristotle, including commentary by Jonathan Beere, Aryeh Kosman, Walter Leszl, Jan Lukasiewicz, Stephen Makin, and C. W. A. Whitaker. Some texts from Frege will also be assigned in order to situate the topics to be discussed during this quarter in the broader context of an inquiry into the differences between pre- and post-Fregean conceptions of logic. I. Kimhi.

51902. Science and Aesthetics in the 18th-21st Centuries II. (=HIST 77302, CHSS 59701)  One can distinguish four ways in which science and aesthetics are related during the last two centuries.  First, science has been the subject of artistic effort, in painting and photography, in poetry and novels (e.g., in Goethe’s poetry or in H. G. Wells’ Island of Dr. Moreau).  Second, science has been used to explain aesthetic effects (e.g., Helmholtz’s work on the way painters achieve visual effects or musicians achieve tonal effects).  Third, aesthetic means have been used to convey scientific conceptions (e.g., through illustrations in scientific volumes or through aesthetically affective and effective writing).  Finally philosophers have stepped back to consider the relationship between scientific knowing and aesthetic comprehension (e.g., Kant, Bas von Fraassen).  In this two-quarter seminar, we will consider these four modes of relationship.  The first part of the first quarter will be devoted to Kant, reading carefully his 3rd Critique; then we will turn to Goethe and Helmholtz, both feeling the impact of Kant, and to Wells, a student of T. H. Huxley.  The second quarter will run for six weeks; in that quarter we will consider more contemporary modes expressive of the relationship, especially the role of illustrations in science and the work of contemporary philosophers like von Fraassen.   The final four weeks will be for students to write a significant paper dealing with some aspect of the relationship.  Students will make a formal presentation of their papers at the end of the second quarter.  (II) R. Richards.

51200. Law-Philosophy Workshop. (=LAWS 61512, RETH 51301, GNDR 50101, HMRT 51301) This is a seminar/workshop most of whose participants are faculty from various area institutions.  It admits approximately ten students by permission of the instructors.  Its aim is to study, each year, a topic that arises in both philosophy and the law and to ask how bringing the two fields together may yield mutual illumination.  There are twelve meetings throughout the year, always on Mondays from 4 to 6 PM.  Half of the sessions are led by local faculty, half by visiting speakers.   The leader assigns readings for the session (which may be by that person, by other contemporaries, or by major historical figures), and the session consists of a brief introduction by the leader, followed by structured questioning by the two faculty coordinators, followed by general discussion.   Students write a 20-25 page seminar paper at the end of the year.  The course satisfies the Law School Writing Requirement.  The schedule of meetings will be announced by mid-September, and prospective students should submit their credentials to both instructors by September 20.  Past themes have included: practical reason; equality; privacy; autonomy; global justice; pluralism and toleration; war; sexuality and family.

Students are admitted by permission of the instructors.  They should submit a c.v. and a statement (reasons for interest in the course, relevant background in law and/or philosophy) by September 20 to the instructors by e mail.  Usual participants include graduate students in philosophy, political science, and divinity, and law students. M. Nussbaum, R. Long.

51405. Equality and (a bit of) Fraternity. Given the current direction of the United States, it seems time to examine two concepts that have fallen out of fashion:  equality and fraternity.  Most of the seminar will focus on the first concept, but the final weeks will be devoted to the second.  With regard to equality, we will ask such questions as, Is equality a good?  What is the proper metric of equality?  What, if anything, is wrong with profiting unequally from unequal abilities?  Writers to be read will include (but will not be limited to) Bernard Williams, Amartya Sen, Elizabeth Anderson, Derek Parfit, G.A. Cohen and Robert Nozick.  As for fraternity, this last member of the revolutionary triumvirate has rarely been studied.  We will attempt to delineate its relation to such concepts as community and solidarity, and we will ask whether, in a large modern state, fraternity is among the proper aims of institutional arrangements. (I) D. Brudney.

51410. Self-Conscious and the Psychoanalytical Unconscious.(= SCTH 50910) Open to Ph.D. students in Philosophy and Social Thought. Otherwise by permission of instructors. It is arguable (and Rödl argues in Self-Consciousness) that self-consciousness is the form of rational life and as such the form of human life. However, it is a traditional idea (an ancient idea) that the human soul has parts, and that alongside reason its parts are thumos and epithumia, the strive for honor and recognition, and sensory desire. This division of the human soul is revealed in the fact that, for men, self-knowledge is difficult (perhaps impossible), for it requires, or, rather, is the actuality of, the unity of the human soul.
We want to think about reason, thumos and epithumia as parts of the soul (we are not implying that these are parts in the same way) and about the frailty and difficulty that attends self-knowledge as an achievement in human life insofar as the human soul has these parts. We shall read selections from Plato and Aristotle, Freud, Lear and Rödl. J. Lear, M. Boyle (Social Thought).

51830. Topics in Moral, Political & Legal Philosophy (=LAWS 78603) The topic will be an examination of philosophical and empirical issues raised by Nietzsche’s moral psychology, including his account of the will, motivation, the sources of moral judgment, and related topics.   We will look at both at selections from Nietzsche’s texts, as well as pertinent secondary literature on Nietzsche, and recent work in philosophy and psychology. M. Forster, B. Leiter (Law).

53340. Conditionals. Conditionals play a prominent role in everyday reasoning as well as in many proposed analyses of key philosophical concepts such as knowledge, causation, freedom, and dispositional features. The best logic and semantic treatment of the English language conditional, or of a philosophically regimented conditional well-suited to these analytic tasks, is a subject of ongoing dispute. We will begin by studying the possible-world semantics for subjunctive conditionals developed by Stalnaker and Lewis, and from there consider more recent innovations and alternatives to the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics, such as probabilistic conditionals, dynamic conditionals, and restrictor-clause conditionals. Throughout, we will try to arrive at a better understanding of the formal criteria that any successful theory of conditionals must fulfill, and relate these criteria to the prominent role of conditionals in a number of notorious paradoxes about everyday reasoning, including those arising from deliberations about conditional obligations. (II) M. Willer.

55390. Plato on Technê: (=SCTH 55390; CLAS 48511). We’ll read various dialogues in whole or in part to understand what sort of capacity counts as a genuine craft for Plato and how (if it does) his view of craft changes over the dialogues; some topics: the relation between craft and practical wisdom/virtue; the distinction between theoretical and applied sciences; the repeated suggestion that sophists, orators, and poets “pretend” to be craftsmen. (IV) G. Lear.

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51200. Law Philosophy Workshop. Martha Nussbaum (Law & Philosophy), Ryan Long (Law & Philosophy)
53900. Wittgenstein Workshop. James Conant (Philosophy), Michael Kremer (Philosophy)
58609. Contemporary European Philosophy Workshop.  Arnold Davidson (Philosophy, Divinity, & Comp. Lit.), and Ryan Coyne (Divinity)
59100. German Philosophy Workshop. James Conant (Philosophy), Robert Pippin (Social Thought & Philosophy)
59200. Literature and Philosophy Workshop. (=SCTH 59200).Robert Pippin (Social Thought & Philosophy), David Wellbery (German & Social Thoght)
59220. Semantics and Philosophy of Language Workshop. (=LING 59220) Malte Willer (Philosophy), Chris Kennedy (Linguistics) and Anastasia Giannakidou (Linguistics)
59900. Contemporary Philosophy Workshop. Ben Laurence (Philosophy), David Finkelstein (Philosophy)
59909. Practical Philosophy Workshop. Dan Brudney (Philosophy), Anton Ford (Philosophy)
59910. Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy Workshop. Gabriel Lear (Philosophy), Elizabeth Asmis (Classics)
59920. Formal Philosophy Workshop. Kevin Davey (Philosophy), Bill Tait (Philosophy)